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

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

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THE EMPIRE AT WAR

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Patron of the Royal Colonial Institute

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THE EMPIRE AT WAR

EDITED FOR THE

ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE

BY

SIR CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

VOLUME I

BY

THE EDITOR



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PREFACE

In the early part of 1916 the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute decided to take in hand a work to be entitled 'The Empire at War', and in the autumn of that year an agreement was made with the Oxford University Press for its publication.

The design of the work was and is to trace the growth of Imperial co-operation in war time prior to the late War, to give side by side a complete record of the effort made in the late War by every unit of the Overseas Empire from the greatest to the smallest, and also to tell in what particular ways and to what extent the fortunes and the development of each part were affected by the War.

The scheme was warmly approved by the late Lord Grey, then President of the Institute, and, with his support, it was recommended to and secured the sympathetic interest of the Government Offices more especially concerned, of the Dominion Governments and their representatives, and of the Governors and Governments of the Colonies. In particular there is special reason to be grateful to the Colonial Office, at whose instance the fullest material has been forthcoming from the Colonies and Protectorates, endless trouble having been taken by the Governors and those to whom they entrusted the task of preparing narratives for the purpose of the book. The Chartered Companies and many other agencies and individuals have most cordially collaborated, and names will be given and due acknowledgment made as the different volumes appear. Here it is only possible to record in general terms the help which has been given, while at the same time emphasizing that the work is not,

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and never was intended to be, in any sense an official publication. For the statements made and the views expressed I am, as General Editor, responsible.

The original scheme, as formulated in 1916, included six volumes: (i) a preliminary volume—the present volume—down to the 4th of August 1914; (ii) a Short History of the Great War; (iii) an American volume devoted to Canada, Newfoundland, West Indies, Bermuda, and Falkland Islands; (iv) an Australasian volume, including Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands; (v) an African volume, excluding Egypt; (vi) an Eastern and Mediterranean volume, including Egypt, India, the Far Eastern Colonies and Protectorates, and the Mediterranean Colonies. But in 1916 it was not contemplated that the War would be so prolonged as it actually was, still less was it foreseen how great, after the War, would be the expense and difficulty of publication. The publishers, authors, and editor found themselves faced with a far greater mass of material than had been anticipated, and with a cost of production which was little short of prohibitive. Further, the illness of the author who had undertaken the second volume, and his much regretted death at a time approaching the date when the volume should have been completed, supplied an additional reason for reconsidering the scheme. Accordingly, in view of the many general sketches of the War which have appeared and are still appearing, it was decided to omit the second volume altogether, and very largely to add to the contents of the four remaining volumes, which will be of much greater bulk than had been originally intended. Retrenchment on maps and illustrations, which would otherwise have been inevitable, will be largely avoided by the generous help of the Rhodes Trustees, who have given a grant more especially for this particular purpose.

This much has been said in explanation at once of the general scheme of the work and of the long time during

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which it has been in hand. The amount of detail has been very great, but now the first volume is issued and the other four volumes are in an advanced stage of preparation.

There are many collaborators in the volumes which will appear hereafter. Of the present one I am the sole author, but I am indebted for help from many quarters.

Sir Francis Younghusband, who will be the author of the section on India in the fifth volume, has kindly read through the pages now published which refer to India. The proofs have been read and corrected by Mr. R. L. Atkinson, who is acting as Sub-Editor of the whole work, and Mr. C. T. Atkinson of Exeter College, Oxford, late officer in charge of the Military branch of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who will supervise the Military portions of all the volumes, has made valuable additions and corrections in the present case. Mr. W. George Maxwell, C.M.G., has supplied material relating to the Malay Peninsula for this volume, as for Volume V. Mr. Emery Walker has collected the illustrations and provided the blocks for this volume, and he will also be responsible for the illustrations for the remaining volumes. From Sir Harry Wilson, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., and the Staff of the Royal Colonial Institute, I have received the greatest assistance during the last five years; and, finally, I want to acknowledge the personal interest which Mr. Humphrey Milford has invariably taken in all questions which have arisen in connexion with the work.

C. P. LUCAS.

June 1921.

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Map of the British Empire in 1714, 1815, and 1914 *at end*

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SECTION I

THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF EMPIRE

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIES

THE theme of this book is the way in which, and the extent to which, the Overseas peoples of the British Empire have served the cause of the Empire in time of war, pre-eminently in the last and greatest of wars. Its object is to trace growing co-operation within the Empire at times when the Empire has been in peril from without; to tell how common effort and common sacrifice cemented unity; how distance, diversities of race, colour, land, and creed yielded to loyalty to one Crown and devotion to equal laws and world-wide liberty.

The empires of history, other than our own, have been the handiwork of war. To most men the word empire has in the past connoted conquest, subjection, and dependence. It is the glory of the British Empire that war has shaped its course, not by riveting an iron yoke upon unwilling subjects, but by creating sense of partnership, joint responsibility, and mutual confidence.

Great Britain first became Great Britain in James the First's reign, when the Crowns of England and Scotland were at length united under a sovereign, who took the title of King of Great Britain. At the same date Greater Britain began with the beginnings of permanent colonization beyond the Atlantic, and the first ventures in the East of the newly-formed East India Company. In the preceding reign, the memorable reign of Queen Elizabeth, England had fought through a mighty war. The danger of military domination at the hands of Spain had been dispelled by the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and English sea-captains had taught the lesson that the future of Britain lay on and across the ocean. For a hundred

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The seventeenth century.

years afterwards there was no similar war. British history through the seventeenth century, until that century was drawing to a close, may be summed up as a fight against arbitrary government at home; a duel with another maritime trading nation, the Dutch, for the upper hand on the sea and in sea-borne commerce; and a slow but steady widening of settlement in the West, of trade on the African coast and in India. The Empire was then in infancy, and its infancy was cradled in diversity and freedom. In the Mother Country the century was one of civil war and revolution. Beyond the seas colonies were refuges for political and religious martyrs and malcontents; trading factories were the domain of private merchants, who did the work of the Empire on their own initiative and at their own risk. Conspicuous for the absence of State control, for the presence of all that makes for democracy and self-government, was the childhood of the British Empire. From time to time, in spasmodic fashion, the Home Government made itself felt across the ocean. There was an interlude of strong firm policy while Cromwell lived and ruled. In one year and another, at this point or at that, English ships and sailors gave occasional assurance of protection to the outposts of the British race. But the Colonies were small and distant, they were divided from the homeland and from one another, and the homeland was divided against itself. In the old Dominion of Royalist Virginia, in Puritan New England, in the West Indian island of Barbados, where Cavaliers and Roundheads fought a miniature civil war, on the fringes of Newfoundland, where a handful of settlers held their own in the midst of a fishing preserve, on the Gambia River and on the Gold Coast, on the East and West sides of India, Englishmen took their own lines and went their own ways, under little or no obligation to the Mother Country for defence against foreign foes, carrying with them the traditional rights of English citizens, cherishing a general allegiance to the old home, but not greatly concerned with King or Parliament, so long as King and Parliament left them alone.

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OLIVER CROMWELL

From the painting by Robert Walker in the National Portrait Gallery

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West Indian levies for the expedition against Hispaniola in 1655.

Perhaps the earliest instance of Imperial co-operation was in 1655, when Cromwell sent out Venables and Penn from England to take Hispaniola from the Spaniards. 'On their arrival at Barbados', Long tells us in his *History of Jamaica*, 'they beat up for volunteers, and having raised there four thousand foot, and two small troops of sixty horse, sailed from thence the 31st of March 1655 for St. Kitts; where they found one thousand recruits, collected partly from thence and from Nevis, and the other adjacent islands.'[1] In its main purpose a miserable failure, the expedition none the less achieved the reduction of Jamaica, and thus the Colonies had a hand in the first territorial addition which was made to the Empire by force of arms. But it was not an encouraging essay in co-operation. The Barbadians, lately in arms against Parliament, and apprehensive of losing their white labour supply, had no love for the expedition, and the levies which were raised in the island were found sadly wanting on active service.

The first Empire War and the Peace of Utrecht.

When a Dutchman became King of England, and Louis XIV was King of France, there came one of the world-wide wars which have threatened the life of, and in the end given new life to, the Empire. The first years of the eighteenth century saw the military power of the Grand Monarch, with its menace to the liberties of Europe, shattered by Marlborough's campaigns; and the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 closed what may be classed as the first of our Empire wars. These were early days in the story of the Empire. Of the present self-governing

[1] *History of Jamaica*, 1774, vol. i, pp. 223–5. The standard histories of Barbados place the number from that island at 3,500. The number which came from St. Kitts, Montserrat, and Nevis was 1,200. Mr. Fortescue, in his *History of the British Army* (1899), vol. i, p. 261, says that the Barbadians did their utmost to obstruct the raising of levies, and seems to imply that all that was done in the island was that Venables 'organized a regiment of negroes and a naval brigade'. But see Professor Firth's Preface to the narrative of General Venables, edited for the Royal Historical Society (1900). He says (p. xxiv) that at Barbados between 3,000 and 4,000 men were raised, who filled up the complements of five regiments and constituted a sixth regiment, in addition to two troops of horse, 60 each. See also Dr. Rawson Gardiner's *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–60* (1901), vol. iii, pp. 354–6.

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Dominions, Australia and New Zealand had been sighted but were wholly unknown; the Cape was the scene of a Dutch trading station; Canada was a dependency of the French Crown and was known as New France. The Peace of Utrecht in 1713 gave to Great Britain in perpetuity the outskirts of the Dominion of Canada as it stands to-day, Acadia, which had already gained the alternative name of Nova Scotia—a sign that Scotsmen had begun to take a hand in Empire work—and Hudson Bay. Exclusive possession of Newfoundland, oldest of all the Overseas Dominions, was also assured by the treaty.

Distance was all-powerful before the forces of steam and electricity were brought into play; and the Colonies, young and immature, could only assist the Mother Country in Empire wars, by defending their own homes with their local volunteers and militia, or at most by making ventures into neighbouring lands and seas. The New Englanders 'did their bit', raiding and raided by Canadians on their own frontiers. They did more. In 1690, led by William Phipps, who had been a ship carpenter, they took the French settlement of Port Royal in the debatable land of Acadia, and in the same year sailed up the St. Lawrence to attack Quebec itself. The Quebec enterprise came to nothing, and Port Royal shortly afterwards reverted to the French; but twenty years later, in 1710, the latter place was again taken by a combined force of ships and men from England and from Boston,[1] and, under the name of Annapolis, one of the few place-names in the Overseas Empire which tell of Queen Anne's reign, passed, with the whole Nova Scotian peninsula, into permanent British keeping.

The expedition to Cartagena.

The eighteenth century grew older, and in 1739 England was at war with Spain. In this war Colonists co-operated with home forces at some appreciable distance from their own shores. An expedition was designed to take Carta-

[1] The only British troops employed seem to have been a battalion of marines, which included portions of the present 1st East Lancashires (30th Foot) and Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (32nd Foot), then serving as marines.

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gena, a fortified Spanish port in what is now the republic of Colombia; and for this expedition a contingent was raised in the North American Colonies. There were four battalions, numbering some 4,000 in all. Massachusetts provided 500; New York and Virginia a like number in either case. Among the Virginians was the eldest brother of George Washington, Lawrence Washington, and his intimacy with Admiral Vernon, who commanded the fleet, led to the name of Mount Vernon being given to the family estate. The Americans joined the home forces at Jamaica, and in the early months of 1741 Cartagena was attacked. There was initial success, but only to be followed by complete breakdown. Wentworth, who succeeded to the command of the troops, was not equal to the difficulties of the task; there was want of harmony between him and Vernon; and the climate did the rest. Of the five hundred men from Massachusetts it was said that only fifty saw their home again. Great as was the death-rate in the force as a whole, the Americans were reported to have suffered most.[1] They were, moreover, as might have been expected, a gathering of undisciplined men: for this reason, and also because many of them were Irish and suspected Papists, they were not trusted and were little used in the actual fighting. They in their turn can have formed no high estimate of leadership from home. It was a miserable story: to take a minor part in a disastrous and humiliating failure was not conducive to Colonial loyalty or to Imperial co-operation.

The capture of Louisbourg in 1745 by the New Englanders.

The war with Spain became absorbed in the war of the Austrian Succession, and France and England fought again, the formal declaration of war being in 1744. Soon

[1] In his *History of Jamaica*, published in 1774 (vol. ii, cap. xiii, pp. 307–8), Long writes: 'The North American recruits are, in general, unfit for the West India Service . . . for the North Americans are far less hardy than the Europeans, and, during the last and former war, died in numbers whenever they were removed to a distance from home. It is very difficult for them to inure themselves to a climate different from their own; nor do they bear transplanting into the Southern Colonies so well as the British, Irish, Germans, or Swiss.' The American contingent for Cartagena was raised by Governor Spottiswoode of Virginia.

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there was a very different tale to tell from that of the fiasco at Cartagena. Though the treaty of Utrecht had given Acadia to the British Empire, the cession did not include Cape Breton Island, which now forms part of the Province of Nova Scotia. The island remained in French possession, bearing the name of Île Royale; and on its shores, at Louisbourg, the French Government reared the strongest fortress on the whole Atlantic coast, spoken of as the Dunkirk of North America. War being declared, the New Englanders, typical English colonists, democratic in politics and religion, dour defenders of local liberties against kings and governors, but withal heart-whole in the cause of the Empire, girded up their loins for the fray, and determined, after some searchings of heart, to set their hands to a memorable enterprise, nothing less than the capture of Louisbourg. Their levies amounted to rather more than 4,000 men, of whom over 3,000 came from Massachusetts, then including Maine; and Maine provided their commander, William Pepperell, a colonel of Militia, a merchant in private life. Ships of war they needed to co-operate with them, and these the Mother Country supplied. There is in the north transept of Westminster Abbey a monument to Admiral Sir Peter Warren. At this time he was commodore of an English squadron in the West Indies, and, having received permission from home, he came to the call of the Colonists. In March 1745 the expedition left Boston, and on the last day of April a landing was made in the neighbourhood of Louisbourg. The fortress was very strong, alike in its natural position and by the handiwork of man. It stood on a promontory, girt by the sea on three sides out of four; on the fourth—the western side—protected by ditches, rampart, and marshy ground. The garrison included brave men enough; but they were hardly two thousand in all, of whom between one-fourth and one-third were Regular soldiers. They were an ill-assorted body, French, Swiss, and Colonial Militia; mutiny had lately broken out among them; and the chief command was wanting in resolution. On the British side there

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MONUMENT TO

SIR PETER WARREN

IN WESTMINSTER ABBEY

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were the elements of friction; but Pepperell was a man of tact and good temper, the land fighting devolved wholly on the Colonists, the men from home had charge of the sea, and land and sea forces worked in general harmony with each other. For forty-seven days Warren's ships, reinforced from home, blockaded the harbour, while on land Pepperell's men pressed the siege, conspicuous for courage and determination as for want of military training and expert skill. At the end of that time, in the middle of June, the garrison capitulated, and the fortress passed for the moment into the keeping of the New Englanders.

The relative importance of events does not change with the centuries; but, as the world grows older, the drama of men and nations is on a constantly greater scale. There cannot have been ten thousand men in all engaged on both sides at Louisbourg in the year 1745; yet the taking of the stronghold, at the time, under the conditions, with the limited resources of the place and of the day, still stands as perhaps the most brilliant single feat of arms ever achieved by British Colonists. For it was in the main the Colonists' work; theirs was the initiative, they bore the brunt of the fight. Without the command of the water, which the King's ships ensured, Louisbourg could not have been taken, but none the less the New Englanders were the protagonists. This was the view of a French resident in Louisbourg at the time, an eye-witness of the siege. 'The enterprise', he wrote, 'was less that of the nation or of the King, than of the inhabitants of New England alone.'[1] It was the view of the English King, George the Second, who, according to the common story, when the retrocession of Louisbourg was being considered, stated that it was not his to give away, that it belonged to the men of Boston.

The path of the British Empire has been strewn with lost opportunities—not wholly lost, if taken for admonition and guidance in these later and more spacious times.

The retrocession of Louisbourg by the peace of 1748.

[1] Louisbourg in 1745: the anonymous *Lettre d'un habitant de Louisbourg*, edited and translated by Professor George Wrong, 1897, p. 37.

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There never was a fairer opening for cementing unity between the Mother Country and the Colonies than the occasion of this great Colonial success. The New Englanders looked at it through their Puritan eyes: they saw in it the hand of the Lord their God, who had brought down the mighty through the agency of His chosen people, fighting, in some sort, like David, not with the up-to-date panoply of warfare but with the sling and the stone. Proud of what their own men had done, they were ready enough to acknowledge the help which the Mother Country had given, and which for the moment obliterated memories of repeated neglect and interminable delays. But it was all thrown away. The King's advisers, less discerning than the King himself, by the Treaty of Aix La Chapelle in 1748, gave back to France Cape Breton Island and Louisbourg, regaining in turn from France on the other side of the world Madras, which had been taken by the French.

Here was an early illustration of the political difficulties which attend a far-flung line. After each war there comes a balancing of accounts, an inevitable process of give and take, when it is impossible to prevent disappointment and chagrin in one quarter or another. But let us suppose that Tsingtau had belonged in full right to Germany, that the Australians, of their own initiative and with the help of a squadron of the Royal Navy, had played the part which the Japanese played and taken from the Germans this Louisbourg of the China seas. Suppose, as the sequel, that the British Government had, at the end of the War, without consulting the Commonwealth in any way, given back Tsingtau to Germany in return for some gain with which the Commonwealth had no concern, it can be imagined how lasting and deep-seated would have been the resentment in Australia. Those who look for the real causes why the North American Colonists parted company with Great Britain will find them farther back than the years when taxation without representation gave immediate ground for discontent, and principal among them was the failure of the Home

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Government to take occasion by the hand, to appreciate the points at which and the hours in which local patriotism coincided with loyalty to the Empire.

Diversity between the Provincials and the Regulars.

The French onlooker at Louisbourg noted with interest and wonderment the wide differences which existed between the Colonial troops and the men from home. 'In fact,' he wrote, 'one could never have told that these troops belonged to the same nation and obeyed the same prince. Only the English are capable of such oddities, which nevertheless form a part of that precious liberty of which they show themselves so jealous.'[1] Poles asunder they seemed to be, and in truth they were. The forces which had inspired the colonization of New England were centrifugal forces; the first Colonists had gone to the wilderness to be free from political and religious control: the ocean, not traversed by steam, not underset by submarine cable, perpetuated and intensified separation: a race grew up modelled on new lines in the New World. Diversities exist still within our Empire, and, it is to be hoped, will always exist. We do not merely tolerate, we welcome diverse characteristics in mind and body, whereby one member of the Empire, or one group of members, supplements the others, to the strengthening and enriching of the whole. We recognize proudly and gladly that the Home Briton brings one contribution to the common stock, while the Canadian or Australian Briton brings from the prairies or the back-blocks other contributions of different kind but equal value; that the non-British races within the Empire supply some ingredients which Nature has refused to our own. But the blending was wanting in the eighteenth century: the diversity was there, but it was a source of weakness not of strength, for want of intelligent handling, and for want of the growing familiarity with and appreciation of one another, which better communication has brought in its train.

The Seven Years War.

In 1756, eleven years after the taking of Louisbourg, France and England were again at open war, and for the

[1] *Ut sup.*, p. 58.

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last time men of the Old North American Colonies fought under the British flag, side by side with British troops of the Line. It was the Seven Years War, before 1914, perhaps, of all the wars to which the Empire has been a party, most conspicuously an Empire War, marked, as it was, by the successes of Amherst and Wolfe in America, of Clive and Coote in India.

Long before war had been formally proclaimed between the two nations, French and English, in 1754 and 1755, were killing one another in North America; and on the 9th of July 1755 occurred the memorable fight on the Monongahela river, when General Braddock's small army, marching to reduce Fort Duquesne, was annihilated by French and Indians. The force included a contingent of Virginians, who, in the tale of the disaster, were contrasted favourably with the Regulars. Washington, who was present throughout the battle, wrote in bitter terms of what he styled the dastardly behaviour of the English soldiers as compared with the Virginians;[1] but he was himself a Virginian, and it should be remembered that in the two battalions of the Line engaged the recruits numbered fully one-half, and between a quarter and a third were Colonists.

The defeat of General Braddock.

This was one outcome of the reverse—to lower the reputation of the Regulars in the eyes of the Colonists, to exalt that of the Provincials. But another and a more salutary result followed. The Home Government wisely decided to enlist among the troops of the Line a body of men familiar with the conditions of North American warfare.[2] Accordingly, in 1756, four battalions were raised of Royal Americans, each battalion comprising ten companies, and each company 100 privates, the total number of non-commissioned officers and men amounting to 4,400. These were the ancestors of the famous 60th Regiment—the King's Royal Rifle Corps. The rank and file included English, Swiss, and Germans settled in

The Royal Americans.

[1] See Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 1884 ed., vol. i, p. 230. The two Regular battalions were the 44th and the 48th, now the Essex and Northampton regiments.

[2] See Butler's *Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps*, vol. i, 1913, pp. 2–4.

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America, white indentured servants and backwoodsmen. They were recruited in great measure from Pennsylvania, and Germans formed a large proportion. Commissions in the regiment were, by an Act of Parliament passed in 1756,[1] thrown open to foreign Protestants; and among the latter were two Swiss, who rose to high distinction, Henry Bouquet, second to none as a leader in forest warfare, and Haldimand, a future Governor of Canada.

The Royal Americans, being on the one hand enlisted in America, and on the other incorporated in the Regular Army, were in some sort a link between the troops of the Line and the Colonial fighting men. There had been similar units before this time, Oglethorpe's, Shirley's, and Pepperell's regiments[2]; and at a later date various

[1] 29 Geo. II, cap. 5 (1756), 'An act to enable His Majesty to grant commissions to a certain number of foreign Protestants who have served abroad as officers or engineers, to act and rank as officers or engineers in America only, under certain restrictions and qualifications.' The Preamble refers to a previous Act of Geo. II whereby foreign Protestants settled in the American colonies might be naturalized after seven years' residence, and continues 'Whereas many foreigners, being Protestants, have been induced by the encouragement offered to them by the said Act, to reside and settle in some of the said colonies (and particularly in the Provinces of Maryland and Pennsylvania) the natural born subjects of which last mentioned Province do in great part consist of the people called Quakers, whose backwardness in their own defence exposes themselves, and that part of America, to imminent danger: And whereas, for the better defence of the said colonies, it hath been proposed to raise a regiment there, consisting of four battalions of one thousand men each, and to enlist as soldiers in the said regiment any of the said foreign inhabitants of the said colonies, who, together with the natives, shall voluntarily enter themselves in His Majesty's Service as soldiers: which foreigners cannot so well be raised or trained without the assistance of some officers who are acquainted with their manners and language. . . .' The Act then provides that, on taking the oath, &c., and giving evidence of being Protestants, the officers and engineers, having served abroad as officers or engineers respectively, might be given commissions to the number not exceeding fifty officers and twenty engineers for service in America only. The engineers were not for any particular regiment; the officers were, as stated, for the new regiment of Royal Americans, the colonel of which, however, was to be a natural born British subject.

[2] Oglethorpe's regiment, which served in Georgia, ranked as the 42nd Foot until it was disbanded in 1748, when the Black Watch, till then numbered 43rd, became the afterwards famous 42nd. Perhaps Oglethorpe's was not quite a precedent for the Royal Americans, as, though stationed

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companies of Rangers were raised from time to time in the King's pay. Moreover, the gaps in the regiments which came out from home were partially filled by recruiting in the Colonies. Still, between the Regular Army and the Provincials, as they were styled, there was a great gulf fixed; and some space must be given to the relations which existed between them at the time of the Seven Years War.

The Regulars and the Provincials at the time of the Seven Years War.

Admirable in time of peace, diversity and democracy are ill-equipped for war. We have seen it before our eyes, when faced with the drilled and centralized military power of Germany. So it was in North America in the early stages of the Seven Years War. The English Colonists outnumbered the French by at least thirteen to one; but Canada was a single whole under a French military despotism, having one mind and one machinery, whereas the British Colonies were a disjointed, ill-assorted miscellany, attached to the Mother Country at arm's length, jealous and suspicious of each other. The Assembly of each colony had the power of the purse as fully as any legislature in the present self-governing Dominions; but Colonial rights had been achieved and maintained rather in spite of than with the goodwill of the Motherland, and the growing breadth of view and sense of nationhood, which has come with federation into larger wholes, was wanting on the North Atlantic seaboard. Great Britain, in turn, had not yet thoroughly learnt the lesson that British Colonists, like the Greeks of old, go out on the terms of being equal, not subordinate, to their fellow-citizens who stay at home. War and disruption were to come before a wider and a wiser time dawned upon the mental horizon of ordinary party statesmen in England. Too late in the day Edmund Burke warned his countrymen that 'a great Empire and little minds go ill together'.

in Georgia, it had been largely formed by drafts from home. But Shirley and Pepperell had each raised a regiment in America in 1754 before Braddock's defeat, numbered respectively 50th and 51st: they lost heavily in the fighting on the Canadian border and were finally disbanded in 1757.

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

LORD CHATHAM

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There were a few who had not needed the warning, pre-eminent among them the elder Pitt, the great Chatham. It is impossible to read his dispatches and letters without feeling that he was instinct with the Imperial spirit in the best sense, with the feeling of race brotherhood; that he had a natural intuition as to how much should be asked from the Colonists, and in what terms, a wise disdain of making a bargain, and a singular power of appealing to the better side of human nature. His influence was the more paramount in that, at the time of the Seven Years War, he controlled all the activities connected with North America, political and military alike. Year after year he wrote out to the Governors, asking the various Colonies to provide so many men for the coming campaign. In doing so, he engaged that the King would supply arms, ammunition, tents, and provisions; and, while he called upon the Colonies to levy, clothe, and pay the men, at the same time he promised strongly to recommend to Parliament in the following year's Session 'to grant a proper compensation for such expenses as above, according as the active vigour and strenuous efforts of the respective provinces shall justly appear to merit.'[1] In time of trouble he was not at pains to find fault. When news came of Robert Abercromby's repulse at Ticonderoga, he wrote to Grenville, 'the troops deserve all applause, the Provincials share the honour'.[2] William Pitt the Elder.

His sympathy with the Provincials is illustrated by his treatment of their officers. An order, which gave great offence, had been issued in May 1756, to the effect that all general and field officers with provincial commissions should rank only as senior captains when serving with Regulars.[3] Pitt removed, or partially removed, the grievance, giving an assurance that 'all officers of the Provincial forces, as high as Colonels inclusive, are to have rank according to their several respective Com-

[1] See *Correspondence of William Pitt, when Secretary of State, with Colonial Governors, &c.*, edited by Gertrude Selwyn Kimball, two vols., 1906, vol. i, pp. 137–9.

[2] *The Grenville Papers*, 1852 ed., vol. i, p. 262.

[3] Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 1884 ed., vol. i, pp. 399–400.

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missions, in like manner as is already given, by His Majesty's regulations, to the captains of Provincial troops in America'[1]; and the Governor of Massachusetts immediately wrote home to tell how this decision had allayed the previous 'dissatisfaction against a junction with the Regulars as the matter of rank then stood'.[2] The success of Great Britain in the Seven Years War was in no small degree due to the fact that her leading statesman appreciated Colonial feeling, Colonial conditions and prejudices, and the worth of Colonial fighting men.

Lord Howe.

There were English soldiers too who appreciated them, notably Lord Howe, brother of the great Admiral, and of General Howe who commanded against Washington in the earlier years of the War of American Independence. He served, as Brigadier-General, under Abercromby, in the summer campaign of 1758, and his death, as the force advanced and skirmished through the woods at the northern end of Lake George, two days before the disastrous attack on Ticonderoga, was held to have taken the life out of the expedition. Assuredly it was, when viewed in the light of later years, an irreparable loss to the British cause in North America. He was a man whom all united to love and to praise. To Wolfe he was 'the noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time and the best soldier in the Army'.[3] We are told how he learnt the lessons of bush-fighting in company with the Rangers; how he discarded himself, and made the men under his command, officers and privates alike, discard, the cumbrous accompaniments of European campaigning. 'Our clothes, our arms, our accoutrements, nay even our shoes and stockings are all improper for this country. Lord Howe is so well convinced of it that he has taken away all the men's breeches.' So wrote Wolfe, referring to Howe as a man 'whom nature has formed for the war of this country'.[4]

Under him troops of the Line and Colonial soldiers

[1] *Correspondence of William Pitt* (Kimball), *ut sup.*, vol. i, p. 138.

[2] Ibid., vol. i, p. 203. [3] See Wright's *Life of Wolfe* (1864), p. 450.

[4] From a letter to Lord George Sackville, May 24, 1758, printed in *The Siege of Quebec*, Doughty and Parmelee. See vol. vi (1901), pp. 78–9.

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
MASSACHUSETS
BAY
NEW ENGLAND
THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND
BY AN ORDER OF THE GREAT AND GENERAL COURT
BEARING DATE FEB^Y 1^ST 1759. CAUSED THIS MONUMENT TO
BE ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF GEORGE AUGUSTUS LORD
VISCOUNT HOWE BRIGADIER GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY'S
FORCES IN AMERICA WHO WAS SLAIN JULY THE 6^TH 1758.
ON THE MARCH TO TICONDEROGA, IN THE 34^TH YEAR
OF HIS AGE. IN TESTIMONY OF THE SENSE THEY HAD OF HIS
SERVICES AND MILITARY VIRTUES AND OF THE AFFECTION
THEIR OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS BORE TO HIS COMMAND.
HE LIVED RESPECTED AND BELOVED: THE PUBLICK REGRETTED
HIS LOSS, TO HIS FAMILY IT IS IRREPARABLE.

MONUMENT TO

BRIG. GEN. VISCOUNT HOWE

IN WESTMINSTER ABBEY

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WOLFE MONUMENT

IN WESTMI

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were as one; and the love which the Colonists bore to him is testified to this day by the monument to his memory in Westminster Abbey. It was placed there at the charge of the State of Massachusetts, whose Assembly voted the money in that he fell fighting in the cause of the Colonies, and to express the affection which their officers and soldiers bore to his command.[1]

Very few Provincials served under Wolfe; and, in estimating the effects of the war for the Conquest of Canada upon the relations between Great Britain and her North American Colonies, it must be counted as a misfortune that the Colonists played no appreciable part in the greatest episode and most brilliant success of the war, the Battle of the Plains and the taking of Quebec. Wolfe himself had the worst possible opinion of the Americans as soldiers: the terms in which he wrote of them in private letters are stronger even than those used by Washington with regard to the Regulars in Braddock's fight.[2] Forbes, who took Fort Duquesne in 1758 with a force in which Provincials, drawn from the Southern Colonies, largely predominated, was equally uncomplimentary. Writing to Pitt, in September 1758, he described the Provincial officers as, with few exceptions, 'An extreme bad collection of broken innkeepers, horse jockeys and Indian traders', and the men under them as 'a direct copy of their officers'.[3]

Wolfe.

Forbes.

[1] This wording is from the Vote of the General Assembly of Massachusetts as given in Hutchinson's *History of Massachusetts Bay, 1749–1774* (1828), p. 71 note. The monument is at the western end of the nave of Westminster Abbey on the northern side, and the inscription upon it is as follows:

'The Province of Massachusetts Bay in New England by an order of the great and general court bearing date Feb. 1st, 1759, caused this monument to be erected to the memory of George Augustus Lord Viscount Howe, Brigadier General of His Majesty's forces in America, who was slain July the 6th, 1758, on the march to Ticonderoga, in the 34th year of his age: in testimony of the sense they had of his services and military virtues and of the affection their officers and soldiers bore to his command. He lived respected and beloved, the public regretted his loss, to his family it is irreparable.'

[2] See, e.g., a paragraph in a letter to Lord George Sackville, printed at p. 84 of Doughty and Parmelee, vol. vi, *ut sup.* See also Wright's *Life of Wolfe*, pp. 452, 497, 504, 515.

[3] 'I vainly at the beginning flattered myself that some very good service

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Amherst.

A large proportion of the men whom Amherst, in succession to Abercromby, led in the central advance on Canada, consisted of Provincial troops; and under Amherst Regulars and Provincials worked well together. Amherst was abundantly tried from time to time, as others were tried, by Colonial Assemblies and Colonial soldiers—the Assemblies constantly recalcitrant, half-hearted, and dilatory in providing the men; the men, when found, devoid of discipline and training. But while he put down with a strong hand peculation, desertion, and mutiny, while he was insistent upon the Colonial levies learning the art of war, he always had a good word for the excellence of the Colonists as axemen, for the zeal and activity of their colonels. In an account of his army in 1759, which is given in Captain John Knox's *Historical Journal*, we read that 'the field officers of the Provincials take their tour of duty in the Line, with those of the Regulars.'[1] Evidently the general made no distinction between Regulars and Provincials, if equally competent, and he stands out as an able and tactful administrator of a mixed force. The Colonial soldiers, or many of them, seem to have been utterly untrained. It might have been expected that New Englanders, of all people, would have been experts in the use of a gun; but the Journal tells us 'as the Provincial troops arrive, great pains are taken to instruct them in their duty, by making them acquainted with the use of arms, familiarizing them to fire at marks',[1] and again 'Such of the Provincial troops as never fired ball are ordered to be out, and fire at marks'.[1] Knox himself, and the 43rd Regiment, in

Captain John Knox.

might be drawn from the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces, but am sorry to find that, a few of their principal officers excepted, all the rest are an extreme bad collection,' &c. Forbes to Pitt, September 6, 1758. Subsequently he somewhat revised his opinion. 'To do justice, I must commend the spirit of some of the Provincials, particularly the Maryland troops, who I retained in the Service, after being left to disband by their province.' Forbes to Pitt, October 20, 1758 (see *Correspondence of William Pitt*, Kimball, *ut sup.*, vol. i, pp. 342, 372).

[1] *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760*, by Captain John Knox, edited for the Champlain Society by Arthur G. Doughty, 1914, vol. i, pp. 468, 470, 471.

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

LORD AMHERST

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which he held a commission, was relieved of garrison duty in Nova Scotia, in May 1759, by a Provincial regiment, and here is the impression that the Provincials left on him. 'The privates are a poor, mean, ragged set of men, of all sizes and ages, their officers are sober, modest men, and such of them as have been upon service express themselves very distinctly and sensibly; but their ideas, like those who have not been out of their own country, or conversed much with Europeans, are naturally confined; they make a decent appearance, being clothed in blue faced with scarlet, gilt ribbons, laced waistcoats and hats; but their ordinary soldiers have no uniforms nor do they affect any kind of regularity.'[1]

The Colonial Militia and Provincial troops.

The poor, mean, ragged set of men developed a few years later into the 'embattled farmers', and left no room for doubt as to their fighting qualities. But embattled farmers they more or less remained, when tried by the standard of European armies. Francis Parkman writes of the New England levies, who gathered to Albany in 1755 to fight under William Johnson, a typical irregular leader of irregular troops: 'The soldiers were no soldiers, but farmers and farmers' sons, who had volunteered for the summer campaign.'[2] These old colonies of England on the mainland of America had never been garrisoned by Imperial troops, or garrisoned only in name;[3] they had practically been left to defend themselves on land; their frontier story was a tale of constant raid and reprisal. Whatever laws were or were not enacted, the male population were perforce bound to defend their hearths and homes; but they defended them in their own way and at their own will. There was no such clearly recognized call to universal military service in North America as there was among South African Dutchmen under the commando system. The New England Colonies, or most of them, had laws under which military service could, if necessary, be enforced. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, for instance, all males

[1] *Ut sup.*, vol. i, p. 306. [2] *Montcalm and Wolfe*, vol. i, p. 291.
[3] See below, pp. 71–3.

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between the ages of 16 and 50 or 60 were, with a few exceptions, liable to serve. In the Quaker Colony of Pennsylvania, on the other hand, conscientious objectors had it all their own way. In Maryland, Virginia, and the Southern Colonies the Militia were largely recruited from indentured white bond-servants, and Mr. Fortescue tells us that transportation was 'the first foundation of our system of Colonial defence'.[1]

Of the leading North American Colonies, Massachusetts was the most virile and patriotic, and in the early days of Massachusetts each township formed its company.[2] In this and the other New England States, at the time of the Seven Years War, when fighting was in prospect, the Assembly voted the requisite number of men and constituted a Committee to impress food, clothing, and the necessaries of war. Volunteers were then called for and, if the full quota of men were not forthcoming, the Militia regiments were mustered, and from their ranks sufficient men were drafted to make up the deficiency. The men brought their own guns, if they had any; and it was only gradually and partially that a distinctive uniform was adopted. The complement of each regiment was 500 men, of each company fifty: the men were enlisted for the campaign only, and in no case for more than a year.[3] Thus it will be noted that the Provincial troops, who marched and fought side by side with the Regulars, were not coincident with the Militia, though made up of men many or most of whom had served or were liable to serve in the Militia. They were mainly men who had volunteered for the campaign, and for service outside their own colony, whether from patriotic motives or attracted by the bounties and pay which were offered. The Colonial levies would have been less irregular had they consisted simply of Militia regiments. Writing to Pitt in May 1757, Lord Loudoun, who was

[1] *History of the British Army*, vol. ii, p. 89.

[2] See Doyle's *History of the English in America: The Puritan Colonies*, 1887, vol. i, p. 225.

[3] This account is taken from Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, vol. i, pp. 384–6.

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then Commander-in-Chief in North America, drew a clear distinction between the Provincial troops and the Militia, much in favour of the latter. 'The Militia are the real inhabitants, stout, able men, and for a brush much better than their Provincial troops, whom they hire whenever they can get them, and at any price.' [1]

Contrast between Provincial and Regular officers.

We have seen the different accounts which were given of the Provincial officers. To Forbes they were the off-scouring of men. Amherst, on the other hand, praised the commanding officers of the Provincial regiments; and to Knox the officers appeared to be sensible, modest men. They varied, no doubt, taking their tone from the surroundings in which they had been reared, developing for good or bad according to the handling which they received from the English generals under whom they served. But there was one feature common to them all: they were the democratic soldiers of democratic communities, and there was no social gulf between them and the rank and file. In New England they were nominally appointed by the Assembly, but for the most part virtually chosen by the privates themselves.[2] They were neighbours, leading their neighbours in war, as they led them in the day-to-day life of their villages and townships. It was a system, or want of system, which made for brotherhood and fellowship, but it did not conduce to discipline; and it was poles asunder from the rigid rule of the British Army, where the officers formed a caste, as compared with the men. This was perhaps the greatest element of friction between Regulars and Provincials. Had there been more years of joint campaigning under generals of the type of Amherst, inspired by statesmen of the type of Pitt, had Lord Howes been multiplied, the men from home and the men of the soil, at first under wise constraint, afterwards by force of association, might have become assimilated to one another: the British officer would have grown less insular and supercilious, the Colonist would have recognized the value of

[1] Lord Loudoun to Pitt, May 3, 1757. *Correspondence of William Pitt* (Kimball), *ut sup.*, vol. i, p. 55.

[2] See Parkman, *ut sup.*, vol. i, p. 386.

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discipline and been less ready to take offence. As it was, they grated sorely, the one on the other; and Parkman, fairest of writers, gives as his judgement that 'the deportment of British officers in the Seven Years War no doubt had some part in hastening on the Revolution'.[1] The best of the English officers, with rare exceptions, not unnaturally from the point of view of their military profession, looked upon the Colonists with a certain amount of well-bred and unspoken contempt, which was not so unspoken in the case of the younger officers, who had not yet learnt, or in some cases by nature and up-bringing never would learn, the rules of courtesy. But it was not merely a matter of professional superciliousness, nor was it wholly to be accounted for by justifiable irritation with the slackness of the Colonists in a war on their own behalf. The officers of the Line came from an up-to-date society in England, of none too good a type, into homes and circles more or less primitive and austere. They brought their fashionable ways and the talk of the town among New England Puritans or the homely settlers of Dutch descent in the Albany district of New York State, and they outraged deep-rooted sentiment, possibly without knowing it. The redcoat was not more different from the homespun of the American farmer than were the ways and the words of the wearers of the redcoats from those of the farmers and their womenkind. There came in too, or grew up on the soil, the race which always hangs on to the skirts of an army, contractors and speculators, parvenus of one kind and another, making money quickly and not too cleanly, working gain for themselves and mischief to others. War is not a continuous succession of battles and marches. In all campaigns there are long intervals of inaction; and the leisure time of the English officers in America and their hangers-on did not conduce to raise the Regular Army in the estimation of the men and women of America.

Contrast between home and Colonial views.

Antagonistic in habits and temperament, comparing and contrasting each other in the camp and in the field,

[1] *Ut sup.*, vol. ii, p. 119.

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the two bodies of fighting men only repeated and reflected the antagonism between the Home Government and the Colonial Legislatures, between home views and Colonial views in State and Army alike. Pitt's influence made for conciliation and compromise; but Pitt was above and before his time; his was not the ordinary tone and temper of the men of the day. In military matters, as in civil, the Mother Country wished to impress its own model upon the Colonies, to substitute uniformity for diversity, to deal with young, undisciplined democracies upon the stiff lines of an old-world society based upon class distinctions. The Colonies, in turn, viewed regularity and system with unreasoning suspicion. 'The home authorities stupidly wanted to change the Militia into a sort of imitation of British Regulars; whilst the Colonial authorities, with equal pigheadedness, aimed at having thirteen little armed mobs, managed by thirteen little local committees, and paid for by the Imperial Government alone, the various Assemblies acting as middlemen in everything.'[1] The plain truth is that the history of the old North American Colonies in their relations with the Mother Country was one of perpetual divergence. They had been largely founded by citizens who went out not to extend the Empire but to be rid of home control. They had developed not under tutelage and effective protection, but under what a great historian has called 'wise neglect'.[2] When at length, in the Seven Years War, there came a time for corporate action, for the linking of armed forces on a large scale, the common effort was not sufficiently prolonged to cancel the accumulated effects of the past, the centrifugal traditions and tendencies of much more than a century. The success which attended the common effort was as inimical to Imperial unity as failure could have been. As long as the French in Canada threatened the adjoining British Colonies, there was the motive of self-preservation,

[1] *The Fight for Canada*, by William Wood (1904), p. 39.

[2] 'The wise neglect of Walpole and Newcastle was eminently conducive to Colonial interests.' Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, 1882 ed., chap. xii, p. 272.

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to keep them within the Empire. The conquest of Canada eliminated the bond of interest and left only that of sentiment and goodwill; while the fact that in the heavy fighting the conquest had been achieved mainly by troops sent out from home was less productive of goodwill in the Colonies than if they had, as at Louisbourg in 1745, been the predominant partners, certainly less than if their men had gone of their own free choice overseas, as in our own day, to the help of the Mother-land. The Seven Years War and the conquest of Canada were the beginning of the end of the old British Empire.

Adam Smith on Colonies.

In 1776, the year after the outbreak of the War of American Independence, Adam Smith published his great book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.* In the chapters which treat of Colonies, he pointed out that 'the English Colonists have never yet contributed anything toward the defence of the Mother Country.'[1] And again, 'the European Colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force for the defence of the Mother Country. Their military force has never been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which the Mother Country has been engaged, the defence of their Colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of those countries.'[2] In his view, therefore, so far as there had been any Imperial co-operation under the old régime, the Mother Country had given and the Colonies had received. 'Great Britain', he contended, 'is, perhaps, since the world began, the only State which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its expense without once augmenting its resources.'[2] The Mother Country had given little enough, and the Colonies, young and immature, could not be expected to do more than provide for their own land defence, which they did, or some of them did, in a partial and ineffective manner. Still we have seen that on

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, 1871 ed., chap. vii, of Colonies, Parts II and III, p. 451.

[2] Ibid., *ut sup.*, pp. 468, 491.

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RODNEY MEMORIAL, JAMAICA

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occasion American Colonists served beyond their own shores, though still in American waters; and similar service was given towards the end of the Seven Years War, after the fighting on the mainland of North America had come to an end. Some companies of Rangers were among the troops, now no longer needed against Canada, which, under General Monckton, who had been Wolfe's senior brigadier at Quebec, and supported by Rodney's fleet, in February 1762 took the French island of Martinique; and in the following summer a considerable number of Provincial soldiers took part, under Albemarle and Admiral Pococke, in the operations which, after heavy losses from climate and disease, ended in the capture of Moro Castle [1] and the possession of the rich Spanish port of Havana. In the Martinique expedition a volunteer regiment from Barbados and some men from Antigua also participated; for in the eighteenth century the West Indies were alive with land and sea fighting, the British West Indian islands were instinct with patriotism and enterprise, and among them none was more patriotic and enterprising than the strong little community of Barbados.

American troops at Martinique and Havana.

Barbadians at Martinique.

Canada capitulated to Amherst's army in 1760 and, by the peace of 1763, finally became an integral part of the British Empire. Twelve years later, in 1775, the North American Colonies were at war with Great Britain. The last South African War ended with the Vereeniging Treaty of 31st May 1902. Twelve years later, in 1914, Great Britain was at war with Germany. The French-Canadians in the one case, the South African Boers in the other, were a people lately conquered and annexed. What was their attitude respectively towards the nation which had conquered and annexed them, in its day of trouble? The War of American Independence was a civil war, between home citizens and overseas citizens of the British race and Empire. The overseas citizens, by the nature of the case, had been from all time the

French-Canadians and South African Dutch.

[1] Commemorated by Burns in *The Jolly Beggars*:

'And the Moro low was laid at the sound of the drum.'

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special rivals and foes of the French in Canada, and Canadians could not but view with suspicion overtures to join hands with them. Still an appeal could be made, and was made, in specious and fair-sounding terms: freedom and the rights of men were invoked; and the occasion was singularly propitious for rising against foreign domination, in that, on the eve and at the outset of war, Canada was almost destitute of British troops and the forts were falling to pieces. But the appeal bore little or no fruit; if some few Canadians joined the revolting colonists, others fought to defend their country under British rule; while the large majority remained passive, waiting on events. The reason was that British conquest and annexation had given to Canada freedom unknown before, that the Canadians had secured substantial advantages by becoming British subjects. In the later case, on the outbreak of war, the British garrison in South Africa was removed in full reliance upon the good faith of a Boer Ministry. The confidence was justified and repaid. A Boer rising took place, it is true, fomented by German intrigue and German money, and there was no counterbalancing influence in the form of traditional enmity to Germany on the Boer side. Yet the rebellion was stamped out by the greatest of Boer leaders and his following, and subsequent campaigns of mixed Dutch and British troops under Boer command stand out among the conspicuous successes on the British side in the War with Germany. In South Africa, as in Canada, incorporation with the British Empire had connoted liberty, and liberty begat in a large degree either passive acquiescence or active goodwill.

Some features of the War of Independence.

The War of American Independence, as a whole, has obviously no place in a book whose theme is Imperial co-operation, unless it be for the purpose of contrast and of warning; but there were some features in it which are relevant to the subject. Not the least unwise of the various acts of unwisdom by which the British Government damaged its own cause and exasperated the Colonists was the employment of German mercenaries against

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the recalcitrant sons of Great Britain; and there was retributive justice in the fact that the disaster at Trenton, on Christmas night in 1776, when Washington surprised and annihilated a body of Hessian troops, was one of the turning-points in the war.[1] It seems passing strange at the present day that there was a time when Englishmen sought to dominate overseas Englishmen by force of arms, and hired Germans to be the instruments of their mad policy.[1]

But there is another feature of this disastrous war which may be contemplated with very different feelings. The undoing of Great Britain in her old sphere of colonization in North America was the making of Canada as a British Dominion. From the position of a conquered dependency which, but for the War of American Independence, must have been overshadowed by, and probably absorbed in, the far greater colonies to the South, as the direct result of the loss of these colonies, Canada rose to the first place among British possessions beyond the seas. The influx of United Empire Loyalists, heart-whole in allegiance to the flag, indomitable in adversity, peopled Ontario and New Brunswick, gave to Canada a strong British element to leaven and to supplement the French-Canadians, and formed the framework of a coming nation. Out of the war which dealt Great Britain the heaviest blow in her history, which took from her the fairest of her provinces, the strongest of her children, and ended the story of her old Empire—out of this war, and as the direct product of it, grew the beginnings of an Empire on a new model; an Empire of freedom and partnership, of a kind and on a scale unknown in all the previous ages of the world, in which divers races and creeds co-ordinated in a growing degree, and self-government became a commonplace. In this new Empire Canada was the pioneer and pointed the way.

[1] It will be remembered that the King's forces in America in the War of Independence included, over and above Hessians and other Germans, a very large proportion of locally raised troops, and one or two of these latter units were given places in the Line.

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From a military point of view—indeed, from all points of view—Quebec was in old times always the key of Canada. The Battle of the Plains and the taking and holding of Quebec decided in effect the fate not of a city merely but of New France. Similarly Carleton's successful defence of Quebec against Montgomery and Benedict Arnold in the winter of 1775–6, after the Revolutionary troops had occupied Montreal and Three Rivers and overrun the whole country up to the walls of the city, again said the last word as to the future of Canada, that it should remain in British keeping for the years to be. The garrison that held it did not number two thousand men in all, and less than three hundred of them were Regular soldiers. Nearly one-third were Canadians, and about four hundred were seamen and marines. Carleton's dispatch at the end of the siege speaks of 'the mixed garrison of soldiers, sailors, British and Canadian Militia, with the artificers from Halifax and Newfoundland'. In short, the small band of men who held the crucial point at a critical time were a kind of tiny embryo of the coming Empire, with its diverse elements all contributing to the security of the whole. Canada, it may be noted, under the French régime, had a Militia system far better organized and more effective than anything of the kind in the British Colonies, and the Militia captain in each parish ranked in importance with the *curé* and the *seigneur*; but under British rule the system speedily decayed, and at the time of American invasion, when Carleton called out the Militia, only a small minority of Canadians responded to the call.

The West Indies in the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars.

Through the eighteenth century the West Indies were the scene of many fights and many incidents connected with the fortunes or misfortunes of the Empire. In the middle of the century they were at the zenith of their wealth and importance; and, when the Seven Years War had run its course, before the Peace of Paris was signed in 1763, it was questioned in England whether, of the captured French possessions, the West Indian island of Guadeloupe was not better worth keeping than Canada.

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NELSON STATUE, BARBADOS

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But these Colonies had become, more and more, purely plantation colonies, whose communities were white oligarchies in the midst of vastly predominating numbers of negro slaves. To Imperial purposes they could and did give money contributions in time of war, but as regards man power, even for their own defence, they relied for the most part on soldiers and sailors from home. Proposals were made to embody negro regiments for Imperial service, to supplement the regular garrisons in the islands, constantly thinned by sickness; and though they met in more normal times with little favour locally, partly from racial distrust, partly from fear of depleting the labour supply, under stress of war, between 1795 and 1799, no fewer than twelve negro battalions were raised, eight of which survived in 1815. In the course of the War of American Independence, Great Britain, in February 1782, had lost to the French all her West Indian Colonies except Jamaica, Barbados, and Antigua, but in the following April, Rodney in the Battle of the Saints made her once more supreme in West Indian waters. A few years later came the French Revolution, the principles of which spread to the great French colony in the island of Hispaniola; and in the British West Indian Colonies, through the long years of the Napoleonic Wars, the doom of the slave trade and of slavery was casting its shadow before. Still there was no lack of patriotic feeling for the Empire. We read of Barbados merchants in 1804 buying a vessel taken from the enemy, giving her the name of the *Barbados* frigate, and presenting her to the Royal Navy, to be used, it is true, in the island waters.[1] To Barbados Nelson came, hunting the French fleet, little more than four months before the battle of Trafalgar, and the first statue erected to his memory is that which stands in Trafalgar Square at Bridgetown. Jamaica has marked the services of Admiral Rodney to the West Indies by a noble memorial at Spanish Town.

[1] See Schomburgk's *History of Barbados*, pp. 367–8, and a very interesting article on the subject in the West India Committee Circular of May 18, 1915, p. 220.

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Canada, Newfoundland, &c., in the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1783, when the first British Empire, or the first chapter in the British Empire, ended with the parting of the United States of America, out of the present self-governing Dominions, the Empire included only Newfoundland and Canada, or rather Eastern Canada. The loss of the United States was speedily followed by the beginning of British settlement in Australia, the first colonists arriving in January 1788. In 1793 France and England were again at war. Thus at the time of the Napoleonic wars Australia was in extreme infancy, and little more than the echoes of the strife reached the distant Southern Seas, loud enough, however, to cause a small volunteer corps to be formed in New South Wales in 1801 for defence against foreign raids or internal rising.[1] At this date New Zealand was, for white men, still a no-man's-land, while British South Africa was the direct outcome of the wars. The Cape Colony, first taken from the Dutch in 1795, restored to them by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, taken again in January 1806 by a British force under Sir David Baird, and finally confirmed to Great Britain by the Peace of 1814, became the nucleus of the present Union of South Africa. Prior to Waterloo, therefore, Canada and Newfoundland alone of the present Dominions were—so to speak—available for purposes of Imperial co-operation; and, with the exception of a passing raid of the Newfoundland Coast by a French fleet in 1796, it was not until the United States, in 1812, entered the lists against Great Britain, that these Dominions became actively involved in the life-and-death fight of the Empire.

Canada and the War of 1812.

The immediate cause of the War of 1812 was the use made by Great Britain of her sea-power in the fight with France, interference, whether justified or not, with the trade and the citizens of neutral nations, and notably of the United States. Then, as in the late war, but with stronger reason then, freedom of the seas was asserted

[1] A special infantry corps was raised in 1789 for service in New South Wales. In 1808 it was taken into the Line and numbered 102nd. In 1810 it was brought back to England and, after serving in America in 1814, was disbanded in 1817.

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as against Great Britain; and British ships and ship captains were charged with violating international rights. But the war itself was pre-eminently a Canadian war. Canada was the main scene of the fighting: the possession of Canada, as a suitable corollary to the successful War of Independence, was the prize for which the Americans fought. It was an interlude in the main struggle against military domination, a 'side-show', as the saying goes, as were the Ashanti and Boxer troubles at the time of the South African War, but none the less it was a war of primary importance in the story of the development of the British Empire; for the effect of the war was to vindicate the United Empire Loyalists of Upper Canada, to bring the British and French nationalities in Canada closer together, and to speed Canada a long way on her path as a nation.

As when the Americans overran the land in 1775, so, when the later war broke out, there were but few Regular British troops in Canada, only four regiments of the Line. It was a time when British resources were strained to the utmost in the Peninsular War. On the other hand, there was now no question of French-Canadians making common cause either with revolting Colonists or with a Mother Country in which the old régime had passed away for ever; and under tolerant British rule, differences of creed in Canada were no longer a bar to united action in the face of common danger. Militia, British and French, fought by the side of the Regulars. At the successful skirmish of Chateauguay, French-Canadians under a French-Canadian leader had the field to themselves. Prominent among the saviours of Canada were the Glengarry regiment, Roman Catholic Macdonells and Highlanders, many of them old soldiers, who had settled in Canada.[1] There was a New Brunswick regiment

[1] The Glengarrys were properly called 'Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles'. They appear in the Army List for 1812 and lasted till 1816. 'Fencibles,' i. e. 'Defensibles', were in origin a species of Militia formed by voluntary enlistment for the defence of a particular district and for a limited time. The New Brunswick unit was raised as a corps of Fencibles about 1803, but was brought into the Line as the 104th in 1810. It was disbanded in 1817.

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and there was a Newfoundland regiment,[1] sent over to aid the sister dominion. The forces which were collected or created to defend Canada, by their diversity, bore witness that the spirit of co-operation was active and strong. Nor should it be forgotten that the British commander in Upper Canada in the earliest and most critical stage of the war, Isaac Brock, of Guernsey birth, who fell deplored at Queenston Heights, as Lord Howe at Ticonderoga, had in him much of the personal magnetism, the cementing force, which endeared Lord Howe to North American Colonists. The end of it was that Canada neither lost nor gained in territory, but that her status and her people gained immeasurably. The Treaty of Ghent, which closed this American War, was signed in December 1814; and after the Hundred Days' campaign in the following year, ending at Waterloo, the world was once more at peace.

[1] A regiment was raised in Newfoundland in or about 1794 and styled the 'Royal Newfoundland Fencibles'. It was disbanded in or about 1800 and succeeded by the 'Newfoundland Light Infantry'. This regiment again was short-lived, and was succeeded by the 'Royal Newfoundland Rangers', who were reorganized in 1812.

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BROCK MONUMENT

QUEENSTON HEIGHTS, CANADA

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CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE INDIAN ARMY

THERE can hardly have been a time when, in the factories of the East India Company, bearing of arms in case of need was wholly confined to Europeans; but the beginnings of the Indian Army, as we know it to-day, date from the middle of the eighteenth century. Early in overseas history the Portuguese in India, as the Spaniards in America, trained and used native soldiers; but at a later date the French were pre-eminent in India in employing native troops, armed, organized, and disciplined after the manner of European regiments. The French governors of Pondicherry adopted the system, and notably Dumas, in or about the year 1739, raised and trained three or four thousand Mohammedan soldiers. His successor, the great Dupleix, increased their numbers; and with this new military machinery, supplemented by political alliances with native potentates, the French made a strong bid for supremacy in Southern India. Writing of the year 1746, the historian Orme tells us, 'At this time the English had not adopted the idea of training the Indian natives in the European discipline, notwithstanding the French had set the example, by raising four or five companies of Sepoys at Pondicherry'.[1] Very soon, however, the English followed the lead given to them by the French, and bettered it.

Isolated from one another, on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts and in the Bay of Bengal, the East India Company's factories or groups of factories developed their respective defence forces on more or less separate lines; and even after the Indian Mutiny, when the Company had ceased to exist, and the control of its troops,

[1] Orme's *History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745* (third ed., 1780, vol. i, p. 81). As stated in the text, the Portuguese, not the French, were the original pioneers in the use of disciplined native troops.

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together with the whole administration of India, had been transferred to the Crown, the three Presidencies still retained their separate armies until, as will be seen, by an Act of Parliament passed in 1893, all the armed forces of British India were, in 1895, finally unified. It was in Southern India that the native Army, the Sepoy Army as it was termed in old days, first came into existence, as it was in Southern India that Frenchmen pointed the way to the 'New Model'. It is stated that the first native corps raised by the Company was in the island of Bombay,[1] and as early as 1747 some Bombay sepoys were sent to Madras; but it was in Madras, more especially, that the employment of native troops in the British service began to make history, and all the senior regiments in the present Indian Army are Madras or ex-Madrasi units.

In 1746 Fort St. George at Madras capitulated to the French under Labourdonnais: some few natives had been enlisted for the defence of the fort, while a larger number helped successfully to defend Fort St. David in the same year. The loss of Fort St. George, which, however, in 1748 reverted to Great Britain under the terms of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, seems to have been a main factor in determining the English to follow up the policy which the French had adopted with so much success.

Stringer Lawrence.

On the north side of the nave of Westminster Abbey, towards the western end, stands a monument erected by the East India Company to the memory of Major-General Stringer Lawrence. It records 'Discipline established, fortresses protected, settlements extended, French and

[1] See Holmes's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, second ed., 1885, p. 46: 'The first Sepoy regiments were raised in Southern India', and in a note to the same page: 'It was at Bombay that the very first native corps were disciplined by the English.' Reference should be made to an article in vol. xviii of the *Quarterly Review* (1818) on 'The Origin and State of the Indian Army', which was written by Sir John Malcolm. Cf. his *Short Account of the Rise, Progress, and Character of the Native Army of India*, written in 1816 and given in the *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company* v. *Military*, pp. 324–38, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 16 August, 1832, 735, V. This account is practically identical with the unsigned article in the *Quarterly*.

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STRINGER LAWRENCE MONUMENT
IN WESTMINSTER ABBEY

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

CLIVE STATUE

OUTSIDE THE INDIA OFFICE

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Indian armies defeated, and Peace concluded in the Carnatic'. It is a monument to a man 'whose fame is far below his deserts',[1] of whom Lord Macaulay, for instance, in his brilliant Essay on Lord Clive, wrote that he was 'gifted with no intellectual faculty higher than plain good sense'. The name of Lawrence is great in the story of British India, but it usually recalls the heroes of the Indian Mutiny, Henry Lawrence, who held the Residency of Lucknow and 'tried to do his duty', and John Lawrence, who made the Punjab a nucleus for the reconquest of India. Their fame has overshadowed the memory of one of the same name, whose services to India and to the Empire were given exactly a hundred years before their time. Yet Stringer Lawrence was known as, and was in fact, the father of the Indian army. He had seen active service on the Continent and in the rising of 1745; and in December 1746 he passed into the service of the East India Company, being appointed Major of the garrison of Fort St. George. He landed at Fort St. David in January 1748, and came home again in 1751; but, having proved his worth, he was speedily sent back to India as Commander-in-Chief of all the Company's military forces in the East Indies, and he reached India for the second time in March 1752. He made, and he tested in successful warfare, the framework of the fighting machine to which we owe our present Indian Empire and much more besides. Under him Robert Clive served his military apprenticeship; and, on the initiative of these two men, disciplined Sepoy levies rose and grew, and went on from strength to strength, when wisely handled and well led. In 1751 native soldiers played a great part in Clive's memorable defence of Arcot, and thenceforward the armies in India under the British flag consisted in a growing degree of sons of the soil. In January 1759 Clive wrote to Pitt, 'we always make sure of any number we please of black troops, who, being both much better paid

Robert Clive.

[1] Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, vol. ii (1899), p. 187. For Stringer Lawrence see *Stringer Lawrence, the Father of the Indian Army*, by Col. J. Biddulph, 1901.

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and treated by us than by the country powers, will very readily enter into our service.'[1]

Native soldiers and overseas service.

These words were written after Clive had, in June 1757, fought and won the battle of Plassey.[2] His small army in that battle included native soldiers from all three Presidencies. There was a newly-raised battalion of Bengal Sepoys, a larger number from Madras,[3] and with the Madras contingent a company of Sepoys from Bombay. The native soldiers from Southern India had been carried on shipboard from Madras to Calcutta in the preceding year, when Clive went up to avenge the massacre of the Black Hole and to retrieve the fortunes of his countrymen in Bengal. This seems to have been the first occasion upon which Indian troops in British pay were taken by sea on active service, and they embarked without reluctance or hesitation. 'The natives of India', wrote Sir John Malcolm in 1816, 'have, generally speaking, a rooted dislike to the sea.'[4] This dislike in past years was usually attributed to the strength of caste feeling, to fear of losing caste by crossing the black water; and the greater aversion to sea transit among the native soldiers of Northern India than among the men of the South was explained on the ground that the northern battalions contained a larger proportion of high-caste natives. It is difficult to arrive at the facts. No trouble seems to have arisen in connexion with embarkation in the infancy of the Native Army, and yet Malcolm wrote that 'the first Sepoys who were raised by the English were either Mohammedans or Hindus of very high caste, being chiefly Rajputs',[4] and that 'the Native infantry of Madras is

[1] Letter of January 1759. *Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 1838, vol. i, p. 391.

[2] None of the existing Indian regiments share with the Dorsetshires, Dublins, and Munsters (see below, p. 61) the battle-honour of Plassey.

[3] The Madras soldiers of more modern times, the 'successors of the old Coast Army', as Lord Roberts terms them in *Forty-one Years in India* (1897 ed., vol. ii, p. 383), seem not to have retained in his opinion 'those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers', and this opinion has been confirmed by the late war.

[4] *Short Account of the Rise, Progress, and Character of the Native Army of India, ut sup.*, pp. 329, 325.

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generally composed of Mohammedans and Hindus of good caste: at its first establishment none were enlisted but men of high military tribes'.[1] It may be taken, however, that the proportion of high-caste soldiers was higher in Bengal than in Southern India, and that this fact had a distinct bearing upon the question of foreign service.[2] The Bombay men seem to have felt less qualms on this subject than any others; from their surroundings they were familiar with the sea: their ranks included a medley of races, and the Hindu soldiers among them were mainly men of the lowest castes;[3] but the Madras Sepoys were also ready enough, under ordinary circumstances, to go on board ship.

In 1758 two battalions of Bengal Sepoys were sent by sea to the Circars and co-operated in the taking of Masulipatam. No difficulty with the men was experienced on this occasion; but, a few years later, bad arrangements in connexion with a similar voyage in 1767, and the loss of two companies when being brought home in 1770, seem to have awakened in the minds of the native soldiers of the Bengal Army great hatred of the sea. While caste prejudice undoubtedly militated against sea transport and foreign service, much must be set down to actual hardships suffered on the sea, and to want of confidence in those in charge. There was also a vital difference between compelling battalions to serve beyond the sea and inviting battalions, or detachments from them, or individual

[1] *Short Account of the Rise, Progress and Character of the Native Army of India, ut sup.*, p. 328.

[2] 'The Bengal Sepoys are born soldiers, the Madras are taught to be so. Among the Bengal Sepoys, Hindus of the better class greatly preponderate; among the Madras Sepoys there is a much larger proportion of Mohammedans, and Hindus of the Lower castes.' Synopsis of Evidence, p. lviii, in the 1832 Blue Book, Minutes of Evidence, *ut sup.* The Bengal Sepoys were supposed to be finer physically and morally than the Sepoys of Southern India. They were not composed of Bengalis but of the fighting races, Pathans, Rohillas, Rajputs, &c.

[3] See the *History of the Madras Army*, by Lt.-Col. W. J. Wilson (1882, &c.), vol. ii, p. 278: 'The Bombay Sepoys have never hesitated to go wherever they have been ordered either by sea or land.' Sir John Malcolm in his *Account of the Native Army*, p. 331, refers to the great medley of races in the Bombay Army, and, e. g., to the number of Jews in it and their excellence as soldiers.

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soldiers, to volunteer for such service. In the overseas expeditions from India, undertaken in the late years of the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth century, the native troops consisted of men who had volunteered for foreign service, such service being sweetened by bounties on enlistment and by special recognition and commendation; and the readiness to volunteer varied no doubt in proportion to the attachment of the Sepoys to the English officers who commanded them. It is told that when, in 1797, Madras Sepoys were asked to volunteer for an expedition which was projected against Manila, the men of a particular regiment which was approached wanted to know whether their Colonel, who was a special favourite, would go with them; and next, whether he would stay with them. Being reassured on both points, they cried out 'To Europe! To Europe!' which was taken to mean that they would follow their leader to the ends of the earth. When, but not until, Indian troops were brought to Malta in 1878, the cry 'To Europe!' materialized.[1]

[1] The story is given by Sir John Malcolm in the *Short Account, &c.*, p. 330, and the *Quarterly* article. Colonel Oram was the officer in question. Sir John Malcolm held that the native troops for overseas service should always be volunteer battalions. Wilson, in his *History of the Madras Army* (vol. i, p. 289), writes: 'Madras native troops embarked for Bengal with Clive in 1756 without hesitation, and they have done so cheerfully on the numerous occasions of foreign service which have occurred from the time of the expeditions to Manila and the Moluccas during the last century, up to the recent dispatch of the Sappers and Miners and the 25th regiment to Malta. This readiness on the part of the Madras Sepoys has been attributed to the fact that the ranks of the Madras Army contained a much smaller number of high-caste men than that of Bengal, and that consequently there were fewer prejudices to contend against. This may be true to a certain extent,' &c., &c. There was at one time in the Bengal Army in the eighteenth century a special marine battalion composed of low-caste men, who would serve anywhere overseas. Reference should be made to the Minutes of Evidence taken by the House of Commons Committee of 1867 upon the Employment of Indian Troops in the Colonies, and to the Report of the Committee (*Army* (*India and the Colonies*), 478, July 26, 1867, and 197, April 3, 1868). See also, with special reference to the Bengal Sepoys, the letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, March 6, 1789, *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis of Cornwallis*, edited with notes by Charles Ross, Esq., 1859, vol. i, Appendix XXIV, pp. 551–2.

Overseas service would naturally not be popular, as involving severance

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AN INDIAN SEPOY

At the end of the 18th century

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Indian soldiers on service outside India.

A very few years after the Indian Army first came into existence, Indian soldiers were employed outside India on the service of the Empire. We have seen how Spain suffered for intervening in the Seven Years War on the side of France by the loss of Havana. She suffered in East as well as West. In that same year, 1762, an expedition was sent from India against Manila, the native troops amounting to two-thirds of the total force. Manila was taken on the 1st of August, its capture almost coinciding with that of Havana : and the Madras soldiers were not withdrawn till 1764. From this time onward, through the latter part of the eighteenth century, the East Indian Archipelago, with Ceylon, formed the main field of foreign service for Indian troops, whenever Spain and Holland were drawn into the never-ending duel between England and France on the French side, and their Eastern dependencies were thereby exposed to British attack. In 1782 a detachment of Madras troops was on board Sir Edward Hughes's ships which took the Dutch port of Trincomalee in January of that year, and they formed the main part of the garrison which was overpowered by the French under Admiral Suffren in the following August. In 1795 Holland, overrun by a French army under Pichegru, and reduced, under the name of the Batavian Republic, to the condition of a French dependency, became again involved in war with England ; and in that year and in 1796 native troops from Madras and Bombay took part in conquering and holding Ceylon. On this occasion we are told that the Madras soldiers ' volunteered

from family ; and prolonged detention abroad on garrison duty—three years being recognized as the maximum limit—would cause dissatisfaction ; but there does not seem to have been any insuperable objection to it on religious grounds. A General Order was made on July 25, 1856, providing that the Bengal Sepoys should thenceforth, like the Madras and Bombay Sepoys, be enlisted without any limitation of place. No recruit was to be accepted ' who does not at the time of enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond Seas, whether within the Territories of the Company or beyond them '. In his *Forty-one Years in India* (1897 ed., vol. i, pp. 435–6) Lord Roberts refers to this Order as one of the causes of discontent in the Native Army prior to the Mutiny, and says ' Service in Burma, which entailed crossing the sea, and, to the Hindu, consequent loss of caste, was especially distasteful '.

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in corps for foreign service '.[1] At the same date, and with the same policy of securing the Dutch dependencies, lest they should become French possessions, Malacca was taken in August 1795, Amboyna and the Spice Islands in 1796. In these operations, again, Indian soldiers, mainly Madras men, were employed, some of them remaining in garrison at Malacca, Amboyna, and Banda till 1801.[2] In this last year, in June 1801, the island of Ternate was taken by a force sent from Amboyna, which included detachments from all the three Presidencies. Reference has already been made to the expedition which was organized against Manila in 1797. It was eventually abandoned, but not until some of the Madras troops, who had volunteered for the service, had been carried on their way as far as Penang. It may be noted that the island of Penang had been in the hands of the East India Company since 1786, when it was granted to them by the Sultan of Kedah in return for an annuity of $6,000; and in 1791 some Bengal Sepoys, who were at Penang, saw some small fighting in the state of Kedah.

The Egyptian expedition of 1801.

In 1797 Lord Wellesley became Governor-General of India, vigorous, aggressive, countering French menace and French intrigue both in and out of India. With the opening of the nineteenth century, Indian soldiers were sent yet farther afield than the islands of the East, and served for the first time outside the bounds of Asia. Few probably at the present day bear in mind that, as far back as 1801, Indian troops crossed the sea to fight in

[1] *Short Account, &c., ut sup.*, p. 330. For the employment of Indian soldiers on foreign service see 'East India (Native Troops). Copy of Minutes by the Most Noble the Marquis of Tweeddale, Kt., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Madras, of the 6th day of March 1845, and of the 28th day of March 1845, upon the system under which native troops of that Presidency are employed on foreign service, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed in April 1867.' See also the Blue Book of 1832, already quoted; Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*, 1882; *A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Army*, by Lt. F. G. Cardew, 1903, &c. A short account is given in *India's Fighters, Their Mettle, History, and Services to Britain*, by Saint Nihal Singh, 1914.

[2] A battalion which remained on foreign service for five years, returning to Madras in 1801, was 'thanked in general orders for its exemplary zeal and spirit; and honorary badges were given to all ranks' (Wilson, *ut sup.*, vol. ii, p. 259 note).

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Egypt. As in our own time, so in the days of Napoleon, Egypt loomed large in the eyes of those who contemplated military domination of Europe, and, through Europe, of the world. As Germany under the Kaiser, so France under the leading of Napoleon, when faced by the sea-power of England, aimed at securing an inner and inland route to the East, and riveting control of that route by possession of Egypt. In 1798 Napoleon carried out the first part of the programme in person, taking Alexandria and, after the battle of the Pyramids, Cairo and the rest of Lower Egypt. The battle of the Pyramids had hardly been fought and won, when Nelson on sea, at the Battle of the Nile, changed the whole outlook. In the following year Napoleon left Egypt and the French army of occupation under Kleber to take care of themselves, and in 1800 the British Government, in their turn, determined to send an army to Egypt. This was the army which, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, won the battle of Alexandria in March 1801. The Indian Government had been asked to co-operate, and Lord Wellesley diverted to the purpose a small force which had been intended for service against the Dutch in Java and the French in Mauritius. The expedition numbered over 5,000 men in all, including troops which were sent up from the Cape and did not join the main body until after the latter had started from Bombay. The native soldiers numbered 1,940 rank and file: there were three battalions, two from Bombay,[1] one from Bengal, the Bengal battalion having been brought round by sea from Calcutta via Trincomalee to Bombay. The whole force was under the command of Sir David Baird. It had been intended to land at Suez, but the winds were contrary, there was a chapter of mishaps, some transports were lost in the Red Sea, others were damaged, and the eventual landing-place, reached in the early part of June 1801, was Kosseir, whence there was a desert march of rather over 100

[1] The successors of these two Bombay battalions, the 102nd Grenadiers and the 113th Infantry bear 'Egypt' on their colours. They served in Mesopotamia during the late war and did not revisit Egypt. The Bengal battalion was disbanded. The 2nd Sappers and Miners also bear 'Egypt'.

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miles to the Nile at Keneh, half-way between Assiut and Assouan. This march was carried out with much care and good management. 'Everywhere the cannon passed with facility, the principal part of which was drawn by bullocks brought with the army from India.'[1] From Keneh, about the end of July, the army marched a little way down the bank of the Nile to Girgeh; thence they were carried in boats to Cairo, and after a halt at Cairo, on to Rosetta, where they arrived on the last day of August. They were just too late to take any part in the fighting, for the French at Alexandria under Menou, who had succeeded to Kleber, were in the act of surrendering to General Hely-Hutchinson, Abercromby's successor. The Turks in those days were on the British side, and the appearance of the Indian troops seems to have made a great impression upon them. They 'were astonished at the novel spectacle of men of colour being so well disciplined and trained: indeed, the general magnificence of the establishment of the Indian army was so different from what they had been accustomed to see in General Hutchinson's, that the contrast could not fail of being striking.'[1] The regiments returned to India in the summer of 1802.

Indian soldiers at Macao, at the capture of the French islands in the Indian Ocean,

In 1808 a Sepoy battalion was sent to Macao under Captain Weguelin, to strengthen the Portuguese in this Chinese station against the possibility of French attacks. It was a volunteer battalion from the Bengal Army, raised for the special purpose and subsequently disbanded. Their stay was short, for the expedition was not to the liking of the Chinese; but it is noteworthy as the first appearance of the Indian Army in the China seas. An expedition had been projected against the French island of Mauritius in 1794, and on this, as on other occasions, the Madras soldiers answered well to the call for volunteers; but their services were not required, as the enterprise was abandoned. In 1800, again, as has been told, a similar project was postponed in favour of the expedition to Egypt. At length, in 1809, the time came for deciding the

[1] *History of the British Expedition to Egypt*, by Col. Sir R. T. Wilson, second ed., 1803, pp. 171–207.

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fate of the French islands in the Indian Ocean. In that year the island of Rodriguez was occupied, as a base for further action. In July 1810 the Île de Bourbon was taken ; [1] and in December Mauritius, then known as the Île de France. In the capture of these islands Indian troops played a prominent part. They were mainly Sepoys from Madras and Bombay, but two volunteer battalions from Bengal were included among the forces to which Mauritius surrendered. In the following year, 1811, a successful expedition from India took from the Dutch their great island of Java.[2] The Native troops employed came from Bengal and Madras, Bengal sending six battalions of Native infantry, some of whom served continuously in the island, until it was finally restored to the Dutch in 1816.

and at the taking of Java.

This bare recital is yet sufficient to show how wide a field was covered [3] in the Great Empire War of more than a century ago, by the activities of an army which was at the time hardly fifty years old, and whose soldiers were servants of a company, not of the King. In counting up what the British Empire owes to the fighting men of India, it should never be forgotten how much they contributed in the Napoleonic wars to the downfall of military despotism and to the triumph of the self-same cause for which England and India in our own day have once more striven—not in vain.

[1] The present 66th and 84th Punjabis (then Madras Native Infantry) and the present 104th Wellesley's Rifles (then Bombay Native Infantry) carry Bourbon on their colours. All these three units served in Mesopotamia in the late War.

[2] For the Java Expedition see Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, vol. vii, chap. xli.

[3] How far afield Indian soldiers are said to have served is shown by the following Question and Answer in the Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1867 on *Army* (*India and the Colonies*), House of Commons Paper 478, July 26, 1867, p. 43. Q. 'Do you remember one remarkable instance that has occurred of the employment of Native troops at a colony out of India, namely the garrisoning at the beginning of this century, or the end of last century, of Nootka Sound, on the coast of America, by a wing of the first Grenadier Bombay regiment for six months?' A. 'I was not aware of that. We send natives of India to the West Indies ; so far as that goes, if you give them sufficient inducement, they will go anywhere for a time.' A reference to the India Office, however, has failed to verify this statement as to the employment

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SECTION II

1816–1885

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN ARMY (CONTINUED) AND THE INDIAN NAVY

Military despotism and coalitions.

THE Battle of Waterloo ended an era in which a supreme effort was made to impose armed force upon the world. It was made by a nation in arms, which, having broken the old régime of feudalism and monarchy in its own land, went in the strength of success and the inspiration of liberty along the path of military domination. Along that path the nation was led by the greatest war-lord of all times, himself a product of the Revolution. The effort was broken, after long years of fighting, by a European coalition against single military ascendancy, and by gradual exhaustion of the force upon which that ascendancy rested; the two chief obstacles to Napoleon's success being the land strength of Russia and the sea strength of England, which exhausted his efforts, and, combined with the uprising in Spain, laid him open to the decisive counterstrokes of 1813–14.

Since Waterloo, and since the War of 1812, there has been unbroken peace between Great Britain and France, and between Great Britain and the United States, though in both cases from time to time relations have been strained. In the Crimean War Great Britain and France joined hands against Russia, this being the first and only war in which Russia and Great Britain have been directly opposed to each other. In 1914, Russia, France, and Great Britain were in line, and once more there was a European coalition in defence of national liberties threatened by the military strength of a single Power.

We have seen that in the Napoleonic wars the British Empire, as we know it to-day, was in its infancy; that the self-governing Dominions were still unformed; that

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Canada and Newfoundland alone among them were at all concerned in the war; and that they were not really concerned with the main war itself but with a side issue. Imperial co-operation was represented by the employment of Indian troops, not, it is true, in Europe, but outside Europe on a wide field of action, extending from Egypt to China. It is now proposed to trace the growth of Empire partnership for seventy years, from 1816 to 1885.

In the eighteenth century, between the first main war with France as the exponent of military domination, which ended in 1713, and the second main war with France as the exponent of military domination, which ended in 1815, there was, as has been told, a notable mid-century war, the Seven Years War, most fruitful of issues to the British Empire. This war was followed by the disruption of the Empire, as the result of the War of American Independence. In the nineteenth century, the Crimean War came midway between the Napoleonic wars and the present war; but, unlike the Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War had only an indirect bearing upon the fortunes of the Empire. The Crimean War, in turn, was followed by a most dangerous rising within the Empire, the Indian Mutiny; but no disruption followed. What followed was the extinction of the East India Company, which had done its work and whose day was past, and the raising of the status of India, by placing its control, both civil and military, in the hands of the Crown.

Services of the Indian Army to the Empire 1816–85.

'The Madras, Bombay, and Bengal Armies have been employed beyond seas from the earliest period of our connexion with India. The Madras Army has garrisoned Amboyna, Ceylon, Ava, Mauritius, the Straits Settlements, Malacca, Java, Burmah, and China; the Bombay Army has been employed in Aden, China, Scinde, and now in Abyssinia; and the Bengal Army in Egypt, Java, China, Ava, and now in Abyssinia.'[1] These words are taken from the Report of a Committee, which was appointed by the House of Commons in 1867, to consider how far

[1] *Report from the Select Committee on Army* (*India and the Colonies*), ordered by the House of Commons to be printed April 3, 1868, 197, p. 3.

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Indian troops might be employed in the Colonies in lieu of British regiments, the report being made in April 1868, at the time of the Abyssinian expedition.

Between the Battle of Waterloo and the Crimean War there was no European war in which Great Britain took part on land, though on sea her fleet, allied, as in 1914, to French vessels, was in action in 1827 at the battle of Navarino. On the other hand, this period was one of many local wars, especially in India and the Eastern seas. During these years the Indian Army was, as ever, a potent instrument in the protection and extension of the Empire. Waterloo had not yet been fought when, for the first and only time, the Government of India was at war with the Gurkhas of Nepal. From 1814–16 the fighting qualities of the mountaineers were abundantly proved, and the treaty which ended the war gave to the Empire comrades in arms, in after years tried and tested in many hard campaigns. Lord Roberts wrote of the Gurkha as the bravest Asiatic he knew.

The Gurkha War.

In 1818, Madras soldiers were employed in Ceylon to quell a Kandyan rising; and in 1824–6 came the first Burmese War, brought at length to a successful conclusion, but accompanied by great loss of life in a most unhealthy climate, and involving overseas service, the prospect of which in this instance led, in 1824, to a serious mutiny of Bengal regiments at Barrackpore near Calcutta. The native troops actually employed in this war were Madras soldiers, and their service was reputed not to have been satisfactory. On their behalf it was stated that the commander of the expedition, Sir Archibald Campbell, was prejudiced against them, and when sending them to attack sent them unsupported by British troops.[1] The whole history of British India and of the Indian Army points to co-operation between white and native soldiers as having been a prime element of success.

The Rising in Ceylon. The first Burmese War.

In this same year, 1824, Malacca, by treaty with the

[1] 'The Burmese War was exclusively carried on by British troops. The Madras troops entirely failed.' Lord W. Bentinck, March 13, 1835. See *East India* (*European and Native Troops*) ordered by the House of Commons to be printed August 1, 1867, 500, p. 75.

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Dutch, became in perpetuity a British possession, and the island of Singapore, upon which far-seeing Sir Stamford Raffles had, in 1819, established a British station, was finally ceded by its native owners to the East India Company. In 1826, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore were incorporated as a single settlement, afterwards known as the Straits Settlements, and were until 1867 a dependency of India, in the keeping of the Indian Army.

The Straits Settlements.

The reign of Queen Victoria opened with the acquisition by India of another overseas dependency. This was the Rock of Aden, taken in 1839, and from the date of its acquisition down to the present time, placed in the keeping of the Government of Bombay. Exactly two years later, in January 1841, the island of Hong-Kong was ceded to Great Britain, the cession being confirmed by the Treaty of Nanking in the following year, under the terms of which Canton, Shanghai, and three other Chinese ports were opened to British trade. This was the outcome of the first Chinese War in the years 1840–2. In this war native troops from India served and fought side by side with British regiments; and in the operations against Canton in 1841, the General in command, Sir Hugh Gough, noted how, at a critical place and time, the Sepoys 'nobly upheld the high character of the native army by unshrinking discipline and cheerful obedience'.[1] In addition to five Native Infantry battalions and sappers and miners from Madras,[2] a battalion of Bengal volunteers served in the war; they were composed of high-caste men, and the difficulty of cooking on board ship during the voyage to China is stated to have caused much mortality among them.[3]

Aden, Hong-Kong, and the First Chinese War.

Within twenty years there was a second Chinese War, which lasted intermittently from 1856 to 1860. In this

The Second Chinese War.

[1] Dispatch of Sir Hugh Gough, June 3, 1841. See the *Annual Register* for 1841, p. 501.

[2] Three of these infantry battalions, now the 62nd, 66th, and 72nd Punjabis, bear the honour of 'China'. So do the 2nd Sappers and Miners. The other two Madras Infantry battalions were subsequently disbanded.

[3] See House of Commons Paper 478, July 26, 1867, *Army* (*India and the Colonies*), *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 3, evidence of Col. (Sir Henry) Norman.

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war, as in the Crimean War, French and English joined hands. It was the war which originated with the boarding by the Chinese of the trading vessel *Arrow* in October 1856, an incident that led to one of the most memorable of all the Parliamentary debates of the last century, to the defeat of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and to his sweeping victory at the polls. Canton was shelled; the Bogue forts were taken; and in 1857 troops were dispatched from England to support the British plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin, in enforcing the demands of the Allies; but on the news of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, they were, at Singapore, diverted to India. Notwithstanding, the Chinese war went on. Canton was taken in January 1858, and shortly afterwards, in February and May, reinforcements of loyal Indian soldiers arrived in China to fight for the Empire.[1] The mouth of the Peiho river was forced, and in June 1858 the Treaty of Tientsin for the moment put an end to the fighting. In the following year, however, the British and French ambassadors, on their way to Peking, were held up by the forts which guarded the entrance to the Peiho, and an attempt by a British squadron to carry the forts failed with considerable loss of life. This was in June 1859, and as the Mutiny had now been stamped out, it was decided to send a strong expeditionary force from India to China. It was a mixed army of some 10,000 men, under the command of Sir Hope Grant, with whom went the future Lord Wolseley, then Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley,[2] and it included among the native contingent Sikh regiments, which had volunteered for the service. The campaign in North China was short and decisive: in August 1860 the forts on the Peiho were captured; in October Peking was occupied by the Allied troops; and the Convention of Peking in that month confirmed the

[1] Two Bengal Native Infantry battalions, now the 10th Jats and 11th Rajputs, were already serving in China and remained loyal. The third old Bengal regiment, which bears 'China 1858–1859', was the 7th Rajputs, and formed part of Townshend's sixth division in Mesopotamia.

[2] Lord Wolseley has given an excellent account of the expedition in *The Story of a Soldier's Life.*

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Treaty of Tientsin and put a final end to the war. The native troops, which at one time or another were employed in this lingering and protracted war, included cavalry, as well as infantry, and regiments from all the Presidencies. They included also the Ceylon Rifle Corps, composed largely of Malays. In the opinion of Charles Gordon, the Sikhs and the other fighting men of the north of India were the Indian soldiers who most commanded the respect of their Chinese adversaries.[1]

The Persian War.

The Chinese War coincided with and outlived the Indian Mutiny. On the very eve of the Mutiny, Indian troops had been employed overseas in another direction, in the Persian Gulf. In the teeth of an agreement lately concluded with the British Government, the Persians besieged Herat, which surrendered to them in late October 1856: the Government of India issued a proclamation of war: a squadron and transports were sent to the Gulf; and, after bombardment, the port of Bushire was occupied in December. At the beginning of 1857 a stronger expeditionary force was sent from Bombay, under the command of Sir James Outram, with whom was Havelock, soon to be associated with him again in the relief of Lucknow. Outram reached Bushire towards the end of January; there was fighting near that place, and later at Mohammerah on the Karun river; and the war ended with a treaty signed in Paris in March, and ratified at Baghdad in May, under which the Persians gave up Herat, and complied with British demands. In this war, native troops, principally from Bombay and Sind, were employed, as always, side by side with British regiments, fighting for the Empire just as the great Sepoy revolt was maturing in India.[2] Outram himself remained in Persia until the beginning of June, returning to India to become at once a foremost leader in the crisis.

[1] *Report from the Select Committee on Army (India and the Colonies) ut sup.*, Minutes of Evidence, p. 135. Various present units of the Indian Army carry 'China 1860–1862', 'Taku Forts', and 'Pekin'.

[2] Among these Bombay troops were three units whose successors were among the first to be sent to the Persian Gulf in 1914–15, i. e. the present 104th Wellesley's Rifles, the 120th Rajputanas, and the 33rd Light Cavalry.

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The Second Burmese War. The Sikhs.

There had been before this time a second Burmese War, involving further overseas service of Indian troops, and resulting in the annexation of Lower Burma at the end of 1852. A Sikh battalion volunteered for service in this war,[1] and served in it, although barely three years had passed since the Sikh nation had fought its hardest against the English at Chillianwallah and Gujerat, and the second Sikh war had ended with the annexation of the Punjab in March 1849. In Burma the Sikhs began a long and glorious record of service for the Empire, beyond the seas, as well as within the bounds of India.

The Indian Mutiny.

The present review of the work of the Indian Army in past years is necessarily confined mainly to noting the overseas expeditions, in which the soldiers of India took part, and mention of Afghan and other wars upon the Indian frontier has been omitted, but it must never be forgotten how much the British Empire in India itself, from the first days until now, has owed to the loyalty and discipline of native regiments. They have been commanded, it is true, by Englishmen; but throughout the ranks they have been composed of natives of India, joining with the English to lay the foundations and rear the fabric of the great system which holds the field to-day. The danger of the Indian Mutiny lay in the preponderating numbers of native troops as compared with white regiments; but this very fact proves the extent to which native troops had been utilized as a machinery for enlarging the sphere of British rule in India and of British influence on the borders of India. In the chronicles of the wars in India, and not least in the story of the Indian Mutiny, we find a constant and striking illustration of the mutual confidence which all the world over has marked the onward path of the British Empire. India was the only part of the Empire outside Europe which was to any appreciable extent affected by the Crimean War. This was due to Russian influence and prestige in Central

[1] The present 54th Sikhs, who, in the late War, gained distinction in Palestine.

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Asia. On the 13th of September, 1854,[1] Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, wrote of 'the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia, which has been formed by the people of India', and continued, 'It must be borne in mind that India has to play her own part in this contest; that, unlike Canada and the Colonies of the Crown, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend'. The Crimean War, it can hardly be doubted, was one of the contributory causes of the Indian Mutiny. The Mutiny was a rising of the Bengal Native Army. Great and far-reaching as was the crisis, it was confined in the main to Northern and Central India. The Bombay Army was only partially affected, the Madras Army was loyal. If the Mutiny betokened widespread disaffection among the natives of India, none the less it gave ample evidence of Indian constancy to British rule. If it was through the leadership and inspiration of Englishmen that the trouble was surmounted and India kept safe for the Empire, the leaders were followed, and the fighting was done by natives of India as well as of Great Britain. Indians as well as English held the Residency of Lucknow[2]; a Sikh regiment formed part of Havelock's relieving force.[3] Native soldiers of the Punjab, infantry, cavalry, artillerymen, sent down by John Lawrence, largely contributed to the fall of Delhi.[4] Conspicuous among them was the famous corps of Guides, hard-fighting frontiersmen of the north, first raised nine years before at the instance of Henry Lawrence. Native Madrasi regiments were shipped to Calcutta and served in Bengal. Baluchi battalions, Maratha cavalry, Sind horse, fought for the British cause. The Protected Native States, with rare

[1] *Report from the Select Committee on Army (India and the Colonies), ut sup.*, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 326–7.

[2] The loyal remnants of three Bengal battalions in the Lucknow garrison were formed into the Lucknow Regiment, now the 16th Rajputs. Similarly the 17th Infantry (the Loyal Regiment) was constituted out of the loyal remnants of another three battalions.

[3] Now the 14th (King George's Own Ferozepore) Sikhs.

[4] Fourteen Indian units, as against eight British, have 'Delhi' among their honours.

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exceptions, were loyal. Rulers were loyal, even when their soldiers were not, as was the case with Sindhia, in Gwalior. The great Southern Principality of Hyderabad was kept in hand through the unswerving firmness of its wise and strong minister, Sir Salar Jung. The Indian Mutiny is quoted in history as a supreme effort of native soldiers to overturn the British Empire in India; but it should be quoted also as a great illustration of the fact to which the whole history of the English in India testifies, that we owe our Indian Empire in large measure to the natives of India themselves.

There was no rest for the Indian Army. As we have seen, before the Mutiny had passed and gone, Indian soldiers were fighting in China; and in 1867–8, now soldiers of the Queen, not of the Honourable East India Company, they were fighting in Abyssinia.

The proposal to send Sikh regiments to New Zealand.

In the interval, in the year 1863, it had been contemplated to send them further afield than ever. Sir George Grey, then Governor of New Zealand for the second time, had, on the advice of his ministers, and in view of a recent murder of British officers and soldiers, portending a renewal of the Maori wars, asked that the military forces in New Zealand should be strengthened by the addition of one European regiment, and of two Sikh regiments from India. Military men in New Zealand, who had served in India, had represented that Sikh troops would be specially well adapted for New Zealand warfare, and the Government decided to comply with the request. A letter was written to the Governor-General of India, Lord Elgin, instructing him to send the two Sikh regiments, made up to 2,200 men, to be paid for by New Zealand, as the New Zealand Ministers had proposed. But immediately afterwards there came second thoughts. The additional cost, which would have been directly or indirectly involved, was estimated at a higher rate than the New Zealand Government had calculated, and Anglo-Indian opinions were forthcoming to question any special aptitude of Sikh soldiers, as compared with Europeans, for bush-fighting in New Zealand. British regiments were

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therefore substituted for Sikhs, but not in deference to any objection raised in Parliament; for it is very noteworthy that the proposal to send Indian soldiers to the Southern Seas excited no interest or comment at the time, though it was called to mind at a later date in the heated Parliamentary discussion which arose upon the dispatch of an Indian contingent to Malta in the year 1878.[1]

The Abyssinian War.

In 1867 King Theodore of Abyssinia held in captivity a number of Europeans, including four British officials; and, inasmuch as repeated demands for their release had proved ineffectual, it became necessary to send an armed expedition to bring him to reason. The enterprise was wholly entrusted to India, and from India some 13,500 troops were dispatched, of whom under 4,000 were Europeans.[2] The native contingent included two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry from Bengal, the Bengal brigade being under the command of Donald Stewart, to whom the future Lord Roberts was Assistant-Quartermaster-General. The other Indian soldiers were drawn from the Bombay Presidency: the arrangements were left in the hands of the Bombay Government; and the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition was Sir Robert Napier, famed in the Mutiny, and at the time commanding the Bombay Army. A great engineer, Napier was emphatically the man for the work in hand; for, like various other wars, but in a singular degree, the Abyssinian campaign was a triumph of organization, road-making, and transport rather than of fighting. It was brief in duration and wholly successful. From the coast to Magdala, King Theodore's stronghold in the Abyssinian mountains, was a distance of about 400 miles: the nature of the country, not the armed forces protecting it, constituted the difficulty. The first troops from India landed at Zula in Annesley Bay at the end of September 1867;

[1] For this proposal to send Sikh regiments to New Zealand, see Hansard July 23, 1863, and see also Martineau's *Life of Henry Pelham, fifth Duke of Newcastle* (1908), pp. 324–6.

[2] See the numbers given in the note to vol. ii, p. 33, of Lord Robert's *Forty-one Years in India*, 1897 ed. Thirteen units of the present Indian Army bear the honour 'Abyssinia'.

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and, before the year closed, an advance had been made to Senafe, some way up the highlands. At the beginning of January 1868 Napier arrived on the scene. The troops went forward into the mountains: there was practically no opposition, for Theodore, a cruel tyrant, was not loved of his subjects, until the Arogi Pass was reached, a few miles from Magdala. There, on the 10th of April, there was a stand-up fight, and three days later Magdala was taken. The captives had already been unconditionally released, Theodore was dead by his own hand, and Magdala was razed to the ground. Before June ended, all the British and Indian troops had left Africa, having done their work thoroughly, with insignificant loss; and their skilful commander became Lord Napier of Magdala. In the early days of the expedition, long before it had been crowned with success, strong testimony was borne in Parliament to the Indian soldiers and their readiness to serve. 'Among all ranks of the Indian Army the greatest spirit and zeal have been shown, and there has been the utmost anxiety to take part in the dangers of the expedition, so that when volunteers were called for, twice as many came forward as were wanted.'[1]

The Perak War.

In 1867, the year in which the Abyssinian expedition started, the Straits Settlements were, for administrative purposes, separated from India, and placed, as a Crown Colony, under the Colonial Office. A regiment of Madrasis, however, continued to garrison Singapore until the year 1871, and in 1875–6 Indian troops were again called into the Malay peninsula to suppress a somewhat serious outbreak. Owing to the prevalence of piracy in the Native States adjoining the British Settlements, their rulers had been required to accept British officers as Residents, nominally to advise, really to control them. The new system was naturally not to the minds of the adherents of the old régime; towards the end of 1875 the British Resident in Perak was murdered; and it became necessary to call in troops from beyond the seas, from Hong-Kong and India, once for all to enforce law and

[1] Sir Stafford Northcote in the House of Commons, November 28, 1867.

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order in these Malay principalities. The Indian contingent included a Gurkha regiment; there was a certain amount of bush-fighting, in which Sikhs and Gurkhas took part; but the rising was gradually suppressed, anarchy passed away, and an era began of almost unexampled prosperity and progress.

Dispatch of Indian troops to Malta in 1878.

The next occasion on which the Indian Army was employed out of India, was memorable in a high degree, though no fighting was involved. In 1878, for the first time in history, native troops from India were brought beyond Egypt into the Mediterranean. They consisted of two regiments of native cavalry, six of native infantry, one of which was a Gurkha regiment, and four companies of Sappers. They numbered in all about 7,000, and all Presidencies were represented. Dispatched from India in April 1878, they reached Malta in May. In July they were sent on to Cyprus, by this time in British occupation, and at the end of August they were sent back to India. Thus the Indian Army, on Imperial service, had at length reached the fringe of Europe. It was a time when party feeling ran strong in the United Kingdom, and when the term Jingoism was coined to indicate suspicion and dislike of a forward policy. The assumption by Queen Victoria of the title of Empress of India, the dispatch of the Fleet to Constantinople, the occupation of Cyprus, the bringing of Indian soldiers upon the scene in Europe, even the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, all met with criticism. There seemed to be an undue access of Imperialism, a tendency to Orientalize British statesmanship. Both Houses of Parliament discussed the matter of the Indian contingent, and the speeches of the Opposition, strong and bitter, were directed at once against the measure itself and against the policy which was conceived to be behind it. It was held to be unconstitutional to bring the troops out of India by the fiat of the Crown, without having obtained the consent of Parliament, and so high an authority as Lord Selborne contended that it was not merely unconstitutional but contrary to the letter of the law. The vision was called up of indefinitely augmenting

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the standing Army of the United Kingdom by troops which were not under the Mutiny Act and not under Parliamentary control; and Lord Hartington, most moderate of men, laid down that 'when they are brought into the Dominion of the Crown outside India, those troops I have described as a non-Parliamentary Army must come under the same regulations as a Parliamentary force'.[1] One of the speakers from the Opposition benches was W. E. Forster, whom none might accuse of want of sympathy with the Empire and the ideals of the Empire. The words which he used are particularly interesting, when read in the light of the present day. He argued that Indian troops had only been used in Oriental wars and Asiatic enterprises. 'If India is to help us in carrying out our foreign policy, we shall have to consult Indian feeling in framing that policy: and, in my opinion, we shall have to treat India rather as an ally than as a dependency. That would be a great change; but, supposing I am wrong, is it no change to rely not upon the patriotism and spirit of our own people, but upon the power of our money bags, to get Gurkhas and Sikhs and Mussulmen to fight for us?'[2] Assuredly, since the date when these words were spoken, a change has come over the spirit of our dream. The controversies which raged in the year 1878 are happily dead and gone; but there remains the outstanding fact that at this date India took a distinct step forward as an integral part of the organism of the Empire.

The Egyptian War of 1882.

In 1880 Lord Beaconsfield was displaced by Mr. Gladstone, and a little later the new Government was faced with trouble in Egypt. A Nationalist rising in that country under Arabi Pasha led to the bombardment of Alexandria by British ships, and to the dispatch of an expeditionary force in 1882 under Sir Garnet Wolseley, as he then was. As in 1801, so eighty-one years later, the forces sent to Egypt from Great Britain were supplemented by troops sent from India. These latter numbered about 7,000 men in all, under the command of Sir Herbert

[1] Debate of May 20, 1878. [2] Debate of May 23, 1878.

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Macpherson. The native troops included three regiments of cavalry and two of infantry from Bengal, and one infantry regiment, a Baluchi regiment, from Bombay, together with sappers from Madras, the total native contingent being rather under 5,000 men. The first regiment from India landed in Egypt on the 24th of August, 1882, and in the second week of September the whole body was gathered at Ismailia. Some Bengal Lancers took part in the fight at Kassassin on the 9th of September, and at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, on the 13th, the Indian soldiers, both horse and foot, were in the fighting line. The native cavalry were among the mounted men who pushed on to Zagazig the same evening and captured the station, and were among the first to reach Cairo. By the end of October the whole force had returned to India.[1]

The fighting at Suakim in 1885.

Three years afterwards, in 1885, the Mahdist rising in the Sudan and the fall of Khartoum brought Indian troops again into the Red Sea, to hold Suakim and to take part in the operations for which that port was the base. It was a small contingent, consisting of one cavalry regiment and two infantry regiments from Bengal, and one infantry regiment from Bombay, General Hunter being in command.[2] The force landed at Suakim on the 14th of March, and on the 22nd was in action at Tofrek, where one of the Bengal Infantry battalions had some sharp fighting. The *Annual Register* for the year tells us that 'The Indian troops, after displaying a little unsteadiness, soon became

[1] Of the three Cavalry units two (2nd Lancers and 6th Cavalry) came to France in 1914 and were moved to Palestine in the spring of 1918. The third (13th (Watson's Horse) Lancers) had a long term of service in Mesopotamia. Of the Infantry two units (7th Rajputs and 20th Punjabis) were both in Townshend's Poona division in Mesopotamia, and the 20th served in Palestine also. The third Infantry unit (129th Baluchis) formed part of the Lahore division in 1914, and was one of two Indian battalions each of which claims to have been the first to engage the Germans.

[2] The Cavalry battalion was the 9th Hodson's Horse, who came to France in 1914 and subsequently in 1918 greatly distinguished themselves in Palestine. The Infantry units were the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, part of the Lahore division which went to France in 1914, the 17th (Loyal Regiment) Infantry, who served in East Africa and Palestine, and the 128th Pioneers, who served in Mesopotamia.

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accustomed to the Arab methods of fighting, and showed themselves capable and courageous soldiers, and, with their European weapons, more than a match for the Arabs.[1] One of the infantry battalions and a squadron of cavalry remained in garrison at Suakim till the following November: the rest returned to India at an earlier date, the projected advance and railway from Suakim to the Nile having been definitely abandoned, and India needing all her strength at home; for this was the year of Russian encroachment upon the frontiers of Afghanistan and the so-called Panjdeh incident; it was also the year of the third and last Burmese War. It may be added that an offer of Indian soldiers in this year, 1885, came from another quarter than India. A Sikh regiment had been raised for service in the Protected Malay States, and a contingent of these soldiers was placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government. Their services, however, were not required.

The Suakim expedition came at the end of one of England's failures, the failure to relieve Gordon and Khartoum and to hold the Sudan against barbarism. It was itself little more than a failure, at best a stillborn expedition. Notwithstanding, the episode has an interest out of all proportion to the actual results at the place and at the time, for here, as will be presently told, Australian troops for the first time took part in the wars of the Empire, and it should never be forgotten that, in doing so, they found themselves at once shoulder to shoulder with fighting men of the Indian Army.

Payment of Indian troops on Imperial Service.

India has been a wonderful asset to Great Britain and to the British Empire, not least because, as has been proved time and again, in India there is always a large armed force of highly disciplined soldiers available at times of emergency for Imperial purposes. This great advantage has necessarily been coupled with a temptation to utilize Indian services outside India at Indian expense; in the words of the late Lord Salisbury,[2] to look upon

[1] *Annual Register* for 1885, p. 346.

[2] When he was Lord Cranborne. The words were quoted in a letter from the Government of India in August 1882. See *Indian Contingent* (*Egypt Expenses*), C. 3507, 1883, p. 5.

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THE GORDON STATUE AT MELBOURNE

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India 'as an English barrack in the Oriental seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them'. To guard against this temptation, when the Act for the Better Government of India was passed in 1858, whereby the administration was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown, the following clause was inserted :[1] 'except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontier of such possessions by Her Majesty's forces charged upon such revenues'. This clause requires Parliamentary approval of any expenditure cast upon Indian revenues for Imperial purposes, and there never have been wanting men in the House of Commons, of the type of Mr. Fawcett, ready to protest against what might be construed as exaction of tribute from a great dependency of the Crown. Still the Parliament of the United Kingdom represents primarily the taxpayers of the United Kingdom, and India in the past necessarily stood in a less advantageous position as a contributing unit of the Empire than the self-governing Dominions, free to contribute or not at their own will. Were it not, however, for this contrast, India has not been treated with exceptional harshness, for the wars of later times, of which a sketch has been given, have, as the wars in Egypt and the Red Sea, largely concerned the high road to India. Even the Abyssinian campaign, as was pointed out at the time, might be depicted as one in which India had greater interest than the more remote provinces of the Empire. In the first Chinese War the ordinary pay of the Indian contingent was charged to India, the extraordinary expenditure was made good by the British Government. In the later Chinese War, when India was suffering from the strain of the Mutiny, the whole expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, with the exception of the expenses of the Indian shipping, was

[1] Sec. 55.

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borne by Great Britain. The Persian War of 1856–7 was held to be one which was undertaken exclusively in Indian interests, and in this case India bore the whole of the ordinary and half of the extraordinary expenditure of the Indian troops employed. In the case of the Abyssinian campaign, the ordinary pay of the troops was charged to India, but none of the extraordinary expenditure; and the decision to impose any of the cost upon India was questioned in the House of Commons, and regarded by Sir John Lawrence, then Governor-General, as unjust to India. The same course was taken with regard to the Perak War;[1] but the whole cost of the contingent sent to Malta in 1878 was paid by Great Britain. On the other hand, the Home Government wished to debit India with the whole cost of the Indian troops sent to Egypt in 1882, eventually contributing £500,000 to a total expenditure which, exclusive of the ordinary pay of the soldiers, largely exceeded a million sterling.[2] In the case of the contingent sent to Suakim in 1885, the cost was again divided, India paying all the ordinary charges of the troops employed, and Great Britain making good all the extraordinary expenditure.[3]

Settlement of the question of allocation of cost.

Almost every expedition beyond the confines of India, in which troops, whether white or coloured, borne upon the Indian establishment, were employed, led to friction between the Indian and the Home Governments, and to protests by the former against the apportionment of the

[1] The extraordinary charges of the Perak Expedition, however, were borne not by the United Kingdom but by the Colonial Government of the Straits Settlement.

[2] The cost of the Indian contingent in 1882, exclusive of the ordinary pay of the soldiers, was estimated at £1,142,000. Apparently it actually came to £1,241,633 10*s.* 4*d.* See *Indian Contingent* (*Egypt*) *Expenses*, Cd. 3507, 1883, in which a summary of previous decisions is given, and see also the debate on the vote for the Abyssinian Expedition on November 28, 1867.

[3] It may be added that in the case of the first Afghan War India paid all the ordinary expenses of the troops and Great Britain all the extraordinary expenses. In the case of the second Afghan War, India paid all the ordinary expenses and Great Britain five millions towards the extraordinary expenses. Thus India was not debited with the whole charge of these frontier wars.

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cost, as being unfair to India. At length, in June 1896, the then Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, suggested the basis of an agreement. He proposed that, whenever the temporary loan of a military force was urgently required, either by Great Britain or by India, such assistance should as far as possible be promptly given; that if the object for which assistance was required was one in which the Government supplying the troops had no special interest beyond the common interest of all members of the Empire, the whole cost of the force should be borne by the one of the two parties which required the aid: and that, if the case was one in which the Government supplying the troops had a 'distinct and special' interest, although it might be less pronounced than that of the Government requiring the assistance, a part of the cost should be borne by the Government whose aid was invoked. Before this dispatch was written to India, a Royal Commission had been appointed in May 1895 'to inquire into the administration and management of the military and civil expenditure incurred under the authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council or of the Government of India, and the apportionment of charge between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for purposes in which both are interested'. Evidence was taken on the question at issue, and in their final report, which was dated April 1900, the Commissioners, starting with Lord George Hamilton's dispatch and following a lead given to them in the evidence of Lord Northbrook, who had been Viceroy of India, suggested that geographical limits might be laid down as a basis for determining the allocation of cost. They indicated that, apart from special cases which might arise, India had no direct and substantial interest in the employment of forces in Europe; in Africa, West of the Cape of Good Hope; in Asia, East of China: that it had a direct and substantial interest in keeping open the Suez Canal, in Egypt and the coasts of the Red Sea, so far as the security of the Canal and the Red Sea was concerned, in questions affecting

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Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Coast and Siam, in Afghanistan and the adjoining areas of Central Asia: that it had, or might have, a modified interest in the East Coast of Africa from Zanzibar northwards, in China and the Malay Peninsula. Should the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India be at issue as to whether or not any particular expedition was of distinct and special interest to one or other of the two parties, the Commissioners suggested that the question should be referred to a representative committee, whose report, with the decision of the Home Government upon it, should be laid before Parliament, which has the last voice in these matters. This solution was in 1902 accepted on both sides, and a much-vexed question was laid to rest.

White soldiers in India.

So far as the foregoing pages have related to India,[1] attention has been almost exclusively devoted to the Indian Army. It is perhaps unnecessary to recall the fact that in the service of the East India Company were white soldiers as well as coloured. For nearly a century and a half, ships or soldiers of the Crown took little or no part in fighting in Indian Seas or on Indian soil. There were two or three years during which soldiers in the pay of the Crown garrisoned Bombay, after it had been ceded by Portugal to Charles II, and before it was handed over by the King to the East India Company:[2] but otherwise

[1] See the *Indian Expenditure Commission*, vol. iv, Final Report, Cd. 131, 1900, pp. 111–4. See also *Indian Expenditure* (*Royal Commission copy of further correspondence between the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Treasury, &c.*), 169, May 1, 1902. In the second volume of the *Report of the Indian Expenditure Commission*, Appendices, Cd. 8259, 1896, will be found at p. 305 the apportionment of charges of the foreign expeditions in which the Indian Army took part between 1838 and 1886, and at p. 364 the details of the troops borrowed by England from India between the Mutiny and 1886. Lord Northbrook's evidence will be found in vol. iii, Cd. 130, 1900.

[2] Bombay was ceded to Charles II in 1661 as part of the dower of his queen, Catherine of Braganza. A small squadron with 500 soldiers on board arrived in September 1662 to take it over, but the Portuguese refused to give it up, and the English did not come into possession till 1665. Charles II handed it over to the Company by a grant dated March 27, 1669. The survivors of the 500 soldiers, who, it is interesting to note, were largely ex-Cromwellians, took service under the Company and were the nucleus of the Company's first European regiment or Bombay Fusiliers. These

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not until the year 1747 were King's soldiers sent out from England, and the first regiment of the Line to see service in India only landed in 1754. It was the 39th, now the 1st battalion of the Dorsetshire Regiment: Plassey is on its colours, and the motto 'Primus in Indis'.[1] Plassey is also on the colours of two other regiments, the Munsters and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers: they are the descendants of the British soldiers of the East India Company.[2] Whether the white men fighting in India were servants of the Company or servants of the Crown, India was a training-ground for the British race in military matters as in civil administration. Few among many, the English in India developed in a rare degree initiative, self-reliance, and resource: they learnt to assimilate their methods of warfare to diverse conditions, to prepare for and to face emergencies, to adjust themselves to time and place, the bedrock of military success being always the conjunction of a small number of white soldiers with a larger number of native soldiers, officered and led by white men.

The Indian Navy

Meanwhile, the East India Company supplemented its land forces by a navy as enterprising and efficient as the Indian Army. From the year 1612, when two little armed ships under Captain Best gave a good account of a far stronger force of Portuguese vessels in the roadstead of Surat, gaining by their prowess privileges for the Company in the dominions of the Great Mogul, on sea, as on land, the East India Company went on from strength to

eventually became a regiment of the Line, the 103rd Foot, now famous as the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. See Sir George Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, 1891, pp. 84–5.

[1] The troops sent out in 1747 apparently consisted only of independent (i. e. non-regimental) companies, which disappeared with the Peace of 1748. Hence the Dorsetshire claim to 'Primus in Indis'.

[2] The statement of *The Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India 1891–2*, 43, March 1894, p. 174, gives the following account of the armed forces in India in 1856, the year before the Mutiny: 'The East India Company maintained a force of 38,000 Europeans with 276 guns, and 348,000 Natives with 248 guns. Of the former, nine battalions of Infantry, 6,000 strong, were recruited by the Crown in the United Kingdom and made over for training to the Company's authorities in England. The rest were provided by the Crown from the home army.'

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strength. Queen Elizabeth's first charter to the Company contemplated their employing armed ships in case of necessity. It provided that 'in any time of restraint six good ships and six good Pinnaces, well furnished with ordnance, and other munitions for their defence, and five hundred mariners, Englishmen, to guide and sail in the said six ships and six pinnaces, at all times, shall be quietly permitted and suffered to depart and go in the said voyages', unless the ships and mariners should be required to supplement the Royal Navy. This permission, which was for the safeguarding of the trading voyages, was repeated in later charters; but in addition the charter of Charles II, on the 3rd of April, 1661, definitely authorized the Company to send out ships of war for the security and defence of their factories when thought necessary. A subsequent charter by the same King, dated the 9th of August, 1683, authorized the establishment of Admiralty Courts and the seizure of 'Interlopers'' ships; and in the reign of James II, on the 12th of April, 1686, another charter was granted, extending the jurisdiction of the Courts of Admiralty, and authorizing the Company to appoint admirals and other sea officers, who were empowered in war-time to raise naval forces, and in time of open hostility with some other nation to exercise martial law.

After Bombay had, in 1669, been handed over to the Company by Charles II, it became their naval headquarters: in 1671 shipbuilding began there; and in 1686 the Company's navy was given the title of the Bombay Marine. There were the same combinations in the navy as in the army. As on land regiments of the Line fought side by side with regiments of the Company, so from the middle of the eighteenth century, ships of the Royal Navy and ships of the Bombay Marine were to be found together on active service in eastern seas. As on land white soldiers and native soldiers fought side by side, so white and coloured men combined to man the ships of the East India Company. Moreover, in 1777, a native battalion was raised for the purpose of supplying marines for service

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on board the Company's ships, 500 Sepoys, afterwards raised to 1,000, who, on the abolition of the Navy, became the 21st regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, now the 121st Pioneers.

In all the overseas operations in which the Indian Army was concerned, the Indian Navy also took a part. It had a hand in the capture of Ceylon, of Mauritius, of Java, in the expedition to Egypt, in Burmese wars, in Chinese wars, in the taking of Aden, in the manifold expeditions to the Persian Gulf. Everywhere, in war-time, from the Red Sea to China, carrying and fighting, the Bombay Marine was in evidence. One of the belated captures in the American War of 1812–14, was the Company's tug *Nautilus*, taken by an American warship in the Straits of Sunda in June 1815, nearly six months after the treaty had been signed which put an end to the war. In 1845, the Company's sloop of war, *Elphinstone*, took out a newly-appointed Governor of South Australia from Bombay to Adelaide, and, carrying on Sir George Grey to govern New Zealand, came in for the Maori war in the North Island, contributing to the fighting seamen, marines, and guns. In India itself the services of the marine were constant, manifold, and effective, on land as well as at sea. We read of a naval brigade serving up the Indus in 1848, at the siege of Multan, 700 miles from the sea; and in the Mutiny detachments were to be found at one point and another on shore. Keeping the sea has from time immemorial been the special rôle of British ships and British seamen; the same task fell to the lot of the Indian Navy, the same tradition was worthily upheld. The records are replete with the suppression of piracy, off the coast of India, on all shores of the Indian Ocean, in the Red Sea, in the Persian Gulf, in Malay waters. Invaluable in this respect to the trade and the shipping of the Empire, the Company's ships equally served the cause both of commerce and of science in the matter of marine surveys, extending from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the East Coast of Africa, to the China Seas, to the Pelew Islands, New Guinea, New Caledonia,

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and Tasmania. In the words of Sir Roderick Murchison, addressed to the Royal Geographical Society in 1862, 'The war services of the Indian Navy, as well as the beneficial and enduring results of its repression of piracy and the slave trade, are well known. These services have been varied, honourable and useful; but in the eyes of geographers, the widespread and lasting utility of the excellent surveys made by officers of the Indian Navy hold an equally prominent place.' The war has made Mesopotamia, which was before hardly known to Englishmen except in Bible story, a land of present and living interest, and the Bagdad route has become recognized as a leading feature in world policy. It may therefore well be recalled that the exploration of the Euphrates valley in the years 1835–42, with a view to the possibility of communication between England and India by the line of this river, was carried out with the co-operation of the Indian Navy, and largely by its officers. Finally, the great dockyard at Bombay became the mother of ships for the Royal Navy as well as for the Indian Marine, Indian teak supplementing British oak. Various ships of war in the service of the Crown hailed from Bombay, among them the *Asia*, Admiral Codrington's flagship at the battle of Navarino.

In one form or another the Indian Navy had a life of exactly two and a half centuries. For most of the time, from 1686 to 1830, it was known as the Bombay Marine. But there also grew up a Bengal fleet, which in 1829 or 1830 was amalgamated with the Bombay Marine, and to the combined ships was given the title, which had assuredly been richly earned, of the Indian Navy. The armed vessels of the Company had been called into being not only as against foreign foes and native pirates, but also as against British interlopers, who infringed the Company's trade monopoly. This latter function entirely disappeared when, in 1834, the China trade was thrown open, the Indian monopoly having already disappeared in 1813. But the Navy outlived the Company which it had served so well, coming to an end, except as a purely

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local service, in 1863. It had a rich and fruitful record, and the services of India to the Empire cannot be adequately measured without counting up the achievements of the Indian Navy.[1]

[1] For the above see the *History of the Indian Navy, 1613–1863*, by Charles Rathbone Low, two vols., 1877; and the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol. xliii, January 1914, April 1914, July 1914, and vol. xliv, January 1915. See also *Indian Expenditure Commission*, vol. iv, Final Report Cd. 131, 1900, pp. 114–5.

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CHAPTER IV

COLONIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF COLONIAL SELF-DEFENCE

Responsible government in the Colonies.

BETWEEN the date of the Battle of Waterloo and the Crimean War, responsible Government for the Colonies came into being, and to the list of the future self-governing Dominions a great addition was made in 1840, when, by the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maories of New Zealand accepted the sovereignty of Great Britain. In that same year the Union Act was passed, reuniting Upper and Lower Canada, as the result of Lord Durham's mission in 1838. Ten years later, by about the year 1848, in this reunited Canada the system of responsible government was fully established, and by 1860 all the British North American and Australasian Colonies, with the single exception of Western Australia, were in possession of self-government. It came into existence in South Africa at a little later date, responsible government in the Cape Colony dating from 1872.

The Colonies and the Crimean War.

While this evolution was taking place, Great Britain and France went to war with Russia in the Crimea. As has been pointed out,[1] this was a war in which the British Colonies beyond the seas had no direct interest; and, even if their security had been nearly concerned, they were not yet sufficiently advanced to play a part beyond their own shores. Still the war did something to quicken the feeling of loyalty to a common cause, and to suggest to the overseas communities the duty of, and the possible necessity for, self-defence. The war appealed rather especially to Canadian sentiment, inasmuch as French and

Canada.

British were, as in 1914, brothers-in-arms. An Address from St. Catherine's in Ontario may be taken as illustrating the prevalent feeling. 'Should the emergencies of war require the withdrawal of the Regular troops from Canada, we will in that case loyally assume the defence of the

[1] See above, pp. 43 and 48–9.

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LORD DURHAM

From a mezzotint by Samuel Cousins, R.A., after the portrait by Sir Thos. Lawrence, P.R.A.

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colony, and preserve (as we have done before) this country as part of the British Empire.' The Address continued: 'Nor do we entertain a fear of the final issue, when two such nations are united, having with them the sympathies and prayers of so large a portion of the civilized world.'[1] The date of this Address was May 1854; in the following November the Canadian Parliament voted an Address on the battle of the Alma, which had been fought on the previous 20th of September, and a sum of £20,000 for the widows and orphans of the sailors and soldiers of Great Britain and France.[2]

Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

In the Nova Scotian House of Assembly, Joseph Howe, great democrat and great patriot, spoke to the effect that 'It is but right that the outlying portions of the Empire should comprehend and should discharge the obligations which in such a crisis rest upon them'. The House voted £2,000 for the relief, education, and support of the widows and orphans of sailors and soldiers; and assurance was given that, if the Regular regiments were withdrawn from Halifax, the Militia might be relied upon for the defence of the Colony, Governor Le Marchant being prepared to organize it and estimating that the numbers might if necessary be raised to 50,000.[3] The adjoining province of New Brunswick gave £5,000 and expressed itself as equally prepared to rely upon Militia for its defence.[4] It may be noted that Joseph Howe gave substantial proof of his personal patriotism at this time of war, by undertaking a mission to New York to recruit British subjects residing in that city for the British Army. The object of his mission became known to the New York Irishmen, and he was in no little danger from the mob. It is interesting too to bear in mind that Nova Scotia had a peculiar interest of its own in the war, in that Fenwick Williams, the gallant defender of Kars, was a Nova Scotian by birth. He came back to his native

[1] *Dispatches from Governors of British Colonies, transmitting Addresses and Resolutions on the subject of the War with Russia*, Cd. Paper, 25th January, 1855, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., pp. 8–9.

[3] Ibid., pp. 10–12.

[4] Ibid., pp. 12–13.

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Province to be its last governor, before Nova Scotia became incorporated in the Dominion of Canada.

Newfoundland.

An Address from Newfoundland was coloured by remembrance of the long-standing grievance of the Newfoundlanders. The House of Assembly called to mind that 'the people of this Colony have had much reason to complain of the sacrifice of their interests to propitiate a rival power and promote Imperial interests'; but notwithstanding, they would support the Anglo-French alliance and maintain friendly relations with the French who fished upon their shores.[1]

Australia and New Zealand.

Loyal Addresses of a similar kind came from the Southern Seas. The Legislative Council of New South Wales, for instance, expressed their determination to do all in their power to resist external aggression and maintain the Queen's authority. The citizens of Hobart were ready to make sacrifices and maintain British supremacy in the Southern hemisphere. An Address from the New Zealand House of Representatives had the merit of telling the plain facts of the case in this youngest and most distant of the British Colonies. 'This Colony, young and feeble, situated in so remote a portion of the globe, can unfortunately add but little to the expression of its unalterable attachment, and true and faithful allegiance to your Majesty's Throne and Person.'[2] Money for widows and orphans was forthcoming from these Colonies, and to some extent in Australia tentative measures were taken for self-defence. A volunteer force was enrolled in Sydney consisting of a troop of cavalry, a battery of artillery, and six companies of foot, but the force died out when the war was over. Another volunteer corps was raised in Victoria; and in South Australia a Militia Act was passed, intended to call out 2,000 men, but was not brought into operation. From all parts of the Empire, not least from the West Indies, came addresses and gifts, proportioned to the means of the different Colonies; and the overseas contributions to the Patriotic Fund

[1] See Cd. Paper of 25th January, 1855, p. 15.
[2] Ibid., pp. 19–20, 25.

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amounted in all to over £143,000,[1] an amount which seems very small when tried by the scale of the present day, but which was a large sum under the conditions which prevailed in the Colonies in the years 1854–5.

The Royal Canadians.

The Indian Mutiny, following close upon the Crimean War, called forth the first regiment which was raised in the present self-governing Dominions for general service abroad. This was the 100th Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment, now the first battalion of the Prince of Wales' Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians). It was raised as a Canadian unit for the Regular Army, with a strength of 1,200. The Proclamation for raising it was issued by the Governor-General of Canada at Toronto on the 3rd of March, 1858, and in the following June the first detachment left for England. In January 1859, the battalion received its colours from the then Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII. The Canadian dépôt of the regiment only lasted for some three years, and it gradually ceased to be manned from Canada. In 1881 it became the first battalion of the Leinster Regiment, being linked to an old Bombay regiment, the 109th Foot, which had served with great distinction in Central India at the time of the Mutiny.[2]

Question of Colonial defence.

With this exception, it may be summed up that at the time of the mid-century wars, between 1850 and 1860, as far as the Colonies were concerned, Imperial partnership was mainly limited to gifts of money for relief, or, at most, to elementary preparations for self-defence in the event of the removal of the Imperial garrisons. In other words, a little more than sixty years ago, the overseas provinces of the Empire, with the exception of India, so far from being prepared to fight the battles of the Empire beyond their own shores, were not prepared in any effective sense to defend those shores. Defence

[1] £143,358 10*s.* 1*d.* See Cd. Paper, August 1855, *Statement of Remittances for Patriotic Fund.*

[2] The Leinsters carry 'Niagara' on their colours. They have inherited this honour from a previous 100th Regiment, the 100th (Prince Regent's County of Dublin), which was raised in 1805, ordered to Canada, distinguished itself at Niagara in the 1812–14 war, and was disbanded in 1818.

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was still looked upon as the charge of the Mother Country. This point of view is seen to have been quite natural and reasonable, if the Empire is studied, as it should be studied, in the light of the family analogy: if it is regarded, as it should be regarded, not as an Empire at all, but rather as a family group. The head of the household protects and pays for the children of the household, until they are old enough to stand alone: and the return is forthcoming in after-years, in the event of the household falling upon evil or dangerous times. Then the children, having already taken their own fortunes into their own keeping, go on to stablish and strengthen the head of the household, the central power which protected them when they were young and weak. In the light of what has happened in the late War, words used by Mr. Gladstone, when giving evidence before a House of Commons Committee of 1861, read like a prophecy: 'I have not the smallest doubt that in the proportion that responsibilities are accepted by communities, they will be more disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self-defence, and to render loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the Empire.'[1] At the same time, and from the same family point of view, it is quite intelligible that the Colonies were late in accepting these responsibilities, in shouldering the burden of self-defence, and that even in 1864, when there was a debate in the House of Commons on the Maori war in New Zealand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then, as in 1861, Mr. Gladstone, noted to the credit of the New Zealand Government that New Zealand was the first of the Colonial possessions that had made any large contribution to the cost of a war.

Early Imperial garrisons in the Colonies.

But had this family analogy held good from the beginning? From the beginning England never exacted tribute from her Colonies. Adam Smith has already been quoted to that effect;[2] equally emphatic is the evidence of a violent critic of the Colonial policy of his

[1] *Report from the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, &c.*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed July 11, 1861: 423, Minutes of Evidence, p. 260.

[2] See above, p. 22.

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day, Sir William Molesworth. 'Every other nation has attempted, in some shape or form, to draw tribute from its Colonies, but England, on the contrary, has paid tribute to her Colonies.'[1] On the other hand, as has been emphasized, the Mother Country, in early days, and in ordinary times, had left the Colonies for the most part to take care of themselves. Here are Mr. Gladstone's words: 'The power of making peace or war was retained by the Mother Country, and the primary responsibility of self-defence borne by these colonies, at a period and under circumstances when they were almost certain to be drawn into entirely English quarrels.'[2] It is true that there was probably no year from the date when Jamaica was taken, when some Imperial garrison or vestige of an Imperial garrison might not be found, at one time or another, in one or other or more of the Colonies, in Jamaica or St. Kitts, in Virginia or New York, in Bermuda or Newfoundland. The fact that the island of St. Kitts was, down to the date of the Treaty of Utrecht, shared between the French and the English, and that there was a French garrison in the island, was a reason for maintaining an English garrison also. New York again was a ceded possession, and here the Proprietor, the Duke of York, afterwards King James II, planted a garrison for the time being. In Charles II's reign an order of the King in Council, dated the 27th June, 1679, to fix the establishment and allowance of the plantations, provided for:

Jamaica

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Major-General, per annum . . .	300	0	0
Maintenance of forts, per annum . .	600	0	0
Two companies of 100 men a-piece, besides officers, per annum	3,327	11	8

Leeward Islands

Two foot companies, each of 80 men, and officers, per annum	2,778	10	8

[1] *Selected Speeches of Sir W. Molesworth*, edited by H. E. Egerton, 1903, p. 176.

[2] *Report of Select Committee*, etc., *ut sup.*, p. 258.

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	£	s.	d.
New York			
Maintenance of forts, per annum . .	1,000	0	0
Virginia			
Major-General, per annum . . .	300	0	0
Maintenance of forts, per annum . .	600	0	0
Two companies of 100 men, and officers, per annum	3,327	11	8

All of which sums were to be paid by the Paymaster of the Forces.[1] But, even where there were garrisons, they were little better than skeletons of garrisons, recruited with difficulty and wretchedly equipped. More often than not the garrisons consisted of independent companies, paid for by the Crown or, in the case of New York, by the Proprietor, but not on the strength of the regiments of the Line; and even when the soldiers were supplied from the Line regiments, the garrisons were attached to the spot in perpetuity, never to be relieved, but left to rot on the most unpopular duty in the service and often in the most unhealthy surroundings. As late as 1804 we have a high authority on military matters speaking of the Colonies as a charnel house for British troops.[2]

When William the Third came to the throne, the only garrisons in the Colonies were one company in the Leeward Islands and two in New York.[3] Subsequently the garrisons were multiplied and, with the taking of Gibraltar and Minorca, Imperial fortresses beyond the seas began to take shape upon the horizon of the Empire. But down to the time of the Seven Years War many, if not

[1] *Calendar of State Papers (Colonial), America and West Indies, 1677–80*, pp. 382–3. See also Mr. Fortescue's Introduction to the volume.

[2] *Enquiry into the Present State of the Military Force of the British Empire, with a view to its Reorganization, Addressed to the Rt. Hon. William Pitt*, by Lt.-Col. Sir R. T. Wilson, 1804, p. 57: 'It is, however, to be hoped, that the day is not remote when our Colonies shall cease to be such a claim upon the active population of this country. That charnel house must be closed for ever against British troops.' The 38th Foot (present 1st South Staffordshires) served continuously in the West Indies from 1706 to 1765, and the 40th (present 1st South Lancashires), which was formed in 1717 by regimenting the garrisons of various American and West Indian Colonies, was not sent home until 1763.

[3] Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, vol. ii, p. 41.

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most, of the Colonies were not garrisoned. With the exception of some companies of the Grenadiers sent to Virginia in James II's reign, no Imperial troops helped the North American Colonists in their early Indian wars, as they helped them immediately after the Seven Years War against Pontiac and his confederates, as they co-operated in the nineteenth century with the South African Colonists against the Kaffirs, with the New Zealand settlers against the Maories, with the Canadian Militia against the rebel half-breeds of the Red River. In the infancy of the Colonies the Mother Country, at any rate on land, did little for their defence.

From the middle of the eighteenth century, from 1755, when the 44th and 48th regiments were sent out to take part in Braddock's disastrous enterprise, there was a wholly different tale to tell, a tale of continuous, not of occasional and spasmodic, co-operation; and, in striking the balance as between the Mother Country and the Colonies, the credit is heavily on the Mother Country's side. Imperial troops were sent out to North America in the Seven Years War in ample numbers; the troops raised in the Colonies, like the regiments of Shirley and Pepperell in the Seven Years War, were Imperial troops, raised and maintained at the cost of the Mother Country; the war was waged in North America in the immediate and direct interests of the Colonists, but the Colonists rose to the occasion only, as has been told, on promise of partial reimbursement of their expenses from the Imperial Exchequer, and even then in most cases not with a whole heart; while their subsequent unwillingness or inability to fight their own battles unaided in Pontiac's war was a direct incentive to the unfortunate attempts of the Home Government to make them contribute to defence purposes.

Defence in the West Indies.

It has been noted how conspicuous and important were the West Indies in the eighteenth century, and it is particularly interesting to trace the evolution of the defence question in the British West Indian Colonies. Their climate and their conditions were widely different

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from those of the northern and middle Colonies on the American mainland, but in their origin these island communities were bona-fide Colonies, settlements in the true sense; they were not merely tropical dependencies, they were in line with the North American Colonies, not with the factories and trading stations on the African Coast or in the East. In early days, the white Colonists, here as elsewhere, made provision for their own defence; they had their Militia laws, and the Militia laws of Antigua, for instance, held up the standard of 'a severe regular and constant discipline from which no person, of any rank or estate soever, ought to be exempted.'[1] Long, in his *History of Jamaica*, published in 1774, tells us that the island Militia was then composed of horse and foot, and comprehended all 'persons' from fifteen to sixty years of age, 'persons' being equivalent to free men. But he goes on to contrast the Militia of his time with the same force in earlier days. 'The militia of this island were formerly not inferior to Regular troops', but 'It has been observed that our modern militia are very dissimilar from their predecessors.' He attributed the difference, if it really existed, to two causes: the first was the introduction of Regular troops, which led to the Colonists depending upon them for defence instead of upon themselves; the second was 'the absence of many gentlemen of fortune, who choose to reside in Great Britain and whose personal influence might tend much to revive and support a martial spirit among the inhabitants'. It was after the year 1730, at the time when the Maroons of Jamaica were giving trouble, that there was a demand in Jamaica for Regular troops in substantial numbers. In all these Colonies the plantation system bore its inevitable fruit. The great preponderance of the slave population bred a feeling of insecurity, a habit of dependence upon the Home Government and soldiers sent out from home, while the wealthy proprietors largely became absentee proprietors, spending their wealth in Great Britain,

[1] Quoted by Long in his *History of Jamaica*, vol. i, chap. x, p. 127. For what follows in the text, see vol. i, chap. x, pp. 123–148, and vol. ii, chap. xiii, p. 302.

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instead of doing their duty in the lands where their fortunes were made.

Imperial garrisons in the Colonies.

After the peace of 1763, Imperial garrisons were numerous in the now widely extended British Empire, including lately conquered islands and provinces.[1] There followed the War of American Independence and, after a short interval, the Wars of the French Revolution. From these prolonged wars Great Britain emerged with an Empire remodelled upon war lines. Practically every Colony had its garrison, nearly every Colonial Governor was a military man. The old tradition of 'salutary neglect' of the Colonies by the Mother Country had passed away, as well as the imperfectly recognized tradition and practice of Colonial self-defence, coupled with virtual independence in internal matters. This was the result of war. Gradually, however, men's eyes and minds became once more habituated to views coloured by peace, and Lord Durham's Report initiated a new policy, which was in truth in large measure a reversion to the original policy or rather—for in the beginning there was no state policy or design—to the original status. How far in the meantime the practice of placing Imperial garrisons in the Colonies had been carried is shown by the evidence given before the Select Committee of 1861 by the representative of the Colonial Office, Sir Frederick Elliot. He informed the Committee that at that date, excluding the Mediterranean stations, there were thirty-four dependencies under the Colonial Office, all the Colonies being then termed dependencies; and in all of them, except one, there were Imperial troops. The one exception was Prince Edward Island, from which the troops were withdrawn in 1854 on account of the facilities or inducements which the island offered for the desertion of soldiers.[2]

[1] See Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, vol. iii, p. 11: 'The foreign garrisons included Minorca, Gibraltar, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Vincent, Dominica, Tobago, Grenada and the Grenadines, Jamaica, New York, Halifax, Quebec, Mobile and Pensacola' in addition to the various outposts in North America, such as Detroit, &c.

[2] See *Report of Select Committee* of 1861, *ut sup.*, Minutes of Evidence, p. 1, and for the case of Prince Edward Island, p. 196 (evidence of the Duke of Newcastle).

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The movement towards Colonial self-defence in the nineteenth century.

Colonial self-defence was the obvious and logical corollary of Colonial self-government. The year 1848 has been taken as the date when responsible government was finally assured in the province of United Canada, and a few more years passed before it was an established fact in Australia. Responsible government was a gradual development; so also was Colonial self-defence. From 1846 to 1852, just as responsible government was being matured, the Colonial Secretary in the Whig Government of Lord John Russell was Lord Grey and, slightly in advance of responsible government, he moved forward in the direction of reducing, though not of wholly removing, the Imperial garrisons. When he came into office, the Maories were up in arms, and in 1846 instructions were written to the Governor of New South Wales to send on to New Zealand troops from the standing garrisons of Australia. The troops were sent, and a correspondence followed on the question whether or not they should be in due course replaced.[1] Writing in 1848, Lord Grey intimated the view of the Home Government that the Australian Colonies 'have now made so much progress in wealth and population, that their inhabitants may reasonably be expected to bear also a part of the heavy charges, which, with a view to that protection, are imposed upon their fellow-subjects residing in the United Kingdom; and that the smallest contribution towards these charges which ought now to be required from the Colonists is that of providing any additional means of local defence which may be required.' Accordingly, the arrangement eventually made with the Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia was that the Imperial Government should pay the cost of such troops as were considered an adequate garrison for Imperial purposes; that the quarters for these troops should be provided and maintained by the Colonies; and that, if the Colonies desired larger armed forces, either they

Action of Lord Grey, 1846–52.

Australia.

[1] See dispatches from Lord Grey to Sir C. A. Fitzroy, 1846–50, in vol. i, Appendix B, of *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, by Earl Grey, second ed., 1853, and in the Appendix to the *Report of the Select Committee* of 1861, pp. 312–16.

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should pay the whole cost of additional troops from home, or they should raise the forces locally.

Similarly, in a despatch from Lord Grey, dated 14th March, 1851, Lord Elgin in Canada was informed that it was intended to reduce the Imperial troops in the United Province of Upper and Lower Canada to garrisons at not more than two or three fortified posts of importance, probably only to garrisons at Kingston in Ontario and Quebec in Lower Canada. The contemplated reduction was urged as a reason for maintaining the Canadian Militia upon a proper footing.[1] Canada.

Lord Grey retired with the Whig Ministry in 1852, and two years later came the Crimean War, followed after a short interval by the Indian Mutiny. These troubled years were not the time to carry out in systematic fashion a new departure with regard to the defence of the Empire; but they were times which illustrated the danger involved in undue dispersion of the armed forces of the Crown, and the necessity for taking steps whereby the overseas people of the Empire would provide, at least in part, for their own security. Moreover, the Volunteer movement, which came to birth in England as a practical answer to the threat of French invasion, gave a stimulus and an example to the Colonies in the direction of self-defence. Accordingly, in the sixties, the policy, long advocated and discussed, at length took definite form and shape.

The arguments of those who, within reason, insisted that the Colonies should no longer depend upon Imperial garrisons were, in effect, threefold. The first argument has already been abundantly emphasized, that Colonial self-defence was no novelty, that it was the old policy of the Empire. This contention was constantly urged, with no little exaggeration. It is enough to quote a fairly moderate statement of the claim, as made by Lord Grey. 'Up to the period of the War of the American Revolution, The arguments for Colonial self-defence. The old policy

[1] See *Correspondence relating to the Civil List and Military Expenditure in Canada*, Cd. Paper April 8, 1851, pp. 9–13. See also the *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, ut sup.*, vol. i, pp. 258–66.

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the then British Colonies, which now form the United States, as well as the West Indian Colonies, were required to take upon themselves the principal share of the burden of their own protection, and even to contribute to the military operations undertaken to extend the Colonial possessions of the British Crown.'[1]

The self-respect argument.

The second argument was what may be called the self-respect argument; that Imperial garrisons were signs of dependence and occasions for interference, that self-government was incomplete without self-defence. To quote Mr. Gladstone again: 'I would almost venture to say, without speaking of cases in which the circumstances are altogether peculiar, that no community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community.'[2] This argument was unanswerable; but it was urged rather in the United Kingdom than by the Colonies themselves. Being human, the Colonies were not ill-content that the main burden of their defence should be borne by the Home Government, which was the sole arbiter in matters of peace and war, and, calling the tune, might plausibly be left to pay the piper. Then there were the usual vested interests involved in the retention of the garrisons, as summed up in caustic fashion by Robert Lowe, who, by the time when the committee of 1861 was taking evidence, had brought home his bitter tongue from Australia. 'The upper classes think that it makes society more agreeable; the young ladies are frantic upon the subject; and people who keep public houses are always glad to see our soldiers.'[3] Moreover, the well-wishers of the Colonies on this side of the water, who in noble phraseology urged upon the Colonies self-defence as the crown of independence, were by no means disinterested well-wishers; for, after all, the third argument

[1] Lord Grey to Lord Elgin, March 14, 1851, *ut sup.* An extract from this dispatch is also given in the Appendix to the *Report of the Select Committee* of 1861, *ut sup.*, pp. 307–8.

[2] *Report of the Select Committee* of 1861, *ut sup.*, Minutes of Evidence, p. 257.

[3] Ibid., p. 230.

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was the main argument, the most practical argument, that, as a matter of fact, the existing system was costly in the extreme to the Imperial Exchequer.

The argument of expense.

For many years the expense of the Colonies under what was called the Downing Street régime had been a favourite theme of the school of Colonial reformers, among whom, in the House of Commons, Sir William Molesworth was prominent in power of invective. 'In every portion of the globe', he assured the House in 1848, 'the British Colonies are more economically and better governed, in proportion as they are self-governed . . . the greater the amount of local self-government, and the less the Colonial Office interferes in the internal affairs of the Colonies, the more economically and the better the Colonies will be governed.' Three years later, in 1851, he moved resolutions embodying this 'idea of the true Colonial policy of Great Britain, which is self-government for true Colonies, and no Imperial expenditure except for military stations'; and he urged that steps should be taken to relieve the Mother Country as speedily as possible from its existing civil and military expenditure on account of the Colonies which were neither military stations nor convict settlements, 'and to free them from that Imperial interference with their affairs which is inseparable from their present military occupation.'[1]

Sir William Molesworth on Colonial expenditure.

It has been seen that, as late as 1861, practically every Colony had an Imperial garrison. The average number of troops on the strength of the Army, which were employed in garrisoning the Colonies—India, of course, being excluded—was, for the ten years 1851–61, between 42,000 and 43,000. This number included not only regiments of the Line, but also resident corps which were borne upon the strength of the army, and whose cost was charged against Army Estimates. Such were the Royal Newfoundland Companies, the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the Cape Mounted Riflemen, the Royal Malta Fencibles, the St. Helena Regiment, the Gold Coast Artillery Corps, the Falkland Islands Company, and in 1857, 2,300 men

Military expenditure upon the Colonies.

[1] See *Selected Speeches of Sir William Molesworth, ut sup.*, pp. 199, 289–90.

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of the German Legion, who in that year were landed in the Cape Colony. At the time of the Crimean war the British Government enlisted in its service German, Swiss, and Italian legions. Of the German legion (9,000 to 10,000 in all) 2,300 offered themselves for settlement in South Africa, and arrived there early in 1857. Among the terms of their emigration was liability to military service for seven years, and for the first three years of this term daily pay. These resident corps seem to have numbered over 8,000 men. The average annual charge upon Imperial funds for the military defence of the Colonies was about three and a half millions sterling, and the Colonies contributed to this sum about one-tenth, or £350,000, the contributions being either direct payments to the Treasury or outlay upon the required defence works. In some few cases, the Colonies spent money upon local forces, which were not borne upon the strength of the Army. The Report of 1861 stated that more than 10,000 Volunteers and Militia were embodied in British North America, a nearly equal number of Volunteers in the Australian Colonies, 1,500 in New Zealand, 1,200 in the Cape, and that the numbers were being considerably increased.[1] It must be remembered that, in addition to military expenditure upon the Colonies, the Mother Country bore also the entire cost of the Fleet, which from all time has safeguarded the whole Empire.

In 1859, at the close of the Indian Mutiny, a Depart-

[1] The above paragraph is taken from two Parliamentary Papers.

1. *Military Forces (Colonies) Return to an Address of the House of Commons*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 25th July, 1859 : 114.

2. *Report from the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, &c.*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 11th July, 1861 : 423. The paper of 1859 gives the average number of N.C.Os. and privates of Her Majesty's forces in the Colonies for the years 1853–7 as 42,693, including in them the Resident Corps mentioned in the text. It makes the average annual amounts provided from Imperial and Colonial funds respectively £3,587,020 and £337,525. It states that the Colonial expenditure, except in the Cape, Victoria, British Guiana, and North America, was almost entirely on the Queen's Forces, either in the form of contributions to the Treasury or in that of outlay on defence works. In the Cape there were armed mounted police, in Victoria a small Volunteer Corps, in British Guiana a Militia, and in Canada,

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mental Committee, consisting of three members, representing the Treasury, the Colonial Office, and the War Office respectively, was appointed to consider the expense of military defences in the Colonies. The report, which was made in January 1860, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed in the following May, found that in the year 1857–8, the expenditure for military purposes in the Colonies, including the cost of the German Legion, amounted to £3,968,599, of which only £378,253—less than one-tenth—was contributed by the Colonies, and two-thirds of this sum by three Colonies alone, New South Wales, Victoria, and Ceylon. It was noted that no Colony, except Canada, and, to a very small extent, Victoria, the Cape, and one or two of the West Indian Colonies, had organized a Militia or other local force.[1]

The Departmental Committee of 1859.

Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island a Militia, all these being local forces paid for from local funds.

The Report of 1861 gives for the year ending March 31, 1860:

	Troops borne upon the strength of the Imperial Army.	*Imperial Military Expenditure.*
(*a*) *In Colonies Proper* .	20,657, including 6,007 Colonial Corps	£ 1,715,246
(*b*) *In Military Garrisons, Naval Stations, Convict Dépôts, &c.* .	20,910 ,, 2,474 ,, ,,	1,509,835
Making a total of	41,567 8,481	3,225,081

It is added that, in addition, the Colonies contributed towards military expenditure £369,224, this sum including the charges for maintenance of local forces, which in Canada amounted to £13,393, and in the Cape to £56,176.

At p. xii of the Proceedings of the 1861 Committee, the average annual number of troops maintained as garrisons in the thirty-four Dependencies under the Colonial Office, and borne on the strength of the Imperial Army for the ten years 1851–61, is given as 42,689, the average cost as £3,500,000 and the average Colonial contributions as £350,000, about one-tenth of the whole. The thirty-four Dependencies, according to Sir Frederick Elliot's evidence (p. 1), excluded the Mediterranean stations, and seventeen of them contributed to their own defence in one form or another. It is difficult to get at the exact details, but the general result seems fairly clear.

The conclusions arrived at by the Departmental Committee of 1859 are given in the text.

[1] *Military Defences (Colonies): Copy of Report of the Committee on Expense of Military Defences in the Colonies*, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 4th May, 1860: 282. See pp. 3–4.

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The Committee divided the Colonies into two classes, military posts requiring exceptional treatment, and all the rest of the Colonies ;[1] and, with regard to the Colonies which were not classed as military posts, the majority of the Committee recommended that the principles of Colonial management and of joint contribution at a uniform rate should be applied; in other words, that each Colony should decide for itself upon the nature of its defences, and upon the numbers of the garrison to be maintained, and that the Imperial Government should pay a share—say a half—of the entire cost. These recommendations embodied Treasury and War Office views, the representative of the War Office being J. R. Godley, who had spent some years in New Zealand as one of the founders of the Canterbury settlement, and had come back to England strongly imbued with the

[1] An interesting return of the cost of the several Colonies of the British Empire at the expense of the British Exchequer, from the years 1853 to 1857, was ordered by the House of Commons to be printed April 19, 1859: 240. It was the total cost, civil, military, and naval, being highest in 1856, when it amounted to £4,877,957 ; but the main point of interest in the return is the classification of the Colonies, as follows :

Military and Marine Stations.	*Plantations and Settlements.*	*Australian Settlements.*	*Sundry Colonies.*
Gibraltar	Jamaica	North Australia	No names specified.
Malta	Bahamas	Western Australia	
Cape of Good Hope	Honduras	South Australia	
Mauritius	West Indies	Victoria	
Bermuda	Canada	New South Wales	
St. Helena	Nova Scotia	Tasmania	
Heligoland	New Brunswick	New Zealand	
Ionian Islands	Prince Edward's Island		
Falkland Islands	Newfoundland		
Hong-Kong	Vancouver's Island		
	West Coast of Africa		
	Ceylon		
	Labuan		

It will be noted that the military and maritime stations include two former possessions of Great Britain, the Ionian Islands and Heligoland : that the West Coast of Africa is graded with Canada among plantations and settlements showing how vague was the classification at this period : and that New Zealand is included among Australian settlements, as also North Australia : Queensland was not separated from New South Wales and constituted a separate colony till December 1859 ; presumably in this list it comes under New South Wales, not North Australia. What the Sundry Colonies were does not appear, but they cost the Imperial Exchequer £71,737 in 1857, and two years previously, in 1855, as much as £199,843.

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view that self-defence was an integral part of self-government, that Imperial garrisons in the Colonies connoted 'interference with their freedom and independence of action'.[1] The Colonial Office member dissented from his colleagues, not being prepared to lay down and apply a drastic uniform rule. Downing Street, in this instance at any rate, was tender towards the pockets of the Colonies; and its representative, Sir Frederick Elliot, when giving evidence later on the same subject before the 1861 Committee, testified of the Australian Colonies that they 'are as liberal as they are rich'.[2] Victoria received especial commendation—with good reason, for in the years 1854–7 Victoria paid the whole cost of her Imperial garrison. By this date the gold diggings of Bendigo and Ballarat had enriched the public-spirited Colony. Elliot's contention was that the cases of the different Colonies should be treated on their merits.

The Select Committee of 1861.

The Committee, if it did nothing else, at least set the ball rolling, and further it emphasized the distinction, which was never again left out of sight, between military stations and Colonies having no outstanding strategical importance. With this report before them the House of Commons, in March 1861, accepted a motion for a Select Committee on Colonial military expenditure 'to enquire and report whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the defence of the British Dependencies, and the proportions of the cost of such defence as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial funds respectively.'[3] The Committee reported in the following July. For the purposes of their inquiry they divided the dependencies of the British Empire, exclusive of India, into two classes. The first class comprised those which might properly be called Colonies, viz. the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius, New Zealand, and the Australian Colonies, excepting Western Australia. The second class comprised military garrisons, naval stations, convict

[1] See his Note laid before the 1861 Committee, p. 323.

[2] *Report of Select Committee of 1861, ut sup.*, Minutes of Evidence, p. 10.

[3] Motion by Arthur Mills, March 5, 1861.

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dépôts, and dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy, viz. Malta, Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, Hong-Kong, Labuan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, Western Australia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast. They devoted their recommendations to the first class, the dependencies properly called Colonies, and expressed the view that, having due regard to local resources, dangers from external attacks, and the general exigencies of the Empire, with these reservations, the Colonies ought to bear the main responsibility and the main cost of their military defence. From the military point of view the report gave evidence of the beginning of the school of thought which gradually prevailed. It pointed out that the tendency of modern warfare was to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power, and, therefore, that it was desirable to concentrate as much as possible the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom, trusting mainly to naval supremacy for the defence of distant dependencies against foreign aggression. In short, every consideration was making for Colonial self-defence. Military reasoning advocated it; Treasury reasoning advocated it; it could be, and it was, presented not as a new departure, but as a reversion to the original policy of the Empire; it could be, and it was, supported as a corollary of self-government, a vindication of Colonial independence, an assertion not so much of Colonial duties as of Colonial rights. So free were the Colonies, that to offer to continue to pay for their protection could be construed as an anomaly and almost as an impertinence. At the same time, the report was guarded in its terms. No violent change was contemplated, no universal rule without exception. As Elliot desired, local circumstances were in each case to be taken into consideration. Moreover, although Colonial self-government was an accomplished fact, the thought of the day fell far short of the modern conception of the self-governing Dominion. All these Colonies were still styled 'Dependencies', and Canada and Australia were still brigaded with the West Indies and

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Ceylon. Like everything else in the British Empire, in thought and in practice, the defence of the Empire, the methods of co-operating in the defence, and the terms under which the co-operation has been effected, have been a matter of slow evolution.

It will be remembered that these were the days of the Palmerston régime, and neither political change nor reduction in military expenditure were to the Premier's mind. Very characteristic had been his attitude towards the motion for the Select Committee. He did not oppose it, but he expressed the view that it would have no practical result, because it was for the Executive Government, not for a Committee of the House of Commons, to decide what number of troops should be maintained in each Colony or dependency; and, where the Colonies had local legislatures, the amount of their contributions could not be decided for them by a Committee, but must be matter of negotiation. Evidently little help was to be expected from the Prime Minister towards the solution of the question of Colonial Defence, and little interest was shown by him in the matter. Nor had the spokesman of the Colonial Office, Chichester Fortescue, been encouraging. He contended that the expenditure in question had been very greatly exaggerated, and he knew 'no surer way of destroying in the Colonies the sense of connexion with the Mother Country than by making up our minds to withdraw from them the presence of British regiments'. On the other hand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone, as keeper of the public purse, as a friend and ally of the Colonial reformers, and as a strong believer in the rights and the duties of young communities, might be relied upon not to let the matter slumber interminably, and he himself gave valuable and suggestive evidence before the Committee.

The motion of March 1862.

The report having been presented, the same member, Arthur Mills, who had moved for the Select Committee in March 1861, a year later, in March 1862, brought forward another motion in the House of Commons to the effect 'That this House, while it fully recognizes the claim of all

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portions of the British Empire on Imperial aid against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy, is of opinion that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security.' This motion was accepted with the addition of the words 'and ought to assist in their own external defence.' In the short debate which took place, Chichester Fortescue, still Under-Secretary for the Colonies, stated that there were fourteen Colonies exercising the right of self-government, and among them he specified Vancouver Island, the Cape, and Natal. He seems to have identified representative institutions with responsible government, which had not yet come into being in South Africa. The statement, emanating, as it did, from the Minister who represented the Colonial Office, illustrates once more how gradual was the evolution of the status of the dependencies. It was only by slow degrees that what seems to us at the present day clear and unambiguous became crystallized alike in reality and in the minds of men. Another speaker commended Victoria and New South Wales as 'the only two colonies which could be called self-dependent, and they were the only two which contributed towards the expense of Imperial wars'. Alike able and willing to contribute to the common cause, the Australian Colonies have never been found wanting in Imperial partnership.

The New Zealand War.

The words just quoted presumably referred to the help which was forthcoming from Australia at the time of the Maori Wars in New Zealand. Imperial troops in Australia were set free to fight in New Zealand, Australian Volunteers taking their place; regiments were raised in Australia for service in New Zealand; and the Victorian Government lent an armed sloop for the purposes of the war. The course which this war took in the sixties, the differences which arose between the General in command, Sir Duncan Cameron, and the Governor, Sir George Grey, and between the latter and the Home Government, the fact that Imperial troops were employed without adequate

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Imperial control over the policy in which they were employed,—all gave a strong impetus to the movement for Colonial self-defence. Instructions for the removal of the bulk of the troops from New Zealand was for some two years not carried out; but eventually the troops were removed, with the exception of one battalion, the 2nd battalion of the 18th Regiment, the Royal Irish. A hard fight was made to retain this last battalion. The Maori troubles were not yet over; and, though the white men of New Zealand were strong enough to deal with the fighting remnant of the natives without Imperial aid, the retention of one regiment of the Line was urged as a 'standard of discipline' and 'a rallying point'[1]—an argument which was also put forward in the case of Canada. The New Zealanders were not without sympathizers in Australia and in England, in Parliament and out of it. The tone of the Colonial Office dispatches was criticized, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Granville, most courteous of men, was taken to task by Lord Carnarvon in the House of Lords for having treated 'the Colonists to the coldest possible logic, but that is not the way to deal with these great Colonies'.[2] The Government, however, wisely held to their decision; in February 1870 the Royal Irish were moved away to Australia; and the internal security of New Zealand was committed to the sole keeping of the Colonial Government.

Removal of the Imperial troops from New Zealand;

The battalion did not stay long in Australia, though many of the rank and file took their discharge and became Australasian settlers. In August 1870, it was sent home, and with it went the last of the Imperial garrison in Australia. In June 1863 a circular dispatch had been written by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Newcastle, to the Australian Colonies, other than Western Australia, suggesting, as a fair compromise,

from Australia;

[1] *Further Papers relative to the Affairs of New Zealand*, Cd. 83, 1870, pp. 124–5.

[2] Speech of March 7, 1870. The dispatch, which was especially criticized, related to a request from the New Zealand Government for financial help. It was dated 21st March, 1869. House of Commons Paper 218, 27th May, 1869, *New Zealand Loan*.

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that each colony should pay an annual sum of £40 for every officer and soldier of Her Majesty's infantry on service in the Colony, calculated upon the average of the usual monthly returns, the total amounting to some £53,000 for 1,327 officers and men. This was to be the maximum charge upon the Colonies, unless they asked for more men, when the rate would be £70 for each additional man, which sum more nearly approximated to the actual cost to the Home Government.[1] The terms were accepted; but soon afterwards a final solution followed in the withdrawal of all the Imperial troops.

and from Newfoundland.

The same step was taken at the same time in the case of Newfoundland, where St. John's had been garrisoned in one form or another from the end of the seventeenth century. Thus, when the seventies opened, the policy of Colonial self-defence had come to stay in Australasia and in Newfoundland.

The Imperial troops in Canada,

It has been seen that the Colonial Office had wisely set its face against laying down any hard and fast rule of universal application in regard to the military defence of the Colonies. The circumstances varied with time and place, and a policy which could suitably and safely be insisted upon in the case of one colony or group of colonies might be impracticable or most unwise in the case of another. The conditions of Australia were and are wholly different from those of Canada or South Africa. When the resolution of March 1862 was passed in the House of Commons, the Civil War was raging in America. The *Trent* incident had taken place in the previous November, Great Britain had been on the verge of war, and in that case Canada would necessarily have been the most exposed province of the Empire. As long as the American Civil War lasted, the time was obviously not ripe for denuding Canada of any Imperial regiments. With the end of the war, and the consequent disbanding of trained Irish soldiers in the United States, came a Fenian raid on the

[1] An extract from this circular dispatch will be found printed at pp. 2, 3 of Cd. 459, August 1871, *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of the Cape of Good Hope*. It does not appear to have been otherwise published. On p. 1 it is stated that the rate was accepted by the Australian Colonies.

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LORD WOLSELEY

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Niagara frontier in 1866, again a reminder of possible trouble on a large scale, only to be countered by adequate armed forces. In the following year the Dominion was brought to birth, a starting-point, but not necessarily an immediate occasion, for a more vigorous policy of self-defence. However, from this date reduction of the Imperial garrison went forward. In 1870 Imperial troops were still in evidence on active service in Canada; for the 1,400 men whom Lord Wolseley, then Colonel Wolseley, led to success in the Red River expedition included, in addition to two Militia battalions from Ontario and Quebec respectively, a battalion of Regulars, the first battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, descendants, it will be remembered, of the Royal Americans, and also a small detachment of Royal Artillery. But in 1871 the garrison was withdrawn from Quebec, and from that date onwards British troops in Canada remained only at the Imperial Naval stations of Halifax and Esquimalt, on either seaboard of the Dominion. At the time of the South African War the Canadian Government raised a battalion to replace and set free for active service the battalion of the Line, which was doing garrison duty at Halifax; and at the Colonial Conference of 1902 a pledge was given verbally by the Canadian representatives to relieve the Imperial Government in perpetuity of the cost of garrisoning the two Naval stations. In 1905 this pledge was formally renewed in writing. At this date there were at Halifax one battalion of infantry, the Royal Garrison Regiment,[1] two companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, and two companies of Royal Engineers: at Esquimalt, one company of Garrison Artillery, and two weak companies

[1] The Royal Garrison Regiment was formed at the time of the South African War by Royal Warrant of February 23, 1901. It was constituted as a 'special regiment of Infantry to be employed on garrison duty in the Mediterranean and at certain other non-tropical stations'. In 1903 the sphere of its overseas service was extended to South Africa. It was composed of re-enlisted ex-soldiers, and an account of it in the *Army and Navy Gazette* of September 5, 1908, stated that 'the regiment consisted of fine seasoned soldiers under capable officers, and the battalions were a credit to the Army'. But it was very short-lived: by 1906 it had been largely disbanded, and the final disbandment was authorized on September 1, 1908.

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of Royal Engineers, the net annual cost to the Imperial Government being £200,000. After some correspondence the Canadian offer went through,[1] and in 1906 the Imperial troops finally left Canada, the last British soldiers being withdrawn from Halifax in February of that year, and from Esquimalt in May. The garrison at Esquimalt dated from 1858, but there can never have been a time, from the foundation of the city, when redcoats were not in evidence at Halifax. On the 1st of January, 1907, the Dominion Government took over from the Admiralty the Halifax dockyard.

The year 1867 may be taken roughly as the date from which the military defence of the Colonies, which had been so much talked of and so long debated, was grappled with in earnest; and when, in the following year, Mr. Gladstone's first Government came into office, intent upon reduction of expenditure, the removal of the Imperial garrisons, as a settled policy, except in the case of a few Imperial stations, was a foregone conclusion. It was in 1867 that a Select Committee of the House of Commons reported on the question whether to any appreciable extent Indian troops might be substituted for white soldiers in garrisoning the Colonies;[2] and in this same year an attempt was made to come to some arrangement with the Cape Colony with regard to the Imperial garrison in South Africa, somewhat on the lines which the Duke of Newcastle had proposed to the Australian Colonies in 1863. There were at the time fully four thousand British troops at the Cape; and as for the moment South Africa enjoyed a rare interval of comparative restfulness, it was held that the force could be reduced, and that the Colonists, if given time, could and ought to pay a substantial percentage of the cost of the remaining troops. No agreement, however, was achieved, and at the end of 1869, the Secretary of State wrote to the effect that British

and in South Africa.

[1] See *Correspondence relating to the Garrisons of Halifax and Esquimalt*, Cd. 2565, August 1905. See also the *Canadian Annual Review* for 1905.

[2] See *Report from the Select Committee on Army (India and the Colonies)*, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 26th July, 1867: 478.

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troops could no longer be retained in the Colony for Colonial purposes, and must be gradually withdrawn, with the exception of one regiment which, for the time being at any rate, would be left, on the grounds that Simon's Bay, like Halifax, was regarded as an Imperial station.[1] A temporary reduction in the force was made, though not to the full extent contemplated, and events soon upset all calculations. The military question, when first raised, was complicated with the constitutional question, responsible government not being in existence at the Cape in 1867, and only coming into existence in 1872 after much hesitation in the Colony. Meanwhile the Diamond Fields came to light, inaugurating a new period of unrest; native wars, Boer wars followed; and August 1914 found 7,000 Imperial troops still in South Africa.

The Cape Mounted Riflemen.

In 1870 Imperial military expenditure at the Cape was reduced by disbanding the regiment of Cape Mounted Riflemen. This was a corps in Imperial pay, which had originated as a body of Hottentot Scouts, and had developed into a regiment of white soldiers with a Hottentot contingent. Side by side with this force, from 1855 onwards, was the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, paid for entirely from Colonial funds and entirely under Colonial control. After the old Cape Mounted Riflemen had disappeared, in 1878 the Frontier Police took their name and in the main their duties, being defined in a later Act of 1892 as 'the permanent Colonial forces both for police and defence'. Deservedly great—not least for the defence of Wepener in the South African War—is the name of the Cape Mounted Riflemen.[2] In maintaining the Frontier police the Cape Colonists made a substantial contribution to the internal defence of the Colony. In 1867 Lord Carnarvon gave £50,000 as the annual cost of the police, while £10,000 a year was paid towards the maintenance of the Regular troops. In 1870 the Legislative Assembly claimed that the Colony paid about £100,000 per annum towards the cost of its own defence.

[1] For the above see Cd. 459, August 1871, *ut sup.*, pp. 13–15.

[2] See the *Record of the Cape Mounted Riflemen*, by Basil Williams, 1909.

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The Canadian Militia.

In his speech on this South African matter, Lord Carnarvon stated that in 1864 Canada paid $300,000 for the Militia and Volunteers, and in 1866 upwards of $2,000,000 for the same purpose. This latter year was the year of the Fenian invasion. It has already been pointed out that the Militia was an integral part of the French system in Canada. Under a military despotism it was a living and effective organization; but with the advent of British rule, with the grant of representative institutions and an elected assembly, it became more or less obsolete. The present strong feeling among French-Canadians against what is termed militarism seems to be an inherited reaction against the dominating military machinery of the old French régime. On paper, it is true, liability to military service in case of emergency remained, and it reappeared in Acts which were passed from time to time. A Militia law of 1803, supplemented by an Act of 1812, held the field in Lower Canada, when the war of 1812 was fought, while the Acts which were in force in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick dated from 1808. The defenders of Canada in the war of 1812 were partly British regiments of the Line, partly regiments locally raised but paid for from Imperial funds, such as the Canadian Fencibles, the Canadian Voltigeurs, and the famous Glengarry Light Infantry, partly the Militia of either province. In Lower Canada a temporary Militia Act was passed in 1830, but at the time of Lord Durham's mission in 1838, the Commissioners whom he appointed to inquire into the municipal institutions of Lower Canada reported the Militia to be 'but a nominal force, which includes every male inhabitant between 16 and 60 years of age', while Lord Durham himself wrote bluntly, 'the Militia is now annihilated.'[1]

The Crimean War led in 1855 to the passing of a new Militia Act by the Legislature of the two United Provinces. This Act retained on paper the old Militia system, every male citizen between the ages of 18 and 60 being held to be a member of the Sedentary Militia—the Militia *in posse*.

[1] See Lord Durham's *Report*, 1912 ed., vol. iii, p. 162; vol. ii, p. 98.

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But it also authorized the raising of a body of 'active or volunteer militia companies', not exceeding 5,000 men in time of peace, to be drilled and paid for ten days in the year—twenty in the case of the artillery—and to be properly armed. In the following year the paid volunteer companies were supplemented by unpaid companies, and according to Colonel George Denison, the net result was an authorized active force of some 7,000 men.[1] An Act of 1859, a retrenching Act, did much damage to this young and promising force; the numbers were cut down, and the days of training reduced from ten to six. Then came the American Civil War, and in 1862 a strong commission, which included an Imperial officer among its members, reported that the defence of Canada demanded a Canadian active force of 50,000 of all arms, with a reserve of the same number, and recommended that the Sedentary Militia should be recognized and quickened into life as the real defence force of the country, that it should be constituted the Regular Militia, providing active and reserve battalions, the Volunteer Militia being retained only in the cities. A bill on these lines was in the same year brought into the Legislature, but it was rejected. Its rejection entailed the fall of the Government, whose successors passed a short Act which did no more than slightly amend the existing law; and the net result was that the defence of the two Canadian provinces at a critical time was entrusted to a maximum of ten thousand volunteers with twelve days' training in the year, over and above the Imperial garrison in Canada. This meant that the responsibility for the safe keeping of Canada, while large armies were operating near its frontier,

[1] See *Soldiering in Canada*, by Lt.-Col. George T. Denison, second ed., 1900, pp. 33–4, 48, &c. This book should be consulted with regard to the early stages of the Canadian Defence Forces. See also the valuable and exhaustive account given in *Canada and its Provinces*, vol. vii, 'Defence 1812–1912,' by C. N. Hamilton, 1914. For the correspondence which passed with regard to the rejection of the Militia Bill in 1862 see Return to an Address of the House of Lords, February 17, 1863, *Copies or Extracts of Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Governor-General of Canada in reference to the Militia Bills proposed and passed in the Canadian Parliament.*

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was placed almost entirely upon the Home Government.

The rejection of the Militia Bill was ill received in England. Writing to that effect on the 21st August 1862, the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, gave as 'the opinions of the best military authorities, that no body of troops which England could send would be able to make Canada safe without the efficient aid of the Canadian people', and he urged that the circumstances demanded a minimum of 50,000 partially trained troops. He raised too the question of a uniform system of Militia training and organization for all the British North American Colonies, arguing that, whatever might be the objections to political union, they would not apply to a union for defence purposes. The Canadian ministers pleaded on the other side 'the unwillingness of the people to act under the compulsory system'. 'Military tastes and aspirations', they said, 'have not been cherished by our people.' In rejoinder the Duke's last word was 'the defence of Canadian territory must depend mainly upon the Canadian people itself'. Lord Carnarvon, than whom Canada had no stauncher friend, had taken the same line in the House of Lords. In July 1862 he called attention to the rejection of the Militia Bill, and in consequence the utter inadequacy of the local defence force of Canada. Moving for the correspondence which had passed on the subject, he said: 'I hold that there ought to be not only a community of feeling, but a real and equitable division of the common burdens between England and her dependencies. Duties and rights go hand in hand, and the people who are desirous of enjoying the privileges of constitutional freedom must be prepared to make some sacrifices in return for that inestimable boon.'

The following year, 1863, saw some improvement in the position. Two Acts were passed by the Canadian Legislature, one of which dealt with the Militia, the other with the Volunteer Militia or Volunteers. The Militia was made to consist of battalions of service Militia, formed by ballot

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

H. R. H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT

President of the Royal Colonial Institute

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and liable to six days' training in the year, and non-service Militia, which answered to the old Sedentary Militia. A Volunteer Militia, unpaid, was authorized up to a maximum strength of 35,000 men, and the Volunteer Militia officers were to rank in front of the service Militia officers —an indication of the constant preference for the voluntary system. An important feature of the legislation was a provision in the Militia Act, which authorized the establishment of schools of military instruction. Such instruction was facilitated by the presence of Imperial troops: Colonel Patrick MacDougall, as he then was, an able and sympathetic officer who knew Canada well, was selected from home to be Adjutant-General in command of the local Canadian forces: he established military schools wherever Imperial troops were stationed; and the cadets who had qualified at them he passed on to a training camp at La Prairie over against Montreal, where in 1865 they came under the charge of the future Lord Wolseley. In *The Story of a Soldier's Life* Lord Wolseley speaks of the La Prairie camp as 'the birthplace of the very fine Canadian Militia force with which I was subsequently intimately associated', and 'the first practical effort made to convert the excellent military material Canada possesses so abundantly into useful soldiers'.[1] How excellent was the material, how ready were Canadians to volunteer for service at a time of crisis, but how deficient was military organization and equipment, was shown when the Fenian inroad took place in the following year.

The patriotism and gallantry of the Canadian Volunteer Militia on this occasion; the fact that Canadian Volunteers and troops of the Line co-operated in safeguarding the Canadian frontier; that with the English troops, 'fortunately not yet withdrawn from Canada', marched 'a young Prince, the son of our Sovereign'; that therefore 'the Empire and the Crown were both represented and Canada felt that she was an integral part of the

[1] Vol. ii, p. 150. Reference should be made to this book and to Col. Denison's *Soldiering in Canada* for an account of the Fenian 'invasion' of 1866.

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Empire',—formed the theme of a speech, which Lord Carnarvon delivered in the House of Lords on July 22, 1870. The young Prince was the Duke of Connaught, the future much-loved Governor-General of Canada; the speaker was the statesman who in 1867 had carried the British North America Act. But one of Lord Carnarvon's objects in speaking was to protest against the removal of the Imperial troops from Canada outside the port of Halifax. We have seen that at an earlier date he had boldly maintained that upon Canada lay the responsibility of providing an effective local defence force. Now he spoke of the efforts and sacrifices which Canada was making, and deprecated the withdrawal of the garrisons from Montreal and Quebec, as being unjust to Canada and inexpedient on Imperial grounds. Canada suffered from Fenianism, solely through her connexion with Great Britain, and British obligations to Canada 'have been and are of a wider political character than ordinary Colonial relations. It is the only one of our Colonies whose border is conterminous with a great foreign Power.' His eloquence, however, did not avail, and the garrisons were moved in 1870 and the following year.[1]

When Canadian Confederation became an accomplished fact in 1867, there were some 4,000 volunteers in training. In the following year, 1868, the new Dominion Government passed a comprehensive Act 'respecting the militia and defence of the Dominion of Canada'. The Bill was introduced and carried by the Minister of Militia

[1] Lord Wolseley was as strong as Lord Carnarvon upon the impolicy of removing the Imperial troops from Canada In *The Story of a Soldier's Life*, 1903, vol. ii, p. 225, he wrote: 'It was a most unstatesmanlike policy, for as long as we kept a few British battalions in the chief towns of Canada, we fostered a living and most useful flesh-and-blood connection between it and the Mother Country. . . . These troops also provided the means for giving some military instruction to their splendid militia. To officers, who, like myself, had long been associated with that force in camps and cantonments, it seemed to be the act of madness, not of statesmen, to withdraw from them that efficacious means of instruction in a soldier's duties.' Lord Carnarvon touched upon this same point in his speech of 1870, and, as stated in the text, the withdrawal of the troops led to the disappearance of the military schools.

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and Defence, the French-Canadian leader, Sir George Cartier. The law created his department, which covered marine as well as land service, and it elaborated the framework of a Militia force very much on the old lines, the Militia being divided into Active and Reserve Militia, and the active Militia being sub-divided into Volunteer, Regular, and Marine Militia. The traditional liability to military service was fully maintained, the Militia being defined as consisting of all male British subjects in Canada between the ages of 18 and 60, all of whom might be called out 'for actual service, either within or without the Dominion, at any time, whenever it appears advisable so to do by reason of war, invasion, or insurrection, or danger of any of them'. In effect, however, the Dominion Government carried on the policy which it found in existence; in other words, it looked to voluntary not to compulsory service for the safe keeping of the country. The presence of the Imperial troops had been a great assistance to the cause of military training; and, with their removal, the military schools fell into disuse. Then came a long period of financial depression; military expenditure was cut down; the number of men in training decreased; the number of days in the year assigned for drilling was diminished. On the other hand, some useful steps were taken. The commander of the local forces was in 1871 given the rank of major-general, and in 1883 it was enacted that the post should always be held by an Imperial officer. In 1876 the Royal Military College at Kingston was established; and small beginnings were made of a permanent force of Regular soldiers, especially in connexion with the artillery. When the North-West rising occurred in 1885, the local forces proved themselves well able to deal with the situation, without any help from Imperial troops, though the staff and supply arrangements were sadly wanting in organization.

Canadian Voyageurs on the Nile Expedition.

Just before this rebellion broke out, Canadians were in evidence in Imperial service. Appointed in 1884 to command the expedition for the relief of General Gordon cut

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off at Khartoum, Lord Wolseley bore in mind his experiences on the Red River expedition, and sent for a body of Canadian Voyageurs, to help him in working his way up the Nile. They were some 400 in number, and in April 1885, when the enterprise was ended, he placed on record in a letter to the Governor-General of Canada, that their services had been of the highest possible value, noting that 'at a time when English, Irish, and Scotch soldiers are employed, the presence with them of Canadians shows in a marked manner the bonds which unite all parts of our Great Empire'.[1] It should be added that at the end of 1884 and the beginning of 1885, offers were made to raise forces in Canada for service in Egypt, and the Dominion Government expressed its readiness to sanction recruiting for the purpose.[2]

Local defence forces in Australia.

When the Imperial troops were withdrawn from the Australasian Colonies, there was no well-defined system of local defence to replace them. Very British these Colonies have ever been in defence as in other matters, waiting till some practical need should demand practical measures. The Australians had no internal troubles to face; the New Zealanders settled theirs when they settled the Maori question; and with the British fleet to protect them, foreign invasion was not even a dream. Still, between 1870 and 1880, Australian defence works received much attention under the advice of Royal Engineers of the standing of Sir William Drummond Jervois and Colonel Scratchley, and not a little was done in the direction of local defence forces, a stimulus to which was given by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8, with the possibility of British intervention. New South Wales had passed a Volunteer Regulation Act in 1867, and volunteering was encouraged by grants of land after

[1] P. P. *Nile Expedition (Canadian Voyageurs)*. Copy of letter to the Governor-General of Canada from General Lord Wolseley, dated the 13th April, 1885, acknowledging the services of the Canadian Voyageurs in the Nile expedition of 1884–5, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 19th May, 1885: 207.

[2] See *Australia-Canada Correspondence respecting offers by the Colonies of troops for service in the Soudan*, Cd. 4324, March 1885.

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five years' continuous service. After the removal of the Imperial troops, a small beginning was made of a regular force, which here, as in other Colonies, practically amounted to the maintenance of a permanent body of artillery. In 1874 the land grants to the volunteers were discontinued, partial payment being substituted for them, and in 1878 the volunteers were reorganized on the 'partially paid' basis. By 1880 the Colony had three well-trained batteries of permanent artillery, a small volunteer force of artillery, infantry, and engineers, and a volunteer naval brigade. The volunteers received six days' continuous training in the year, and sixteen days' drill, being paid while on training or on drill, and also being rewarded for efficiency. In Victoria, from 1854 onwards, a volunteer force had been continuously in existence; and, when the Imperial troops finally left the Colony, the Colonial Government instituted a paid artillery corps. By 1880 the Colonial Defence Forces included a body of permanent artillery, which, however, was for the time disbanded in 1881, a paid naval force with a naval reserve, and volunteers in all branches of the service, artillery, engineers, cavalry, and infantry, capitation grants being given for effective volunteers. At a later date, in 1883–4, the place of the volunteers was taken by a paid Militia. South Australia relied on volunteers paid when on duty, and on unpaid rifle corps. In 1886 the volunteers in receipt of payment were renamed Militia. Queensland similarly relied upon volunteers till 1884, when a small permanent corps was established, supplemented by partially paid militia and volunteers.[1] Reaction after the Maori wars was for a long time in evidence in New Zealand, the forces which had been raised for actual fighting being rather reduced than organized. A permanent artillery unit came into being in this Colony under a defence Act of 1886, supplemented, as in other Colonies, by volunteers.

The year 1885 proved that good work had been done

[1] For the early defence forces of the Australian Colonies see the *Official Year Book* of the Commonwealth, No. 2, 1901–8, pp. 1075–81.

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Dispatch of Australian troops to the Sudan in 1885.

in training and equipping fighting men in Australia. The tragedy of the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon could not fail to appeal to the sons of the Empire, whether at home or beyond the seas; and following close upon the news, the telegraph cable brought, in February 1885, a message from the Government of New South Wales, offering to send two batteries of field artillery and one battalion of infantry 500 strong, fully equipped, to land them at Suakim within 30 days, and to pay all expenses. This offer, with which the name of the acting Premier of the Colony, William Bede Dalley,[1] will always be associated, was followed by similar messages from Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland, Victoria promising a contingent of 600 or 700 men. The New South Wales offer was accepted to the extent of the battalion of infantry and one battery of artillery, the forces being already organized, fully equipped, and ready for immediate service; while the answer to the other Australian Colonies was to the effect that their promise of help would gladly be borne in mind in the event of the military operations being prolonged into the autumn. On the 3rd of March the New South Wales contingent, nearly 800 strong, embarked at Sydney, and on the 4th of April, General Graham, commanding at Suakim, reported that they had shown themselves 'worthy comrades in arms'. Their services were only required for a very short time; in the middle of May, Lord Wolseley inspected them at Suakim prior to their return; and in June they reached home. It had been, strictly speaking, no more than a flying trip to the Red Sea littoral of a small body of armed men from the South: but none the less this little expedition was of far-reaching import; it marked an epoch and it made history. In the words of Reuter's telegram, this was 'the first occasion in which Australian troops have shared in the defence of the Empire'. Unasked, at their own free will, at their own expense, for the first time the

[1] There is a memorial tablet to Dalley in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral, which was unveiled by Lord Rosebery in July 1890.

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'IN MEMORY OF

WILLIAM BEDE DALLEY

THE AUSTRALIAN STATESMAN AND PATRIOT'

Tablet in the Crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral

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self-governing Colonies took part in Empire warfare far from their own shores. The Governor of New South Wales called to mind that it was 'blood and iron that brought about German unity', and war was calling forth the latent forces of unity in the British Empire. Very noteworthy it was that the movement should have originated in Australia—all the more noteworthy in that Australians had lately been bitterly incensed against the Home Government for the vacillation which had enabled the Germans to plant themselves in New Guinea; and it was wholly fitting that the Mother State of Australia should be the Colony to make the first offer and actually to send the troops. But there was more than this. Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, rightly laid stress upon the fact that the incident gave evidence of the progress which had been made by the Australian Colonies. 'I could hardly have anticipated', he wrote to New South Wales, 'that your government would be in a position to supply immediately, and with complete efficiency, an important contingent fully prepared for foreign service in a distant country'; and of the Australian Colonies generally he noted, 'The desire and the power to offer effective military help in a campaign at a great distance from their shores, of which they have now given such satisfactory proofs, mark a distinct and important advance in their political growth.' The desire had long been there, and now the power was in evidence; the children were coming to manhood and stepping out into the world as active members of the household. It was a small beginning, but the 800 men who went to Suakim and who, as the correspondence showed, were available for service in India or the Mediterranean, if they wished to volunteer for it, were the forerunners of coming legions in the coming time. Fifteen years more and the hundreds became thousands in the South African War; another fifteen years, and to the call of the race tens of thousands came up from the Southern Seas.[1]

[1] See *Australia-Canada Correspondence respecting offers by the Colonies of troops for service in the Soudan*, Cd. 4324, March 1885, and Cd. 4494, July 1885.

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It has been seen that other motives, besides those of economy, favoured the reduction of the Imperial garrisons in the Colonies, and that the Committee of 1861 had noted the tendency of modern warfare to concentrate its blows. It had become an obvious source of weakness, in days of steam communication, constantly being accelerated, to disperse small bodies of trained soldiers here and there throughout the world. On the other hand, it was equally obvious that the first and the main line of defence of the British Empire, the Royal Navy, must in all parts of the world be provided with coaling bases, strongly fortified and securely held. All military experts could be in agreement on this head, while differing as to whether or not, in this Colony or that, some special reason might exist for the temporary retention of a few Imperial troops, to be the nucleus of a large defence force locally raised, or to keep the Imperial factor in evidence before the eyes of coloured races and foreign visitors. The bedrock of naval and military policy came to be concentration of strength. How the defence forces stood in the middle of the eighties is shown by the following extract from the Introduction to the Colonial Office List for 1887, written on the eve of the first Colonial Conference, which was held in that year: 'Since 1870 the Imperial troops have gradually been withdrawn from all the self-governing Colonies, and now, with the exception of the garrisons of the naval stations at Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Capetown, the land defence of these Colonies rests entirely on their local forces. Of the other Colonies, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Natal, Mauritius, St. Helena, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana, British Honduras, Bahamas, and Bermudas still possess Imperial garrisons. Including the garrisons of Halifax and Capetown, the total number of Imperial troops stationed in the Colonies numbers 23,000 men, and the cost £1,816,762, of which the Colonies contribute £185,000. The various local forces of the Colonies, including the Volunteers, Militia, and armed constabulary, number about 70,000, the Canadian Militia

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LORD CARNARVON

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alone furnishing a force of 37,000 men.' It is evident from this list of Colonies that there was still no little dispersal of Imperial troops, notably in the West Indies.

The Royal Commission of 1879 on coaling stations.

To this matter, and to the all-important question of Imperial coaling stations, attention had for some years past been called by a Royal Commission. The scare of war with Russia in 1878 had for the moment opened men's eyes to the vulnerability of the Empire, to the total absence of preparation against a time of war. Accordingly, in 1879, a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad, and the apportionment of the cost of defence between the Imperial Government and the Colonies. The Chairman was Lord Carnarvon, who had lately left the Colonial Office, and who in this, as in other matters relating to the safety and the progress of the Empire, showed courage and foresight rare among the statesmen of his day. Three reports were presented in 1881 and 1882, and they partially saw the light when, but not until, the first Colonial Conference met in 1887.[1] They dwelt upon 'the paramount importance to the British Empire of securing coaling stations. Not until the important coaling stations shall have been made secure can the strength of the British Navy be adequately exerted at sea'; and they pointed out that the Australian Colonies were 'taking effectual measures for the defence of their principal ports'.[2] This was the beginning of tabulating on an intelligible plan Imperial fortresses and fortified coaling stations on the ocean highways, of a scheme for systematic Imperial defence, keeping in view the requirements of the Royal Navy as the great bulwark of the Empire, the security of sea-going commerce as the life-blood of its widely sundered peoples. The direct route to the East would be safeguarded at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong-

[1] The first two reports and extracts from the third and final report were among the papers laid before the Conference. See *Proceedings of the Colonial Conference*, 1887, vol. ii, Appendix, 'Papers laid before the Conference': Cd. 5091, 1887, pp. 297–338.

[2] pp. 337–8.

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Kong; the outer route at the Cape, to which great prominence was given in the reports, and, on the way to the Cape, at Sierra Leone, which was to become a fortified coaling base, strangely out of keeping with the pacific and philanthropic traditions of Freetown, St. Helena being another stepping-stone on the way. The Indian Ocean would be watched over at Port Louis in Mauritius; the West Indies at Port Royal in Jamaica, and at Castries in St. Lucia, the harbour for which French and English competed so fiercely in bygone days. Bermuda and Halifax were, like Gibraltar and Malta, acknowledged fortresses of the Empire. On the Pacific Coast of Canada was Esquimalt, while in the Southern Seas Australia was seeing to her own defences and setting her own house in order.

There were many delays, which Lord Carnarvon, with steady insistence, year by year, by speech and letter, deprecated, writing as late as 1889 words which now read as prophetic: 'Our principle is exactly the reverse of that which has guided to victory the German Government, who have adopted as their standard readiness and fitness for war, instead of some ideal perfection which entails years of delay, and ends in ultimate disappointment.'[1] There were again many changes of view among the military and naval experts. In 1884, it was laid down that Trincomalee 'must always be, as it has ever been, the rendezvous and base for our fleets and ships in the Indian Ocean',[2] yet in no long time Trincomalee was left desolate, and in Ceylon the commercial port of Colombo was constituted the one and only fortified coaling base. Still by slow degrees the work went forward, mainly through the efforts of a standing Colonial Defence Committee, established in 1885, the able secretary of which was for some years the present Lord Sydenham. Ever, as modern conditions have developed, the tendency has been to greater concentration: one station and

Colonial Defence Committee.

[1] Letter to *The Times* of February 19, 1889.

[2] *Correspondence relating to the Defence of Colonial Possessions and Garrisons abroad*, Cd. 4186, 1884, p. 4.

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another has dropped out, sometimes after large expenditure to no purpose; but a few great bases have been retained, and in the matter of fortresses and coaling stations there has been concrete evidence of an Imperial policy.

The Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865.

In the period covered by this section, an Act of Parliament was passed which, in a quiet and unostentatious manner, contemplated and facilitated naval co-operation in the Empire. This was the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865. It empowered the Colonies to offer, and the Imperial Government by Order in Council to accept, armed Colonial vessels with their complements of officers and men, for general service in the Royal Navy, to be under the discipline of the Royal Navy, and in all respects an integral part of the Royal Navy; and it also empowered the Colonies to raise and maintain a body of volunteers on terms of 'being bound to general service in the Royal Navy in emergency', such volunteers to form part of the Royal Naval (Volunteer) Reserve.[1] The Act, in short, while safeguarding most specifically the powers of the self-governing Colonies, removed any legal difficulty in the way of their contributing in kind to the Royal Navy, should they wish to do so, and should occasion arise. It widened their naval horizon: it opened a prospect of not merely maintaining vessels for coastal defence and purely local purposes, but of participating with men and ships in their own waters and beyond, on equal terms, in the Royal Navy. The Act passed with general assent through both Houses of Parliament, and in the Committee stage in the House of Commons, the Minister, Mr. Cardwell, expressed a hope that it would be 'the foundation of a naval force maintained by the energy and at the expense of the Colonies, constituting a most valuable addition to the Imperial defences.'

The Royal Colonial Institute.

It remains to notice the first beginnings of an agency which in war or peace has done much to promote Imperial Unity during the last half-century. In June 1868, a small

[1] The Act is 28 and 29 Vict. cap. 14. For its terms see Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, vol. iii, pp. 1271–6.

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meeting was held in London at Willis' Rooms to found a Colonial Society. The Society was founded: in 1869 Queen Victoria named it the Royal Colonial Society; in 1870 in lieu of Society the term Institute was adopted; as the Royal Colonial Institute it received a Royal Charter in 1882, and by 1884 it was installed in a permanent home in Northumberland Avenue. The object of the Founders was to provide a meeting-place in the metropolis of the Empire for visitors from the Colonies and India, and for those in the homeland who were interested in the Colonies and India, to procure and disseminate information, and to facilitate interchange of views on Colonial and Indian subjects. It was an effort, much needed at the time, and justified by success, to dispel the ignorance and apathy which were alleged, with no little reason, to prevail in the United Kingdom regarding the overseas peoples, their lands and their concerns. Its birth was blessed by the leaders of both parties in the State, it found cordial support alike at the Colonial Office and at the India Office, though within a few months' time, as will be told hereafter,[1] members of the Colonial Society, with more zeal than discretion, were found to be taking the field against Downing Street. The time was ripe for such a movement. The Dominion of Canada had come into existence in the previous year, a confederation which had in it infinite potentialities either for co-operation or for divergence, according to the tone and the temper of the Motherland. While the Society was being formed, Mr. Gladstone's first great Ministry came into power, embodying the full force of British Liberalism, identified with increase of liberty, removal of restrictions, loosening of bonds, sympathy with small and rising states and nationalities, but not with Empires. If it included among its members W. E. Forster, pronounced and outspoken Imperialist, it included also the great embodiment of the opposite school, John Bright. Goodwill to the Colonies was undoubted, but it was goodwill to speed them on whatever path they

[1] See below, pp. 137–9.

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chose for themselves, wherever the path led. What was wanting, not only in the eyes and minds of the Colonists, but in living fact, was indication on the part of the Mother Country that she had need of her children, that she looked to a future which her children with herself should mould and share, appreciation of what that future would be when shaped not by the British Isles alone, but by the British Isles in unison with the Colonies and India. Knowledge was needed, and the sympathy which comes from knowing and heeding. Late in the day a Society for the purpose was set on foot; but when it came, it came to stay and it did its work. 'The new Society', wrote the historian of New Zealand in 1883, 'was not a power, but it expressed a conviction.'[1] It was a factor in the time and a sign of the time. It betokened that the British people were waking up to the fact that they had an Empire, not to be tried only by the economic standard of the Manchester School, but even if tested by that standard alone, most worthy to be kept in perpetuity as capable of limitless development.

[1] Rusden's *History of New Zealand*, 1883, vol. ii, p 572.

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SECTION III

1886–1902

CHAPTER V

THE INDIAN ARMY (CONTINUED)

India in 1885.

In the year 1885 Lord Dufferin was Viceroy, and before the year ended Lord Roberts, then Sir Frederick Roberts, became Commander-in-Chief in India. Among his manifold and brilliant services to the State, Lord Dufferin had been Governor-General of Canada before he went to bear rule in India. There was one precedent of the same kind. Canada, before the Dominion came into being, had been governed by Lord Elgin, who subsequently became for a short time Viceroy of India. After Lord Dufferin's time, Lord Lansdowne, and again Lord Minto, followed his example, becoming in either case Governor-General first of Canada and afterwards of India. Of late years the interchange of Governors between Australia and India has been constant. Among others, Lord Northcote left the governorship of Bombay to be Governor-General of the Commonwealth, and Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, had previously been Governor of Queensland and of New South Wales. It is some long time since, in Sir Bartle Frere, India provided one of her leading administrators, who had been Governor of Bombay, to be Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner of South Africa. The growing unity of the Empire is in no small degree at once illustrated and promoted, and the statesmanship of the United Empire enriched, by service in high place, at one time in the self-governing Dominions, at another in India.

As has been noted in a previous chapter, this year 1885, in which Indian troops were sent to Suakim, was a critical year in India. But because it was critical, it was fruitful, a year in which there were marked beginnings of a new era. In the autumn of the year came the third and last

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Burmese War. A short and swift campaign in November ensured the surrender of King Thebaw, the occupation of his capital, Mandalay, and the subsequent annexation of Upper Burma; though three years and more of dacoity and jungle warfare followed, before the country was pacified and civil administration supported by a strong specially raised body of military police. The incorporation of Upper Burma was a long step forward towards finality in the frontiers of the Indian Empire.

The Third Burmese War.

Among the troops which served in the Burmese fighting was an auxiliary corps of mounted men. In the early days of the East India Company there were, and must necessarily have been, potential soldiers at the Company's factories, in the European employees of the Company, ready to serve in time of need. As the Company grew out of the factory stage and developed regular armed forces, both white and coloured, the need for such auxiliaries died away. The Indian Mutiny called them into life again, and about 1860 came a new stimulus from the volunteer movement in England. Some further encouragement was given to the Volunteers in India in this year 1885; at the opening of the present century they numbered throughout India some thirty thousand men, Europeans and Eurasians, and the numbers have since been more than maintained. Before the War they formed a valuable supplement to the regular armies, including companies for port defence, Garrison Artillery, Light Horse, Mounted Rifles, and Infantry Rifle Corps, railway employees contributing a volunteer defence force for the security of the lines.[1]

White volunteers in India.

[1] For the Volunteers in India see *The Indian Army, a Sketch of its History and Organization*, reprinted from the third edition of the *Imperial Gazetteer*, 1907, pp. 53–4. The volunteers 'existed in the early days of the British occupation as Militia at the Chief Settlements'. See also the Annual Parliamentary Papers on *The Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India*. On April 1, 1900, the enrolled strength of the Volunteers was 31,036, of whom 29,994 were efficient. In 1907 they were about 34,000, with 32,000 efficient, 61 corps in all. See the account given below, pp. 264–5, of the beginning of the volunteer movement at Singapore, from which it appears that the Singapore Volunteers were the first modern Volunteer Corps in India.

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The Panjdeh Incident.

Earlier in the year than the Burmese War there occurred what was known as the Panjdeh incident, armed encroachment by the Russians upon the Northern border of Afghanistan, where a Boundary Commission was at work. It was by far the most serious and threatening feature of the year in India. As in 1878, so in 1885, war between Great Britain and Russia was imminent; but happily in either case the difficulties were adjusted; and in course of years a clear understanding was established with the Russian Government, the respective spheres of influence being definitively demarcated. The crisis, however, had, directly or indirectly, in various ways, far-reaching effects. Not only did it call attention anew to the numbers and organization of the regular armed forces of India, and to the condition of the land frontiers of India from the point of view of possible invasion, but it led to a gradual change of the whole outlook, military and political alike, to a wider conception of India as a whole, to a broader basis of policy. The eyes of India, or of those responsible for India, were now turned outwards more than before; the arms of India were sharpened for the protection of India from alien enemies rather than for the preservation of internal security: feudatory chieftains of India, who in the days of the Mutiny had stood as loyal friends in their own immediate surroundings of a hard-pressed and beleaguered British garrison in India, now came forward rather as partners in a plan which should concern India as a single entity, as an Imperial factor for defence and offence, not a land to be held down and kept passive, but a land and a people or group of peoples to be active in assisting and establishing the strength of India, and through India the strength of the Empire, of which India was now an integral part rather than a subject dependency.

The immediate outcome of the crisis was a substantial increase in the numbers both of the British and of the native troops in India. There followed improvements in the organization of the Indian Army, the introduction of

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the linked battalion system,[1] of regimental centres, the formation of a reserve of Indian soldiers, to be kept in training and called up in case of emergency—all changes tending to assimilate the Indian to the British Army. The trouble had arisen on the North-West Frontier: while it was acute and troops were being mobilized, the future Lord Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, had been designated to command an army corps, and the North-West Frontier had been his special study and the scene of his campaigns. When therefore, in a few months' time, he succeeded Sir Donald Stewart as Commander-in-Chief in India, the defence of the North-West Frontier became his peculiar charge and received unremitting attention. It was not only a question of works and defences, of improving communications, of forts, of roads, of railways: it was a matter of concentrating large forces within striking distance of the danger points,[2] as well as of dominating the frontier tribes and, as far as possible, enlisting them in the service of India. Thus the North-West Frontier of India, the part of India where India's foreign relations are most in evidence, came to be the principal seat of military strength in India; and, as its military importance was more and more emphasized, so its political status was more and more enhanced. In the days when the three Presidencies had separate armies, the whole of the North of India was the province of the Bengal Army. When, in April 1895, the separate Presidency Armies were abolished, India was divided into four territorial commands, one of them being the Punjab command, in which was included the North-West Frontier. In 1899–1900 the control of the all-important Khyber Pass was transferred from the Government

The North-West Frontier.

[1] The linked battalion system was a leading feature of the Cardwell reforms of 1871, whereby each Line regiment had always one battalion at home and one serving overseas.

[2] In 1885 'it was found that measures were necessary, which would allow of the concentration of a considerably larger and stronger force in the North West of India without denuding the rest of the country of military protection'. *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1891–2 and the nine preceding years*, March 1894: 43, p. 175.

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of the Punjab to the Government of India, a special corps, the Khyber Rifles, having lately been formed to take charge of the pass. Another year went by, and then, in November 1901, the North-West Frontier was constituted by Lord Curzon a separate province of India.

Increase in the proportion of Northern soldiers.

In the earlier days of the English in India, when the East India Company was step by step building up a territorial dominion, the fighting was in the lowlands of India, and in the typical Indian climate with more or less constant temperature, in the plains of Bengal or in the coast-belt of the Carnatic; and, as it extended into Central India, it was of much the same character, the English with their native adherents being pitted against natives of more or less similar races and in more or less similar surroundings. Mountain fighting hardly came on the scene until the Gurkha War of 1814–16, the end of which gave Simla into British possession and brought the British power up to the Northern mountains. In former times the native soldiers of the South, the old 'Coast Army' of Madras, were, as we have seen, an army of many fights and much distinction. They were not measured to any appreciable extent against the races of the northern fringe of India: they fought like against like, and fighting in the plain and in the heat was indigenous to them. But, as years went on, Indian warfare veered more and more to the North: the South, as compared with the North, became habituated to peace: warlike traditions and instincts in the South tended to die away, and meanwhile the races of the North, not only the mountaineers, the Pathans and the Gurkhas, but also the Sikhs of the land of the Five Rivers, proved again and again their mettle as soldiers. The fighting passed on from tablelands to mountains and, when on lowlands still, to jungles and swamps in Burma: the fighting men were taken into varying temperatures and into strange surroundings: more and more, for military purposes, the Northerners proved their ascendancy in fibre and physical stamina. Thus it came to pass that, while the North-West tended to absorb a larger proportion than

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before of the military strength of India, the army even in Southern India was more and more leavened with the Northern races.[1] At the same time, in the words of an official report, 'the conditions of military action in Burma, which forms part of the Madras command, proved beyond the capacities of the troops of that Presidency,'[2] and eventually, in 1903–4, the military district of Burma was separated from the Madras command.

The Imperial Service Troops.

From the days of the Mutiny onwards, mutual confidence between the Government of India and the feudatory chiefs of the Native States has, with isolated exceptions, been progressively on the increase. In 1881 the State of Mysore was replaced under native rule : in 1886 Sindhia received back the fortress of Gwalior in exchange for Jhansi. These States have local military forces, varying in organization and in value according to the type of ruler and the material of the population. But, in addition, many of them had, through the quarter of a century preceding the Great War, made a definite and voluntary contribution to the military strength of the Empire, in the form of Imperial Service Troops, that is, troops equipped and trained, under the supervision of British inspecting officers, for active service outside their respective States, in the words of the official reports, 'organized to take part in military operations in line with those of the Indian Army.' In his book, *Forty-one Years in India*, writing of the year 1887–8, Lord Roberts tells us, 'Of the many subjects discussed and measures adopted during this, the last year of Lord Dufferin's

[1] For this paragraph see especially the *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1891–2 and the nine preceding years, ut sup.*, pp. 181–2. See also what Lord Roberts says in *Forty-one Years in India, ut sup.*, pp. 383 and 441–3. See also *The Indian Army, ut sup.* In 1914, out of twenty-eight infantry regiments descended from Madras units, fifteen had ceased to be recruited from Madras, and of the remaining thirteen, three were Pioneers. Out of three surviving cavalry regiments there were only three squadrons of Madras and Dekhani Mussulmans against nine composed of up-country races.

[2] Quoted from *The Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the years 1891–2, ut sup.*, p. 182.

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Viceroyalty, I think the scheme for utilizing the armies of Native States, as an auxiliary force for the service of the Empire, was the most important both from a political and military point of view.' He adds that Lord Lytton first propounded the idea, appointing a Committee, of which Lord Roberts was himself a member, to consider it; and that he, with others, was at the time doubtful as to the wisdom and expediency of such a step. But during the Afghan War, in 1879, a contingent between 3,000 and 4,000 strong, infantry and cavalry, from the Native States of the Punjab, with whom was the Commander-in-Chief of the Patiala Army, served him well in the Kuram Valley campaign; and the crisis of 1885 made evident 'the unmistakeable spirit of loyalty' of the native rulers.[1] The feeling which the threat of Russian invasion called forth in 1885 is well recorded in the *Annual Register* for that year: 'The imminence of a rupture with Russia elicited an almost universal expression of loyalty from the "articulate classes" of India, which received a practical form in the spontaneous offers of military aid from all the leading feudatory States in the Empire.'[2] There was no mistaking the significance of the movement. It was an indication of a new spirit in India, or rather of a spirit which had not been fully apprehended, because no occasion had hitherto arisen to call it to light. Danger threatened from outside closes up the ranks within. A prospect, however distant, of a novel foreign domination suggests comparison of what might be with that which is, and induces appreciation of the existing régime, if it rests upon an honest basis. India was, in fact, becoming a single unit, in and of the British Empire: the feudal leaders of India were widening their horizon and outlining a future broader and greater than their more isolated past, a future of partnership in a single India and through India in a great world-wide community. As in Canada or Australia local life in

[1] *Forty-one Years in India, ut sup.*, vol. ii, pp. 426–8, and later pages; also p. 167.

[2] *Annual Register* for 1885, p. 309.

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a province or a state has been found compatible with, and has been enriched by, inclusion in a Dominion or a Commonwealth, and as the political system of a Dominion or a Commonwealth has in no way conflicted with the yet wider orbit of an Empire, so it has been, in somewhat different guise, in India.

The movement of 1885 gathered strength and received new expression in 1887, when the Jubilee of Queen Victoria's reign was celebrated. There came from the Nizam of Hyderabad an offer of money and men for frontier defence, an offer which led to others of a similar kind. Hyderabad, in South Central India, is far removed from the North-West Frontier: all the more noteworthy therefore was the initiative taken by the ruler of this great native state 'towards co-operation in the task of Imperial defence'.[1] The matter was not allowed to sleep, and, on the eve of leaving India, Lord Dufferin, in November 1888, announced 'that the Government of India had given earnest attention to the offers of the Chiefs, and had determined to accept them by raising a portion of their forces to such a pitch of general efficiency, that it might take a place in line with the Imperial army of India'.[2] This announcement was made at Patiala, one of the native states of the Punjab—the states which, as we have seen, had sent troops to serve under Lord Roberts in 1879. In these states, in Kashmir, and in the northern Rajput states, the first Imperial Service troops were organized: Gwalior followed, and then Mysore. The beginnings were under the eye of Lord Roberts, wise and sympathetic leader and guide; and, shortly before he left India in 1893, he spoke of having inspected the majority of the Imperial Service corps in the North of India, that their efficiency exceeded his

[1] '. . . the movement towards co-operation in the task of Imperial defence, initiated in the autumn of 1887 by His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad. This chief made the formal offer of assistance in men and money towards the protection of the North-West frontier of India, and his example was followed by similar offers on the part of all the principal Chiefs of the country.' *Moral and Material Progress, 1891–2, &c., ut sup.*, p. 13.

[2] Ibid.

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most sanguine expectations, and that the success of the scheme must be attributed to the loyalty and enthusiasm of the rulers of the states.[1] These words were spoken in the State of Jodhpur, the home of Rajput horsemen, led by gallant Sir Pertab Singh. He and his followers have served the Empire in many fights, in and out of India, and when Lord Roberts, in his last days, went to visit his old Indian comrades on the Western front in France, his tried friend was there at the head of his Jodhpur Lancers to greet him once more before he died.

For many years after their inception, the authorized strength of the Imperial Service Troops stood at 18,000 more or less. The states supplemented each other, contributing infantry or cavalry, according to their kind. Kashmir alone brought also artillery, two mountain batteries, to the common stock, and the Kashmir troops rendered excellent service during the War in East Africa and Palestine. In other cases Imperial co-operation took the form of native sappers or of transport corps, and from the Rajput state of Bikanir came a noted camel corps, 500 strong, almost the first Indian unit to be in action against the Turks, in the Sinai Peninsula, at the end of 1914. On the 1st of April 1912, the total strength stood at 22,271, towards which twenty-nine states contributed. They were composed, in round numbers, of 10,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, 2,700 transport, 700 camel corps, and 700 sappers.[2] These troops, notably the Kashmir troops, saw much fighting in frontier wars. The *Gazette of India*, in 1892, issued after the Hunza Naga campaign of 1891, recorded 'the good services rendered by the soldiers of the Kashmir regiments, who on this, the first occasion of the employment of Imperial Service Troops in the field, gained confidence of the officers

[1] See *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India 1892–3*, July 1894: 199, p. 156. See what Lord Roberts says of the Rajput cavalry of the State of Jodhpur and of his friend Sir Pertab Singh in *Forty-one Years in India*.

[2] See *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1911–12 and the nine preceding years*, July 1913: 220, p. 16.

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and men of the Indian army with whom they were associated.'[1] Kashmir soldiers again served with distinction in 1895, in the defence of and the operations for the relief of Chitral, while Gwalior and Jaipur provided transport corps for the same expedition. In 1897–8 came the Tirah campaign, and once more the *Gazette of India*, in 1898, bore testimony to the worth of the Imperial Service Troops. 'The Imperial Service Troops attached to the force have taken their full share in the hardships of the campaign, and, fighting side by side with their comrades in the regular army, have given a tangible proof of their readiness, and that of their rulers, to assist in the defence of the Empire.' Beyond the frontiers of India, too, they served in Africa and notably in China in the Boxer campaign; and ever the leader of one state or another was with his men in the field. On the personality of the chiefs the value of the troops of their respective states has mainly depended; and, recognizing this cardinal fact, Lord Curzon in 1901 organized an Imperial Cadet Corps, the members of which should be young men of noble birth, to be trained for military leadership.[2]

Overseas employment of Indian troops 1885–1903.

During the years under review in this chapter, one small campaign followed on the heels of another on the North-Western and Northern frontiers of India. Manipur, Chitral, Tirah, among other less-known names, attracted much attention at the time. What British conquest implies to the conquered, the goodwill which follows in its train, had been seen in past years, when the lately conquered Sikhs fought hard for the British cause: it was seen again, when, shortly after the Tirah campaign, 'the Tirah Afridis offered contingents for service in

[1] See a *History of the Imperial Service Troops of Native States*, by Brigadier-General Stuart Beatson, C.B., 1903, pp. 139–40 and 151.

[2] On the subject of the Imperial Service troops, reference should be made to Lord Roberts's book and General Beatson's book already quoted; to the Annual Reports on the *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India*; and to the *Indian Army, ut sup.*, 1907, at p. 54 of which will be found statistics of these troops up to that date. See also the Parliamentary Return of June 24, 1902: 238, *East India* (*Imperial Service Force*).

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South Africa'.[1] Meanwhile, as for years and generations past, Indian soldiers were in evidence beyond the seas.

At Suakim.

In 1896, when Kitchener was beginning the advance which was to end in the overthrow of the Mahdist régime and the recovery of the Sudan, Indian troops were again, as eleven years before, borrowed and lent to hold the Red Sea port of Suakim. They were a brigade of all arms, 2,500 strong; they were sent from India in May and returned home in November and December of the same year. As on the former occasion, the cost was shared between Imperial and Indian revenues, the former bearing the extraordinary charges, the latter the ordinary.

In East Africa.

In the same year some 700 Indian soldiers[2] were employed on the East African Coast, in the neighbourhood of Mombasa, stamping out Arab raids, which were rife at the time in the coast region. In the next year, far inland in East Africa, a more arduous task confronted them.

The Mutiny in Uganda.

In September 1897 a dangerous mutiny broke out among the Sudanese troops, who, to the number of some 1,600 men, garrisoned the Uganda Protectorate. The mutineers attracted to themselves some native support; an exiled King came back to raise rebellion; and a year passed before the disturbances were finally quelled. On a very minute scale the crisis recalled the Indian Mutiny; and as in India, so in Uganda, the Sikhs, a mere handful in the latter case, were to the front in upholding the loyal cause. 'The detachment of Sikhs,' we are told in an official report on the operations, 'men selected from the 14th and 15th Sikhs, fought with such determined and conspicuous gallantry as to add to the already high reputation of these regiments.' High praise was also given to a contingent of Punjabi Mohammedans; while in the later phases of the rising, detachments of a Baluchi regiment, then the 27th regiment of Bombay Light Infantry, stamped out resistance, earning by

[1] *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1899–1900,* June 1901: 207, p. 192.

[2] The 124th Baluchistan Infantry were the first Indian unit to be employed in this quarter and bear the honour 'British East Africa 1896',

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their fine services special mention in dispatches.[1] Some 1,100 Indian fighters in all took part in these operations. In the next year 450 Indian soldiers sufficed to put down a rebellion of the Ogaden Somalis in the East African districts of the Juba river, north of Mombasa, and on the borders of the Italian Protectorate.

Jubaland Rising.

The Somali tribes are a somewhat troublesome ingredient in the British Empire. In the north-eastern corner of Africa, separated from British East Africa by the Italian Somaliland Protectorate, is British Somaliland. Behind it are the highlands of Abyssinia; its chief port, Berbera, faces Aden across the water. There were Egyptian garrisons in these regions prior to 1884, when, as the result of the Mahdist rising in the Sudan and the collapse which followed, the garrisons were withdrawn. Other Powers came in to 'peg out claims' in the vacant spaces; Great Britain in the years 1884–6 concluded treaties with various Somali tribes: from Aden detachments were sent to hold the ports of Zeila and Berbera; and in 1887 a British Protectorate over this part of the Somali Coast was formally notified. Aden is the nearest British centre: Aden is a dependency of India, and the Somaliland Protectorate in its early days was in charge of India and under the supervision of the Resident of Aden. In 1898 it was placed under the Foreign Office, and finally, in 1905, under the Colonial Office. Yet Aden remained and remains the starting-point and rallying-place for the Protectorate on the other side of the Gulf, and help in time of need has come through Aden from India. So it was in the years 1901–4, when Somaliland had produced its Mahdi, the Mullah; the 'Mad Mullah' as he was at first termed, but who had method in his madness, one of the fanatical leaders of which Mohammedanism has been so prolific. His activities gathered strength and aggressiveness in 1901; they were directed at once against the Abyssinians and against the English with their Somali following; and in consequence

In Somaliland.

[1] See Cd. 9123, January 1899, Africa, No. 1 (1899), *Papers relating to recent events in the Uganda Protectorate*, pp. 9–36.

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the Protectorate became a scene of raids and counter-raids, of interminable elusive fighting in waterless desert. Driven out of the British into the Italian Protectorate, the Mullah collected fresh forces and resumed his attacks in December 1901 and in 1902. In October 1902 a severe fight took place at Erego in Italian territory, in the midst of dense bush, in which the native levies on the British side suffered heavy losses. Through 1903 the desultory fighting went on, vain attempts being made to intercept the Mullah and his men between the British and Abyssinian forces; but, while the Dervishes were hard pressed, the reverses were not all on one side; on the 17th April, at a place called Gumberu, a detachment of some 200 men of the King's African Rifles was annihilated; and a few days later another small column was severely handled and compelled to fall back on its base. At length, on the 10th of January 1904, there was something like a pitched battle at Jidballi, ending for the Dervishes in defeat, rout, and heavy loss of life; and the outcome of it was that the Mullah came to terms, and was for three or four years comparatively passive, dwelling by agreement in the Italian sphere. During these long-drawn and wearisome operations, constant reinforcements were brought in to stiffen the British fighting line. African soldiers of the King's African Rifles came from the East Africa and Central Africa Protectorates; a small contingent came from South Africa; but the reinforcements of Indian troops were on a larger scale. A handful of Sikhs were the forerunners of many more Indian fighters.[1] Some were brought from service in the other African Protectorates, but the main forces came from the garrison of Aden or direct from India. The number of native troops on the strength of the Indian Army, who were employed out of India in the Somaliland operations, was returned as 3,376, artillery, sappers, infantry, and mounted

[1] See *Somaliland Dispatches, regarding the Military operations in Somaliland from the 18th January 1902 to the 31st May 1904*, Cd. 2254, 1904, p. 8. The above paragraph is based on this White book. Special mention is made of the Bikanir Camel Corps on p. 30.

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infantry ; [1] there were Sikhs, Punjabis, Marathas, and the Imperial Service Troops were represented by the Bikanir Camel Corps, which won high praise.

At the time of the South African War native Indian regiments took the place of white regiments on garrison duty outside India, as in Mauritius, Ceylon, and Singapore, thereby setting free a corresponding number of white fighting men for the South African campaigns ; while the burden of another war, which coincided with the South African War, further straining the resources of the British Empire, devolved almost entirely upon, and was carried through by, the native troops of the Indian Army. This was what was known as the Boxer rising in China.

The Boxer Rising in China.

After the war between China and Japan in 1894–5, European penetration in China had been aggressively active. At one point and another, one Power and another had gained a fresh footing, the French in the south, the Germans at Kiaochow, the Russians at Port Arthur, the English at Kowloon and Weihaiwei. Disintegration of China seemed to be proceeding apace, and anti-foreign feeling stimulated revolution. Unable possibly to suppress the revolutionaries, the party of reaction at Peking, headed by the astute and powerful Dowager Empress, connived at the opposition to the foreigners and their religion, the attitude of the Court circle towards the foreign Legations bearing some resemblance to Greek policy as evolved by King Constantine and his advisers in the earlier years of the Great War. The result was that a secret society movement, a constant epidemic in China, attained something like the proportions of a national rising. The revolutionaries styled themselves 'The Righteous Harmony Fists', which missionaries or pressmen translated 'Boxers' ; and murders of missionaries and their native converts took place in the later part of 1899 and the earlier months of 1900. The position of the European community at Peking became critical ; in June 1900 a veritable reign of terror was established in the city, and eventually on the 20th of June a regular

[1] See *East India (Employment of Troops out of India)*, March 27, 1905.

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siege of the foreign Legations by Chinese troops began. Some additional guards, a few marines and bluejackets, had been sent up prior to this date; but a relief expedition, numbering some 2,500 men of various nationalities, which started from Tientsin on the 10th of June, under the command of the British Admiral on the China station, Sir Edward Seymour, was compelled to fall back with considerable casualties, in imminent danger of being itself cut off. The foreign settlements at Tientsin had, in the meantime, been attacked, and communication with the sea threatened.

For eight weeks the Peking Legations were besieged, and cut off from the outer world; their inmates were very generally believed to have perished. The chief refuge and stronghold of the Europeans was the British Legation, thronged with non-combatant refugees, and held by a garrison of about 400 men. Meanwhile the Powers gathered forces for decisive action. Troops in the British service were sent up from Hong-Kong and Singapore, and replaced by Indian regiments; while from India, under command of General Sir Alfred Gaselee, came an expeditionary force. Two infantry brigades, in addition to divisional troops, arrived in China in July 1900, and in that month and August two more brigades started from India, the fourth brigade including Imperial Service troops. With the Jodhpur contingent went Sir Pertab Singh; the Maharajah of Bikanir led the men of his State; Sindhia went from Gwalior, providing a hospital ship at his own expense. In all over 14,000 Indian troops were sent, exclusive of the Hong-Kong garrison; three regiments of cavalry, 17 battalions of infantry, and 550 sappers; the white troops numbered 648, a single infantry battalion, the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers. The safety of Shanghai was assured by landing a strong force, which was not finally withdrawn till towards the end of 1902; Tientsin was overpowered and made safe; and from this point, on the 4th of August, a strong composite army of mixed nationalities started for the relief of the Legations, the British Indian con-

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H.H. SIR PERTAB SINGH

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tingent numbering 3,000 men with 12 guns. There were actions on the way on the 5th and 6th of August, and on the 14th the Legations were relieved. In General Gaselee's words, 'Her Majesty's troops had the supreme gratification of finding they were the first to relieve the sorely pressed beleaguered garrison'. Indian soldiers were the first to enter at half-past two in the afternoon on this memorable day—a Rajput regiment, the 7th Rajputs, together with a detachment of the 1st Sikhs.[1]

After the Legations had been relieved, Chinese resistance collapsed, and on the 26th of August the Imperial city was surrendered to the Japanese contingent. The Indian troops were employed in some minor operations, in an expedition to Paoting in October 1900, General Gaselee being in command of the mixed forces on this occasion and—strange as it seems at the present day—taking instructions from Count Waldersee, the newly appointed German commander-in-chief of all the allied forces in China. But a peace protocol was signed on the 14th of January 1901, and, though Peking was not formally evacuated until the following 17th of September, the various forces which had been sent to China were gradually withdrawn. Thus India, in time of need, had once more upheld the common cause, though the whole charges in this case were borne upon Imperial funds; and, as Australians and Indians had joined hands at Suakim in 1885, so it was again in China; for, during a few months from October 1900, 250 men of the Australian Naval contingent garrisoned the British Legation at Peking.

Australian Naval Contingent at Peking.

It has been seen that the employment of native Indian troops on garrison duty in the Colonies was considered by a House of Commons Committee, which reported in 1867. The account of the Indian Army given in the *Imperial Gazetteer* states that 'Indian troops were first employed in Colonial garrisons in 1898, but the larger

Employment of Indian soldiers in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates.

[1] The 7th Rajputs served in the late War in the famous 6th Division in Mesopotamia, the 1st Sikhs (now the 51st) served with distinction at Aden, in Mesopotamia, and in Palestine.

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measure arose from the call made on India during the South African War, and is now accepted as a permanent arrangement'.[1] Under this arrangement battalions of Indian soldiers have been stationed more especially in Ceylon, Mauritius, Singapore, and North China, five infantry battalions being added to the strength of the Indian Army in the years 1898–1902, in order to replace the corps lent to the Imperial Government for garrison duty outside India. On the eve of the Great War, in the year 1913–14, seven battalions of Indian Infantry and one battery of Indian Artillery were employed in the Colonies and in China, in addition to a mountain battery of Garrison Artillery employed in Egypt and an Indian contingent in Somaliland.[2] Nor has the help given by India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates ended with the loan of regiments of regular native troops. In the years 1891–5 Indian soldiers were allowed to volunteer for service in Central and Eastern Africa, where they have proved invaluable, and in 1892 a special infantry battalion composed of Mohammedans of Upper India was raised to garrison Hong-Kong, being given the name of the Hong-Kong regiment.[3]

[1] *The Indian Army, a Sketch of its History and Organization, ut sup.*, p. 36.

[2] *Moral and Material Progress, 1913–14*, 298, July 1915, pp. 122–4.

[3] This unit was subsequently disbanded, but Indian soldiers enlisted later in the 'Hong-Kong and Singapore Battalion' of Garrison Artillery maintained for the defence of British ports in Eastern waters. The battalion was distributed between Hong-Kong (3 companies), Singapore (1 company) and Mauritius (1 company), and a battery of mountain artillery, which did good service in Egypt in the War, was manned from this battalion. See below, p. 255.

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

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

From the portrait by Chas. Furse, A.R.A.

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CHAPTER VI

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

THE Colonial Office, as a separate office, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as Colonial Minister solely and exclusively, date only from the middle of the nineteenth century, from June 1854, when England was entering on the Crimean War. For a few years in the eighteenth century, from 1768 to 1782, there had been a separate Secretary of State for the Colonies or the American Department; but with the close of the War of American Independence and the disruption of the old British Empire, the office was abolished by Burke's Act, and a little later the charge of the Colonies was combined with the War Office until 1854. After this last date, so slow was the Home Government and the home public to appreciate the growing importance of the Overseas Empire, with the exception of India, that the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies was for years hardly in the first rank of Cabinet appointments, and Lord Carnarvon stands out as perhaps the only statesman of high repute before the last decade of the century whose name was made entirely at the Colonial Office. About the same time the permanent staff of the office gained a broader and more sympathetic outlook, when Sir Robert Herbert became Permanent Under-Secretary of State. He brought with him personal knowledge of overseas conditions and of Colonial sentiment, having been the first premier of Queensland, when Queensland was constituted a separate Colony. Yet the awakening was slow. Whig tradition lingered on the one side, content with passive non-interference. On the other, Conservative Imperialism, attracted by India, was, for the most part, fitful with regard to the Colonies. It was not until, by personal choice and preference, Mr. Chamberlain, in 1895, took charge of the Colonial Office, that a new conception of the meaning and the possibilities of the Empire began

Mr. Chamberlain.

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to lay hold of the public mind. For the first time a man who was at once an acknowledged leader of advanced democracy and a trained expert in commercial life brought to the problems of the Empire a combination of practical business capacity and progressive political instincts, with no undue reverence for traditional methods and with confident belief in a constructive future.

The Diamond Jubilee.

In 1897 came the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria, and it was made an occasion for a pageant, in some sort, of the Empire which had grown up in the Great Queen's long reign. The Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies were in the forefront of the honoured guests of the Government and the nation, while small representative bodies of armed men were brought from all parts, telling the home citizens for the first time how varied and numerous was the manhood of the Empire, and how large the potential reserve of fighting strength. Two years later the white citizenship of the Empire was tested by the South African War.

Lord Milner.

In May 1897, shortly before the Diamond Jubilee was celebrated, a new Governor landed at the Cape, Sir Alfred (now Lord) Milner. Of widely different character and upbringing from Mr. Chamberlain, he had, in common with him, strength of will, width of outlook, and grasp of the meaning of the Empire. There always has been, and always will be, divergence of view as to the rights and wrongs of the South African War. Any controversial subject of the kind is happily alien to this book, nor can the South African War receive more than a brief notice. But there is the outstanding fact to be noted that, as this war marked the beginning of a new era in the evolution of the Empire, so the two British statesmen upon whom the responsibility of the War mainly fell stand out as the two men of their time who had the closest perception of, and the most active sympathy with, the new Commonwealth of peoples which was being evolved.

India and the South African War.

The East Coast of Africa, North of the Portuguese possessions, has always been more or less closely connected with Asia, more or less colonized from the opposite

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shores of the Indian Ocean. It was not so with the southern peninsula of Africa, until incoming Europeans brought Asiatics in their train. At the time of the South African War, India had to some extent a special concern in South Africa, in that for many years past there had been an influx of Indian coolies into Natal. They had been brought in, under the Indenture system, to work the sugar plantations, with the result that British East Indians and other Asiatics outnumbered the whites in Natal, and filtered through into the South African Republic, where their treatment formed one of the many points at issue between the British Government and President Kruger. Moreover, the war was a war in which the future of the whole Empire was at stake, and, as in former years, as at the present day, India, ever-ready in soldiers and equipment to face an emergency, proved a tower of strength. In the first critical stages of the war, when the British forces in South Africa were a mere handful, the position in Natal was undoubtedly saved by the prompt dispatch of reinforcements from India. Early in September 1899, when war seemed to have become inevitable, the Viceroy was instructed by telegram to send to Durban from the white garrison in India, a brigade of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a brigade division of field artillery; and in the following month of October four infantry battalions, three regiments of cavalry, and three batteries of Royal Field Artillery were landed in Natal, nearly 5,700 officers and men in all. In January 1900 another cavalry regiment and two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery came in from India; and in February, two companies of Burma Mounted Infantry, bringing with them their Burmese ponies. At the end of February and beginning of March another small contingent left India for South Africa. This was a body of white volunteers, two companies of mounted infantry, raised by Lt.-Col. Lumsden, who had been commandant of a volunteer corps, and it was known throughout the war as Lumsden's Horse. By the end of March 1900, 8,200 British officers and soldiers had been sent to South Africa from India, accompanied by 5,700

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native non-combatants, and bringing with them horses, mules, guns, and war equipment of all kinds. Before the war ended, India contributed in all over 19,000 fighting men to South Africa, the cost of the troops being borne on Imperial revenues. From Ceylon too there came a small but efficient body of white men, over 200 all told.

Mr. Balfour had announced in the House of Commons on the 28th of July 1899 that, in the event of war in South Africa, it was not intended to employ any but white troops upon the British side. The colour question has always presented peculiar difficulties in South Africa, and the Government of the day judged that bitterness would be accentuated, were other than European regiments to be placed in the fighting line against the Boers. The decision was, in a high degree, a self-denying ordinance, for it deprived Great Britain and the Empire of the invaluable services of the native Indian Army. Nor could it fail to disappoint the ruling chiefs of the Indian principalities,[1] who, as has been seen, had given the clearest evidence of their desire to take an active part in the defence of the Empire, to be recognized as partners in its responsibilities, as admitted in full measure to its fellowship. Yet, indirectly, much help was forthcoming from the princes and peoples of India. Indian generosity, always abounding, provided horses, hospital equipment, ambulance service, medical aid; and over 10,000 Indian non-combatants, as stretcher bearers and in numberless other ways, gave whole-hearted service in South Africa throughout the war.

Canada and the South African War.

When President Kruger's ultimatum was issued on the 9th of October 1899 and fighting began, the armed forces of Canada consisted of 1,027 Regular troops of all ranks, and 30,861 Militia. On the 31st of July previously, the Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, had proposed and carried a motion in the Canadian House of Commons, expressing sympathy with the efforts of the

[1] 'During the year 1899–1900 the ruling chiefs felt some disappointment at the decision that their forces should take no part in the war in South Africa.' *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1899–1900*, June 1901: 207, p. 195.

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Home Government to secure equal rights and liberties for British subjects resident in the South African Republic. But he and his Government held, as did many Canadians, especially French-Canadians, that Canada was not bound to take an active part in every war in which the United Kingdom was involved, that the South African War was no menace to Canada, that the Militia Act applied only to defence of Canadian soil, and that it must be for the Dominion Parliament to decide whether or not a fighting force should be dispatched on overseas service. Public feeling in Canada, however, rapidly matured in favour of sending a Canadian contingent to South Africa; the veteran Conservative leader, Sir Charles Tupper, pressed the Prime Minister to act, assuring him of the full support of the Opposition; and three or four days after the date of the Boer ultimatum, the decision was taken to send troops across the sea.

Before the war had begun to run its course, and bitter experience had shown the need for all the help that might be forthcoming from overseas, and the special need for mounted men, the military authorities in England suggested that the self-governing Colonies should contribute infantry by preference, in units of 125 men each, to be incorporated on arrival in South Africa in regular units. The Colonies were to pay the cost of equipment and transport to South Africa; on arrival the Colonial troops were to be rationed and paid at the cost of the Imperial Government, on the same scale as the soldiers from the United Kingdom; and they were to be sent home in due course at the charge of the Imperial Treasury. The rates of pay on active service were, however, as a matter of fact, supplemented by the respective Colonial Governments. To many Canadians, notably to Colonel George Denison,[1] it seemed that a series of small units, attached to and merged in as many separate British regiments, would not be a contingent representative of Canada. The Dominion Government took the same view, and com-

[1] See *The Struggle for Imperial Unity*, by Lt.-Col. George T. Denison, 1909, chap. xxiii, pp. 258–70.

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munication with the War Office in London resulted in the dispatch from Canada of a single infantry battalion, eight companies strong, 1,150 men in all, the second (Special Service) battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment.[1] Commanded by an able Canadian officer, Colonel Otter, the battalion embarked at Quebec on the 30th October 1899, and landed at Capetown on the following 30th of November. Immediately on arrival the Canadians were stationed on Lord Methuen's line of communications, at Belmont, on the railway north of the Orange River, and a detachment took part in a brilliant little fight at Sunnyside Farm on New Year's Day 1900, Queenslanders being among their comrades. Throughout the main operations of Lord Roberts's Army, the Royal Canadians formed part of Smith-Dorrien's famous brigade in the 9th division, the other three battalions of the brigade being the Shropshire Light Infantry, the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the Gordon Highlanders. Up to Paardeberg they marched and fought. At Paardeberg they made the final push which preceded Cronje's surrender. From Paardeberg to Bloemfontein, from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, now serving under Ian Hamilton, they had their fill of fighting; and, when most of them went home to Canada towards the end of 1900, they had placed to their credit, and to the credit of the Dominion, a year's campaigning, crowded with incident and crowned with honour.

Later troops sent by the Canadian Government in the early part of 1900 consisted of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, a unit of the permanent Canadian forces, and some newly-raised formations. First came the Canadian Mounted Rifles, largely recruited from the North-West Mounted Police, and three batteries of Field Artillery. In March a fine body of some six hundred Canadians, trained roughriders, men of the West, left Halifax for South Africa. These were Strathcona's Horse, commanded

[1] The first battalion was simply the permanent Infantry unit in the Defence Force of Canada. By constituting the specially-raised Expeditionary Force a second battalion of the regiment, the honours for active service accrued to the regiment in the event of the second battalion being disbanded.

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by Colonel Steele, and enlisted and sent at the expense of the High Commissioner for Canada, Lord Strathcona. Except that they took no part in the Ladysmith fighting or Buller's campaigns until the latest stages, Canadians were in evidence throughout the whole field of war. In the great advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, while the Royal Canadians were marching under Ian Hamilton on the extreme right, on the opposite wing Canadian horsemen formed part of General Hutton's mounted infantry brigade. A battery of Canadian artillery, sent round to Beira, by forced marches reached Plumer on the very day on which he made his final start to join hands with Mahon and relieve Mafeking. Canadians served with Warren in the rebel district of West Griqualand, and shared in the stiff fight at Faber's Put. Time and again, up to the very end, Canadians proved themselves second to none as grim and resolute fighters. On the Komati river, on the 7th of November 1900, Canadian Dragoons and guns covered the retreat of Smith-Dorrien's column, a whole small detachment sacrificing themselves to the last man to save the guns. At Boschbult, in the Western Transvaal, on the 31st of March 1902, a party of Canadian Mounted Rifles held their ground until eighteen men out of twenty-two had been killed or wounded.

Nor did Canada's part in the South African War end here. A Canadian regiment was raised to garrison Halifax, thereby releasing for service in South Africa a British battalion, the first battalion of the Leinsters, a regiment which, as we have seen,[1] had itself originally been raised in Canada and borne the name of the Royal Canadians; and finally, over 1,200 Canadians were found to take service in the South African Constabulary, the military police force which was raised while the war, in its guerilla stage, was still running its tedious course. In one way or another, directly or indirectly, Canada contributed over 8,000 men to the South African War.

As far back as 1881, when the Boers were up in arms, and the British reverse at Laing's Nek preceded the

[1] Above, p. 69.

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Australia and the South African War.

débâcle at Majuba, the news of the check brought an instantaneous offer from Australia of two thousand volunteers. So prompt have the men of the South ever been to rally to the Motherland and to the common cause of our race. So it was again in 1899. The very first offer of help from beyond the seas came from Queensland, an offer of 250 mounted men with machine guns. This was on the 11th of July, three months before the war began. Australia had a somewhat special concern in the war, for among the Uitlanders in the South African Republic, for whom equal rights were demanded, was a substantial number of Australian miners. The first overseas troops to reach South Africa were, appropriately enough, men from the Mother State of Australia, a detachment of New South Wales Lancers, who happened to have been at the time at Aldershot on a special course of training. During the course of the war New South Wales contributed over 6,000 fighting men, and the other Australian Colonies in proportion. The total number of Australian troops who served in South Africa exceeded 16,000, including a battery of artillery from New South Wales. Like the Canadians, the Australians took part in well-nigh all the operations, except the Natal campaign. The handful of New South Wales Lancers were among the very few mounted men who accompanied Methuen's first advance. As has been mentioned,[1] Queenslanders participated in the Sunnyside raid. Still companying with Canadians, Queenslanders escorted the Canadian battery that caught up Plumer. Mounted Australians served under French when he menaced Colesberg; they rode with him for the relief of Kimberley; and an Australian patrol were the first to join hands with the long-beleaguered garrison. Australians, meanwhile, formed part, and a most noteworthy part, of the depleted force, which, in the critical first half of February 1900, was left under Clements to hold the lines before Colesberg, keeping in check as best might be, and hourly and stubbornly falling back before, an enemy in far superior numbers,

[1] Above, p. 130.

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

CAPTAIN COOK

From the portrait by Nathaniel Dance, R.A., in the Gallery of Greenwich Hospital

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while Roberts relieved Kimberley, and once for all the tide turned again. At one point and another, Victorians, South Australians, West Australians, Tasmanians, all made their names here. Australians formed a large proportion of Hutton's mounted infantry brigade, serving under a General who knew Australia and its men. More than half of the 500 men who, in August 1900, held their ground at Elands River, when given up for lost, were Australians, mainly from New South Wales and Victoria. Australians were in Carrington's force, which vainly tried to relieve them, before Kitchener himself brought effective relief. When Plumer hunted De Wet through and out of the Cape Colony, indomitable Australian horsemen dogged the Boer leader's trail. In a word, in the great spaces of South Africa, and especially in waterless regions, no men could be found better adapted to the conditions, in physique and training as well as in fighting spirit, than those who came from the Back Blocks of the Southern Continent.

New Zealand and the South African War.

Among the earliest of the Colonial contingents to reach South Africa was a body of New Zealanders. As again in 1914–18, New Zealand in proportion to population sent more fighting men to the war than any other British Dominion or Colony outside South Africa itself. The ratio was almost as high as in the United Kingdom, while the outlay in money upon the war per head of the population was greater than in any Colony other than the Cape Colony and Natal, though Queensland was hardly behind in this respect. A forceful man, Mr. Seddon, was Prime Minister, and contingent followed contingent, until the total number of New Zealanders who served in the war exceeded 6,000. The quality was as good as the numbers were large, and the New Zealand men were in the very first rank of the mounted troops. Like the Australians, and in most cases side by side with the Australians, they served on almost every front, with conspicuous merit, riding under French and Hutton, under Plumer and various other commanders. Early in the war, in the Colesberg fighting, in January 1900 they made a memorable charge at Slingersfontein farm, 'New Zealand Hill' in this region, like 'Australian Hill',

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telling of Australasian prowess. Late in the war, in the great drive in the north-eastern district of the Free State in February 1902, they bore the brunt of De Wet's onrush at Langverwacht.[1]

South Africans.

The forces raised in South Africa itself on the British side were large, over 52,000 in all, and their mettle was proved on many fields. The stubborn defence of the Wepener position stands to the credit of the Cape Mounted Rifles and kindred South African levies; while on the Natal side, more especially in the critical early stages of the war, the Natal Mounted Police, and the famous Uitlander regiment, the Imperial Light Horse, rendered conspicuous service.

It may be here noted that the contingent from South Africa, which served in Somaliland after the South African War, consisted of 140 British Mounted Infantry and 100 Burgher Mounted Infantry. They came with horses and remounts; and the General under whom they served in Somaliland in the first six months of 1903, General Manning, wrote of 'the excellent services rendered by the Burgher Mounted Infantry', adding that 'their knowledge of country and their adaptability to the conditions of service in Somaliland make the corps a very valuable addition to the force'.[2]

The place of the South African War in Imperial co-operation.

What is the place which should be assigned to the South African War in the story of Imperial Co-operation? It stands out as the first war in the New British Empire in which the overseas peoples collaborated with the Mother Country on an appreciable scale. The Suakim expedition

[1] In the Parliamentary Paper of the *Colonial Conference 1902*, Cd. 1299, October 1902, p. 43, Appendix II, a list is given of Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand contributions to the war as follows:

	Number of men.	*Expenditure.* £
Canada (including garrison of Halifax)	8,400	620,000
New South Wales	6,208	391,620
Victoria	3,897	138,327
Queensland	2,903	203,164
South Australia	1,494	82,068
Western Australia	1,165	51,646
Tasmania	796	38,393
New Zealand (approx.)	6,000	334,000

[2] *Somaliland Dispatches*, Cd. 2254, 1904, p. 30. See above, p. 120.

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of 1885 will to all time be memorable as setting a precedent of the utmost value; but the emergency was not comparable to that of the South African War, the effort was not of the same magnitude, the incident was not in the same class. We have to go back to the old British Empire, to the days of the Seven Years War, to try to find a parallel and a contrast. Then, as in the South African War, British Regulars and British Colonists fought side by side, but the analogy is very slight. It might have been somewhat closer, had no troops been engaged in South Africa on the British side other than British Afrikanders and the soldiers of the Line from home, the latter sent out, as Pitt sent the regiments under Amherst and Wolfe, to aid the South African Colonists. Even so, there would hardly be ground for comparison. The South African War had much in it of the nature of a Civil War; it was a kind of compound of the Seven Years War and the War of American Independence which followed. There is no real ground for comparing the two cases, but there is much ground for contrasting them. The British Colonists in the eighteenth century, as we have seen, had little love for the redcoats who came among them, even though they came to fight their battles; they themselves had to be perpetually humoured and coaxed to do their part. But in 1899 British Colonists, living in lands far remote from the scene of war, were more than ready to come and fight; and, when the first months of the war had brought reverse, disaster, and menace to the whole system of which they formed a part, their resolution stiffened and their spirit rose; they came unbidden to the help of the Motherland and the call of the race. The South African War was a pronouncement to an unfriendly and suspicious world that the British Empire was a single entity, a union in diversities, not an artificial and temporary combination, but a living body of many members.

In the next place this war was peculiarly a war of evolution, and the Empire is the product of evolution. It was so alike on the military and on the political side. It was precisely the kind of war to form—for an Empire

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of manifold diversities—a fitting prelude, a suitable preparation for collaborating at a later date in the greatest of all wars. To attune Colonists and soldiers of the Line to each other, what better field could there be than a theatre of war beyond the seas, where the physique, the training, the horsemanship of the Colonists would find full play, where Canadian or Australasian could teach much to the soldier from the narrower limits of the island home and in turn learn much from him in military habit and in discipline? If in this first large venture at co-operation, the inchoate armed forces of the Colonies had been rooted in trenches or kept cooped up at perpetual close quarters on a European front, there would have been more chance of friction, less opportunity for gradual assimilation. So also on the political side. The Colonies were giving generously and with open hand, but still, as compared with their tremendous and wholesale effort of fifteen years later, partially giving and partially paying; their armies were still in infancy; their nationhood was not yet complete. In the course of the war Australia became a Commonwealth, the Union of South Africa was the result of the war: the services offered, accepted, and rendered constituted a claim and registered an advance in Imperial partnership; but the stage was still intermediate; obviously there was more to come.

Once more, it was a white man's war. So it was decided, and the wisdom of the decision need not be questioned. But this fact of itself made the war incomplete as an expression of United Empire. It ruled out the partnership of India, and it debarred Indian troops from directly sharing in the enterprise, the suffering, and the success. It was, in short, a war which ended the nineteenth century with something in the direction of Imperial co-operation far above and beyond all that had gone before, and began the twentieth century with the record of a combined effort, pointing the way to far wider combination and immeasurably greater achievement.

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CHAPTER VII

COLONIAL CONFERENCES AND COLONIAL DEFENCE FORCES

First suggestion for a Colonial Conference.

WHEN the Colonial Society, the germ of the Royal Colonial Institute, was first formed, the Home Government was at issue with the Government of New Zealand on the question of withdrawing from the Colony the last remaining battalion of the line. The uncompromising attitude of the Home Government on this question, and the tone of a dispatch which negatived a request for an Imperial guarantee of a New Zealand loan, gave offence to the friends of New Zealand on this side the water, and their resentment found expression in a circular letter, which was written on the 13th of August, 1869, to the present self-governing Dominions, not then all self-governing, and to the colony of Mauritius, a copy being at the same time communicated to the Colonial Office. The address from which the letter was written was the Royal Colonial Society's Rooms at the Westminster Palace Hotel, and the three gentlemen who signed it purported to represent a committee appointed at a meeting of influential Colonists in England, 'with the view (amongst other things) of communicating with the different Colonial Governments, in reference to the present state of relations between the Mother Country and her Colonies'. The writers contended that the policy of the Home Government towards the Colonies, as illustrated in the case of New Zealand, seemed to disclaim any responsibility on the part of the Mother Country for the welfare or the safety of the Colonies, 'except to the extent of partial protection in case of foreign war with civilized powers', and to point, as an ulterior result, to a severance of the connexion; that the interests of the Colonies, in relation to the Mother Country, were not adequately secured under the existing system of administration, the Colonial Office being ill adapted

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for carrying on friendly intercourse with Colonial Governments or representing their wants and wishes, while the attention of the British Parliament was absorbed in the immediate concerns of the United Kingdom. With a view to finding a remedy and effecting such changes in administration as might be thought desirable, the writers conveyed the suggestion 'that a conference of Colonial representatives, duly authorized by the respective Governments in which Responsible Government has been established, should be held in London', and they invited the Colonial Governments to appoint such representatives.[1]

It was an unwise letter, verging on impertinence; it was badly received not only in England but in the Colonies also; and it had a diametrically opposite result to that which the writers intended. Speaking in the House of Lords on the 14th of February, 1870, Lord Carnarvon, who was by no means enamoured of the policy of the Government, none the less made critical reference to 'the self-constituted advisers of the Colonies here in London', while, on the same occasion, the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time, Lord Granville, who was the principal object of attack, spoke of the three signatories to the letter as 'proposing something like the establishment of a universal college in regard to the Colonies'. Lord Granville, on receiving the letter, had written a friendly and politic dispatch to the Colonies[2] concerned, in which he was able to place the proposal in the light of interference with the Colonial Governments and their accredited representatives as well as with the Colonial Office, and this view was taken in the Colonies themselves. One and all declined the invitation, the Queensland Government commenting in caustic terms

[1] Cd. 24, February 1870, pp. 1–2.

[2] The dispatch was drafted by the very able Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time, Sir Frederick Rogers (Lord Blachford). 'A dispatch I drafted at Blachford to turn the flank of some fellows who are trying to set up an anti-Downing Street Colonial Conference. It seems to have answered its purpose, for I hear they complain that till that dispatch went round they got nothing but favourable answers and now they get nothing but unfavourable.' Letter from Lord Blachford written in November 1869. See *The Letters of Lord Blachford* (1896), p. 279.

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upon 'the mischievous interference of these self-constituted Colonial Societies and other pretended representatives of the Colonies in England'.[1] Thus this private venture into Imperial politics, well intentioned but ill timed and ill judged, proved a complete fiasco. On the other hand, not only did it attract considerable attention at the time, calling forth two Parliamentary Blue Books and causing the *Annual Register* for 1870 to devote appreciable space to 'the proceedings of a number of gentlemen purporting to represent Colonial feeling',[2] but it was of permanent historical interest as the first move in the direction of a Colonial conference. Sixteen or seventeen years passed before any similar proposal was made, or at least any proposal of a kind which attracted serious attention. When next a Colonial conference was invited, the political atmosphere of the Empire was wholly different, there was no question of private intermediaries, and the invitation came from the Colonial Office itself.

The first Colonial Conference, 1887.

'There is on all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions of the Empire.' So wrote Mr. Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the self-governing Colonies in November 1886, quoting the words of the Queen's speech at the prorogation of Parliament in that year, and suggesting the first of the Colonial conferences. It was the year preceding and looking forward to the Jubilee of Queen Victoria's reign; it was the year following the Suakim expedition, reference to which was made in the same dispatch; the patriotic offers of the Colonies being taken as 'the first practical result of much careful work during recent years'. These words were well chosen. The importance of the action taken by New South Wales, and of the backing given by the other Australian Colonies, consisted in the evidence which was thereby forthcoming of actual work done in the direction of developing armed forces overseas. Imperial defence was the keynote of the invitation to a conference. 'The time has now arrived when an attempt may fairly

[1] Cd. 51, March 1870, p. 5. [2] *Annual Register* for 1870 [111–113].

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be made to attain to a better understanding as to the system of defence which may be established throughout the Empire.' Discussion of political federation was deprecated; the time was not ripe; but co-ordination for defence purposes had come within the range of practical politics.[1]

The delegates to the Conference, which met in 1887, were not from the self-governing Colonies alone. Other parts of the Empire were also represented; for in British fashion, this beginning of a movement, which has grown so greatly under our eyes, had in it little that was formal or exclusive. It was an Empire gathering, on an occasion to do honour to the Empire's Queen, utilized for taking counsel and for friendly interchange of views. The visitors were welcomed at the outset by Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister, and words which he used read strangely at the present time. 'I do not think that, so long as the Empire holds together, the Colonies are the least likely to be brought into any war. The policy of this Empire is essentially pacific.' Yet he referred to contingencies and possibilities which might arise, to tendencies which might develop, and to the consequent need for concerted measures of defence; and Germany was called upon the scene. 'We cannot emulate the German Empire in conducting all our Imperial affairs from one centre;' but the *Kriegsverein*, 'the union for military purposes' which had preceded the consolidation of Germany, supplied a text for insisting upon the desirability of a British 'union for purposes of mutual defence. That is the business which the Conference has now before it.'

Thus the first attempt at something like a representative gathering of the clans of the Empire was primarily concerned with defence. The recommendations of Lord Carnarvon's Commission with regard to coaling stations gave food for thought and material for discussion; much time and attention was devoted to the question of the

[1] See *Proceedings of the Colonial Conference 1887*, vol. i, Cd. 5091, July 1887; vol. ii, Appendix, Papers laid before the Conference. For the various quotations given see vol. i, pp. vii–viii and 5–6.

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naval force to be maintained in Australasian waters; and from one of the representatives of the Cape Colony, Hofmeyr, a leader among South African Dutchmen, came a motion, far-seeing and statesmanlike, though it passed into history as no more than a pious opinion, that throughout the Empire there should be a uniform supertax upon imports from foreign countries, the proceeds of which should be devoted to the general defence of the Empire.

The Naval Agreement with the Australasian Colonies.

The principal immediate and concrete result of the Conference was an agreement—for ten years in the first instance—between the Imperial Government and the Australasian Colonies, to the effect that the squadron of the Royal Navy in Australasian waters should be strengthened by the addition of five fast cruisers and two torpedo gunboats, the Colonies paying towards the total cost a maximum sum of £126,000 per annum. The agreement was ratified by Acts of the respective Parliaments, the Imperial Act providing at the same time for expenditure on coaling stations,[1] and Lord Carnarvon, who was visiting Australia in the autumn of 1887, in a memorable speech at Melbourne on the 25th November in that year, spoke of the bill which had just been passed by the Legislature of Victoria with prompt unanimity as 'that bill which binds these Colonies to the Mother Country in the bonds of a common defence'.

Sir Bevan Edwards's Mission.

The Commission over which he had presided had recommended that a military officer from home of standing and experience should either visit the Australian Colonies from time to time, or preferably be stationed in Australia for a short term of years, to inspect and advise in time of peace, to take command of all the armed forces in time of war. A request to the same effect was made by the spokesmen of Australia at the 1887 Conference, and the Secretary of State for War promised that a General Officer should be sent out occasionally on a tour of inspection. Accordingly, in 1889 Major-General Bevan Edwards visited Australia and New Zealand. He found in the Australian Colonies—Victoria and New

[1] Imperial Defence Act of 1888, 51 and 52 Vict. cap. 32.

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South Wales being by far the best equipped—the nucleus of a permanent force, over 900 artillerymen and submarine miners, supplemented by militia or volunteer forces for the most part 'partially paid'. The partial payment consisted in pay given to compensate for loss of wages during the time of military instruction, and in free rations issued while the men were in camp or called out for service. The whole tenor of his recommendations was towards federation of Australia for purposes of defence. He urged that the permanent forces in the several Colonies should be amalgamated into one fortress corps, that there should be a uniform organization of all the armed forces, a common Defence Act, and an officer of the rank of Lieutenant-General to advise and inspect them all in peace time, to command them all in time of war. Passing on to New Zealand, he recommended that the permanent artillery and submarine miners in New Zealand should be combined with the Australian fortress corps, that the 'partially paid' system of Australia should be adopted in New Zealand for the local militia or volunteers, and that New Zealand should join with Australia in securing the services of a General Officer for purposes of inspection.[1] Co-operation, common action, a uniform system was advocated and was wanting. All else promised well. The Australian Colonies, or at least Victoria and New South Wales, from first to last stood out in the Empire for readiness to undertake the burden of self-defence and even more. 'They put us to shame,' wrote Lord Carnarvon in a letter to *The Times* of July 9, 1888, on the subject of 'The condition of our coaling stations', 'for with smaller means they have shown an appreciation of the risks of modern war, and of the requirements of modern defence, which English Governments have been slow to understand.'

But both at home and beyond the seas good intentions fructified slowly. It seems to be inherent in the British

[1] See *Correspondence relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies*, by Major-General Bevan Edwards, C.B., Cd. 6188, August 1890.

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race to be slow to provide against eventualities. In peace time stimulus is wanting, and the argument is always used, with fatal effect, that to prepare against war is to invite war. Very leisurely was the Imperial Government in the matter of fortifying the coaling stations and organizing the defence of the Empire, and very leisurely were the Colonies, even the willing Colonies of Australia, in the matter of systematic and concerted action for the purposes of mutual defence.

Colonel Hutton's command in New South Wales.

The mission of Bevan Edwards, and his advocacy of an Australian *Kriegsverein*, gave to the veteran leader in New South Wales politics, Sir Henry Parkes, a text whereon to preach federation or union of the separate Australian Colonies. Defence was a lever for federation—a powerful lever; but, on the other hand, the wider scheme overshadowed and tended to postpone the measures which military men recommended, and in which, on their merits, politicians also in the main concurred. If union or federation for all purposes was coming within reach, it did not seem well in the meantime to elaborate a military organization, which would follow as a matter of course, when Australia became a single community. Meanwhile, the defence forces in New South Wales deteriorated; in 1892 they formed the subject of inquiry by a Royal Commission; and in May of the following year a commandant arrived from England, Colonel Hutton, who had been trained in the school of Lord Wolseley and Sir Evelyn Wood and had specialized in what was then a new branch of the service, mounted infantry. Hutton set himself to reorganize the armed forces of New South Wales on a plan which might be extended to Australia as a whole, the basis of his scheme being provision of a field force for active defence and a garrison force for passive defence of the fortified ports. It was the time of the war between China and Japan, and the striking successes achieved by Japan quickened Australian interest in military matters. His proposals, in their main outline, commended themselves alike to the Colonial Defence Committee in London and to the

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commandants of the other Australian Colonies, who combined to elaborate a scheme of federal defence. The active defence force, the Federal Field Force, was to be composed of two units, a mounted brigade consisting of cavalry, mounted rifles, and artillery, and an infantry division consisting of infantry supplemented by artillery. Either unit was to have its own engineers, Army Service Corps, Medical Service Corps, and ammunition column; in a word, it was to be a miniature army in itself, as opposed to the disjointed bands of men, splendid material but devoid of co-ordination, who had so far represented the military strength of Australia. The principles and the ground-plan found favour with the Premiers of the Colonies in council assembled, but they decided to await general federation. Thus matters stood when Hutton returned to England in 1896, the main lines which he had drawn being followed after the Commonwealth had come into being.

The Colonial Conference of 1897.

In 1897, upon the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria, there was another Colonial Conference in London, presided over by Mr. Chamberlain, now Secretary of State for the Colonies. It was confined to the self-governing Colonies, all of whom, eleven in all, were represented by their Prime Ministers. Imperial Defence was again a prominent subject in the deliberations; the Australasian naval agreement was maintained, and from the Cape Colony came an offer of the cost of a first-class battleship for the Royal Navy—an offer subsequently commuted for an annual contribution in money, which was supplemented by Natal. The Secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee was called in to explain what steps, in the opinion of military experts, were most necessary to be taken in each Colony in order to prepare for emergencies; facilities were promised by the War Office for securing uniformity in arms and ammunition; and a suggestion was made and favoured that there should be occasional interchange of military units between the Mother Country and the Colonies. Much stress had been laid upon this last point in the

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Chairman's opening speech. He contemplated the incorporation of Colonial regiments, from time to time, for temporary service, in the Regular Army, not merely as a measure profitable for instruction, but as opening a door to the fighting men from beyond the seas 'to share in the dangers and the glories of the British Army'.[1] Still it cannot be said that substantial progress in military co-ordination resulted from the Conference of 1897; and when, in April 1898, Colonel Hutton addressed the Royal Colonial Institute on the subject of 'A co-operative system for the defence of the Empire', giving the fruits of his Australian experiences and expounding his views, he pointed out that little had so far been done towards organizing the defence of the Empire upon any comprehensive scale.

General Hutton in Canada. His Report for 1898.

Shortly afterwards he went out to Canada, having been appointed Major-General in command of the Canadian Militia. A new Militia Act had been passed in Canada in 1886, and at the 1887 Conference a full account had been given of the Canadian armed forces, a considerable body, at any rate on paper, but admitted to be insufficiently trained. A Canadian Defence Commission was at work when he arrived in Canada in August 1898. His Report for that year upon the troops under his command was supplemented by a general survey, in which the existing condition of the military forces of the Dominion was described as unsatisfactory in the extreme, and radical reform was recommended. 'The Canadian militia', he wrote, 'consists of a number of small units of cavalry, artillery, and infantry of varying strength, and of a very varying condition of discipline and efficiency. . . . The militia force of Canada is not, under the existing system, an army, in its true sense; it is but a collection of military units, without cohesion, without staff, and without those military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness.'[2] The truth

[1] Cd. 8596, July 1897, p. 9.

[2] *Department of Militia and Defence. Dominion of Canada. Report of the Major-General for the year ended 31st December 1898.* Ottawa, 1899, p. 16.

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was that in the democratic British Empire as a whole, and in each of the democratic units of that Empire—in strong contrast to India—cohesion, organization, system—a living not a paper system—the factors which trained soldiers knew to be essential, were all wanting. The necessity was not apparent, the expense was, and so was the likelihood of incurring unpopularity by drastic reforms. The special conditions of Canada had been such as to excuse, if not to justify, reliance upon Imperial troops in case of need, and the Militia had not yet in fact emerged from the stage of a force supplementing an Imperial garrison into that of an army primarily and directly responsible for national defence. The North-West rising of 1885 had illustrated at once the excellence of the fighting material and the absence of organization.

Hutton put forward much the same views as he had developed in Australia. He aimed at creating a Canadian national army worthy of a Dominion which was now a nation, adequate at once to defend the soil of Canada and to participate, if required, in the defence of the Empire. For the defence of Canada, as of Australia, he postulated the necessity of having twin forces, garrison troops to protect strategical centres, and field troops, a mobile force, for active operations. The latter, the field troops, could be made available for co-operation with other British troops whenever and wherever the Canadian Government might be willing to employ them for Imperial purposes. In order to transform the existing militia force into a militia army, it would be necessary to create an Army Service Corps, an Army Medical Corps, an Ordnance Store Corps, a Pay Department, a corps of Engineers, all the branches of the service that minister to the fighting men, to provide and regulate stores, to give fuller power to the General in command, to train a General Staff. The views were sound; the defects of existing conditions were manifest; but the civilians did not see eye to eye with military experts; to a large section of Canadians defence of Canada was one thing and participation by Canada in the wars of the

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Empire was quite another; and even defence of Canada seemed no urgent matter, as long as friendly relations with the United States were maintained and the British Fleet was supreme at sea. Not until the war of 1914 taught its terrible lessons would or could the democracies of the world realize the truth of the warning which military men, and Lord Roberts above all, reiterated, that an untrained and unorganized people is helpless against a power scientifically prepared and concentrated for war. Hutton's views were in advance of the place and the time; there was friction between him and the Dominion Government; and, the South African war having broken out, he returned to England in February 1900 to take up active service in South Africa.

The Committee of Imperial Defence.

It has been seen that, amid wars and rumours of wars, the Colonial Defence Committee was established in 1885. Ten years later, in 1895, a Defence Committee of the Cabinet was formed; and in 1901 or 1902, at the time of the South African War, the Committee of Imperial Defence first came into existence, being further developed and given a permanent secretariat in 1904. The Colonial Defence Committee then took the position of a Sub-Committee of the more important body. The Committee of Imperial Defence was described in the papers laid before the Colonial Conference of 1907 as 'purely a consultative body, having no executive powers or administrative functions'.[1] Its duties were to advise and assist the Cabinet, in whose hands lay 'the higher direction of military and naval operations'. But in the usual British fashion it grew and gathered strength, and the Dardanelles Commission, in their first report published in 1917, registered the conclusion that 'in practice it did more than advise, it decided'.[2] On the 25th of

[1] See *Papers laid before the Colonial Conference, 1907*, Cd. 3524, May 1907, p. 15.

[2] See *Dardanelles Commission, First Report*, Cd. 8490, 1917, p. 4. See also *Committee of Imperial Defence, Treasury Minute*, May 4, 1904, Cd. 2200, 1904. It will be seen that the Dardanelles Commission state, 'This Committee was tentatively initiated in 1901 and reconstructed in 1904'; whereas the Treasury Minute of 1904, to which the Dardanelles Commission refer,

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November, 1914, it was superseded for the time being by the War Council.[1]

It was the child of the South African War, and it opened a door for closer relations and interchange of news. In 1903 the Canadian Minister of Militia sat as a member of the Committee; in 1905–6 a general scheme of defence for Australia emanated from it. Meanwhile the South African War gave rise to another tentative proposal for co-operation, very interesting and suggestive, though not immediately fruitful of practical results.

The New Zealand Defence Act of 1900.

The proposal originated with New Zealand. In the midst of the war, in October 1900, the Parliament of New Zealand passed an Act[2] amending the New Zealand Defence Act of 1886. This new law, among other provisions, empowered the Governor to establish an Imperial Reserve as part of the military forces of the Colony.

Provision for an Imperial Reserve.

Members of any other branch of the forces might enlist in the reserve for a term not exceeding three years, becoming subject to special regulations as to discipline, drill, and training, and receiving an efficiency grant not exceeding £5 per annum. The Reserve was to be available for Imperial service outside New Zealand, at the sole cost of the Imperial Government, by special arrangement on each occasion, and within limits to be fixed or approved by the New Zealand Legislature. It was also to be available for employment outside the Colony, by special arrangement with the Imperial Government and the Governments of the Australian Colonies, on terms under which the cost would be shared between the various Governments concerned. But every arrangement made in either of these two cases was to be subject to the approval of the Colonial legislature. It was estimated that the strength of the Reserve would reach 10,000 men.

states that the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was originally formed in 1895 and remodelled on the basis of the Imperial Defence Committee in 1901.

[1] A good account of the Committee of Imperial Defence and of its Sub. Committees was given by Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on July 25, 1912.

[2] No. 69 of 1900. See sec. 12.

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Seddon's motion for the Colonial Conference of 1902.

Mr. Seddon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the author of this law, followed it up by setting down a motion on similar lines for discussion at the Colonial Conference of 1902. It ran as follows: 'That it is desirable to have an Imperial Reserve force formed in each of His Majesty's Dominions over the seas for service in case of emergency outside the Dominion or colony in which such reserve is formed. The limits within which such reserve force may be employed outside the colony wherein it is raised, to be defined by the Imperial and Colonial Governments at the time such reserve is formed, and to be in accordance with any law in force for the time being respecting the same. The cost of maintaining and equipping such Imperial Reserve force to be defrayed in such proportion and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments.'[1] Here was a self-governing Colony adopting for itself, and recommending to others, a principle which, as we have seen, had already commended itself to, and been adopted by, the Feudatory States of India, the principle of maintaining a body of Imperial Service Troops, and it is interesting to note that Mr. Seddon contemplated the enlistment in the Imperial Reserve of New Zealand of Maories as well as of white New Zealanders.[2]

View of the Colonial Defence Committee.

The proposal, in its broad outline, could not but be congenial to the military advisers at home, when they considered it prior to the meeting of the Conference. The Colonial Defence Committee welcomed it, noting that the motion for the Conference differed from the provisions of the New Zealand law in not requiring a special act or resolution of the Colonial Legislature at the time of the emergency, and that it was preferable that enrolment in an Imperial Reserve should simply be for general service in the event of war. A closely reasoned paper on the subject of *The Organization of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service*[3], dated November 25, 1901, and written by Lt.-Col. Altham, on the Staff of the War Office,

[1] See Cd. 1299, October 1902, p. vi and pp. 27–33.
[2] Cd. 1299, Appendix V, pp. 58–9.
[3] Cd. 1299, pp. 47–52.

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Colonel Altham's Memorandum.

is of special interest. The writer postulated that the South African War, still at the time running its course, had shown, on the one hand, 'that the Regular Army, as organized before the war, was by itself inadequate in strength to the needs of the Empire'; on the other, 'that the self-governing Colonies are willing and able to assist in making good some part of the deficiency in military strength, which the war has disclosed'. He proceeded to argue—an argument which would not now be used—that in the case of a war with one or more states of European race and descent, military contingents, other than men of European descent, need not be considered; and, in common with all the military experts, he emphasized the necessity of being able to rely upon Colonial contingents of definite strength and efficient both in equipment and in training. He suggested that Australia might provide for Imperial service in case of emergency two mounted brigades and one infantry brigade, 9,000 men in all; New Zealand, a mounted brigade and two battalions of infantry, 4,000 to 4,500 in all; Canada, a brigade division of field artillery and a brigade of infantry to the number of 3,000 men, Canada, from her strategical position, being obliged to retain a larger proportion of her armed forces at home than was the case with the other self-governing Colonies.

Papers by Sir George French and Sir E. Hutton.

This paper was one among several which were laid before the Colonial Conference. The Conference had been called in view of the Coronation of King Edward VII, and it held its sittings from June to August 1902. The other papers included one by Major-General George French,[1] who had had long military experience in Canada and Australia, and who, at the time when he wrote his memorandum, May 1900, was commandant of the military forces of New South Wales. He recommended an Australian War Reserve of 10,000 men, largely mounted men, for by this time the special value of the mounted men from overseas was being adequately recognized. The men were to receive a retaining fee for

[1] Cd. 1299, pp. 62–3.

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efficient service, and the reserve pay, together with pay when on active service, was to come from the Imperial Exchequer, though the Colonial Governments were to make up the difference between Imperial and Colonial rates of pay, as had been the case in South Africa. General Hutton supplied a minute, written in April 1902, upon the Defence of Australia,[1] elaborating the views which he had already put forward, but not advocating a special Imperial Reserve. He had come back from South Africa in November 1900, and, when the Commonwealth of Australia had been brought to birth on the 1st of January, 1901, and defence thereby became a concern of the central Government, his previous record in New South Wales, together with his recent active service as leader of mounted overseas troops in South Africa, marked him out to be the first Commander of the Defence Forces of Australia. From January 1902 to November 1904 he held the appointment, carrying into effect a complete system of military training.

Divergent views upon Imperial co-operation in military matters at the Colonial Conference of 1902.

All military men, though they might differ in details, advocated some system under which the fighting forces of the Empire would—to however limited an extent—be co-ordinated; which would establish units in being, not on paper, trained not potential soldiers; in which there would be some measure of uniformity, some common lines of military defence, enabling the Empire to face sudden emergencies with the certainty that each province would be prepared with an agreed contribution of fighting men, of definite quantity and standardized quality. Mr. Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War, was spokesman of the common-sense military view, when, at the Conference, he expressed a hope that, should an emergency arise, and should the Colonies in such a case be willing to come to the support of the Mother Country, 'they should be in a position to do so with a body of troops, however moderate in number, which could be put in line with our own Regular troops against a European power'.[2] He suggested that a certain number of Colonial

[1] Ibid., pp. 64–72.

[2] Ibid., pp. 30–2.

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troops should be specially trained as a part of the Army Reserve of the Imperial force; in short, he endorsed Mr. Seddon's motion. 'Up to now,' he told the Conference —and latter-day events have proved that his words were wise words—'Great Britain has always been the last in the field. We cannot afford to be the last in the field.'[1] The subsequent proceedings of the Conference, however, testified not only to the constant divergence between military and political views, but also to the fact, too often left out of sight, that difference of opinion exists not only, very often not so much, between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions as a whole, as between one self-governing Dominion and another. The Prime Ministers of the Cape Colony and of Natal were disposed to agree with the New Zealand view, but the representatives of Canada and Australia held that to establish a special force, set apart for general Imperial service, and practically under the control of the Imperial Government, was objectionable in principle, as derogating from the powers of self-government enjoyed in the Dominions. It was not often that Canada and Australia were in line at the Conference, and the view now put forward was especially the Canadian view, very especially the view of the Laurier Government, largely dependent upon the French-Canadian vote. The Canadian Ministers submitted a memorandum[2] intimating the strongest desire to carry out defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial Government and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers, but only so far as was consistent with the principle of local self-government; they held that this principle was infringed by the New Zealand proposal and by the views enunciated at the Conference alike by the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty. The net result was that Mr. Seddon's motion was shelved.

Opposition to Seddon's motion from Canada and Australia.

Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, gave in few words the views of the Admiralty, and his own, as to the control and distribution of the naval forces of

The Naval discussion at the Conference.

[1] Cd. 1299, pp. 30–2. [2] Ibid., pp. 73–4.

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the Empire.[1] He contended that in naval matters the word 'defence' must be ruled out. Naval defence consisted in taking the offensive, in a concentrated, mobile, striking force, not in divided, localized, and comparatively passive squadrons. A single navy under undivided control, moved here and there by a single authority, was the one thing needful. Given a single Empire fleet, he was not content with a money contribution such as Australia and New Zealand were giving under the Australasian agreement, however generous the contribution might be; he would have the overseas peoples look upon the Navy as their very own; he wished to see in it more Colonial officers and seamen; he wanted 'from all parts of the Empire a personal contribution to the Navy'; his fear was that 'Canada, South Africa, and Australia, being in fact continents, should become too much continental and too little maritime in their aspirations and ideas'.[2] Once more the doctrine put forth was distasteful to Canada. The Canadian Government contemplated establishing a local naval force in Canadian waters and a Naval Reserve,[3] but proposals for a contribution, monetary or personal, to a central fleet under a central authority did not accord with Canadian views of self-government.

New Australasian Naval Agreement and contributions from the Cape, Natal, and Newfoundland.

Australia thought differently—at the time. The Australasian naval agreement was in being, and the Minister of Defence, Sir John Forrest, in a memorandum written at Melbourne prior to the Conference,[4] had definitely declared against an Australian navy, and in favour of making 'The Royal Navy the Empire Navy, supported by the whole of the self-governing portions of the Empire'. The outcome was a revised Australasian agreement for a further term of ten years, under which the Australasian squadron was to be substantially strengthened and improved, and a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve established in these Southern Seas, the contribution of Australia being raised to a maximum of

[1] Ibid., pp. 14–17.
[2] Ibid., p. 20.
[3] Ibid., pp. 18, 74.
[4] Ibid., pp. 9–14.

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£200,000 per annum, of New Zealand to £40,000. The preamble to the agreement stated that the contracting parties recognized the 'necessity of a single navy under one authority, by which alone concerted action can be assured, and the advantages which will be derived from developing the sea-power of Australia and New Zealand '.[1] Appreciation of the value of the Navy to South Africa was shown by the Cape Colony increasing its annual contribution to the general maintenance from £30,000 to £50,000, and by Natal giving a similar annual grant of £35,000. Newfoundland, cradled in the Navy, gave £3,000 per annum towards the maintenance of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve of not less than 500 men, together with a special contribution of £1,800 towards the fitting and preparation of a drill ship. Thus, though Canada stood aloof, the Conference of 1902 marked a distinct advance in Imperial co-operation on the sea; and both on land and sea the desirability of giving more commissions to Colonists in the Empire forces received attention.

Very interesting and very instructive are the records of this Colonial Conference, coming, as it did, on the heels of the South African War. For the first time the overseas peoples had co-operated on an appreciable scale in an Empire War. Their citizens had been among the foremost fighters; their Governments, in varying degrees, had made the cause their own. The war had given for the first time living practical experience as to the requirements of the Empire from the point of view of soldiering and defence: the defects, the want of system and uniformity, had been made patent on the one hand; on the other, the great and growing potentialities of the Empire as a whole, and the special potentialities of the component parts. But these potentialities had come into being through young nations coming into being; they had grown with the growth of the young nations, and that growth meant stronger sense of nationhood, greater impatience of anything that savoured of sub-

[1] Cd. 1299, p. 24.

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ordination or dependence. The need for co-ordination, the strength which would come from co-ordination, were proved as only war could prove them; but at the same time, and to precisely the same extent, it was clearly proved that all practical proposals in the direction of co-ordination must be harmonized with aversion to any semblance of external control. It became apparent that the great problem of the Empire was, as it still is, how to reconcile uniformity and diversity—uniformity needed for purposes of war and common defence; diversity, the essence of peaceful development.

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SECTION IV

1902–1914

CHAPTER VIII

LORD KITCHENER IN INDIA

Growth of the Empire in strength between 1902 and 1914.

THE South African War ended on the 31st of May, 1902; the Great War began on the 4th of August, 1914. Hardly more than twelve years passed between the two wars, but it is wonderful to what an extent the British Empire gathered strength in this short interval. It would not be true to say that it was shaping to meet a great crisis, that we were putting our house in order. On the contrary, in the years immediately preceding the fateful time, the house was in much disorder; industrial unrest was rife in the British Isles; the Irish question was further from settlement than ever; there was want of organization, as always, in the Empire as a whole. At home there was not merely reluctance to prepare for the possibility of war, but reduction in the strength of the Army and a movement to reduce the Navy. Notwithstanding, the position of the Empire, both externally and internally, was immensely strengthened; resources were increased; ability to face an emergency and stand a strain became immeasurably greater; and the political isolation of the Empire in the world at large passed away.

Improvement in foreign relations.

For the South African War found and left us with hardly a friend in the world. France, irritated by the Fashoda incident, was at least as hostile as Germany. Between Russia and Great Britain no love had been lost for many years. Other neutral nations, small and great alike, with rare exceptions, if any, looked upon the South African War as a case of a powerful people, who prated of liberty, taking away freedom in order to secure gold mines. Jealousy, suspicion, malice, and all uncharitableness were the dominant feelings with which Great Britain and her children were regarded. The feelings were all the

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more bitter because outsiders were at a loss to know what conclusions should be drawn from the war. They wanted to take accurate stock, for purposes of defence and offence, of the English and their apparently clumsy commonwealth. But they were no wiser after the war than before. The fighting had been very prolonged; the issue had at times seemed in doubt; the difficulties of bringing to bay an exceedingly mobile enemy in so vast a theatre of war had not been properly appreciated; the failures at the outset of the war, and the minor mishaps in its later stages, inevitable in guerilla warfare, had undoubtedly overshadowed the solid success which was in the end achieved. On the other hand, it was patent that there had been a rally to the flag from peoples in distant parts of the world, who, in most cases, had no immediate interest to serve and no special concern with the causes of the war or the scene of action; and there had been a dour tenacity in shouldering reverses, retrieving defeats, and wearing down an almost interminable resistance. There was, in short, an uncomfortable feeling among the many enemies of England that the reserve power of the British Empire was an unknown quantity, and that the widely advertized British decadence was not assured.

The death of Queen Victoria brought to the throne, in King Edward VII, a sovereign whose personality was, especially in the sphere of foreign relations, a great national asset. He loved peace, and all his influence made for peace and kindly understanding. The French were congenial to him and he to France. His personal efforts in the direction of improving Franco-British relations were supplemented by diplomacy; and the treaty which was signed in April 1904 changed the whole outlook between the two Powers. It was a comprehensive agreement; there was much giving and taking. Africa and Newfoundland, Morocco and Egypt were set against each other; causes of past ill-feeling and sources of future friction were swept away; and the two great neighbouring nations of Western Europe joined hands again, practical proof of the entente being given at the Algeciras

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904.

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Conference of 1906, when Germany found that Great Britain stood firmly behind France. Even before the South African War ended, Great Britain secured in the Far East a strong friend and ally in Japan. A treaty of alliance was concluded in January 1902, and the relations between the two Powers were drawn still closer by a further treaty of August 1905, which effectually safeguarded 'the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India'. When this second treaty was signed, Japanese and Russian representatives were already in the United States, negotiating the treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, and which was signed on the 5th of September. Two years later, in 1907, both Japan and Great Britain came to a full understanding with Russia, and embodied it in new conventions. The Anglo-Russian Convention, signed at the end of August 1907, covered the whole danger zone in Asia, the document dealing, in three separate sections, with Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Thus a wholly new chapter opened in the relations between Great Britain and Russia; and, by the end of 1907, France, Russia, Japan, and Great Britain had established the footing upon which they stood when seven years later the Great War came.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaties of 1902 and 1905.

The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907.

As it was without the Empire, so it was within. In India we come to a time of comparative respite from frontier wars, of internal development, of political progress, of army reorganization; a time when royalty was much in evidence, strengthening the attachment to a personal King-Emperor, which counts for so much in the East. As Prince of Wales, his present Majesty spent four months in India in the winter of 1905–6. After his accession to the throne, in the winter of 1911–12, he again visited India, first of British sovereigns to do so, and held in person the Coronation Durbar, Her Majesty the Queen accompanying him on either visit. The self-governing Dominions waxed and thrived. The Conferences of 1907 and 1911, now no longer Colonial but Imperial Conferences, were, as will be seen, distinct milestones on an onward

Internal growth of the Empire.

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and upward road. The new Australian Commonwealth in its infancy was favoured with fat years, following upon the leanest years of drought. Immigration into the Dominion of Canada grew amazingly, peopling the great corn-growing areas of the North-West. Newfoundland, through the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, was finally relieved from the incubus of the Treaty Shore, while the later Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration of 1910 settled outstanding difficulties with the United States. The grant of self-government to the annexed Boer Republics was speedily followed by the Union of South Africa; and, in amaze at this sequel to the South African War, the outside world was more than ever at a loss what to make of England. In a word, when the crisis came, it came to a fast-growing Empire, full of life and vigour. The dangerous unrest at the centre of the Commonwealth, the lack of effective co-ordination among its members, the obvious absence of organization for war, the obvious presence of all the diversities which are the fruits of peace among liberty-loving and democratic peoples, all, by their glaring contrast to a system forged and framed and shining with readiness for war, tended to conceal the fact of underlying resources; but the resources were there.

The growth of Germany.

Meanwhile, the Empire to which it was a contrast was growing too. Germany made giant strides, growing at home and overseas, on land and on the ocean, in riches and population, in volume, diversity, and penetration of trade, in armaments, in the power and the will to be aggressive. In no previous age had Great Britain and Germany come appreciably into conflict. Their respective spheres of action lay outside each other. Before 1870 the German nation had hardly existed as a political unit, and at first the attitude of England was one of friendliness, based upon the memories of the Napoleonic Wars and the age-long rivalry with France. But a change came when Germany had been unified on a military basis, when instinct took the Germans forward, and upon instinct supervened State policy.

Bismarck.

Bismarck was the high-priest of the blood-and-iron

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cult. His aim had been, by any or all means, to unify Germany, and to make unified Germany the leading Power upon the Continent of Europe. This aim accomplished, to strengthen and to safeguard the position which had been won was uppermost in his mind; he was not so much concerned to widen the horizon. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy served his purpose. It was concluded in 1882; the treaty was made public in 1883; and it was finally renewed for twelve years from May 1903 to May 1915. When, in the eighties, Germany acquired dependencies beyond the seas, and thenceforth her onward path tended to intersect that of England, this was from no predilection on Bismarck's part for a colonial empire, Chancellor though he was.

The Triple Alliance.

The beginning of German overseas enterprise.

Kaiser Wilhelm the Second came to the throne in 1888; in 1890 Bismarck ceased to guide the destinies of the Empire which he had created, and Germany definitely entered upon a new era of unlimited expansion. Military and continental strength was to be maintained in all its fullness, but it was to be supplemented by strength on sea. German trade was to supplant that of other nations all the world over, and the traditional sick man's heritage, the lands which Turkey had misgoverned for centuries, were in one form or another to pass into German keeping. The conception, becoming clearer and more sharply defined as the years went on, was that of a world-power; and always present, not unfrequently avowed, was the fact that, in German eyes, England was the great obstacle to working out the German destiny.

The Kaiser.

The Anglo-German Convention of 1890 gave Heligoland to Germany, greatly adding, when fortified, to the strength of the Germans in the North Sea. Seven years later, in 1897, Von Tirpitz was placed at the head of the German Marine. In the next year, in 1898, the first Naval Law was passed, and the German Navy League was founded. After two more years, in 1900, while Great Britain was in the midst of the South African War, a second Naval Bill was proposed and became law, covering far wider ground than its predecessor, and in effect

Creation of German sea-power.

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creating a High Sea Fleet. Other Naval Acts followed in 1906 and 1908, 1906 being, it may be noted, the year in which the first German submarines were taken in hand; and eventually came the Naval Law of 1912, which was recognized in the British Empire generally as a more or less direct challenge to British sea-power, inviting an adequate response and further co-operation for sea defence among the British peoples.

Germany and Turkey.

It had been the traditional policy of Great Britain in bygone years to befriend Turkey, to prevent the complete dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. As this policy fell into disrepute among British statesmen and the British public, there came an opening for Germany. In 1889, the year after he succeeded his father, the Kaiser visited Constantinople; and nine years later, in 1898, he repeated the visit, went on to Jerusalem and to Damascus, and openly proclaimed himself the protector of Turkey, the Mohammedans' friend. There was much in Turkey to attract Germany. Would-be world dominators are ever drawn towards the East. Napoleon felt the lure no less than others. Keen-sighted German financiers and merchants, not overburdened with scruples, saw a rich future harvest in Asia Minor. German statesmen saw in this direction a possibility, at a later date, of menacing, competing with, or striking at British power and British interests in the East. But there was a yet further point, more clearly discerned now than at the time. It is difficult for those who inherit peace-loving traditions to appreciate a national state of mind which tries all things and all men first and foremost by their fighting value. Only in the light of the late war have we realized the hideous possibilities which would assuredly emerge from a Germanized Asia or Africa—countless legions of coloured janissaries, trained and organized to follow leaders as ruthless as they are resolute, and to impose the will of their masters upon a terrorized world. One of Germany's highly trained soldiers, Von der Goltz, had, in the years 1883–95, reorganized the Turkish Army; he could testify from personal experience, and indeed all the

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world knows, what fine fighting material are Turkish soldiers. Could the man-power of the Ottoman Empire be placed at the disposal of Germany, it would mean an immense accession of military strength. One outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 was greatly to raise the prestige of Asiatics as fighting men; and whether he hails from Europe or from Asia, the value of the Turkish soldier is beyond dispute.

The Bagdad Railway.

Railways for peace or war, for commercial or strategic purposes, play an ever-growing part in making history. In the later years of the nineteenth century the Germans took a more than intelligent interest in the railways, or rather the want of railways, in Asiatic Turkey, obtaining their first railway concession in Asia Minor about the date when William II became Kaiser. A full-blown formal contract for the construction of the Bagdad Railway bore date the 5th of March, 1903. It was a 99 years' concession to the Anatolian Railway Company to prolong the line from Konia to Bagdad and Basra, in other words a concession to the Deutsche Bank and Herr Guinner to complete railway communication from the Bosphorus to, or nearly to, the Persian Gulf. It was a new and greatly revised version of the Euphrates Valley schemes of 1856–7 and 1871, which had had special interest for India. The new scheme started from the European end, and was not initiated by Great Britain. It is true that Great Britain, with other Powers, was invited to co-operate, for British money was at the time wanted to make the venture fructify; but the chief concern of Great Britain was to safeguard her own predominance in the Persian Gulf, and with that object to control, if possible, the final section from Bagdad to the sea. By the year 1905 the line had been carried south-east through Asia Minor as far as the slopes of the Taurus range; while, on the other side of that range, Germany had acquired the line running inland to Adana from the port of Mersina on the Gulf of Alexandretta. A few months before the war an understanding had been reached between Great Britain and Germany, but the agreement was still unsigned when war came.

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The Hedjaz Railway.

Meanwhile, the opening of the twentieth century saw the Hedjaz Railway taken in hand by the Turkish Government; and, by 1909, the line from Damascus to Medina had been constructed, mainly by military labour. A further extension to Mecca was contemplated, but had not been carried out by the date when Turkey entered into the war. The Hedjaz line is within measurable distance of Egypt and the Suez Canal; if prolonged, it might, in the event of war, bring trouble to the Aden Protectorate; if Turkey became a vassal of Germany, as she did under the guidance of Enver Pasha, the railway promised to be a source of danger to British interests in and British communications with the East. A growing menace to the world as a whole, to the British Empire in particular, lay in this gradual extension of a German panorama.

The cost of Imperial defence in 1903.

In August 1903 an interesting return was given to the House of Commons,[1] showing the cost of Imperial defence, as borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom, by India, and by five of the more important Crown Colonies; the self-governing Dominions not being included in the return. The total sum was £87,500,000. Out of this total the Navy and Army estimates of the United Kingdom accounted for £69,000,000, divided in almost exactly equal figures between the Navy and the Army, £34,500,000 in either case. The total net military expenditure of India was slightly under £18,000,000, and the naval expenditure £393,000. The five contributing Crown Colonies were Ceylon, Mauritius, Hong-Kong, the Straits Settlements, and Malta. They contributed between them £355,000, of which the three Eastern Colonies, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, and Hong-Kong gave £130,000, £117,000, and £76,000 respectively, or £323,000 in all. This return showed that the burden of the defence of the Empire devolved mainly upon the United Kingdom, but that a very substantial part was borne by India, and that the

[1] *Imperial Defence and Consular Service, Return of the total cost of Imperial Defence, including India and the Crown Colonies, and of the total cost of the diplomatic and consular service to Great Britain and Ireland*, August 12, 1903: 339.

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Eastern Crown Colonies, in proportion to their size and resources, gave sums of large amount. In plain words, wherever the Home Government was supreme, the charge of Imperial defence was distributed according to ability to bear it, the self-governing partners not entering into the calculation, as having it in their power to give or to withhold at will. Imperial co-operation in the dependent half of the Empire was a matter of dictation by the central authority; Imperial co-operation in the self-governing half was an uncertain quantity; how far each self-governing Colony might provide for its own defence, how far it might be willing to contribute to common defence, as the Australasian Colonies by the revised naval agreement were contributing, was entirely within their own competence.

Lord Kitchener in India.

Fresh from the South African War, the man who had carried that war to a successful issue, Lord Kitchener, arrived in India before the end of 1902, to take up the duties of Commander-in-Chief; and the year 1903, which opened with the Coronation Durbar of King Edward VII, saw the armies of India under the moulding hand of a great military organizer. He held the command for between six and seven years, and when he laid down his office in 1909, in a speech at Simla in August of that year,[1] he stated in a few words the lines upon which he had worked. Peace with honour, he contended, 'can be purchased only by readiness for war. Therefore I hold it to be the duty of every Commander-in-Chief to strive with all his might after such readiness, and, at the same time, while so striving, to use all his influence against the frittering away of the military resources of the country in military adventures which are not demonstrably necessary and unavoidable.' Two main principles, he added, had been the basis of what he had done in India or tried to do. One was that each step in Army reform must be founded upon an accepted policy. The other was in all things to look ahead. 'I think that one of the weaknesses of our English rule in India is that we do not

[1] Farewell speech at the United Service Club, Simla, August 21, 1909.

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LORD KITCHENER

From a pastel by C. M. Horsfall, in the National Portrait Gallery

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always look sufficiently ahead.' He might have added that it is one of our weaknesses, not in India alone. Not to look sufficiently ahead is a congenital weakness of democracy.

The Tibet Mission of 1903–4.

Assuredly there was no frittering away of the strength of India in military adventures in Lord Kitchener's time. There was hardly any fighting, except on two occasions. The first occasion was one of exceptional interest. Troubles had arisen with Tibet, and with China, the suzerain of Tibet, as to the frontier line on the side of the Indian State of Sikkim and as to trading relations. By agreement with the Chinese Government, a Commission, under Colonel Younghusband, now Sir Francis Younghusband, was appointed by the Government of India in 1903 to meet Tibetan and Chinese Commissioners just within the Tibetan border. But at the time and place appointed the envoys of China and Tibet did not appear; and the peaceful mission from India, by the necessities of the case, required and received an adequate military escort, becoming in the following year, 1904, a small expeditionary force of 1,000 British and 2,000 Indian troops. Younghusband knew well the conditions of the case, and on his advice the Himalayas were traversed in winter time, while the snows were hard, an object lesson to the Tibetans that ice and mountains are not an impenetrable barrier. On the 31st of March hostilities began, the British force being attacked as it advanced through Tibetan territory. Gyantse was reached on the 11th of April; then came a halt while reinforcements were being brought up, and further instructions sought from India. In June there was some more sharp fighting round Gyantse; but the mission went forward, and on the 3rd of August was before the sacred city of Lhassa. At Lhassa, on the 7th of September, Younghusband concluded a treaty; on the 23rd of that month the expedition began its homeward route; and by November most of the troops were safely back in India, having marched and fought at an average height of 14,000 feet, sometimes at as high a level as 17,000 to 18,000 feet. By this treaty

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the Tibetans were bound over against any territorial or other concession to foreigners without British consent; they also undertook to pay an indemnity, to keep open the marts and roads, and not to obstruct peaceful trade. The treaty was confirmed by a Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th of April, 1906, and received due recognition in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expedition of 1908.

The only other fighting which took place was on the North-West Frontier. In February and May 1908 two punitive expeditions, both under the command of Sir James Willcocks, were directed, the former against the turbulent Zakka Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley, the latter against the Mohmand tribes, the object, that of putting an end to border forays, being achieved in either case.

Lord Kitchener's Army Reforms in India.

Readiness for war being, in Lord Kitchener's eyes, the one and only way to ensure peace, he set himself, during his term of office in India, to remodel the Indian fighting machine. Unlike Lord Roberts, whose active service, prior to the South African War, had been wholly in India or with the Indian Army, he himself had learnt his military lessons in other schools and on other fields. But he had had continuous experience of actual fighting for years past. Hardly had he completed his task in the Sudan, when South Africa called for him; and from South Africa, after a flying visit to England, he went on immediately to India. Thus he brought to India practical knowledge of warfare under varied conditions, experience not gained some years back and growing out of date in intervals of peace, but fresh experience, the experience of yesterday. He had seen the mischief caused by want of preparation and improvised machinery; he had tested the lines upon which, under the latest phases of modern warfare, preparation could most effectually be made; and in India he had a field in which, as nowhere else in the British Empire, he could hope to make his determined will felt, and his views prevail. His cardinal principle at this time was that army organization in peace time

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should be the self-same organization as in time of war; readiness for war meant nothing else, nothing else would be a sure preventive of war. The machine must be ready, not half ready; no change in distribution of troops, no fresh grouping of units, ought to be needed in the event of war; the army in war should be simply the army of peace time taking the field.

Abolition of dual military control.

One factor in the Indian system, which at once threatened possible destruction to such reforms as he deemed to be necessary, and, on the face of it, did not tend to promote efficient administration, as he conceived efficiency, was the existence of a kind of dual military control. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the discipline and the executive control of the Army; he sat in the Viceroy's Council, but only as an extraordinary member. Among its ordinary members, the Council included a Military Member, a soldier, who was head of the military department, had charge of the administrative and financial business of the Army, and held in effect the position of military adviser to the Government. This arrangement presented obvious opportunities for friction and divided counsels. The Military Member was always a soldier of high repute and tried experience, though not of the same standing in the Army as the Commander-in-Chief. Yet he was placed in a position to sit in judgement upon the views of the Commander-in-Chief; and upon his advice it largely or mainly depended, whether or not those views would commend themselves to the Government of India and be carried into effect. The majority of military men naturally regarded the system with disfavour; all depended upon the personal relations between the Military Member and the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Roberts tells us [1] that his military colleague in the Council for five years was General Sir George Chesney, that he was a personal friend, and that they worked together most harmoniously. He adds that he was relieved to find that Chesney's successor, General Sir Henry Brackenbury, held views which were in general

[1] *Forty-one Years in India, ut sup.*, vol. ii, pp. 440–1.

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accord with his own, an indirect testimony to the difficulties which might have arisen, had the new Military Member been a man of divergent views. The question of dual control was not raised in the first instance by Lord Kitchener, nor did it arise at the outset of his term of office. Attention was called to it by the India Office at home at the end of 1904, and, the subject having been raised, Kitchener condemned the existing system in no uncertain terms. He found no support in the Viceroy's Council. The particular question at issue could be presented, on the one hand, as an attempt to make the military power and its representative independent of the Civil Government; on the other hand, and more accurately, as a reform whereby there should be one mouthpiece in the Council, and one only, of military views and requirements; one military adviser to the Civil Government, and one only; the Commander-in-Chief in all things and at all times the servant, not the master, of the Government of India. The latter view prevailed at the India Office, but not without the loss of Lord Curzon, who resigned his office of Governor-General in August 1905. The first step taken was a half-measure. In March 1906 the existing Military Department was abolished, and the military business of the Government of India was divided between an Army Department under the Commander-in-Chief, who was given a Chief of the Staff, and a Department of Military Supply under an ordinary member of Council, a Military Finance branch being at the same time created in the Finance Department of the Government. A further and final step came three years later, in March 1909, shortly before Lord Kitchener's term of office expired. The Department of Military Supply was then abolished; its work was taken over by the Army Department; and, as member of the Viceroy's Council in charge of that Department, the Commander-in-Chief took into his hands the sole direction of military administration in India, subject to the supreme control of the Government of India. In these days of quickly changing views, what is held to be a reform to-day is

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counted an abuse to-morrow; and only a very few years passed before the change which was completed in 1909 was, in the light of the disasters in Mesopotamia, strongly criticized and condemned. It was held to have resulted in the creation of two distinct departments under one man, in over-centralization coupled with the very evil of dualism, which it was designed to remove. 'It is clear', ran the report of the Mesopotamia Commission in 1917, 'that the combination of the duties of Commander-in-Chief in India and Military Member of Council cannot adequately be performed by any one man in time of war, and that the existing organization is at once over centralized at its head, and cumbrous in its duality below'.[1] On the other hand, this criticism may in turn be countered by the contention that the disasters which called it forth were the outcome rather of parsimonious policy than of defects in the military machine. It will be borne in mind that Lord Kitchener left India before he had had time personally to test the new system for many months together. It is possible, and even likely, that what would have been effective in his own strong hands overweighted those who came after, more dominated than he had been by civilian restriction and control; and even Lord Kitchener himself can hardly have contemplated so intense a strain as was imposed upon the military organization of India in the early stages of the war. He has passed beyond praise or blame, and with him has gone the possibility of recording final judgement upon the question at issue.

Army Reorganization.

It has been seen that the separate Presidential Armies were finally united in 1895. Under the old system the Madras Army had taken charge in Burma, and there had been two forces outside and independent of the Presidential Armies. One of these was known as the Punjab Frontier Force, which, at first administered by the Government of the Punjab, came in 1886 under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. The other was the Hyderabad Contingent, which, having been under the Govern-

[1] *Mesopotamia Commission Report*, Cd. 8610, 1917, p. 116.

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ment of India, as represented by the British Resident at Hyderabad, was eventually, in 1903, placed under the Commander-in-Chief, and then abolished as a separate force, the cavalry and infantry units being allotted to Bombay and Madras respectively.[1] Under Lord Kitchener unification went forward. The battalions were renumbered as units of a single army, and the Presidential names entirely disappeared. With a view to speedy mobilization, the troops were concentrated in fewer and larger cantonments than before; the various corps were not localized in any way; the policy of reconstituting the old Madras regiments with sterner fighting material was continued; the substitution of frontier militia for garrisons of regular troops in the tribal districts on the North-West Frontier, which had been initiated before Kitchener's time, was further carried out; the pay and the conditions of service for the native troops were improved; and in April 1904 the maximum number of the native reserve was raised to 50,000.

Military training and the Staff College.

The training of competent officers and an efficient staff was taken in hand with a will. In April 1904 the Commander-in-Chief addressed an exhaustive memorandum to the Army, in the form of an Army Order,[2] which he prefaced with a reference to 'the general question of the preparedness of the Army in India for war', and in which he dealt at length with the military education of officers and the training of troops for war. 'We must follow a system of training for War', he wrote, 'suited to the vastly changed conditions of the present date, and steadfastly eliminate all obsolete traditions'; and he held out expectation that a staff college for India would shortly be established. In the following year, in March 1905, the college was brought to birth; and, after a start

[1] In the war the three cavalry regiments of the old Hyderabad contingent served with the Indian cavalry corps in France and two of them in Palestine also; the two infantry regiments served in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and East Africa.

[2] See *East India (Progress and Condition): Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1904–5*: 175, May 18, 1906, pp. 192, &c.

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had been made at Deolali, was installed in its permanent home at Quetta in 1907. In 1908–10 a General Staff was created, on the modern lines that had been adopted in England, divided into a staff for organization and training, and a staff for the current business of army administration.

The Three Commands of 1904.

The unified Indian Army had in 1895 been distributed in four commands, the Punjab, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras Commands, the Madras Command including Burma. In 1903–4 Burma was, as already told, severed from Madras, and became in effect a fifth command under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief. More sweeping changes followed almost immediately. In October 1904, on the principle that the Army in peace should be organized and trained in the same units in which it would take the field on the outbreak of war, for these four or five commands were substituted three commands, and two divisions independent of any command. The three commands, named the Northern, Eastern, and Western Commands, represented the old Punjab, Bengal, and Bombay Commands respectively. Each command contained three divisions ; each division, one cavalry brigade and three infantry brigades, together with divisional troops of cavalry, artillery, sappers, pioneers, and so forth. The old Madras Command, with Burma, was abolished, being represented by the two independent divisions, the Secunderabad and the Burma divisions, which were placed immediately under the Commander-in-Chief, the divisional commanders reporting direct to Army Headquarters.

The two armies of 1907.

This reorganization, as it stood, was short-lived ; possibly it was only intended to lead on to more. The experiment of independent divisions worked well, and suggested further decentralization on the one hand, coupled with greater concentration on the other. Accordingly, two Army Orders, issued in May 1907, constituted two armies, or rather, two halves of a single army, for the whole of India ; a Northern Army, including the Peshawar, Rawal Pindi, Lahore, Meerut, and Lucknow divisions, together with three independent frontier brigades ; and

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a Southern Army, including the Quetta, Mhow, Poona, and Secunderabad divisions, together with the garrisons of Aden and Burma. The Northern Army thus represented the Punjab and Bengal Commands of the past; the Southern Army, the Bombay and Madras Commands. Either Army was placed under the command of a General Officer with a suitable staff; but, on the other hand, the divisional commanders were given wider powers than they had previously enjoyed.

Such were the lines of Army reform which Lord Kitchener laid down, and upon which he worked, distributing the troops with a view at once to the internal security of India, and to rapid mobilization in the event of war. It will be remembered that Russia and Great Britain did not come to their friendly understanding until August 1907, and that therefore, during the greater part of his term of office, the traditional danger to India from without was a danger still. Few contemplated that a more potent and more subtle danger was gathering round not India only but the whole Empire. He gave up his appointment on the 9th of September, 1909, and the five years between that date and the beginning of the war were years in which financial restriction was urgently preached and practised, the Indian Army suffering in consequence. The report of the Mesopotamia Commission tells us that guns were cut down, reserves were depleted, the number of divisions available for immediate mobilization was reduced.[1] The result was that the fighting machine of India was under strength at the very time when it was subjected to excessive strain, and the organization which this strong man had built up was subjected to criticism, because it had been stunted, and had in consequence deteriorated.

The Jubilee of Crown Rule in India.

While he was still Commander-in-Chief, India kept the Jubilee of its transfer from the East India Company to the Crown. The occasion was marked by a Royal Message to the Princes and Peoples of India, which was read by the Viceroy in Durbar at Jodhpur on the 2nd of November,

[1] *Ut sup.*, p. 10.

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1908.[1] The message stated that 'The proclamation of the direct supremacy of the Crown sealed the unity of Indian Government and opened a new era'; and it ended with a reference to 'the wisdom and mutual goodwill that are needed for the achievement of a task as glorious as was ever committed to rulers and subjects in any State or Empire of recorded time'. In the following year, 1909, a summary was published of the results of the fifty years.[2] This interesting State paper noted the fact, too often overlooked, that 'India is not a single country, with a homogeneous population. India is, in truth, a congeries of countries, with widely differing physical characteristics. It contains a number of peoples, speaking many languages, holding many creeds, observing different customs, and enjoying divergent degrees of civilization'; and the claim was made, in terms of studied moderation, that 'the administration of India by the Crown has been an earnest and fairly successful attempt to solve political, social, and material problems of much difficulty and complexity'.

One great factor in the growth of partnership has been the formation of larger units within the Empire. Had the thirteen colonies, which, in the eighteenth century, seceded from the Empire, been before, what they subsequently became, united states; had they been already federated into a Dominion or a Commonwealth, the relations between them and the Mother Country would have been on a surer and sounder basis, and the friction which had such disastrous results might not have arisen. For the more nearly contracting parties approach to an equal basis, the less likelihood there is of unequal dealings or the suspicion of unequal dealings. Where there is great disparity between the partners, where the relation is, in fact and of necessity, one of supremacy and subordination, rather than of partnership on equal terms, the senior partner is the subject of

[1] *East India (Proclamations)*, November 1908, p. 324.

[2] *East India (Fifty Years Administration): Memorandum on some of the Results of Indian Administration during the past fifty years of British Rule in India.* Cd. 4956, 1909.

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constant criticism, good intentions are misconstrued, and incidents are taken to be indications of a dominating policy. 'The Proclamation of the direct supremacy of the Crown', to quote again King Edward the Seventh's words, 'sealed the unity of Indian Government.' It was the first step, a long step, in unifying India. It meant bringing to birth in one way, as the federation of Canada or Australia in another, a nation within the Empire. It meant the bringing of something more than mere dependence; it pointed the way, the only way, to Imperial unity.

Very diverse were and are the component elements of India; they are summed up in the phrase, 'the Princes and Peoples of India'; and the 'Peoples of India' became the 'People of India', after his present Majesty had held this Coronation Durbar at Delhi in December 1911. When he left on his return voyage to England, a message went from the Princes and People of India to the People of England, through the medium of England's Prime Minister, conveying to 'the great English nation an expression of their cordial goodwill and fellowship; also an assurance of their warm attachment to the world-wide Empire of which they form a part, and with which their destinies are now indissolubly linked'. Here was a clear note of partnership. But in this composite whole, this 'incorporation of many strangely diversified communities',[1] there were and are two distinct sources of partnership. In British India proper the introduction of representative institutions, which before the war had been largely extended by the Indian Councils Act of 1909, had been creating a people in a sense which former ages in Eastern lands never knew; while by the side of British India stand the Feudatory States, whose princes have felt the call of partnership, because their ruling rights have, under the King-Emperor's régime, been scrupulously upheld. The census of 1911 gave to India, including the Native States, a population of 315 millions, an increase of 21 millions upon the return of 1901. Since the war

[1] From the Royal Proclamation of November 2, 1908.

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a long further step has been taken towards self-government for India, but, notwithstanding, these many millions must for generations to come be far removed from a single unit. There are, and must be, many cross currents, many elements of unrest, yet the unifying influence of British rule or British protection proceeds 'steadfastly and without pause'.[1] The forces of modern science make for unification; the railways, which traverse the great peninsula; the irrigation works, which obliterate dividing desert areas. But two bonds of union stand out above all. One is the person of the Sovereign, the King-Emperor, whose sovereignty has been emphasized by the transfer of the seat of government to the old Imperial city of Delhi, and brought home to the princes and people of India by the presence among them of King George. The other is the unified Indian Army, supplemented by Imperial Service troops and volunteer levies, embodying all the strongest and most virile elements of the Indian millions, which, in India and beyond India, stands and has stood for many generations as the contribution of India to the common defence of the Empire.

[1] Ibid.

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CHAPTER IX

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES AND DOMINION DEFENCE FORCES, 1903–10

The self-governing Colonies, 1903–7.

It has been seen that the Proceedings of the Colonial Conference at the end of the South African War indicated that the inevitable result of the war had been to prove the necessity for, and to promote the spirit of, co-operation for purposes of defence; but at the same time, and in no less degree, to strengthen the feeling of individual nationhood among the self-governing Colonies. The two tendencies were not, and are not, contradictory to or incompatible with one another; they were, and are, two streams flowing, if not in the same channel, at any rate in the same direction, that of partnership. That this twofold instinct or policy was a living and a growing fact was shown by the trend of public feeling with regard to naval defence. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed in 1903 the Act necessary to ratify the revised Australasian naval agreement; but it was evident that the agreement was not wholly congenial to Australians or to many of them; and two years later, in August 1905, Mr. Deakin, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, wrote that the agreement was not popular in Australia, for the reason that 'No Commonwealth patriotism is aroused, while we merely supply funds that disappear in the general expenditure of the Admiralty'.[1] On the other hand, the fact that Canada, the premier self-governing Dominion, stood aloof from any concerted action with regard to the naval defence of the Empire, and made little sign of providing for her own naval defence, was, to say the least of it, not inspiring either to Canadian patriotism or to the cause of Imperial unity. There was a growing feeling to this effect both in and out of Canada. In 1903 the Chambers

[1] Mr. Deakin to the Governor-General August 28, 1905. See *Colonial Conference, 1907.* Papers laid before the Colonial Conference, 1907. Cd. 3524, May 1907, p. 70.

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of Commerce of the Empire met in conference at Montreal, and passed a resolution affirming the principle that it was the duty of the self-governing Colonies to participate in the cost of the defence of the Empire, while noting at the same time that the Colonies claimed the privilege of keeping their own initiative as to the nature and mode of participation. The Governor-General, Lord Grey, did not hesitate to remind Canadians of their duty in this matter of naval defence; while in England, in December 1904, a strong deputation to the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, urged that the self-governing Colonies ought to take a greater share of the burden of Imperial defence, and called attention to the fact that, while the rise of new naval powers made naval defence more important than ever, Canada contributed nothing to this vital object. Germany, we have seen, was by this date launched upon her naval career, and the relations between Germany and Canada were none too friendly. Germany had penalized Canada for giving preference to imports from the Mother Country, and Canada retaliated in 1903 by placing a surtax of ten per cent. upon all imports from Germany.

The Alaska Arbitration.

Canada was not wholly fortunate in her relations with the Home Government in the years 1903–4. In the Autumn of 1903 a decision was given on the Alaska boundary arbitration, and the British Commissioner, the Lord Chief Justice of England, was found in the award to have parted company with his two Canadian colleagues, thereby making the issue less favourable to Canada than Canadians had held themselves entitled to expect. There was, in consequence, no little resentment in the Dominion; once more, so it seemed, Canadian interests had been sacrificed, in order to retain the good graces of the United States; and in the Dominion House of Commons, the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, made the arbitration a text for pointing out, in measured terms, the limitations to Canadian autonomy, which were involved in the Imperial connexion. 'I have often regretted', he said, 'that we have not in our own hands the treaty-making power, which would enable us to dispose of our own

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affairs. . . . But we have no such powers; our hands are tied to a large extent, owing to the fact of our connexion—which has its benefits, but which has also its disadvantages—the fact of our connexion with the Mother Country making us not free agents.' The disappointment was great, but it was not exaggerated either by the responsible ministers or by the Canadian public as a whole; and the incident had the good effect of practically leaving border relations and disputes between the Dominion and the United States to be adjusted on the Canadian side by Canadians, working hand in hand with a wise and tactful British Ambassador at Washington, the present Lord Bryce.

In the infancy of the Defence Forces in the self-governing Colonies, it was obviously expedient that the commanders of the forces should be selected officers from the Army at home, trained soldiers of high standing and reputation, who could give to the Colonies, what is necessarily wanting in young communities, professional knowledge and tried experience. At the same time, these appointments from home contained elements of possible friction.

The Dundonald incident.

The professional soldier, if keen on his profession and his work, is naturally impatient of politicians, who look at military questions through Parliamentary eyes. Men accustomed to take soldiering seriously, as a science demanding study, discipline, system, would find none of these things in immature overseas democracies. Thus in this or that colony, at one time or another, there was almost inevitably conflict of view between the commander of the forces and the Colonial Government; and the commander, if recognized to be a man of sterling character, professional ability, and hard work, would find support from those Colonists who, like himself, were anxious to create a Defence Force in something more than name. Then, on the one side, the bogy of militarism could be trotted out by the Government; on the other, the Opposition could find reasons for agreeing with the General, seeing that he did not agree with the Government; a press controversy would easily rise and grow, with the result that an

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Imperial officer might be made to some extent a pawn in Colonial politics, and the Home Government be indirectly compromised. We have seen that General Hutton, in his command of the Canadian forces, had not seen eye to eye with the Minister of Militia and Defence. In 1902, after the South African War had ended, the command was given to Lord Dundonald, who had won distinction as a cavalry leader in South Africa. Like Hutton, a keen soldier, enthusiastic and untiring in his efforts to place the Defence Forces of Canada upon a sound footing, Dundonald resented political interference, as he deemed it, with his executive powers as Major-General in command of the forces; and in June 1904, at a military dinner, intended to be of a private nature, he indicted Canadian ministers for meddling, on political grounds, with the appointment of officers in the Militia. His speech found its way into the press, aroused a party controversy, and was followed almost immediately by a Canadian Order in Council dismissing him, on the ground that the speech was 'a grave act of indiscretion and insubordination' and indicated 'a regrettable failure to appreciate the principles of British constitutional Government'. Personally popular, and known to have his work at heart, he found no little backing among the Canadian public, and left Canada amid many signs of friendship and confidence. The incident was a personal one, for which the Home Government was in no way responsible; but it attracted attention on both sides the water; and the fact that Dundonald had been appointed, as others before him, in virtue of his standing in the Army, did not tend to make the employment of commanders from that source more congenial to political leaders in Canada. Provision, however, was made to prevent a recurrence of the difficulty in a new Militia bill which became law in August of this same year.[1] This Act placed the authority of the Minister

The Canadian Militia Law of 1904.

[1] Liability to active military service, which, as has been seen above on p. 97, was fully retained in the 1868 Act, was still retained in this new Act, but with a slight change of words. Sec. 70 ran:

'The Governor in Council may place the militia or any part thereof

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of Militia beyond all question, subordinating to him any military officer who might be placed in command of the Militia, and providing him with an advisory Militia Council on the model of the newly formed Army Council in England. The Act further authorized the appointment, if desired, of an Inspector-General, and of a Chief of the General Staff. Before the year ended, the Commanding Officer was dispensed with, an Inspector-General was appointed, and Sir Percy Lake, a Canadian on his mother's side, was made Chief of the Staff. In that capacity, and from the 1st April 1908 as Inspector-General and Chief Military Adviser of the Government, Lake from 1904 to 1910 handled the problems of the Defence Force with conspicuous tact and success.

The Commonwealth of Australia, as has been told, took over from its component States the charge of naval and military defence, the transfer dating from March 1901.

Australian Defence Acts of 1903–4.

Defence Acts were passed in 1903 and 1904, under which all male citizens of the Commonwealth between the ages of 18 and 60 were declared to be liable to serve in time of war, enlistment in peace time being voluntary. The Defence Force was defined as consisting of permanent and citizen forces, the permanent force being composed of soldiers and sailors enlisted for continuous service for a specified term, while the citizen force included a paid Militia as well as volunteers. General Hutton was the first and only commandant of the military forces, for in Australia, as in Canada, following the precedent which had been set at the War Office at home, and in order to avoid conflict between civil and military authority, the Act of 1904 provided for a Council of Defence, a Military Board, and in lieu of a Commandant, an Inspector-General. The change took effect in January 1905, after Hutton had

on active service in Canada and also beyond Canada, *for the defence thereof*, at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of emergency.'

The words *for the defence thereof* were new, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier laid stress upon them in the conscription debates of 1917, arguing that compulsory military service under the existing law must be limited to purely defensive purposes.

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completed his term of three years and returned to England.

The Lyttelton Dispatch of April 1905.

At the Colonial Conference of 1902, the decision was taken to hold future Conferences, if possible, at intervals of four years; the next Conference was accordingly due in 1906. In anticipation of it, Mr. Alfred Lyttelton, who had succeeded Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, in April 1905 addressed a notable dispatch to the self-governing Colonies, making suggestions as to the future organization of the Conferences.[1] Their continuous life was now assured; and accordingly he proposed that for the term 'Colonial Conference' the name 'Imperial Council' should be substituted, as more accurately representing what had 'grown into existence by a natural process'. For the evolution of these Conferences had been in consonance with the whole tenor of British history; it had been essentially a natural and spontaneous growth, bearing no marks of artificial pressure or preconceived design. The permanent members of the Imperial Council, it was suggested, should be the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of those Colonies which had been represented at the 1902 Conference, or, in the absence of any Prime Minister, a representative specially appointed for the purpose by the Colonial Government. Other Ministers could be called in, as in 1902, when required for special purposes, to assist the consultations of the permanent body; and India should be represented when the interests of India were concerned. Any further attempt to define the constitution of the Council was deprecated; its functions could be left to develop as circumstances should dictate. But as the Council would meet only at intervals of four years, the dispatch went on to suggest that a kind of standing Royal Commission should be created, to hold the thread of continuity; 'a permanent Commission, representing all the States concerned'; a purely consultative and advisory body, with the double duty of preparing subjects for coming meetings of the Council or Conference, and examining and

[1] Cd. 2785, November 1905, pp. 1–5.

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reporting upon subjects referred by the Council or Conference. The Imperial Defence Committee was quoted by way of analogy to the proposed Commission; and it was added that on the Imperial Defence Committee the Home Government desired to secure from time to time the presence of Colonial representatives. As a matter of fact a precedent had already been set, Sir Frederick Borden, the Canadian Minister of Defence, having, as has been told, in 1903 taken part in the Committee's deliberations. Guarded and friendly in its terms, sound and statesmanlike in its outlook, this circular dispatch was an invitation, warranted and guided by the past, to advance a step further, on the lines pointed out by the past, in the direction of Imperial Co-operation. Very instructive was its reception in the Colonies. The Cape and Natal wholly favoured the proposals. Australia was favourable. New Zealand, in the midst of a General Election, sent no reply. Newfoundland was doubtful. Canada distinctly, though courteously, dissented. The Canadian point of view was that any change in the title of the status of the Colonial Conference should preferably emanate from the Conference itself; that the name 'Imperial Council' suggested 'a permanent institution, which, endowed with a continuous life, might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment upon the full measure of autonomous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by all the self-governing Colonies'; and that therefore, if any change of name was made, the title 'Imperial Conference' would be preferable; that the proposed standing Commission again 'might conceivably interfere with the working of responsible government'. Thus from Canada, the premier self-governing Dominion, came once more the intimation, ever being repeated in one form or another, that Colonial automony is the one thing needful, and the warning that any overture from the Home Government, however well meant, may be construed as a tendency to limit that autonomy.

The coming Colonial Conference was postponed till 1907, and further discussion of Mr. Lyttelton's proposals

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was reserved till the Conference met. *Quieta non movere* continued to express the attitude of the Canadian Government. While Australia and New Zealand both placed upon the agenda paper resolutions in favour of an Imperial Council, no resolution on any subject was forwarded from Canada, and Laurier, when criticized on that ground in the Canadian House of Commons, replied that Canadian representatives went to London to receive suggestions rather than to make them; and, with reference to the subject of defence, he laid down that Canada would not be drawn into the vortex of European militarism.

The Conference of 1907.

The Conference met in April 1907. It was memorable, among other reasons, for the presence of General Botha, as Prime Minister of the Transvaal, now a self-governing British Colony. The members were welcomed by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, though, as on former occasions, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, not the Prime Minister, was Chairman of the Conference. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in his speech of welcome, laid stress upon freedom and independence as 'the essence of the British Imperial connexion, freedom of action on the part of the individual state, freedom in their relations with each other and with the Mother Country'.[1] The term 'Imperial Conference' was adopted, the choice of Canada; the name self-governing Colonies made way for that of self-governing Dominions; the Conference was defined as a Conference between Governments, between His Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas; the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was constituted *ex officio* President of the Conference, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions, *ex officio* members; the Secretary of State for the Colonies was to act as Chairman in the absence of the President, and such other Ministers of the representative Governments as might be appointed by their Governments were also to be members of the Conference,

[1] *Colonial Conference, 1907.* Published Proceedings and Précis, &c. Cd. 3404, April 1907, p. 5.

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but each Government was only to have one vote. Finally a permanent secretariat of the Conference was established under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and provision was made for subsidiary Conferences, when occasion required.

All the changes, it will be noted, were in the direction of equality of partnership; all indicated the growing nationhood of the self-governing Colonies, now called Dominions in recognition of higher status. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was in future to preside over these Empire gatherings, *primus inter pares*, displacing the departmental minister who had special charge in England of Colonial matters. It was a final but most friendly repudiation of the old-time bogy of Downing Street, a concrete expression of the fact that departmental domination over the self-governing communities had passed away; and although, contrary to the views of some of the overseas representatives, notably of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Deakin, the secretariat of the Conference was still kept under the aegis of the Colonial Office, within that Office the Dominions were demarcated from the Crown Colonies.

Defence questions at the 1907 Conference.

No Royal Jubilee or Coronation coincided with the 1907 Conference; no formal ceremonies or public functions distracted attention. It was a very busy Conference, and the discussions covered much ground, including the all-important subject of defence. In this matter the standing problem of the Empire, how to reconcile unity and diversity, presented itself in the most direct and practical form. Of necessity, in the older country, in the United Kingdom, there was a store of expert naval and military knowledge, not yet to be procured on the spot among the younger peoples overseas. Of necessity, expert opinion in the Mother Country was wholly in favour of uniformity in the armed forces of the Empire, so far as uniformity might be practicable; for uniformity means efficiency in war time; it means adequate preparation in peace time for the exigencies of war. Expert naval opinion, in particular, centred on the fact that the ocean is one, demanding

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a single fleet, under undivided control. Naval tradition in England taught that defence must ever be found in offence; and, strengthened by latest study of modern conditions, it taught further that safety can only be found in concentration, that dispersion of power invites disaster. On the other hand, there stood out the fact that the component parts of the Empire were year by year taking more clearly defined form and shape, year by year becoming more keenly conscious of their individuality, their nationhood. This meant diversity, impatience of any centralizing agency. Imperial patriotism was an outcome of, not a substitute for, Colonial nationalism, and therefore must be expressed in terms of such nationalism. These, and none other, were the lines on which the Empire commended itself to the growing power of Labour. The Empire must be saved and defended, but saved and defended by units on land and sea, in peace time at any rate, each under the immediate and sole authority of the part, not of the whole. How to find the greatest common measure of these conflicting views was and is the vital question.

Military defence.

The South African War had clearly shown the need of preparing for war in time of peace. This was a sound and salutary lesson; but other deductions drawn from this war were not so sound. The war had been unique in kind; it had been fought over a very large area, thinly peopled, deficient in roads and railways. In no other war before or since had one of the two combatant armies consisted in effect wholly of mounted men. It was not a war upon which to base conclusions applicable to future wars, especially to wars on the continent of Europe. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 came as a corrective to the impressions which the South African War had left; it demonstrated that 'War is in the present day becoming more and more an exact science',[1] and in the light of that war, the Home Government gave its views to the 1907 Conference.

Before Russia and Japan had come to blows, the

[1] *Colonial Conference, 1907.* Cd. 3524, May 1907, p. 19.

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Esher Commission, appointed towards the end of 1903, had begun its work of reorganizing the War Office upon lines which military nations with large armies had adopted; an Army Council came into existence; the office of Commander-in-Chief disappeared. At the 1907 Conference, the Secretary of State for War, the present Lord Haldane, explained the principles which were being put into practice.[1] War having become more than ever a science, it was essential to keep the organization and business administration of an army in peace time distinct from the service which consisted in the study of war problems and in the higher training of staff and troops. The latter service entailed 'provision of a brain for the army in the shape of a General Staff', and the arrangements for such a staff in London had lately been completed, in September 1906. As to the Army itself, preparations for war, in the eyes of the Home Government and their military advisers, involved two forces with distinct functions. Behind the Navy, then and always our first line of defence, stood, as a second line, the Territorial Force, under no obligation to go overseas. But there was need also for an Expeditionary Force, designed for overseas service, and for troops to police the Empire in peace and in war. To these ends the Regular Army had been organized. In all the parts of the Empire the Home Forces ought to be organized with a common end in view and a common conception; to make the common conception a living and working reality was the function of the General Staff. It was desired to give to that Staff, as far as possible, an Imperial character, to welcome to it officers from overseas, to lend the services of its members to the overseas forces. The desirability of having an Imperial reserve of officers was also suggested.

The Secretary of State's speech was supplemented by four military papers, which were laid before the Conference. Two of them had been compiled by the General Staff. The subject of the first was 'The Strategical Conditions of

[1] *Colonial Conference, 1907.* Cd. 3404, April 1907, pp. 19–23, and 3523, May 1907, pp. 94–9.

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the Empire from the Military Point of View'. Placing supremacy on the sea in the forefront of the defence of the Empire, the memorandum urged that each portion of the Empire should, as far as possible, maintain sufficient troops for self-defence, and that all the component parts should be prepared to give mutual support to each other upon definite lines in case of emergency. To this end it was desirable that they should all adopt systems of military organization capable of being readily assimilated to one another. The paramount factor was adequate preparation, leading up to a well-worked-out plan of campaign. Training was all-important, and therefore training colleges; the General Staff, still in its infancy, would form a bond of union, including officers from all parts of the world. Something had already been done in the direction of interchange of officers, but much more might be done; and it was suggested that whole units, battalions, squadrons, batteries, might occasionally be interchanged. The second paper dealt with 'The Possibility of assimilating War Organization throughout the Empire', recommending uniformity in the military terms used, in the number and composition of each unit, in the grouping of the units, in the provision of administrative services, the point of it all being the great addition of strength which would be derived from organization on common lines. The two other papers, of a more special character, on 'Patterns and Provision of Equipment and Stores for Colonial Forces', and on 'The Desirability that the Colonial Governments should give their orders for Ordnance Stores, particularly Arms and Ammunition, through the War Office', had precisely the same object in view, that of making ready for war in uniform fashion, ensuring, for instance, that troops likely to be called on to fight side by side should be supplied with the same ammunition.[1]

Apart from the practical good sense of the suggestions made in the Secretary of State's speech and the War Office Memoranda, they are of much historical interest,

[1] For these four papers see *Colonial Conference, 1907*. Cd. 3524, May 1907, pp. 18–37.

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as indicating how clearly it was recognized at home by 1907, that in all matters pertaining to the Empire, not merely in all matters of domestic concern, in the military as well as in the political sphere, the Dominions were masters in and of their own houses. No attempt was made to revive the plan of ear-marking, in the defence forces of the Colonies, special bodies of Imperial service troops; no guarantee was asked that contingents of given strength and composition should be forthcoming in case of war; no word was said of exercising any authority or control from home; it was carefully pointed out that the General Staff was 'a purely advisory organization of which command is not a function',[1] and in this advisory organization partnership was invited on terms of perfect freedom and complete equality. A common end, a common conception, assimilation to the extent that the diverse contingents would in case of need fit in with each other; this was the sum and substance of the recommendations, suggesting at most a federation of armed forces, not a union, and a federation without a central body of control. The soldiers, like the statesmen, fully realized that the line of least resistance was simply to point the way towards a further measure of voluntary combination; and the General Staff 'gladly acknowledged that in their recognition of the first duty of citizenship British nationalities oversea have taken a lead and are providing an example to the United Kingdom'.[2]

The outcome of the discussion, inspired by tactful handling of the subject, was a unanimous resolution in favour of a General Staff, and sound practical results followed. Yet the terms in which the resolution was worded told the familiar story, that what was uppermost in the minds of the Dominion representatives, or of some of them, was jealously to safeguard their autonomous rights. They were as follows:

That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, with-

[1] Cd. 3404, April 1907, p. 21.

[2] Cd. 3524, p. 21.

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out wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognizes and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and War organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.' [1]

Another resolution of the Conference affirmed somewhat superfluously what was already an existing practice, that the Colonies should be at liberty to apply to the Committee of Imperial Defence for expert advice, and 'that, whenever so desired, a representative of the Colony which may wish for advice should be summoned to attend as a member of the Committee during the discussion of the questions raised'.[1]

Naval defence.

The 1902 Conference had contributed little towards the military defence of the Empire, but had been comparatively fruitful on the naval side. In 1907 the parts were reversed; the suggestions with regard to a General Staff led to permanent results; little or no advance, on the other hand, was made with regard to naval defence. Motions on the subject were fathered by Australia and New Zealand, and they showed marked divergence of view between these two partners to the Australasian Naval Agreement. New Zealand proposed an increased contribution to the squadron in the southern seas. Australia pressed for revision of the Naval Agreement. It has been told that the Agreement was not liked in Australia, and that Mr. Deakin had raised the subject in 1905. He then suggested, as an alternative to the existing arrangement, a service of subsidized mail steamers, to be available in war-time as cruisers or transports; but the proposal did not commend itself to the Admiralty, well

[1] Cd. 3523, pp. v–vi.

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content with the *status quo*, seeing that it left the ships under their undivided control. In 1906, the Committee of Imperial Defence supplied the Commonwealth, by request, with a complete scheme for the defence of Australia on land and sea, and repeated once more the doctrine of a single fleet under one authority, combating the growing desire among Australians to have a fleet of their own. The naval officers of the Commonwealth, in turn, criticized the scheme, and put forward detailed proposals for a separate Commonwealth flotilla of destroyers and torpedo-boats to be supplementary to the Royal Navy. Then came the Conference, and the First Lord of the Admiralty made a statement, again emphasizing the necessity for unity of control, but intimating at the same time that the co-operation of the Colonies would be welcomed in the form most agreeable to themselves, and that, whether they gave or not, the Admiralty acknowledged their own obligation to defend, to the best of their ability, the King's Dominions over the seas. The Australians were, in short, set free to cancel the existing agreement, if they wished to do so. This was the net outcome of the Conference, so far as the sea was concerned. Canada still stood wholly aloof from any naval co-operation, in the sense understood by the other Dominions; and, when one of the representatives of the Cape suggested a resolution to the effect that it was the duty of the Overseas Dominions to contribute in some form to the upkeep of the Navy, Laurier would have none of it, and the matter dropped.

After the Conference.

This Conference ended only seven years before the Great War began. A memorandum by the General Staff, published early in 1909, expressed 'little doubt that the not far distant future will witness a great development in the potential military resources of the Empire'.[1] It was hidden from man's eyes that the near future would be a time of supreme trial, witnessing development of far more than potential resources of all parts of the Empire, and co-operation on a scale which the best of experts could

[1] *Imperial Conference. Correspondence relating to the Proposed Formation of an Imperial General Staff.* Cd. 4475, February 1909, p. 7.

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not have foreseen. Meanwhile, as though the world was growing uneasy, and the Empire was half unconsciously bestirring itself, with a sense that all was not well, there was far more aftermath from the Conference than on former occasions; discussion went on in the form of correspondence; resolutions were not quietly shelved until the next Conference came round again. The General Staff justified their existence, and, in the memorandum which has been quoted above, outlined a scheme of expansion into an Imperial General Staff. The scheme contemplated a central body in London, working directly under the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and 'local sections in the United Kingdom, in each of our Regular garrisons abroad, in each self-governing Dominion, and in India'. In a self-governing Dominion, the chief of the local section of the General Staff would be the adviser and under the control of the Dominion Government, in close communication with, but not receiving orders from, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Thus Dominion autonomy was fully secured, and the scheme was made palatable to Canada. Great stress was laid upon uniformity of training, and the necessity, for that purpose, of establishing in due course in the overseas Dominions staff colleges on similar lines to the colleges at Camberley and Quetta. In the meantime overseas officers should be encouraged to make the fullest possible use of Camberley, as the central school of military education for the Empire.

The Imperial General Staff.

After his return to Australia, Mr. Deakin, the untiring Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, devoted his energies very especially to defence questions, making a full and exhaustive statement of his policy in the Commonwealth Parliament in December 1907. He foreshadowed compulsory military training on land; his proposals for naval defence centred on a Commonwealth flotilla, to consist largely of submarines, the importance of which, as the coming naval weapon, had been emphasized at the Imperial Conference. There had been some slight misunderstanding with the Admiralty, the Australian statesman wishing in effect to revise and modify rather than

Australian naval defence.

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wholly to cancel the naval agreement, the Admiralty being willing to consent to the agreement being cancelled, but not to continue their obligation permanently to keep King's ships in Australian waters on other terms than those embodied in the agreement. Eventually, in deference to Australian wishes, the Admiralty worked out a scheme for the establishment of a local naval force, a Commonwealth flotilla, which was sent to Australia in August 1908. By this date New Zealand had further accentuated her dissent from the Australian view of naval defence, by spontaneously and unconditionally increasing her contribution to the Royal Navy from £40,000 to £100,000 per annum, adding in plain words that the Dominion Government recognized that the Navy must be at the absolute disposal of the Admiralty.[1]

The Liberal Government, which came into office in the United Kingdom towards the end of 1905, did not carry out the shipbuilding programme which had been laid down by their predecessors. A large number of their supporters, in Parliament and out of it, wished to restrict, not to expand, naval and military armaments; they regarded preparation for war as a challenge and provocation to war; and saw in naval and military provision for national security designs to divert public money and public opinion from political, social, and industrial reform. In the face of this body of opinion, in the early days of wholesale reaction against the Government which had been responsible for the South African War, and while election pledges and speeches were still comparatively fresh in men's minds, it was difficult for Ministers to do full justice to the needs of Great Britain in the matter of defence—growing needs, inasmuch as the ability, if not the will, to menace or to attack was growing on the Continent year by year. Eventually the Navy estimates, presented to the House of Commons in March 1909, showed a large increase of expenditure, and the speeches accompanying them gave evidence of some anxiety.

The naval estimates of 1909.

[1] See *Correspondence relating to the Naval Defence of Australia and New Zealand.* Cd. 4325, October 1908.

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Germany was proceeding apace with the construction of a powerful fleet; the rate at which her new ships were being constructed was constantly accelerated; there was only half-knowledge or less as to her methods and her designs; but it was quite clear that a strong challenge to British sea-power had come into being, and it was far from clear that it could be effectually countered in the immediate future. The Opposition in the House of Commons, though hopelessly outnumbered, moved a vote of censure; there was a Guildhall meeting; and in the Press and in the country there were abundant signs that the public mind was stirred in no ordinary degree. A little later, in the early days of June, an Imperial Press Conference was held in London, a gathering of leading journalists of the Empire; and, in a memorable speech at the opening dinner, Lord Rosebery uttered grave words on the subject of Imperial defence. He referred to the 'bursting out of navies everywhere', to living in the midst of silent warfare. It was a time of profound peace, untroubled on the surface by any outstanding political complications; but it was an ominous calm, such as precedes a storm. He warned his hearers that it might be their duty to take back the message to the various quarters of the Empire 'that some personal duty and responsibility for national defence rests on every man and citizen'.[1]

The New Zealand naval offer.

The feeling of uneasiness and insecurity had already found an echo beyond the seas. It has been seen that, among the self-governing Dominions, New Zealand stood prominent, under Mr. Seddon's successor, Sir Joseph Ward, for unconditional and whole-hearted support of the Royal Navy; and from New Zealand came, on the 22nd of March, a telegram offering to the Home Government the gift of a first-class battleship of the latest type, and a second if required.[2] This splendid offer, as gracious in

[1] Speech of June 5, 1909, *Times* Report.

[2] For the New Zealand and other offers, see *Imperial Conference, Correspondence and Papers relating to a Conference with representatives of the self-governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defences of the Empire.* Cd. 4948, November 1909.

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Australian offers.

form as it was substantial in amount, was followed, in April, by a movement in Australia to present a Dreadnought to the Navy, the States of New South Wales and Victoria intimating their readiness to make the gift, should the Commonwealth Government not think fit to do so. The Naval Agreement was still in force. The Admiralty scheme for a local navy had only a short time since been sent out to Australia; and meanwhile there had been a change of Government in the Commonwealth, Mr. Deakin and his colleagues being replaced by a Labour Ministry, with Mr. Andrew Fisher as Prime Minister. The new Government adhered to the plan for the creation of a Commonwealth fleet in preference to giving a battleship to the Royal Navy, and made proposals to that effect, while at the same time continuing the subsidy under the Naval Agreement. In a telegram of the 15th April they laid down in no uncertain terms that 'all the Dominions of the British Empire ought to share in the most effective way in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire;' but they contended that, in the case of Australia, that object would be best attained by encouraging naval development in Australia, with the result of making the people of the Commonwealth efficient at sea, 'and thereby better able to assist the United Kingdom with men as well as ships to act in concert with the other sea forces of the Empire'.[1] They argued, in some respects, on the same lines as Lord Selborne at the Conference of 1902.[2] They were, however, a short-lived ministry. Deakin returned to power at the beginning of June 1909, and offered the Dreadnought or, in the alternative, such addition to the naval strength of the Empire as might be determined as the outcome of the special Conference which was about to be held.

The Canadian resolution.

The importance of naval defence had always been adequately recognized in the southern seas. It had not, so far, been adequately recognized in Canada. It was therefore of special moment that the Canadian House of Commons, on the 29th of March in this year, 1909, passed

[1] Cd. 4948, pp. 3–5.

[2] See above, p. 153.

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a unanimous resolution on the subject. It recognized the duty of the people of Canada, as they increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities in national defence; it deprecated, under the existing constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes; but it cordially approved of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Royal Navy.[1] Cautiously worded, as it was, and safeguarding, as ever, Canadian autonomy—for it was mainly the handiwork of Sir Wilfrid Laurier—the resolution showed a marked change in the attitude of the Dominion Government on naval questions, and it encouraged the Home Government to improve the occasion.

The Naval and Military Conference of 1909.

It will be remembered that the first resolution of the Conference of 1907 provided for the holding of subsidiary Conferences, if matters of importance calling for early consultation should arise in the four years' interval between the main gatherings. Under this provision the Imperial Government invited the self-governing Dominions to send representatives to a special Conference in London, to discuss, confidentially and with the help of expert advice, the naval and military defence of the Empire. The meeting and discussion took place at the end of July and in August 1909, the representatives of the South African Colonies being delegates who came to London primarily for another purpose, to carry the Union of South Africa through its final stages, and who therefore, under the circumstances, did little more than hold a watching brief. The Conference was very practical and business-like, military and naval matters being discussed separately. Over and above the actual results achieved, its historical interest consisted in the evidence which was provided of approximation of view, or at least of appreciation of different points of view. An Admiralty

[1] Cd. 4948, pp. 5–6.

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Naval defence.

memorandum, which was circulated as a basis for discussion, laid down that, if the problem was simply one of naval strategy, the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure would be obtained by maintenance of a single Navy. But strategical considerations alone did not meet the case; varying political and geographical conditions must be taken into account; one Dominion might wish to co-operate in one way, another in another. Thus the creation of separate Dominion fleets was no longer contested, and naval experts contented themselves with suggesting that a Dominion, desirous of creating its own Navy, should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit, not a mere flotilla of torpedo craft and submarines, designed for coastal defence alone, but a complete self-contained unit, with a minimum of one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines; a squadron, in short, which in time of war would find a definite place in the whole naval organization of the Empire, and fit into the place, with the help of a common standard of training, discipline, and efficiency, and of equal facilities for refitting in all parts of the Empire. It was not only, and not merely, a concession to the views of Canada and Australia; it was in a sense a wider conception than that of the single fleet under central control, a conception of separate complete entities, which would none the less combine, at need, into one homogeneous whole, on a well-defined, intelligent plan; it was a reconciling of diversity and unity.

In Australia and New Zealand.

There were some joint meetings, and then Canada, Australia, and New Zealand settled their plans separately with the Admiralty; South Africa holding its hand until the Union was a *fait accompli*, Newfoundland being content with existing arrangements. Australia wanted to have her own fleet; New Zealand still adhered to her belief in the single Navy. The case was met by constituting a Pacific Fleet of the Empire, consisting of three units, in the East Indies, the China Seas, and Australian waters respectively. The third of these units was to be the Commonwealth Squadron; the battle-cruiser, presented

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by New Zealand to the Royal Navy, was to be the flag-ship on the China Station. New Zealand, after the Australasian Naval Agreement had been cancelled, would continue her annual contribution of £100,000 to the Navy, and in peace time some ships from the China Station would be allotted to New Zealand waters, manned, as far as possible, by New Zealanders, in order to keep in living and perpetual evidence the direct connexion between the Dominion and the Royal Navy, the money contribution of New Zealand being applied to make good the difference between British and New Zealand rates of pay. Before the year ended, the Australian Parliament passed a Naval and Military Defence Act, together with a Naval Loan Act providing for £3,500,000, and an order was placed for the construction of the battle-cruiser which was to be the flag-ship of the Commonwealth Squadron. The New Zealand Parliament similarly passed an act, authorizing a loan of £2,000,000 to cover the cost of the ship of war given to the Royal Navy, and the construction of a battle-cruiser was promptly ordered. The title and the wording of this New Zealand Loan Act should be recorded, as illustrating the consistently patriotic attitude of New Zealand. The formal title was 'An Act to make provision for the gift of a ship of war to the King'. The short title, as given in the Act, was 'The Naval Defence Act 1909'. In other words, to New Zealanders, the gift of a ship of war to the Royal Navy was synonymous with the naval defence of New Zealand; and the Act specified that the ship should be 'the property of His Majesty the King in respect of the Government of the United Kingdom', and be 'free from any control or authority exercisable by the Parliament or Executive Government of New Zealand'. It was a notable vote of confidence by a self-governing Dominion in the Home Government and the Royal Navy.

In Canada.

Canada, like Australia, had declared in favour of a Dominion Fleet, and the Admiralty had contemplated a Canadian fleet unit, like the Australian fleet unit, to be stationed on the Pacific side. The double sea-board of Canada, however, made this arrangement, for the time

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being, unsuitable in the eyes of the Canadian representatives, and plans were formulated for a force of unarmoured cruisers and destroyers, to be distributed between the two coasts. A beginning was made in Canada by buying two cruisers from the Admiralty and passing a Naval Service Act in 1910.

Military defence at the Conference.

The Conference was fully as practical on the military as on the naval side, and gave in either case the same evidence of approximating views. A general resolution was passed, to the effect 'That each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire',[1] and then a Sub-Conference of experts, presided over by the Chief of the General Staff, discussed proposals, which he had drawn up, 'for so organizing the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war'.[2] The result was distinct progress in the direction of standardizing and assimilating the various defence forces, and in developing the Imperial General Staff, the Sub-Conference being in effect of itself equivalent to a meeting of such a staff. The conclusions arrived at were approved not only by the main Conference, but also by the Committee of Imperial Defence; and the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, summed up the result as 'a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown, wherever they are, that, while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial Army'.[3]

Australian naval defence after the Conference.

The decision to create an Australian naval unit was promptly followed up. In the course of 1910 shipbuilding for the purpose went forward both in the United Kingdom and in Australia, and before the end of the year two destroyers, which had been ordered before the Conference, reached Australia from home. The battle-cruiser, the flagship of the unit, bearing the name of *Australia*, was built in Great Britain, and sent out in 1913; while earlier

[1] Cd. 4948, p. 29. [2] Ibid., p. 31. [3] Ibid., p. 19.

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in the same year, two smaller cruisers arrived from the United Kingdom, one of them, the *Sydney*, which, much less than two years later, accounted for the German raider, the *Emden*, off the coast of the Cocos Islands. The Commonwealth Defence Act, which was passed towards the end of 1909, and to which further reference is made below, covered naval as well as military defence, and in November 1910 a comprehensive Naval Defence Act was passed. Under this Act the naval forces of the Commonwealth were divided into the Permanent Naval Forces and the Citizen Naval Forces, the Citizen Naval Forces being subdivided into the Naval Reserve and the Naval Volunteer Reserve, of which the former answered to Naval Militia, paid while on service, the latter to Naval Volunteers, not ordinarily paid in peace time. The Act also provided for the appointment of a Board of Administration for the naval forces, to be called the Naval Board. But the Commonwealth Government did not rest content with the construction of a fleet unit and the passing of this Act. They had already invited Sir Reginald Henderson, a retired Admiral of the Royal Navy, to come out and advise, especially as to naval bases, and generally as to the Australian naval service and naval requirements. Reporting in March 1911, with the advantage of having before him Lord Kitchener's views on land defence, Henderson formulated a bold and most spacious naval policy for Australia, contemplating a large fleet of fifty-two vessels, eight of which would be battle-cruisers, with a complement of 15,000 officers and men, to be completed in 22 years, the fleet to be divided into an Eastern and a Western Division, with primary bases at Sydney and Fremantle respectively. A cadets training college was to be established at Sydney ; and the Naval Board, which had found a place in the Naval Defence Act, was to be constituted without delay, but given more real control over the naval forces than was contemplated by the Act. The report was a clear indication that the island continent, like the island Mother Country, looked for its future in large measure on the sea. Australia was fairly

Sir Reginald Henderson's Report.

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launched upon a policy of naval expansion, a policy worthy of a great community rooted in confidence in the coming time.

Australian military defence.

In the interval between the date when General Hutton left Australia and the naval and military Conference of 1909, little progress was made in the direction of developing and organizing the military forces of the Commonwealth. The Defence Acts of 1903–4, however, had made provision for cadet corps, and the constantly growing number of boy cadets and of members of rifle clubs was evidence that there was no want of military spirit among the younger citizens and in the coming generation. When Mr. Deakin in the Commonwealth Parliament, in December 1907, outlined his defence proposals, including compulsory military training, he stated that he and his colleagues had kept closely in mind 'the democratic system of military organization in Switzerland'.[1] He was again in power, and the present Sir Joseph Cook was his Minister of Defence, when, exactly two years later, and following closely upon the naval and military Conference, the Commonwealth Parliament in December 1909 passed a new and most democratic Defence Act. This Act, the first of its kind in the British Empire under modern conditions, made all male citizens of the Commonwealth within certain ages liable to naval or military training, unless exempted under the terms of the law. Training as junior cadets was prescribed from 12 to 14, as senior cadets from 14 to 18, and adult training in the Citizen Forces—the citizen forces being equivalent to the Militia and Volunteers—from 18 to 20. Other provisions of the Act included the establishment of a military college and a school of instruction for non-commissioned officers.

Lord Kitchener's visit to Australia.

Before this Act had been brought into operation, Lord Kitchener, whose Indian command had lately expired, reached Australia, having come at the invitation of the Commonwealth Government to inspect and advise. He arrived at Port Darwin on the 21st December 1909, and, having gone through all the States and visited all

[1] Cd. 4325, p. 28.

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the military camps and defence works, he made a report in February 1910. He estimated that 80,000 men were required to defend Australia on land, half to protect the larger cities and the defended ports, half to be a mobile striking force. He recommended that the Citizen Forces should be organized upon a territorial basis, Australia being divided into so many areas, each of which would supply a definite proportion of a fighting unit to be placed in charge of a thoroughly trained instructional officer from the permanent forces. Insisting, as in India, upon the necessity for a system of adequate training, steadily and consistently followed up, he advised that training should be compulsory up to 25 years of age instead of 20, and that a Staff Corps should be formed, which would be recruited from the military college and supply officers for the permanent instructors for the Citizen Forces. His recommendations were, in all their main points, accepted by the Labour Government, which, as the result of a General Election, came into power in April 1910; an amending Defence Act was passed later in the same year; and the new military college was opened, though not at first in its permanent home, under the charge of General Bridges, whose death in command of the First Australian Division at Gallipoli deprived Australia of a soldier of rare promise, second to none in study and knowledge of his calling.

Military defence in New Zealand.

Military defence in New Zealand was developed on the same lines as in Australia. New Zealand had been represented at the naval and military Conference by her Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, and at his request a scheme of reorganization was drawn up by the General Staff. On the Prime Minister's return to the Dominion, a new Defence Act was passed in December 1909. This Act, like the Commonwealth Act, provided for compulsory training, the limits of age for general training of adults being 18 to 21. Provision was also made for a Council of Defence and an Inspector-General, and the volunteers were renamed the Territorial Force. Lord Kitchener went on from Australia to New Zealand in February 1910, and

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pending his arrival and inspection the new Act was not brought into operation. His recommendations were to the same effect as those which he had made to the Commonwealth Government, and he urged that 'New Zealand and Australia should adopt homogeneous military systems in order to be able to efficiently support one another in the event of national danger'.[1] In particular he recommended that the New Zealand Staff Corps should be recruited from cadets sent to and trained at the military college in Australia. His recommendations were carried out almost in their entirety: the age of liability to compulsory training was extended from 21 to 25; the Dominion was divided into areas, each supplying its quota to the defence forces; and the Amending Act, which was passed in November 1910, dispensed with the Council of Defence and substituted for it a Commandant.

Naval and military defence in Canada.

In May 1910 the Canadian Naval Service Act became law. It provided for a Department of the Naval Service under the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, for a Director of the Naval Service, a Naval Board, a Naval Reserve, a Naval Volunteer Force, a Naval College. All the machinery was there for the creation and expansion of a Dominion Fleet; contracts were invited for new ships; but little or no real progress was made in naval defence. The outlook on land was more hopeful. The Militia Act of 1904 had raised the maximum of the permanent force —the Regular troops of Canada—from 1,000 to 2,000 men, and the number was subsequently increased. On the 31st March 1909 it stood at nearly 2,600 men, including all arms of the service. Its principal duty was described in an official report as being the instruction of the Active Militia, which, as distinguished in the 1904 law from the Reserve Militia, formed the main defence force of Canada, and in the year 1908 was composed of 43,000 more or less trained men. The ranks were filled by voluntary enlistment for a term of three years, the members were paid while on service, and the law prescribed a maximum of

[1] See Lord Kitchener's letter to Sir J. Ward, March 2, 1910. New Zealand P. P. H. 19 A.

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thirty days' drill in the year, though as a matter of fact the days of annual training only amounted to sixteen in the case of the city corps and the artillery units, and to twelve in the case of the rural corps. Lord Dundonald, before he parted company with the Dominion Government, had formulated a scheme for 46,000 men on a peace establishment, capable of being expanded in time of war into a first-line force of 100,000 men, with a reserve behind them. He aimed at a skeleton army in peace time, with all the units, in outline, of an organization suitable for taking the field in time of war, a nucleus of trained fighting men and of the administrative services indispensable to an army in the field, and a standing supply of ordnance, arms, ammunition, and equipment for 100,000 men. He proposed to decentralize the defence forces, grouping the existing military districts under five commands, and to make military training effective by the establishment of a central training camp, for the training of the permanent corps and of a few officers and non-commissioned officers of each Militia unit. Lake worked largely on his lines, and in due course a central camp was provided at Petawawa, on the Ottawa river, 100 miles higher up the river than the city of Ottawa. Canada had long had a military college at Kingston, which was maintained at a commendable level of efficiency; and, as in Australia, the system of cadet corps, which found a place in the 1904 Act, gave in a growing degree good results, and promised well for the coming time.

Visit and report by Sir John French.

In 1910, the same year in which Lord Kitchener visited Australia and New Zealand, Sir John French, now Lord French, holding at the time the appointment of Inspector-General of the Imperial Forces, went out to Canada at the request of the Dominion Government, to inspect the Canadian defence forces, arriving in May. His report embodied much the same criticisms that all experienced soldiers, one after another, passed upon the citizen forces of the Overseas Dominions. He did not condemn the volunteer system as being inadequate to the needs of Canada, because he considered that it had not yet had

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a fair trial; but he reported both the organization and the training of the Militia to be defective. The organization was defective, because the proportion between the various arms of the service was not correctly adjusted, because the different military areas were not required each to provide something like a due quota of the various arms; because the peace organization had not been assimilated to the organization which would be required in war time. The training was defective, because military knowledge in the higher command was inadequate, because the test qualifications for officers and non-commissioned officers of the Active Militia were not strictly enforced, because the rank and file were not compelled to fulfil their engagements. While the standard of training and efficiency in the permanent force was satisfactory, in the Militia there was no uniformity of standard. No sufficient arrangements existed for speedy mobilization, in connexion with which the establishment of a railway War Council was suggested; and the staff was described as absurdly inadequate. What was wanted was 'a sound peace organization and a thoroughly well-established staff system in order to ensure that immediate mobilization and prompt movement which alone can secure to Canada the initiative in a serious war'.[1] The Petawawa camp and the Royal Military College at Kingston won commendation; and, like all commanders who had known the work of overseas forces in the field, French had nothing but praise for the material of which those forces were composed. They needed only to be shaped in the days of peace into such a machine as is demanded by the exigencies of modern warfare. Sir Percy Lake, now on the eve of leaving Canada, gave his own views as to the best means of giving effect to French's recommendations.[2] There was no real divergence between the two men. Lake had been working on sound lines; much progress had been made, though there were still grave defects, very especially in regard to the number and the quality of the Staff.

[1] Report by Sir John French, Canadian Sessional Paper No. 35 a, A. 1911, p. 29.

[2] Canadian Sessional Paper, No. 35 b, A. 1911.

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It must always be borne in mind that the defence forces of the overseas Dominions were the citizen forces not merely of young democracies but of young nations still actually in the process of being made. Into Canada, for instance, in the years now under review, there was a constantly and rapidly growing influx of immigrants; new areas were opened up; new provinces were marked out; movement was everywhere. The conditions were such that it was far more difficult to create and maintain anything approaching a uniform system than in a matured community. Beyond the seas, as in the United Kingdom, it was rightly sought to build up defence upon a territorial basis, but in the Dominions year by year the basis changed, as fresh land was peopled and new centres came into being. What nature dictated to these overseas Dominions was growth, development, commercial, agricultural, industrial enterprise, expansion at will, anything rather than discipline or system. Was it likely that the necessity of preparing in peace time a trained machine for war could be brought home to the voters of the busy cities, the prairies or the back blocks? Was it likely that the ordinary party politician would care to devote himself to the organizing of defence forces and run the risk of being charged with wasting public money, favouring militarism, and running counter to democracy? The wonder is not that so little was done, but that so much was done; and much was done. By the end of 1910 the Australasian Dominions had settled, more or less, their naval and their military programmes, and were steadily at work on both. By the same date Canada had, in a half-hearted way, recognized the call of naval defence, and had made sound and appreciable progress with defence on land. South Africa, meanwhile, had accomplished its Union, a necessary preliminary to a national defence system adequate to the future. Kitchener had recast the military organization of India, and had laid down or revised the lines for Australia and New Zealand. French had given to Canada the benefit of his sound military judgement and tried experience. That the over-

Results of overseas defence up to the end of 1910.

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seas Dominions should in future have similar advice at their disposal was assured when, under the reorganized War Office at home, two Inspector-Generals were appointed, one for the Home and one for the Oversea Forces,[1] and it was provided that the latter should inspect the forces of the self-governing Dominions, when desired to do so by any Dominion Government. Most of all, the Imperial General Staff had come to stay; it had become a working reality, an Empire federation of trained and training soldiers; a practical recognition that war is a science which must be studied, an art which must be learnt, to be practised aright; that for the Empire there must be only one school of study, with different houses in different parts, but with the pupils all learning the same lessons, interchanged with one another, comparing notes with one another, from students becoming teachers and handing on to others sound principles and the rooted conviction that no haphazard collection of half-trained, undisciplined men can possibly defend a country or an empire.

[1] The field of action of the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces covered 'those portions of the Empire outside the United Kingdom, other than in India, where troops under the control of the Home Government are stationed'. He combined with his inspectional duties those of General Officer Commanding in Chief in the Mediterranean. He was to inspect the defence forces of the self-governing Dominions when invited to do so. See Cd. 5598, 1911, *Army, the Duties and Responsibilities of the Inspectors-General of the Home and Oversea Forces*, p. 3. See also Cd. 5746–2, July 1911, *Papers laid before the Imperial Conference Naval and Military Defence*, pp 11–13.

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CHAPTER X

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES AND DOMINION DEFENCE FORCES, 1911–14

The Imperial Conference of 1911.

FOUR years having elapsed since its last meeting, the Imperial Conference met again in 1911. Once more the gathering coincided with a great state ceremonial, the Coronation of His present Majesty. The Conference had now attained some finality of form and shape. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presided, and in his opening speech noted that 'There are sitting at this table to-day six prime ministers, all holding their commission from the same King, and all deriving their title to its exercise from the voice and vote of a free democracy'.[1] For the first time South Africa was represented as a single unit, and General Botha, who had come to the 1907 Conference as Premier of the Transvaal, now took his seat as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. For the first time, too, the Prime Minister in a Labour Ministry spoke for one of the overseas nations, Mr. Fisher, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia. For the fourth time at these Empire gatherings Sir Wilfrid Laurier represented Canada. The sittings lasted from the 23rd of May to the 20th of June, and the discussions ranged over many subjects. There was a somewhat ambitious motion placed upon the agenda paper by the Government of New Zealand, in favour of 'an Imperial Council of State, with representatives from all the self-governing parts of the Empire, in theory and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of His Majesty's Dominions overseas'.[2] In moving it, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Sir Joseph Ward, second only to Sir Wilfred Laurier in seniority of standing at the Conference, developed the proposal into one for an Imperial Parliament of Defence,

[1] *Imperial Conference, 1911. Precis of the Proceedings.* Cd. 5741, June 1911, p. 6.

[2] Cd. 5741, p. 11.

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to be composed of elected representatives, and to deal with questions common to the whole Empire; but the scheme had not been fully worked out, it did not commend itself to the other Prime Ministers, and the motion was in consequence withdrawn. A similar fate befell resolutions from New Zealand and South Africa on the subject of future reconstruction of the Colonial Office and the secretariat of the Imperial Conference. In order to try to find the greatest common measure of divergent views, the Secretary of State for the Colonies made a proposal to create a standing committee of the Imperial Conference, a somewhat similar proposal to that which Mr. Lyttelton had made in 1905, but there was no unanimity in favour of his scheme, and the existing machinery was left as it stood.

With one exception, no new departure was made at the Conference; but that very fact marked the stage of Imperial co-operation which by this date had been reached. Principles had already been accepted; the mutual relations between the various Governments were now fully recognized and thoroughly understood; there was no longer any need for elucidation of what the Imperial Conference was or was not, what were or should be the limits of its functions, what should be its constitution. The meetings were now on an assured basis, and the goal was clearly defined, 'Imperial unity based upon local autonomy',[1] to quote Sir Wilfrid Laurier's words. It remained to apply the principles in this direction and in that, to devote time and attention to particular subjects rather than to generalities.

Overseas representatives at the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Only one precedent was set by the Conference, but it was a new departure of high significance. For the first time at these Conferences defence questions had no place in the general discussions at the main conference. The reason was obvious. Here again the principles involved had been already settled; the lines had been laid down and accepted; the recent Naval and Military Conference of 1909 had carried defence far into the region of

[1] Cd. 5741, p. 7.

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specialized subjects to be worked out in detail and largely in confidence, with the help of technical advice. Accordingly, at the instance of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, it was at once agreed that naval and military matters should be relegated to the Committee of Imperial Defence. The proceedings at this Committee were strictly confidential, but it was made known that they included, as the Prime Minister had promised in his speech at the opening of the Conference, a statement by the Foreign Secretary, explaining fully and frankly to the representatives of the self-governing Dominions the international position at the time. This was in fact, and was fully recognized to be, the beginning of taking the Dominions into partnership with regard to the foreign relations of the Empire. 'Hitherto', said the Prime Minister of Australia at the end of the Conference, 'we have been negotiating with the Government of the United Kingdom at the portals of the household. You have thought it wise, Sir, to take the representatives of the Dominions into the inner counsels of the nation.[1] . . . I think no greater step has ever been taken, or can be taken, by any responsible advisers of the King;' and Mr. Asquith in reply echoed Mr. Fisher's words: 'The representatives of the Dominions have been admitted, as it were, into the interior, into the innermost parts of the Imperial household'.[1]

On the agenda paper for the Conference the New Zealand Government had placed a motion to the effect that the High Commissioners of the several Dominions should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, when naval and military questions affecting the Dominions were under discussion. But, when the overseas representatives to the Conference went to the Committee, and held their confidential meetings, it was unanimously agreed that the Dominions should be represented on the Committee, when occasion arose, by specially appointed representatives, not by the High Commissioners; and also, that in each Dominion a Defence Committee should be established, keeping in close touch

[1] Cd. 5741, *ut sup.*, pp. 82, 84.

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with the central committee at home. So much was made public in a dispatch to the Dominions from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in December 1912. By that date the new Canadian Government, which had in the meantime replaced Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Ministry, had been made cognizant of what had passed; and Mr. Borden, the Prime Minister, had intimated that a Canadian Minister might spend some months annually in London for the purpose, adding a wish that the 'Dominions Ministers who might be in London as members of the Committee of Imperial Defence should receive, in confidence, knowledge of the policy and proceedings of the Imperial Government in foreign and other affairs'. On this Mr. Harcourt's comment was, that the Committee was a purely advisory body, but that any Dominions Minister resident in England would always have free and full access to information on all questions of Imperial policy, and he quoted a public speech of his own, in which he had stated that he saw 'no obstacle, and certainly no objection, to the Governments of all the Dominions being given at once a larger share in the executive direction in matters of defence, and in personal consultation and co-operation with individual British Ministers, whose duty it is to frame policy here'; that he would welcome a more continuous representation of Dominions Ministers upon the Defence Committee, if they so desired; and that all would be glad if members of the Dominion Cabinets could be annually in London.[1]

Mr. Harcourt's Dispatch of December 10, 1912.

Thus Imperial co-operation was growing apace. Without laying down any hard-and-fast rules of the game, without defining spheres of influence or limits of action, in such manner as might be convenient from time to time on friendly, family, almost informal lines, the inmost circle at home was thrown open to the responsible Ministers from the overseas peoples. Defence was recognized as involving foreign policy, and recognition by the Dominion Governments that defence was a matter

[1] See *Dominions No. 13. Dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies as to the Representation of the Self-governing Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence.* Cd. 6560, January 1913.

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of common concern brought in its train corresponding recognition by the Government of the United Kingdom that the Dominion Governments must be taken into confidence with regard to the foreign relations of the Empire. Mr. Harcourt laid strong stress upon the fact that the Committee of Imperial Defence was an advisory body only, but we have seen the verdict passed upon it later by the Dardanelles Commission that 'in practice it did more than advise, it decided '.[1]

Progress made at the 1911 Conference in naval and military co-operation.

In the summer of 1912, before Mr. Harcourt wrote his dispatch, similar views to those embodied in it had been expressed in the House of Commons by the First Lord of the Admiralty and by the Prime Minister; and on the 25th of July in that year Mr. Asquith gave an outline of what had passed at the Committee of Imperial Defence at the time of the 1911 Conference. The Dominion Prime Ministers had been present at the Committee on three days. On one Sir Edward Grey had enlightened them on foreign policy; at the other meetings naval and military policy had been discussed, on statements by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War respectively. The naval and military discussions at the Committee were supplemented by Conferences at the Admiralty and the War Office, between the Defence Ministers and the experts, the results being included among the papers laid before the Imperial Conference.[2] At the Admiralty the representatives of Canada and Australia came to a clear understanding with the Home Government as to future relations between the Dominion navies and the Royal Navy, and as to the limits of the Canadian and Australian naval stations. The stations were defined in writing and on the map. It was laid down that the training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions should be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the Royal Navy, the officers and men of the respective forces being by arrangement interchangeable; the flags to be flown on the Dominion

[1] See above, p. 147.

[2] See *Imperial Conference, 1911. Papers laid before the Imperial Conference Naval and Military Defence.* Cd. 5746-2, July 1911.

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ships were prescribed; provision was made to eliminate possible causes of friction in regard to relative seniority of standing as between the officers of the respective forces, and so forth; and it was definitely stated that in time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion had been placed by the Dominion Government at the disposal of the Imperial Government, the ships should form an integral part of the British fleet, and remain under the control of the Admiralty for the continuance of the war.

Military defence was discussed at the War Office by a Committee presided over by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that title having come into existence in November 1909. Various memoranda were laid before the Committee, on the development of the Imperial Staff and the formation and organization of local sections of the Staff in the Dominions, on the adoption by the Dominions of the same examinations for the promotion of officers of their permanent forces as were laid down for officers of the British Regular Army, on courses of instruction in the United Kingdom and India for Dominion officers, on the terms upon which the services of the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces would be available for the Dominion Governments, on the education of Dominion officers at the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta. These papers and the conclusions arrived at with regard to them showed marked progress in co-ordination of the military forces of the Empire, growing uniformity in military education and training, recognition of a common standard of military efficiency. The General Staff had done its work tactfully and well, and its evolution into an Imperial Staff was rapidly becoming an accomplished fact. On the military side the stocktaking of 1911 was eminently satisfactory.

The change of Government in Canada.

The Imperial Conference ended; the delegates dispersed, and from a series of harmonious, unruffled meetings in London Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his two Canadian colleagues, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Marine, went back to a sea of trouble in Canada. In January of this memorable year, 1911, Mr. Fielding, the

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Canadian Minister of Finance, had come to an understanding at Washington with the American Government for mutual tariff concessions between Canada and the United States; he had negotiated a reciprocity treaty, though not in treaty form. The terms were submitted to the Canadian and American legislatures; in the United States they were eventually approved, but not in Canada. In Canada opposition to the agreement was strong from the first, and steadily grew in strength. It was strong in Parliament, stronger still outside. Well-known Liberals declared against the policy of the Liberal Government; the manufacturing interests were solid in opposition; and an unwise, blatant speech by a leading American politician, which in effect commended the agreement as a first step towards the annexation of Canada by the United States, called into new life in the Dominion enthusiasm for the time-honoured 'national policy', for upholding fiscal protection against an overshadowing neighbour. The Canadian House of Commons was adjourned for two months, from the middle of May to the middle of July, in order to enable Canada to be represented at the Coronation and the Imperial Conference. On Laurier's return the Parliamentary fight was resumed; Laurier determined to appeal to the constituencies, and before the end of July Parliament was dissolved. The General Election was held in the latter part of September, a strong Government majority was turned into an equally strong majority for the Opposition, and on the 6th of October the gifted and eloquent French-Canadian Prime Minister resigned office, after an unbroken reign of fifteen years. His successor was the present Sir Robert Borden, who had led the Opposition with patient courage in the low-water time that followed the disappearance from the scene of the fathers of Canadian confederation. One of these Elder Statesmen, however, Sir Charles Tupper, still survived in extreme old age to see his party return to power, and not many weeks before the election, during Laurier's visit to England, the two men, divided root and branch in party politics, had met together in

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unity, when the memorial tablet to the birth of the Dominion was unveiled at the Westminster Palace Hotel.

Far-reaching effect of the change.

The change of government in Canada meant more than the ordinary swing of the political pendulum. It meant much more, not in Canada alone. Whether the issue had been rightly or wrongly presented, whether the voting had been based on sound reasoning or on misapprehension, the result of the election was a distinct and definite pronouncement in favour of Imperial Unity, a clear refusal to take a step which might conceivably imperil that unity. It profoundly modified the attitude of Canada towards Imperial questions, and the attitude of Canada was a most important factor in the problem of the Empire. As the eldest and the greatest of the self-governing Dominions, as the pioneer of them all in self-government, federation, nationhood, Canada held and holds at Empire gatherings a position which, if not unique, is at least outstanding. This position had been consolidated by the fact that, at all the Imperial Conferences held in London, except the first rudimentary meeting of 1887, one and the same statesman had spoken for Canada, by his long tenure of power gathering influence and leadership in the counsels of the Empire, as years went on and as the Conferences grew in number and in stature. But Sir Wilfrid Laurier, French-Canadian by birth and upbringing, and deriving his most solid political support from the French-Canadian province of Quebec, stood from first to last, in regard to the Empire, for what may fairly be called a policy of friendly isolation. The agenda papers of the Conferences rarely, if ever, contained any motions from Canada; when the Conferences met, if ever some forward move was suggested, the voice of Canada was almost always on the negative side. Time and again, as has been seen, new proposals were discouraged by Canada, on the ground that they might possibly touch upon the fringe of the ark of the Covenant, colonial autonomy. To keep Canada out of what he styled the vortex of European militarism, vigilantly and almost suspiciously to safeguard her

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self-governing rights, to leave the existing status as far as possible alone, that was Sir Wilfrid Laurier's policy. At this last Conference of 1911 he laid down in so many words, 'we have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war, and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases'.[1]

When the Borden Ministry came into office, all this was changed. The new Prime Minister stood as steadfastly as Laurier himself for the nationhood of Canada; but he was not concerned with perpetually reiterating an acknowledged truth, and perpetually safeguarding an assured fact; he was not beset with apprehension that more pronounced partnership in the Empire might impair a position which had long been unassailable. On the contrary, he saw in active co-operation with the Mother Country the crown of nationhood. By taking a more active and leading part in defence of the Empire, Canada would attain what was still wanting to complete her status as a nation, her full and rightful share in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire. 'Canada does not propose to be an adjunct, even of the British Empire, but, as has been well and eloquently expressed, to be a great part in a greater whole.' So he defined his outlook for Canada to the Royal Colonial Institute in July 1912, on his first visit to England after taking office. In December of the same year, when presenting his naval proposals in the Canadian House of Commons, he emphasized the principle that 'The Great Dominions, sharing in the defence of the Empire upon the High Seas, must necessarily be entitled to share also in the responsibility for and in the control of foreign policy'.

Naval defence the vital question of the Empire.

The call of the sea to the British race is a living reality, a constantly potent influence, directing the path and shaping the destiny of the Empire. The sea has salted the sentiment towards the Mother Country with the savour of an unbroken, dominating tradition not to be found in other peoples or commonwealths of peoples

[1] Cd. 5745, *Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911*, July 1911, p. 117.

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It is impossible closely to study the records of the Imperial Conferences without conviction that underlying everything was the bedrock principle of security and supremacy on the sea; that determination to uphold British sea-power at all costs was so deeply rooted as to be taken for granted. The Conferences gave more clearly defined results in regard to naval defence than in any other respect. The earliest of them all, the Conference of 1887, produced the first Australasian money contributions to the Royal Navy. The next London Conference, in 1897, prolonged the contributions and supplemented them by one from the Cape Colony. The third London Conference in 1902 ended with all the self-governing Colonies, except Canada, contributing to the Navy in one form or another. In the sphere of naval defence again, Imperial co-operation has been markedly spontaneous, the outcome of free-will and of goodwill. The Admiralty never badgered the overseas people to keep their own seas; they always took up the position that, whether the overseas peoples co-operated or not, the Royal Navy would be responsible for the safekeeping of the whole Commonwealth. The Cape came forward unasked with the offer of a battleship; unasked, New Zealand gave a battle-cruiser, and offered a second; there was no haggling about the offers and the grants, no conditions were attached to them, they were free gifts. Once more, the evolution of naval defence, as the Conferences went on, was in effect an embodiment of the whole Imperial problem. It illustrated the divergence of views, becoming more pronounced, and then being recognized and adjusted with practical British good sense. We have seen the restiveness of Australia under a system of money contributions to the Navy. It never entered into Australian minds to refuse co-operation on the sea, but their growing desire was to co-operate in a way which would mark Australian individuality. We have seen that New Zealand, on the contrary, gave unconditional adhesion to the doctrine of one fleet. That doctrine, the doctrine of one sea, one navy, one command, was held in the strongest possible

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manner by the Admiralty, and yet we find the Admiralty wisely accepting, and cordially helping to work out, the methods of compromise, which must mark the path of Imperial partnership, if that path is to lead onward.

The attitude of Canada towards naval defence.

Alone among the self-governing Dominions, Canada, or rather the Canadian Government, seemed not to hear the call of the sea. In spite of the double seaboard of the Dominion, there was little evidence of interest in or concern for naval defence on the part of the responsible Ministers. Time after time Canada stood aloof from naval co-operation, apparently well content that the Royal Navy should safeguard her trade and mercantile marine, but not disposed either to contribute to the cost of that navy or to create a fleet of her own. When at length, in 1909, a resolution in favour of naval co-operation was, as has been told, carried unanimously in the Canadian House of Commons, the effect was instantaneous; the resolution was made a text by the Imperial Government for calling the Naval and Military Conference of that year. But, even after the Conference had been held, and after the Canadian Naval Defence Act of 1910 had been passed, the interest of the Laurier Cabinet in naval matters was a languid interest; merit was made of taking over the charge of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt from the Imperial Government; the two cruisers bought from the Admiralty, the *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, were manned principally by officers and men lent from the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve, and were placed in commission, one on the Atlantic side, one on the Pacific; tenders were invited for cruisers to be built in Canada, but had not been awarded by the date when the Laurier Cabinet fell; in short, taken as a whole, the proceedings of the Canadian Government in naval matters were in strong contrast to the energy and zeal shown by the Australians in speeding up the construction of a Commonwealth fleet. Accordingly, when the Borden Ministry came into office, they suspended their predecessors' halting programme, and held their own hands until, after personal

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conference in England, the general naval situation could be clearly apprehended.

Sir R. Borden's naval policy.

The Naval Estimates, which the First Lord of the Admiralty laid before the House of Commons in March 1912, showed a small decrease in the shipbuilding votes as compared with the previous year; but it was explicitly stated that the Estimates had been framed upon the assumption that the existing programmes of other naval nations, so far as they were known, would not be enlarged; otherwise Supplementary Estimates would be required. They were required, and were presented to the House on the following 22nd of July, to the amount of nearly a million sterling. Lord Haldane's visit to Germany in the previous February had not led to any modification in German naval or military policy, and the new Naval Bill which was introduced into the Reichstag in April, and became law in May, provided, in Mr. Churchill's words, for 'a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power'.[1] These words were amplified in a memorandum drawn up later by the Admiralty for the Government of Canada, and made public in December. The memorandum pointed out that the main feature of the German Naval Law was 'not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year, . . . that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war . . .' and that this great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of commerce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts.[2]

[1] See Hansard, Mr. Churchill's speech, July 22, 1912.

[2] See *Naval Defence, Memorandum on Naval Defence Requirements prepared by the Admiralty for the Government of Canada*, Cd. 6513, December 1912.

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It was patent to all but those who were blinded by inveterate prejudice, that a grave and imminent danger to British sea-power had grown up in the North Sea.

Before the Supplementary Estimates were presented to the House of Commons and the debate upon them took place, the new Prime Minister of Canada, with several of his colleagues, had, early in July, arrived in England. They, in their turn, had now the entrée to the inmost circle; at the Committee of Imperial Defence and at the Admiralty they learnt first-hand the facts of the case, the gravity of the position, the naval requirements of the Empire, the way in which those requirements could best be met; and an understanding was arrived at, based upon closer partnership, upon increased effort by Canada with corresponding increase in Canadian influence, an understanding in principle diametrically opposed to the policy of friendly aloofness, to which Sir Wilfrid Laurier had so long and so tenaciously adhered. The change in the attitude of Canada had a marked effect upon the Home Government. 'Now Canada has come forward,' said Mr. Churchill, authorized by the Canadian Ministers to state 'that any special action which the immediate future may require of them will not be delayed pending the settlement of a final and permanent naval arrangement.' Then, as to the *quid pro quo*, 'If we are told that the beginnings of co-operation in defence must carry with them the beginnings of association in policy, then I say that both in measures of defence and in the direction of policy the co-operation of the Dominions with the United Kingdom will be of inestimable benefit to the strength of the Empire and to the great cause of peace.'[1] On this same 22nd of July the British Prime Minister spoke in similar terms, 'Side by side with this growing participation in the active burdens of the Empire on the part of our Dominions, there rests with us undoubtedly the duty of making such response as we can to their obviously reasonable appeal that they should be entitled to be heard in the determination of the policy and in

[1] Hansard, *ut sup.*, July 22, 1912.

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the direction of public affairs.'[1] Later in the year appeared Mr. Harcourt's dispatch, which has been already quoted. The change of Government in Canada had done much to promote co-operation; Germany, before the war, had begun her beneficent work of consolidating the British Empire; the call of the sea had once more proved to be the most potent of all calls to the British race.

Gift of a battleship to the Royal Navy by the Federated Malay States.

The Cape and New Zealand had set precedents for offering or giving battleships to the Royal Navy. There was another precedent in 1912. In November it was announced that the Council of the Federated Malay States had offered a first-class armoured warship at a cost of two and a half millions sterling, payable in five years, and that the offer had been gratefully accepted by the Home Government. Here was help forthcoming, not from a self-governing Dominion, but from an Eastern Protectorate. The Malay States had flourished amazingly under British protection, and in this very practical way Malays and Chinese showed their appreciation, willingly and ungrudgingly contributing to the primary factor in Great Britain's strength. By this time Borden had returned to Canada, followed in due course by the Admiralty memorandum, which, while explicitly disclaiming the slightest desire to put any pressure upon Canadian public opinion or upon the Dominion Parliament, stated no less explicitly that the answer to the question, in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, was 'that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply'.[2] This was the Canadian Prime Minister's brief when, in a memorable speech, he unfolded his naval policy to the House of Commons at Ottawa on the 5th of December, 1912. His policy was embodied in a short Bill 'to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire'. It was proposed that 35 millions of dollars should be

Borden's speech of December 5, 1912.

[1] Hansard, *ut sup.*

[2] Cd. 6513, p. 6.

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appropriated and expended in the immediate construction and equipment of three battleships or battle-cruisers of the most modern and powerful type, to be placed, when built, at the disposal of the Crown for the common defence of the Empire, on terms to be agreed upon between the Dominion and the Home Government. The great need of the Empire was an answer to the German menace by immediate increase of British naval strength. This need the Canadian Government would meet by supplying new warships, in addition to, not in substitution for, the ships which the Admiralty was building. These ships would be for the time an integral part of the Royal Navy, but without prejudice to their reversion to the control of the Canadian Government, should it be ultimately decided to create a Canadian naval unit. Borden laid stress upon the necessity of upholding, in the face of latest developments, British power upon the high seas, vital to Canada, as to all parts of the Empire. His proposal was one to meet an emergency, it was not the beginning of an intended series of periodical contributions; it was a specific indication of the resolve of Canada no longer to delay taking an active part in the naval defence of the Empire, but to give immediate help in the form in which help would be most effective and most appreciated. Coupled with this naval co-operation was the assurance of the Home Government that they would welcome a Canadian Minister in London to act as a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and that 'no important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with such a representative of Canada'.

Defeat of Borden's proposals.

His scheme met with vehement opposition from Laurier and his followers. Laurier contended for a permanent policy of naval defence on the part of Canada by ships constructed, armed, and manned in Canada, such a policy as would give effect as speedily as possible to the Naval Service Act of 1910. Through the early months of 1913 the controversy raged, the spirit of Canadian nationalism being in effect ranged against the policy of closer partner-

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ship. All the resources of Parliamentary machinery were employed to wreck the Bill. It passed the House of Commons, but at the end of May was defeated in the Senate. The New Zealand offer of 1909 had been from first to last unconditional, from first to last not marred by any opposition. The great Canadian offer of 1912 was of the nature of a bargain, but a most worthy bargain. Canada was to do her part in naval defence, the British Government was to do its part in giving to Canada a greater share of control in foreign policy. The Borden scheme was broad, bold, and generous, based upon mutual confidence, giving what was most wanted, receiving what was most desired. Its initiation marked a great advance; its failure for the time being was proof, not of any demerit in the scheme itself, but of the strength of party feeling and of nationalist sentiment in the eldest and the greatest of the self-governing Dominions. While New Zealand gave as a free gift, with all the grace that can be made to accompany a free gift, one-half of Canada saw in giving merely a form of tribute, and in the *quid pro quo* which was attached to the giving, a closer relation which might bring in its train inconvenient responsibility. So this great and promising effort in naval co-operation bore no immediate fruit, and in the fourteen months which followed before the war began, though Sir Robert Borden still held office, no further definitive step was taken in the same direction.

Naval policy of New Zealand modified.

The battle-cruiser *New Zealand*, the New Zealanders' gift to the Royal Navy, was, under the arrangement made in 1909, to have been the flagship of the China unit of the Pacific fleet; but, as German naval pressure increased and with it the necessity for what Mr. Churchill, in the spring of 1914, styled 'concentration in the decisive theatre, and for the decisive event',[1] the Admiralty expressed a strong desire to keep the new battle-cruisers in European waters, where alone—again to quote Mr. Churchill's words—they would meet their equals.[2] Ready, as ever,

[1] Speech in the House of Commons on presenting the Naval Estimates for 1914–15, March 17, 1914, see Hansard. [2] Ibid.

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to co-operate in all ways with the Admiralty, the New Zealand Government in 1912 placed the *New Zealand* unreservedly at the disposal of the British authorities, though, before taking her place in the danger zone of the home seas, the great ship was in 1913 sent on tour to the Dominions, and visited the land which brought her into being. In other respects, too, the Admiralty had somewhat departed from the understanding of 1909, being unable to station in New Zealand waters ships of as heavy a type as had been promised; and, a new Ministry having come into office in New Zealand, with Mr. Massey as Prime Minister, Col. (now Sir James) Allen, the Minister of Defence, arrived in England early in 1913 to confer with the Home Government. The outcome of his visit was that the New Zealand Government decided to initiate a Dominion naval service; the Admiralty lent a training ship for the purpose; the expenses were to be met out of the sum of £100,000 annually voted as a subsidy to the Royal Navy; and in December 1913 a Naval Defence Act was passed, creating New Zealand naval forces and a New Zealand Royal Naval Reserve. It was in contemplation, too, to have a fast modern cruiser built in England, to be owned by, and in peace time to be under sole control of, the Dominion Government. Thus, shortly before the war began, New Zealand, not so much by her own desire as by the force of circumstances, entered upon the same path as Australia, and moved in the direction of providing for her own naval defence. But, in making this new departure, the Dominion still closely adhered to the doctrine of the single navy. The new law provided in very explicit terms for placing everything, forces and ships alike, at the disposition of the Government of Great Britain in the event of war or of imminence of war, and service in the New Zealand naval forces included service without as well as within the limits of New Zealand, service in the Royal Navy and in the other naval forces of the Empire.[1]

[1] See *Dominions No. 16. Report for 1913–4 relating to the Self-governing Dominions.* Cd. 7507, July 1914, pp. 79–85.

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The Commonwealth Fleet.

Following on the agreement as to the relations between the Dominion fleets and the British Navy, which was arrived at between the Admiralty and the Canadian and Australian representatives in 1911, the British Parliament later in the year passed the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act, and the Commonwealth Parliament passed a corresponding Act, the amending Naval Defence Act of 1911. With additional stimulus given by Sir Reginald Henderson's report, the Commonwealth Government pressed forward steadily and continuously the construction of the Australian naval unit, making what the First Lord of the Admiralty styled a heroic effort.[1] By the end of 1913 the fleet included, in addition to destroyers and submarines, the battle-cruiser *Australia*, the flagship of the squadron, and the two light cruisers *Sydney* and *Melbourne*, while a third of their type, the *Brisbane*, was being built in Australia from material sent out from England. The last admiral to command the old squadron of the Royal Navy in Australasian waters, Admiral King Hall, had gone back to England; the first admiral to command the Dominion fleet, Admiral Patey, had come out on the *Australia*. The Imperial Naval dockyard at Sydney had been transferred to the Commonwealth Government. A naval college had been opened in temporary quarters at Geelong on the shores of Port Phillip, subsequently finding a permanent home at Captain's Point, Jarvis Bay. On the 4th of October, 1913, the Australasian naval agreement, with its money contributions to the Royal Navy, was finally cancelled. In a word, an Australian Navy and an Australian naval service became a living and vigorous reality, with every prospect of growth to larger dimensions. The Commonwealth Government had in the meantime proposed that a further naval conference should be held, not in London but in Australia or elsewhere in the Dominions, to ensure complete understanding on the question of co-operation for naval defence, but it was not found possible to arrange

[1] Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, March 17, 1914. See Hansard.

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a conference before the war began.[1] But for the war, there would have been need again to revise the terms of naval partnership, for, in laying the annual Naval Estimates before the House of Commons on the 17th March, 1914, Mr. Churchill indicated a change in the Admiralty view. Australians and New Zealanders looked for naval strength on the spot, in the Pacific waters; they were not content with the Admiralty doctrine that security for the Southern lands and seas could best be assured by naval strength concentrated at the heart of the Empire, ready to strike at the heart of the foe. Australians were committed, and had gained Admiralty assent, to the creation of a complete self-contained naval unit, owned by and, in peace time, directly under the eyes and the control of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, year by year the German menace tended more and more to dominate the naval outlook in England, perpetually reinforcing the argument for concentrated strength and a single navy. Though the Australians had lost no time in carrying out their part of an agreed programme, and by their energy had proved to demonstration that one Dominion fleet at any rate had come to stay, yet the naval experts of the Admiralty, under the conditions of the time, sought for a new compromise, more nearly approximating to the ideal of a single navy than the close alliance of fleet units, which, in 1909 and 1911, had been taken as the solution of the problem. Accordingly, the First Lord outlined a policy, which he characterized as the right policy, combining 'sound military principles with local aspirations',[2] a policy to which he believed that future developments would gradually and naturally tend. It was a policy of maintaining an Imperial squadron, to which the Dominion Governments would contribute their heavy ships, which would be swiftly and freely mobile, which would find in

The scheme of an Imperial squadron.

[1] See *Correspondence relating to the representation of the Self-governing Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence and to a proposed Naval Conference.* Cd. 7347, April 1914.

[2] Mr Churchill's speech in the House of Commons of March 17, 1914. See Hansard.

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Canadian, Australasian, or South African waters adequate naval bases, docks, and repairing plant, enabling it, in time of emergency, to operate in any of these waters for a long time together, and which would on each station be supplemented by local defence flotillas and light cruisers built for the protection of the local trade. He took, as an analogy, co-operation by a group of farmers, all of whom would possess their own ordinary agricultural implements, but would combine to buy a steam plough and a steam thresher, to be used by each in turn. It was a plan strongly resembling the New Zealand proposal of 1902 for the establishment in each Dominion of an Imperial Reserve force; the cold reception given to that proposal did not augur well for the success of a kindred policy on sea; and, as a matter of fact, Australian criticism was promptly forthcoming. The war put an end, for the time being, to divergence of view; but it is of living interest to trace, in the sphere of naval defence, the various phases in the evolution of the never-ending Empire problem—how to find the greatest common measure of naval and military effectiveness on the one hand, and political aspirations on the other; how, with a perpetually changing naval and military outlook, to prepare in peace time for war, and yet not to run counter to the sense of national ownership in sea and land forces, in men and guns and ships, which is not, and never will be, satisfied with owning them at a distance from their own lands and seas.

The naval question in South Africa.

The Union of South Africa had not, by the date when the war began, developed any definitive policy of naval defence. Of the four constituents of the Union, the two new colonies, the late Boer Republics, were purely inland states, and it was not to be expected that sea-power and naval defence, so specially associated with Great Britain, would directly appeal either to their sentiment or to their interest. The contributions given annually to the Royal Navy by the Cape and Natal, of £50,000 and £35,000 respectively, were continued after the Union had come into being; and speeches of South African leaders, both

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

GRAVE OF CECIL RHODES IN THE MATOPPOS

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in South Africa and in England, showed that the call of the sea was not ignored. Words used by General Botha in a public speech, to the effect that he and his colleagues recognized their responsibility to undertake the naval defence of South Africa, led to the final parting between himself and General Hertzog in December 1912; and in March 1913, a long debate on the naval question in the Union House of Assembly ended with general acceptance of a motion by the Prime Minister, requesting him and his colleagues to take counsel with the Imperial Government as to what provision should be made for naval defence, and subsequently to submit proposals to the Parliament of the Union. Meanwhile the South Africa Defence Act of 1912 contained provisions for a Coast Garrison Force to protect the defended ports, and for a Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The Coast Garrison Force was to include one corps to be called the South African Garrison Artillery, the first division of which would be the existing Volunteer Corps of Cape Garrison Artillery, and another corps for engineering and signalling duties, to be called the South African Coast Defence Corps. The nucleus of a Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve existed already in the form of naval volunteer corps at Capetown and Durban. The Reserve was formally constituted on July 1, 1914, and at the end of that year numbered nine officers and 284 men.

The South Africa Defence Act of 1912.

The South Africa Defence Act—very complete and exhaustive—laid down the lines and elaborated the details of the future military system of South Africa. The Union, at the date when the Act was passed, alone among the self-governing Dominions, still had within its borders an Imperial garrison, the presence of which, in the beginnings of a citizen army, was of much practical usefulness, enabling the new armed forces to be raised and organized without undue haste or pressure, and giving facilities in the matter of military training. It was of advantage, too, that strong bodies of military police of one kind or another had for very many years been an integral part of South African organization; while

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compulsory military service, in the form of the commando system, was a familiar feature of South African life. The new law placed in the forefront the liability of all male citizens of European descent, between the ages of 17 and 60, to personal service in time of war, and, between the ages of 17 and 25, to four years' training for military service in time of peace. The Defence Forces were divided into five categories, the Permanent Force, the Coast Garrison Force, the Citizen Force, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and any Special Reserve established under the Act. The nucleus of the Permanent Force—the Regulars—was to hand in the military police of the four united Colonies. This force, some 2,500 men strong, was to include five or more regiments of South African mounted riflemen, distributed through the provinces of the Union, the long-tried and far-famed corps of Cape Mounted Riflemen[1] forming the first regiment of the force. The main defence force under the Act was and is the Citizen Force, comprising three divisions, the Active Citizen Force, the Citizen Force Reserve, and the National Reserve. The Active Citizen Force, combined with the Permanent Force, was to be the first line of national defence. It was to be organized, on a territorial basis, in complete self-contained units; and its ranks were to be filled by 50 per cent. of the whole number of male citizens of European descent between the ages of 17 and 25, other than those already serving or specially exempted under the terms of the law. It was held to be unnecessary to train the whole population, and expense was a matter of consequence; all, however, were to be registered, and if in any military district the number presenting themselves for training fell short of 50 per cent., the deficiency was to be made good by ballot. Training was not made compulsory under the Act before the age of 21, but might be undergone voluntarily from the age of 17 upwards; the first of the four years, when the citizen was in the recruit stage, would be the most strenuous, and during all the days of continuous training, daily

[1] For the Cape Mounted Riflemen, see above, p. 91.

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pay was to be allowed. Those citizens who were liable to, but not called up for, military training were to become members of rifle associations, and the law provided for cadet training for boys. The Citizen Force Reserve included citizens up to the age of 45; the National Reserve included all citizens liable to personal service in time of war; and certain sections of the Act provided for Special Reserves. For the training of officers a South African Military College was called into existence. A Council of Defence, presided over by the Minister of Defence, was created; but no distinctive appointments of command or inspection were mentioned in the law; they were left to the discretion of the Government.

These were some of the main provisions of the South Africa Defence Act, perhaps the most comprehensive and most carefully elaborated of all the Defence Acts of the overseas peoples. The Bill became law in June 1912; the new Permanent Force dated from April 1913; reorganization was as yet incomplete, the Citizen Force was still in process of creation, when all was put to the test by the outbreak of war with Germany. It would be difficult to picture the infancy of a new system clouded by more trying and more discouraging conditions; it would be equally difficult to find a parallel to the promptitude and success with which the conditions were surmounted. The Imperial garrison was withdrawn.[1] The first Commandant-General of the Citizen Force, General Beyers, of proved ability alike in field and council, resigned his post, and shortly afterwards was in open arms against the Government. The nascent Defence Forces were faced with the double problem of civil war within the Union, foreign war upon its borders. But supremely able leadership was to hand: the Minister of Defence was General Smuts; the Prime Minister, General Botha, was the greatest of South African generals. Nowhere within or without the Empire were the issues challenged with such

[1] The South African garrison, with the exception of a few fortress units and other details left behind at Capetown, served in General Rawlinson's force which landed on the Belgian coast in October 1914. and subsequently distinguished themselves in the battles of Ypres 1914.

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swift directness or so skilfully decided, and South African fighting men, under South African leadership, passed on to win new distinction in lands and on fronts far removed from South Africa.

Defence forces in Australasia and Canada, 1911–14.

In Australasia and in Canada, in the interval between the Imperial Conference of 1911 and the beginning of the war, evolution of defence forces on land went forward with less change and incident than occurred in the sphere of naval defence. The defects and shortcomings were in a measure common to all the Dominions; they were the faults of infancy and youth, while citizen armies were in process of creation, faults which only time and care and liberal expenditure could remedy—deficiencies of stores and ordnance, and most especially want of sufficient training and of an adequate supply of trained instructors. But between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and Canada on the other there was a great gulf fixed, in that the democracies of the Southern Seas had adopted compulsory military training and Canada had not. Progress was perhaps most noticeable and most real at the top and at the bottom of the military system or systems.

The Imperial General Staff.

On the one hand, the development of an Imperial General Staff was steadily and continuously maintained and extended; branches of the Staff were formed in the Dominions; and, on the 1st of April, 1912, a Dominion section of the central Staff in London was constituted to which Canada and Australia sent officers. On the other hand, the training of boy cadets made conspicuous progress, and was distinctly the most encouraging feature of the time.

Success of the cadet system.

In Canada a great stimulus was given to the cadet movement and to the formation of cadet corps by the establishment of the Strathcona Trust, designed to promote the physical training of Canadian boyhood, and called into being by the munificence of open-handed Lord Strathcona. In Australia and New Zealand the training of cadets was an integral part of the compulsory system. Physical training, and in Australia to a very small extent military training, began with Junior Cadets, boys between the ages of 12 and 14; while the Senior

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Cadets, boys from 14 to 18 years of age, were placed under methodical military training in its elementary stages, this cadet training in Australia, as Sir Ian Hamilton pointed out, being not only a preparation, but to some extent a substitute, for adult recruit training. The reality and the seriousness of cadet training in Australia was well illustrated by the fact that it was found necessary to pass an amending Defence Act in December 1911, the principal object of which was to shorten the hours and lighten the obligations of military training imposed upon Senior Cadets.

The Australian Defence Forces.

In June 1911 the Military College of the Commonwealth was opened in its permanent home at Duntroon, in the Federal capital territory of Canberra. Before the war, admission to the College was by open competition, some thirty staff cadets between the ages of 16 and 19 being admitted annually; and a four years' course was prescribed, to be followed by further training in England or in India. From the College would come the commissioned officers of the Permanent Forces, and these officers in due course would instruct the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Citizen Army. The College served the purposes of New Zealand as well as of Australia, provision being made for the admission of ten New Zealand cadets in each year. In 1911 a war railway council for the Commonwealth was initiated; and in 1912 considerable changes took place, the Council of Defence being remodelled, and the organization of the Defence Forces being, as had been repeatedly urged at the London Conferences, more nearly assimilated to that of the British Army. After Lord Kitchener's visit and report, the duties of Inspector-General of the Commonwealth troops were entrusted to General Kirkpatrick, who subsequently, in 1914, was Director of Military Operations in India; and year by year, through a difficult time of transition, solid progress was undoubtedly made. The full fruits of the new system were not looked for, the military organization of Australia was not expected to be completely matured, before the year 1920.

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Sir Ian Hamilton's Report.

We have a review of the merits and defects of the military forces of Australia and of New Zealand on the eve of the war, in the form of reports by Sir Ian Hamilton, who, in the capacity of Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, visited these Dominions in the first six months of 1914.[1] He had had Dominion soldiers under his command in the South African War; since that time he had studied at first hand various foreign armies, notably the Japanese Army in time of war; and, with a special view to his Australasian visit of inspection, he had attended the Swiss manœuvres, and there gained the latest possible experience of a continental army trained and organized on the Militia principle. He was therefore exceptionally well qualified to see the citizen forces of Australia and New Zealand in true perspective. Australia was blest, or the reverse, not only with a Council of Defence for the purpose of considering questions of naval and military policy and expenditure, but also with a Military Board to control and administer the military forces of the Commonwealth, the Minister of Defence being chairman in either case. General Hamilton urged once more, as so many other soldiers had urged, in consonance with what were held to be the best and soundest views of the day on army reform, the necessity for eliminating in matters of organization, as far as possible, the distinction between peace and war conditions; for decentralizing, and relieving the military commanders from the purely business work incidental to an army, which he held should be entrusted to a separate department under a comptroller-general of military administration. He found in the Australian land forces the defects inherent in every Militia, want of practical experience in the field and of habits of discipline, the one and the other only to be acquired by continuous service. He found, as was inevitable in a young force, only a comparatively small number of officers capable of giving good

[1] The Australian report, dated April 24, 1914, was ordered to be printed as a Command Paper for the Commonwealth Parliament in May 1914, No. 14, F. 5588. The New Zealand Report, dated June 4, 1914, was similarly printed for the New Zealand Parliament, H. 19 A.

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military instruction. The standard of musketry was low, and other weak points were indicated. But the strong points were placed more in evidence; the Engineers, the Army Service Corps, and the Army Medical Corps were highly rated; and the verdict upon the fighting men was that 'the whole of the Regulars, and three-fourths of the actual serving militia, are sufficiently trained to take part in a modern battle', while the units of the army might be expected to improve in efficiency at the rate of not less than 10 per cent. per annum. On the 31st December, 1913, the trained land forces of the Commonwealth were represented by 2,468 members of the Permanent Forces, and 45,915 of the Active Citizen Forces.

The New Zealand Defence Forces and Hamilton's Report.

New Zealand differed from Australia in having her Militia forces controlled, subject to the authority of the Minister of Defence, by a single officer, not by a Board. The very capable General Officer Commanding the Dominion troops was General Godley, who subsequently commanded the New Zealand Division in Gallipoli and later the 2nd Anzac Corps in France, and under his charge the defence forces grew in numbers and in worth. An amending Defence Ordinance was passed in November 1912, the amendments being principally in points of detail; in that year the peace establishment of the Territorial Force—the Militia—was fixed at 30,000; while the Permanent Forces at the time numbered 600, including staff corps officers, permanent non-commissioned officers, and 300 Royal New Zealand Artillery. New Zealand was divided into four, as Australia into six, military districts; and in order to meet the growth of the citizen force, steps were taken to create at the head-quarters of each of the four districts a small permanent staff. When Sir Ian Hamilton visited the Dominion in May 1914, he found a live and growing citizen army, well and economically administered, in the linked stages of Senior Cadets, Territorial Force, and—prospectively—Territorial Force Reserve, with the supplement of a general training section and of rifle clubs. Of the cadet

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system he spoke in the highest terms; it was proving to the full as successful as in Australia, except in the scattered country districts, the conditions of which made proper training almost an impossibility. In New Zealand, as in Australia, he recommended that the Senior Cadets should be still more closely linked to the Territorial Force, by affiliating the various cadet companies to particular units and battalions of the Territorials. As in the case of Australia, he advocated relieving the General Officer Commanding the forces, and the district commanders, from financial and routine business, leaving them free to devote their whole time and attention to purely military duties. Discipline he found to be weak, but the organization to be 'in the main soundly conceived and sensibly acted upon'; the administrative services were efficient; and his final judgement was that the New Zealand army 'is well equipped, well armed; the human material is second to none in the world; and it suffers as a fighting machine only from want of field work and want of an ingrained habit of discipline'. In 1914 the actual strength of the Permanent Force was 578, the full establishment being 626. The actual strength of the Territorial Force was 25,902.

The Canadian Defence Forces and Sir Ian Hamilton's Report.

In Canada all citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 are legally liable to service in the Militia, but there was no machinery for enforcing the liability. Among the many thousands of immigrants who have streamed into Canada are the Doukhobors, who came over from Russia in 1898 and were at first settled in the province of Saskatchewan, but the majority of whom subsequently moved to British Columbia. They were 'conscientious objectors' of a pronounced type, and on arrival in Canada were exempted from liability to service in the Militia; but the report of a Royal Commission of inquiry appointed by the Government of British Columbia recommended in December 1912 that the exemption should be rescinded.[1] In the absence of compulsory military training, the problem of the defence forces in Canada was at once

[1] See Sessional Papers of British Columbia for 1913.

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more difficult and farther from solution than in Australia and New Zealand. The material conditions of Canada in the years 1911–14 added to the difficulty. The rapid development of the Dominion and the increase of population—though the returns of the 1911 census fell short of the numbers which had been anticipated—on the one hand made it necessary to constitute new military units, especially in the North-West, and on the other, brought in their train abundance of civil and industrial employment at high pay, with the inevitable consequence of depreciating military service, and making it difficult to maintain at full strength the small Permanent Force of some 3,000 men, upon which the Active Militia depended for instructors, without higher attraction in the form of salary than the Canadian Government was disposed to offer.

Sir Percy Lake issued his last report as Inspector-General of the Canadian Militia on the 26th of October, 1910, shortly before Sir John French's visit of inspection. In his concluding remarks, he summed up judgement to the effect that the Canadian Militia was not really efficient or ready to take the field; no force could be efficient with only twelve days' training in the year. He held that the best hope for future efficiency lay 'in the success of the cadet movement, an increased period of annual training, and, above all, in the adoption of suitable measures for increasing the supply of qualified officers and non-commissioned officers'. His successor was a Canadian, General Otter, of proved service in South Africa. In 1911, in accordance with Sir John French's recommendations, a new scheme was adopted, whereby the organization of the Militia in Eastern Canada was made the same in peace time as in war, six divisions being formed with four cavalry brigades, and each division being placed under a commander with a divisional staff. The divisional commanders were to control all the troops within their respective areas, and were to report direct to Militia head-quarters at Ottawa. With the change of Government in this year, Sir Frederick

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Borden was succeeded as Minister of Militia by Col. Sam Hughes, who in November called a conference at Ottawa of military men, educational authorities, and leaders of the cadet movement, in order to give a stimulus to military training and to recruiting for the Militia. Still, General Otter's report upon the Canadian military forces for the year 1911 told much the same story as Sir Percy Lake had told—shortage of officers, lack of qualifications in officers and non-commissioned officers, difficulty in keeping the permanent units up to strength; the root of the evils being the pecuniary attractions which presented themselves outside military service, and which were not countervailed by adequate outlay upon the defence forces of the Dominion. Similarly, in his report for 1912, written in view of his own retirement, which took effect from the 1st of December in that year, Otter registered his conclusion that the Militia was not taken seriously either by the public or by its own members. On the other hand, the cadet movement, in which Col. Hughes took special interest, went forward by leaps and bounds; and in 1912 organizers and inspectors of cadet corps were appointed in the districts, while, before the year ended, a Director of Cadet Services was added to the head-quarters' staff at Ottawa.

Sir John French had reported in 1910 that it would not be possible to put the Militia in the field in a fit condition to undertake active operations until after the lapse of a considerable period. Three years after he made his report, in the early summer of 1913, Sir Ian Hamilton, prior to his visit to Australia and New Zealand, made a tour of inspection in Canada, his report being dated the 30th of July 1913.[1] He found that in many directions great progress had been made in the interval, as much as could reasonably be expected. 'Organization is very markedly more thorough; training has been levelled up in some respects; and, under the supervision of the

[1] *Report on the Military Institutions of Canada*, by General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, Ottawa, 1913.

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general staff, the education of all ranks and especially of the higher ranks has been improved.' Hamilton had declared himself in England as a firm upholder of the voluntary principle, and was therefore likely to emphasize the strong points in the voluntary defence forces of Canada and to extenuate their shortcomings ; but, none the less, he clearly emphasized the fact that, for adequate home defence, Canada required not only an efficient system of voluntary training, but also the additional insurance which would be found in boy training and in a national organization based upon citizen service. Boy training might well become so general and so thorough as to be a partial substitute for universal manhood training ; but, were the promising cadet movement to stagnate and not fulfil its promise under the existing voluntary conditions, then he was prepared to advise that Canada should follow the example of the other Dominions and adopt compulsory training up to the age of 18. He put his finger upon the main weakness of the Canadian system, that, while the time-honoured universal liability to service in the Militia was duly embodied in the Militia Act of 1904, the section was simply a dead letter, doing more harm than if it were non-existent, inasmuch as on paper it provided for a reserve militia, whereas in reality there was no provision of the kind at all. He advised that, without at the time going farther in the direction of enforcing the liability, the old custom of preparing military muster rolls of the citizens should be revived, and that upon the muster rolls should be based the schemes of war organization for home defence. He found, in short, in the provision for universal service, always retained but never acted upon, in the liability of the very existence of which the great majority of Canadian citizens were wholly ignorant, the true basis for forming a national army of Canada ; and, without proposing any scheme of universal training, he advocated in effect preparing and keeping up to date a register of all able-bodied citizens, to be called up in case of real emergency to the various military centres, thereby

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securing at least the recognized potentiality of a reserve militia.

Turning to the Active Militia, he reiterated in different words what had been so often pointed out, the paucity of instructors and—largely in consequence—the indifferent quality of the instruction; he recommended an increase in the instructional staff, the appointment of brigade-majors to supervise the more elementary regimental training, importation of time-expired non-commissioned officers from the Regular Army in England, decentralizing of instruction and multiplication of local schools, payment for sixteen days' training in the rural corps instead of twelve, sixteen days being the recognized time in the case of the city corps. It was all a matter of expense, and he urged that economy in regard to military training was a most false economy. In the sphere of organization, he recommended raising the peace establishment of, and fixing a minimum strength for, existing units; and he commented strongly upon the total absence of reserve stores for war. Among other recommendations was one for forming a National Reserve (not to be confused with the nominal Reserve Militia), composed, as in England, of men who had served in the Permanent Forces or the Active Militia; for the interchange of regiments or battalions of the Permanent Forces with similar units of the Regular British Army; and for amendment of the law, in order to enable the Canadian Defence Forces to volunteer for overseas service, the Militia Act being concerned with home defence.

The figures which were given in the report showed how wofully short was the number of partially trained Canadian fighting men, compared with the recognized requirements of war organization. 'And yet it moved.' In 1913, out of an establishment of 74,606 armed forces in all, 57,527 of all ranks received some measure, though an inadequate measure, of military training. This was a large increase over former years. Moreover, the number of cadets exceeded 44,000; and there were over 48,000 members of rifle associations. The fighting material was beyond all doubt or praise, though it was emphatically

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raw material; and among its specialities were the mounted men of the Western prairies and a small corps of Guides. These were a body of scouts, who bore the same title as the far-famed fighting corps of the Indian frontier, but whose duties more closely corresponded to the literal meaning of the name. They were originally organized by Lord Dundonald in 1903, to act as Intelligence officers; and at the beginning the corps consisted of 118 officers without any rank and file, the members of the corps being largely civil engineers and surveyors. By 1911 they had developed into a mounted corps of five detachments, each detachment numbering about 40; and the future maximum strength was fixed at 500. In the Great War the Guides gave to the fighting service of Canada and to its Intelligence branch more officers in proportion to their numbers than any other body in the Canadian army.

Such were the military forces of the self-governing Dominions when the war came. It caught them in their infancy, not yet co-ordinated with the armies of the Mother Country, of India, or of each other. It caught them half organized, less than half trained; the training had to be completed on the sands of Egypt or in the mud of Salisbury Plain. It caught them while still quite immature; and yet history may hereafter tell that it came at precisely the right moment to ensure their future success. For, while these young nations were trying to set their houses in order, it taught, as nothing else could teach, that citizen forces are in the last resort the one and only sure guarantee of democracy and freedom; that the constant exhortations of those who knew war to prepare for war, the perpetual insistence upon the necessity of training, discipline, skilled instruction and the like, represented living facts. It cut short the baseless dreams and the fatuous platitudes of those who confused provision for security with militarism. It associated the beginnings of these national armies with some of the noblest fighting since the foundation of the world; and it hallowed them with a memory, which will never die, of fearless sacrifice and chivalrous devotion.

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SECTION V

1914

CHAPTER XI

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1914

The British Empire in 1914.

In August 1914 the British Empire covered rather more than one-fifth of the land area of the world, nearly 11½ millions of square miles, inhabited by some 425 millions of human beings.[1] All the continents, with their adjacent islands, contributed to the total. The largest number of British square miles was in America, mainly in the spacious Dominion of Canada. Next came Australasia, then Africa, then Asia. Europe came far in the rear, the United Kingdom and the small Mediterranean Colonies making an insignificant fraction of the enormous whole. In population Asia headed the list by a very long way, India contributing fully three-quarters of the total number of the King's subjects. Europe came next, then Africa, America, and, last in the list, Australasia; the continents which provided the greatest number of square miles finding the smallest number of human beings. Tried by the test of revenue, Europe, that is the United Kingdom, was easily first in the list; Asia, that is, in the main, India, was easily second; then came Australasia, America, and Africa, Africa having now fallen to the bottom of the list. Taking one more standard, the somewhat melancholy standard of public debt, Europe, that is the 'old country', with its long record of wars, naturally headed the list by a very long way; then came Australasia, gallantly borrowing to build up the future; Asia, Africa, and America followed in the order given, the New World, in the matter of indebtedness, coming last. The total debt of the Empire was given at £1,661,000 millions, a huge sum, but small as compared with the immense debt which the war has left behind.

The nucleus of this strange combination of wondrously

[1] The statistics are mainly taken from the *Statesmen's Year Book*, 1914.

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ERRATUM

Page 240, line 4 from bottom.

For The total debt of the Empire was given at £1,661,000 millions

Read The total debt of the Empire was given at £1,661 millions

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diverse communities, dispersed over the face of the whole earth, was the United Kingdom, with an area of rather over 121,000 square miles, and a population round about 45 millions. The white population elsewhere in the Empire amounted, very roughly, to about 17 millions, making a total white population in the Empire of some 62 millions. It was an island nucleus, a home country circled by the sea, 'in a great pool a swan's nest,' so the greatest of all Englishmen wrote of Britain, when the island had but lately become Great Britain.

The German Empire in 1914.

Differing at all points and in all phases, poles asunder from every side of view, was the mighty antagonist of the British Empire, the German Empire; continental in its essence, in its essence concentrated; a homeland large, closely knit, highly organized, with some outlying overseas dependencies, all latter-day acquisitions; the very antipodes of a pair of unevenly yoked islands, in strange sort and in diverse manners perpetually widening their sphere by a process of growth and loose expansion, not by the application of a tight hand and a mailed fist. Germany in Europe had an area of 209,000 square miles, the centremost square miles of the European Continent, peopled in 1914, according to the ordinary returns, by some 68 millions, though these figures were no doubt too low. Overseas, the German Empire included an area of rather more than 1,100,000 square miles, with a population of over 12 millions, the white members of which did not exceed 25,000. Nine-tenths of the area was in Africa; the other tenth was in the Pacific, with the exception of one small but most valuable foothold in Asia, the leased area at Kiao-chau. In the New World the Germans were many in number, but not one square foot of American soil owned allegiance to the Kaiser. In Africa Germany had four separate dependencies, and each of the four marched with British territory or Protectorate. Similarly in the Pacific Islands the two Powers were side by side.

The diversity of the British Empire.

On paper there was no comparison between these two Empires. The German Empire, in size and numbers, was far inferior to the other. But war is not made on paper,

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and the British Empire was not made for war. Its outstanding feature was and is endless diversity. The number of different tenures, by which the lands were held, and the peoples counted as being within the British circle, illustrates the variety of the component elements. There were lands which were British in virtue of settlement, ranging from Barbados or the Bermudas, empty islands in either case when the English first landed on their shores, and never even invaded by any other European Power, to Newfoundland, oldest of British Colonies, or the Continent of Australia. There were lands made British by freewill cession. Such were Malta in the Mediterranean, Basutoland in South Africa, in the Pacific the Fiji Islands, and the noble British Dominion of New Zealand. The site of Freetown at Sierra Leone had been given or sold for a nominal price to a band of English philanthropists; the site of Fort St. George at Madras had been bought or leased by a British trading company, the first bit of Indian soil owned by the English. The British tenure of Cyprus was a licence to occupy and administer the island, paying an annual tribute to its Turkish owners; Wei-hai-wei in North China was held on lease, so was the major part of the Kowloon peninsula over against the island of Hong-Kong. Conquest and forcible annexation accounted for the Rock of Gibraltar at one end of the inland waterway to the East, for the Rock of Aden at the other end. It accounted for much of India; for part of the Dominion of Canada, where, however, the North-West territories and British Columbia were not the fruits of war; for part of South Africa, where again Natal was British in virtue of settlement. Very much of the British Empire was in point of law not British soil at all, only British under the convenient form of Protectorate; and the kinds of Protectorate in turn were manifold, varying from simple assurance of protection against foreign foes, coupled with control of foreign relations, to complete administration in the name of the native ruler. Some Protectorates, more especially in Africa, had evolved out of a still more embryonic phase,

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known as 'spheres of influence'. The Sudan was under joint British and Egyptian authority; the New Hebrides group in the Pacific were under a condominium of Great Britain and France. Dominions and dependencies had in turn their own dependencies, ranging, for instance, from Papua, subject to the Government of the Australian Commonwealth, to the Maldive Islands, which from all times have followed the fortunes of Ceylon. In Borneo, under British protection, a British chartered company ruled at will a territory rather larger than Scotland. Adjoining it, and also under British protection, was a state whose ruler, a benevolent despot, was a private English citizen, Rajah Brooke.

Constitutions were as various as tenures; they ranged from parliaments of self-governing Dominions, from political machinery more democratic than that of the Mother Country, to no legislatures at all, with intermediate stages of all kinds. In the self-governing Dominions unity had grown up from below, the product of closer approximation between separate colonies or discordant races. In India unity was coming down from above, the outcome of a single controlling power, alien to the soil. The whole fabric of the Empire was so illogical, so wholly without parallel in history, so impossible to define, so hard to understand or to explain, that to the orderly German mind, as to the unfriendly German eye, it seemed to be a bundle of sticks with no containing bond, except in name. The wonder grew when the losses which the Empire had sustained were counted up. No system in the world ever sustained such a loss in magnitude and in kind as the severance of the United States, and yet survived. Like the gains, the losses had come from various sources. The supreme loss just mentioned was the result of defeat in war; the transfer of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864 was a purely freewill cession, giving the lie to Adam Smith's dictum that 'no nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province'; the cession of Heligoland was the outcome of a political bargain, countervailed by gains in Africa. 'Our Colonial

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Empire', said Lord Carnarvon, far back in 1870, 'has indeed been the child, sometimes of accident, and sometimes of mistake; but in spite of all it is an Empire of which we have reason to be proud'.[1]

The British Empire has been the result of growth.

'Specs I growd' was the account given of herself by Topsy in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The British Empire is the greatest illustration of growth that the world has seen. No Empire has ever had so much that was natural, so little that was artificial, in its composition. It grew, not in spite of itself, but in spite of its government, for its chronicles are replete with vain efforts made by one Ministry and another to refuse additions and to check expansion. It has been 'as if a man should cast seed into the ground, and should sleep and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how'. With many and grievous stains upon its record, above all the incomparable wickedness of the slave trade, the British Empire has at least resembled the Kingdom of God in this one feature of growth. Growth necessitates diversity, if it is growth on natural lines; the more a plant grows, the more it differs from the original seedling; there could not possibly be so many glaring anomalies in the Empire, if it had been artificially made. All this has implied peace, not war. It is true that much of the Empire has come in the train of war; but the proportion of its area which is the immediate and direct result of premeditated conquest is not very large. More has come through peaceful channels; and the work of private citizens or combines of private citizens has, directly or indirectly, been more responsible for expansion than any direct action of the State.

The slow development of the British Empire.

Through the centuries the expansion went on, with alternations of gain or loss, with ebb and flow of tide. The term 'Empire', the story of most empires, suggests well-defined action, clearly-cut results, a more or less speedy and continuous process of over-running and annexation, a campaign or a series of campaigns, in a year or a few years, followed, it may be, by a new series of

[1] Speech in the House of Lords, February 14, 1870.

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wars and new annexations linked on to the old. All this was wanting in the history of the British Empire. Cabot's venture was only five years later than the first great voyage of Columbus. Columbus pointed the way to Spain, and in little more than half a century the Spanish-American Empire was an accomplished fact. Cabot pointed the way to England, and a century and more passed before England had a single permanent foothold beyond the ocean. So it went on; all the elements of conquest were wanting; trading ventures and stations, small settlements on islands, peninsulas, and fringes of coast, were the initial stages of the British Empire. 'Line upon line, line upon line, here a little and there a little,' so the British race went to work, with no ground-plan for the future, casting their bread upon the waters and after very many days bringing the bread back to an overstocked island from spacious British possessions beyond the seas. The world was before them when they set out on the path of overseas expansion. It had been nominally parcelled out between Spain and Portugal, but the parcelling was ineffective, and much of the earth consisted of more or less empty spaces. It was otherwise when, in our own day, the newly consummated German Empire sought for fresh lands to conquer and annex. Late comers into the field of overseas competition, the Germans saw but one road to their future destiny, the road which had led them on in Europe; they looked for expansion by use or threat of the sword. Fashioned into an Empire of single purpose and manifold tentacles, the embodiment of uniformity, as the British Empire was the embodiment of diversity, having at great expense supplemented the strongest army in the world by a navy second only to one, Germany was a terrible antagonist for the amorphous British Empire, of which it would not be true to say that it had joints in its armour, because, except in one respect, the Empire, taken as a whole, cannot be said to have been armour-clad. The exception, a great one it is true, was the Royal Navy. But for the Royal Navy, the two Empires might have been described in terms of

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David and Goliath, inverting the parts; the British Empire a Goliath in size, but going into battle comparatively unarmed; the German Empire, a David, arrayed from head to foot in the most up-to-date armour, fully proved.

The Royal Navy.

In *The Influence of Sea-Power on History*,[1] written more than a quarter of a century ago, the great American naval historian, Captain Mahan, contrasted the political conditions of Great Britain down to 1815 with those of modern days, in their effect upon the naval policy of the nation. To the fact that in past times the Government of England was in the hands of a landed aristocracy, carrying on a long political tradition, he largely attributed 'the firm maintenance of her sea-power, the haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation in which its military element was kept'. Whatever were the defects of the old régime, and the sufferings of the community under it, he questioned whether latter-day democracy would keep the same firm hold on the sea. 'Popular governments are not generally favourable to military expenditure, however necessary, and there are signs that England tends to drop behind.' We have had abundant illustration of the reluctance of the rank and file of modern democracies to make adequate preparation for war in time of peace; but the reluctance has been due to more than one cause. There is democratic impatience of organization and constraint; there is the argument that to prepare for war encourages war; but there is also the further fact that the present age differs from former times, not only in being more democratic, but also in being to an infinitely greater degree than any previous age dominated by science. Those who foresaw the growing danger from Germany, and warned us of it, were men of professional knowledge and study. They knew the conditions, and appreciated the possibilities, of modern warfare. They were not heeded by the majority of their countrymen, for one reason, because the extent to which the conditions of modern warfare differ from those of the past was not realized and understood. An

[1] See Chap. I, 'Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.'

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age of science and machinery had come to pass in war and peace alike; an age not merely of nations in arms, as opposed to standing armies, but of nations professionally trained in the science of war. The large majority of well-meaning peace-loving British citizens still thought sleepily that training for war was unnecessary, except perhaps for a small nucleus; that there would be time to provide when the crisis actually came; that security could be improvised. Bloated armaments were a convenient phrase and a favourite theme, and professional sailors and soldiers, who pointed the way to safeguard freedom, were suspect as enemies to freedom.

But, after all is said, and in spite of the party system, governments in British communities are more than mere mouthpieces of the electorate; they recognize and shoulder their responsibilities, and do not always set at nought expert knowledge. In regard to sea-power, in particular, there has always been a determining residuum of British common sense, which has instinctively held by the Navy, and to which no government of any shade of opinion can afford to run counter. Backed by it, naval strategists laid their plans effectively to counter the German menace, and were, on the whole, well supplied for the purpose with ways and means. The naval estimates for the financial year 1914–15 showed an expenditure round about £52,000,000, more than double the contemporaneous naval expenditure of Germany. Between 15 and 16 millions were allotted for building new ships, again more than double the German vote for the same purpose. Thirteen battleships and a battle-cruiser were under construction on the 1st of April, 1914, in addition to a large number of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The strength of the British Royal Navy was being maintained at a level exceeding the strength of the German Navy in the proportion of 8 to 5; and the *Naval Annual* for 1914 could record that 'in completed battleships of all classes the British Navy is still equal to those of Germany and the United States—the next two strongest navies—combined'. The trained complements

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of ships are even more important than the ships themselves; and the statement of the First Lord, which accompanied the Naval Estimates, intimated that 'Provision had been made for the number of officers and men to be increased during the year by 5,000, to man the ships now under construction, and to enable the new organization of the Fleet to be completed step by step with the increasing establishments of foreign powers; also for the needs of the air service'. The total number of officers, seamen, boys, coastguard, and Royal Marines was returned at 146,000, of whom the Royal Marines numbered nearly 17,000. The men on active service in the first line were supplemented by ample reserves, including the Royal Fleet Reserve, the Royal Naval Reserve, and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. Considerable advance was reported in the air service, which had its central office at Sheerness.

All this strength was, as far as possible, disposed so as to be most effectively used when war came. We have seen the persistence with which the Admiralty held to the doctrine that the sea is one, that sea-power must be concentrated. The Royal Navy was not dispersed abroad in tune with the scattered nature of the Empire. On the contrary, while on the one hand the Empire became more and more widely flung, on the other hand, its first line of defence was in a constantly growing degree more closely gathered together. The Empire was grown for peace purposes and on peace lines; the Navy which took it in charge was framed for war and disposed on war lines. Policy and preparation alike, though not all the preparation that the best men advocated, were in evidence on the water; and when war came, because the British Navy was not caught napping, and because it was concentrated, it held the watery field, in spite of the development of submarine activity, from first to last, almost unchallenged. The truth of Blackstone's words was once more illustrated. 'The Royal Navy of England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament; it is its ancient and natural strength, the floating bulwark of our

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island.'[1] Well did Francis Bacon, when writing three hundred years ago 'Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates', lay stress upon 'the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain)'.

The British mercantile marine.

The vantage of strength at sea does not rest only upon the number, size, and quality of fighting ships at a given time; it has a far broader basis, the total shipping and the total seafaring population of a kingdom and estate, and not the total seafaring population only, for in modern days the Navy depends more than formerly upon landsmen for its recruits. In all our wars the British mercantile marine has been a factor of the first importance. Outside and beyond its primary function of feeding the island people, and bringing across the seas raw material for the island factories, it has been an indispensable adjunct to and supplement of the Royal Navy. There was a time in our history when there was no Royal Navy, when the ships of the British seaports, trading in peace time, fighting in war, kept the Narrow Seas; the Cinque Ports, in particular, had a retaining fee, in the form of special and most extensive privileges, for taking charge of the Channel. The levy of Ship Money, against which John Hampden took his stand, was an echo of an ancient call, the call of the king to his subjects to find ships for the service of the realm, or pay in lieu. From all time ships and men to sail them and to fight have been the principal dowry of the kingdom of Great Britain. The Royal Navy waxed and grew, the distinction between the fighting ship and the merchant vessel became more marked, but the merchant ships also waxed and grew, alike in number and in size; and ever as war came on, again they played their part. In 1914 the British mercantile marine constituted at least 40 per cent. of the merchant shipping of the world. The largest merchant ships afloat were German steamers. A German company, the Hamburg-Amerika line, owned a greater tonnage than any single British company; on sea, as on land, the German Govern-

[1] Blackstone's *Commentaries*, vol. i, Book I, chap. xiii, sec. 418.

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ment applied the forcing process, and was prolific of subsidies in one form or another, whereas the British Government paid only for work done, as in carrying of mails, with rare exceptions, such as a subsidy to the Cunard Company for use of their fast steamers in the event of war. Yet the total British tonnage was from three to four times in excess of that of Germany. This meant far more than preponderance in seaborne trade; it meant an immense numerical superiority of seafaring men, a nursery, a training school, a reserve for the Royal Navy, with accumulated traditions and experience, unparalleled in the world; it meant unrivalled facilities for transport, well illustrated in the South African War, shipbuilding on a scale unknown in other lands; multiplicity and diversity of seacraft and seacraftsmen, of tramps, trawlers, drifters, manned by a race of men who occupied their business in great waters, and handed on from father to son the secrets of the sea. When war came, they brought to the work of war and to the service of the Navy, in patrolling, in mine-sweeping, in countless other ways, a priceless combination of fearless courage and expert skill.

Submarines and Air Service.

The English have been, of necessity, a sea-going race; they have been also an inventive race, applying their science to practical purposes. Sea-going and invention seem to have gone hand in hand; the sailors are the handy-men among Englishmen, and Englishmen are the handy-men among nations. They may be slow starters—they are in war; but, as the work goes forward, they find out and apply the best machinery. So it has been, not only on land and sea, but under the sea and in the air. As the war went on, the handy-men made themselves more and more felt, and the sea-going race excelled in navigating the skies. The capacities of submarines, though not the infamous uses to which they might be applied, had been fully appreciated by the Admiralty before the war; and one distinguished admiral had seen in them the doom of battleships and the beginning of a wholly new naval era. In 1914, British submarines

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outnumbered German by between two and three to one. In aircraft and aviation the British Empire had not led among the nations before the war; it had followed, rather leisurely. Balloons, chiefly captive balloons, had played their part in war for a century and more; but the aeroplane was a wholly new product, first used for war purposes in 1911, in Mexico, and in the Italian campaign in Tripoli. The birthplace of the aeroplane as an assured practical invention, made practical by the use of petrol, a driving force of light weight, was the United States; and in Europe the French were the first to assimilate the new discovery and develop its possibilities. The first flight across the Channel, in July 1909, was from France to England, not from England to France, and was made by a Frenchman, Bleriot. Germany, meanwhile, concentrated her attention upon the dirigible balloon, and produced the monster airship, the Zeppelin. Though balloon schools, and in war time balloon sections, had been in existence for some thirty years under the British War Office, it was not till 1911 that an air battalion of the Royal Engineers was formed; and the Royal Flying Corps, with two Wings, Naval and Military, dates only from 1912. Then there came into being flying schools for both services, aircraft factories, and an Air Committee in connexion with Imperial defence. On the eve of the war, in January 1914, a division was made of aerial activities, the Navy taking over the dirigible airships, the descendants of balloons, the lighter than air service; while the aeroplanes, the heavier than air service, were made the special charge of the Army; but, side by side with the dirigibles, the Navy kept and developed a new industry, dating from 1913, seaplanes, like gulls, dividing their time between the surface of the water and the air. Flying was only in its infantile stage when the war began; but never surely in the history of the world did a new invention develop so fast or give so much promise for the future; and if our people cannot claim a first place in bringing the science to birth, when the British airmen got into their stride, few could equal them and none surpass.

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The British Army.

If the British Empire and Germany be compared, as they stood on the eve of war, and with reference to the coming war, it is right to place the British Navy in the scale as against the German Army; the Navy having been to Great Britain and to the Empire what the Army was to Germany, the bedrock of the national strength, the first and main line of defence, the service in which Great Britain led the world, as Germany led in land forces; and from this point of view it is inaccurate to postulate that Great Britain was unprepared for war; her Navy was, on the whole, as ready for immediate action as were the German legions. The German Navy was the complement of the German Army, as, in a sense, the British Army was the complement of the British Navy; and comparing the German Navy, as it was in 1914, with the British Army at the same date, there can be no question that the German Navy was stronger in proportion to the German Army than the British Army in proportion to the British Navy. The German fleet stood second among the navies of the world, yielding place in the matter of strength to the British Navy alone, and there was no question as to its efficiency. It was this combination of land- and sea-power, created at great financial strain, which made the German menace so potent and so serious, and testified to the set purpose of German aggressiveness. The fleet was large and growing, and it was effective, more effective in that machinery plays a far greater part in warfare, whether on sea or land, than was the case in former times; but it was a wholly new creation, it had not behind it any long and distinguished record, such as was the heritage of French seamen in the days of Napoleon; and, though efficient, it did not stand out as peculiarly pre-eminent in efficiency. In these respects there was no analogy between the German Navy and the British Army. It is true that the British Army was the complement of the British Navy, but true only in the matter of numerical strength. It was a small army, the army of an island power with large possessions beyond the seas; but it

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was an army with traditions second to none in the whole history of the world, with a catalogue of campaigns and victories which had decided the fate of continents, with far more varied experience than had fallen to the lot of the armies of other nations; and in its latest phase, in 1914, it was, for its numbers, the best trained and finest fighting force in the world.

At every point Great Britain stood out in contrast to Germany. The German fleet, like the German Army, was manned by compulsory national service. British sailors and soldiers alike were recruited by voluntary enlistment, the age of enlistment in the case of the Army being 18 to 25. The ordinary term of enlistment for the ordinary Regular was 12 years, of which 7 years were usually spent with the colours, and 5 in the Army Reserve. The Regular Army consisted in peace time of the troops with the colours and the Army Reserve, while behind these two forces came the Special Reserve, lineal descendants of the old Militia and enlisted for 6 years. Then, after Lord Haldane's reforms had taken effect, there were the Territorials, who had replaced the Volunteers and Yeomanry; and there was also the National Reserve, consisting of old soldiers, time-expired Regulars or ex-Volunteers. This last force came into being on private initiative, only receiving official recognition after its success had been assured. These different classes of fighting men were linked up together, to a far greater extent than in former days; troops of the Line, Reservists, Special Reservists, Territorials committed only to home defence, all had their place as integral factors of one whole; and the head and front of it all, in case of war and mobilization, was the Expeditionary Force, organized to be thrown across the sea to the danger-point at earliest notice. None might say that when the 4th of August, 1914, came, it found the Expeditionary Force unready. The strength of this force was, in round numbers, about 160,000; including it, the total strength of the Regulars and Army Reserve together was about 250,000, of the Special Reserve under 100,000. The Territorials, in

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actuality not on paper, seem to have numbered about 250,000 out of an establishment of 315,000; and the National Reserve some 200,000. All in all, the actual fighting strength of the United Kingdom, as opposed to the potential fighting strength, may be taken to have been well under a million, though it is almost impossible to give strictly accurate statistics of the military forces of the United Kingdom in the year 1914.

Overseas Forces.

To what has already been said of the oversea forces of the Empire in the self-governing Dominions and in India there is nothing to add. The established strength of the Army in India for the year 1914–15 was returned at 238,000, of whom 78,000 were Europeans and the rest natives. In the case of the Dominions, figures purporting to give the fighting strength, in the sense of armies ready to take the field, would be wholly misleading; the returns would include as trained soldiers numbers who were only partially trained. The value of the Dominions from a military point of view, an immense value, was that they were nurseries of fighting men of superb quality, to be used in the near future, but only after further months of hard and continuous training on a war basis. In Egypt and the Sudan there were organized forces, armies in being, as in India; for hold on Egypt and on the Suez Canal was vital to the security of the British Empire. But Egypt at the beginning of the war was not a British Protectorate. The British Protectorate, formally proclaimed to the world, was the outcome of Turkey, the nominal suzerain of Egypt, joining the enemy ranks. Prior to that date Egypt, though actually under British control, was not in name included within the circle of the British Empire; and the Egyptian Sudan was in the anomalous position of being under the joint protection and authority of Great Britain and Egypt. There was more than enough to occupy the armed forces of Egypt and the Sudan in maintaining the *status quo* on the spot, and providing, alike on their borders and in their midst, against German or Turkish intrigues and machinations among a Mohammedan population. Eastern lands, not excluding India, are fruitful of

Egypt and the Sudan.

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political unrest; Egypt had not, like India, a tradition of British leadership in war for many generations; and even in peace time Lord Kitchener's firm hand had been needed to deal with malcontents. Egypt was therefore a source of anxiety as well as of strength; it was not possible to leave all to the armies of the soil, far less to indent upon those armies for foreign service. On the contrary, when war came, it was found necessary to replace and strengthen the British army of occupation, and watch and ward in the Delta and on the banks of the Suez Canal was kept by British and Indian troops.

Local Forces in the Colonies and Protectorates.

It has been seen that India supplemented Great Britain in providing garrisons for the Colonies. As a rule, these Indian troops were battalions borne upon the strength of the Indian Army; but sometimes they were special service battalions, such as the Hong-Kong regiment in the years 1892–1903, raised in India for service in Hong-Kong, and such as the specially raised Hong-Kong and Singapore battery, which did good service in Egypt during the war. There were cases, too, already noted, in which Indian soldiers were recruited directly for employment under the Governments of the Crown Colonies or Protectorates. The Sikh contingents in the African Protectorates came largely under this category, and so did the fine regiment of Malay States Guides, of whom mention has already been made. These latter were the lineal descendants of the Perak Sikhs, who in turn had developed out of the Perak armed police, called into existence by the Perak rising of 1875–6. They were recruited both locally and in India, and officered by Regular officers of the British and Indian armies. Paid by and in the service of the Government of the Federated Malay States, they were, by treaty, available in time of emergency for the defence of Singapore. They had already shown their readiness for Imperial service beyond the seas by volunteering for such service in South Africa and China, though the offers were not accepted, and during the war, from 1915–19, they served with the Aden Field Force. In 1913, the regiment consisted of three double companies of

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infantry, two of Sikhs, and one of Punjabi Mohammedans and Pathans, in addition to a dépôt company of recruits, and of a mountain battery of artillery, nearly 900 in all, exclusive of British officers.

The latter-day policy of concentrating the Regular British forces as much as possible on land as well as on sea, of fortifying and garrisoning only a very few Imperial stations, and leaving the large majority of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates undefended, except so far as from their own populations and resources they could provide for their own defence, had an inevitable and useful result. Whereas the placing of Imperial garrisons in the Colonies in past times had led to the decline of the local militia, the withdrawal of Imperial troops made for self-help. A stimulus was given to local defence forces, militia, volunteers, rifle corps; the importance of ensuring adequate and efficient police was more fully recognized; all the Colonies had defence schemes prepared for them in case of war and invasion, and nearly every community, large or small, had, at any rate on paper, the nucleus of a defence force in one form or another, while some had laws containing provisions for limited compulsory service. Even where there were still Imperial garrisons, local forces were as a rule in evidence.[1] In Malta there were two battalions of the King's Own Malta regiment of militia, each about 1,100 strong; there was also a small Malta division of Royal Engineers. The Royal Malta Artillery was borne on the establishment of the Regular Army, and formed part of the garrison, though recruited solely in Malta.[2] In Bermuda there

[1] Mauritius was an exception. It had no local defence force other than the police.

[2] These forces trace their descent from those improvised during the Napoleonic wars. In 1798, after the destruction of the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, the Maltese rose spontaneously against the French. Under British leadership, and with the assistance of small British and Neapolitan forces, they succeeded in overcoming the whole French garrison, who surrendered in 1800. The Maltese Light Infantry were raised in 1800 during these operations, and various other forces were raised later in the island. After the war they were all reorganized as the Royal Malta Fencibles, an infantry regiment which in 1861 was changed into an artillery corps, the present Royal Malta Artillery. The King's Own Malta Regiment

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were two companies of militia artillery, rather under 200 coloured men, and four companies of the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps, about 230 white Bermudians. Ceylon, Singapore, Hong-Kong, all had Regular garrisons; but side by side with the garrisons were local defence forces. Ceylon, which had sent a white contingent to the South African War, had 2,000 volunteers, including Mounted Rifles, Garrison Artillery, Planters' Rifle Corps, and 14 companies of Ceylon Light Infantry over 1,100 strong; the island had also an appreciable number of volunteer boy cadets. In the Malay Peninsula the Regular garrison at Singapore and the Malay States Guides were supplemented by volunteer units. The Singapore Volunteer Corps had in one form or another a very long history behind it.[1] At the end of 1913 its strength was 39 officers and 607 men. It consisted of infantry (Chinese and Malays), an artillery unit of men trained in coast defence gunnery, an engineer unit, a maxim-gun company with four maxim guns, and a field ambulance unit. Penang had a small volunteer corps of infantry, including European, Malay, and Chinese companies, about 280 of all ranks. The Malay States Volunteer Rifles, solely European, numbered more than 600 in five companies of infantry with two machine-guns. In addition to some volunteers, the State of Johore, over against Singapore, had a military force of 500 infantry and 100 artillery. Hong-Kong had a volunteer corps and a volunteer reserve, numbering between them over 500. With the dismantling of the fortifications of Castries in St. Lucia, and the withdrawal of the regular garrisons from that island and Barbados, Imperial forces were from 1905–6 onwards nowhere to be found in the West Indies, except in Jamaica, where was stationed a battalion of the West India Regiment, and small detachments of Royal Garrison Artillery and Engineers; but nearly all of these Colonies organized local defence forces of one kind or another. In the larger

of Militia were not raised as such till 1889, but bear the date MDCCC on their colours to show their connexion with the original Maltese Light Infantry.

[1] See Appendix to this Chapter.

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Colonies strong bodies of semi-military police were supplemented, in Jamaica by a company of militia artillery and a small rifle corps, in Trinidad by 100 volunteer Light Horse and 160 volunteer Light Infantry, in British Guiana by a militia infantry battalion and an artillery company. In Barbados and the Windward Islands there were small volunteer forces in addition to the police. In some of the Leeward Islands there was the embryo of an armed force, an Antigua Act providing for companies of infantry and mounted infantry up to 200 in all. In British Honduras the volunteers included two companies of infantry and a detachment of mounted infantry. In the far distant south the Falkland Islands had, nominally, a small volunteer force. In nearly every Colony there was some little unit of armed force and there were some rudiments of military training, which led to much more when war had begun and contingents were gathered together for fighting overseas.

African soldiers.

There is not space to give in detail the local defence forces of the many British Colonies and Protectorates; but a word must be said of tropical Africa, where two well-organized bodies of soldiers had been in existence for some years before the war, either of them serving not a single Colony but a group of Colonies or Protectorates, one on the western, the other on the eastern side of Africa. These were the West African Frontier Force and the King's African Rifles. A special interest attaches to them from the point of view of Africa as a military reservoir. Africa, the latest exploited of the continents, is, among the continents, most completely a dependency of Europe. The New World of America has passed out of the stage of dependence on Europe into that of equality and partnership; so also has Australasia. The rise of Japan to the level in peace and war of the leading Powers of the world, the evolution of India within the British Empire, the development of the Arab power of the Hedjaz, indicate a time of transition, when Asia is ceasing to be the handmaid of Europe. Africa alone, with the exception of South Africa, seems marked for dependence on Europe

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for generations to come. How dangerous in the hands of votaries of militarism might Africa be, has been emphasized by a great South African, General Smuts; how effective in such hands African janissaries can be made was abundantly proved in the German defence of German East Africa. It has been seen that in India, in bygone days, the French took the lead in training Indian soldiers on European lines. In Africa again, after the conquest of Algeria, they pointed the way; and once more Great Britain followed the lead given by France as illustrated by the two native forces which have been named above.

The West African Frontier Force.

The beginning of the West African Frontier Force was in 1897–8, when, by the direction and under the authority and supervision of Sir Frederick Lugard, at the time Commissioner for the Hinterland of Lagos and Nigeria, Lt.-Col. Pilcher, soon to win distinction in the South African War, raised and took command of a battalion of native troops for service in Nigeria. The battalion was about 900 strong, with an establishment on paper of 1,200; officers and non-commissioned officers were sent out from England; the rank and file consisted of Hausas, Yorubas, and Nupes. The head-quarters were fixed at Lokoja, at the junction of the Niger and the Benue. The first battalion was speedily followed by a second, raised in 1898 and commanded by Lt.-Col. Fitzgerald. The men were recruited mainly at Ibadan in the Lagos Protectorate, and were moved on to head-quarters at Jebba. They consisted of 800 to 1,000 Hausas and Yorubas, with British officers and non-commissioned officers, as in the case of the first battalion. In addition to these two battalions of native infantry, there were three batteries of artillery under Major Robinson, engineers, and a telegraph section. Nigeria was, in short, equipped with a miniature army. The success attained in organizing and training the troops was, by Sir Frederick Lugard's testimony, largely due to Sir James Willcocks, who brought the Indian Army Corps to France in 1914. Lt.-Col. Willcocks, as he then was, commanded the force in 1899–1900, and, with African troops alone, for the

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South African War was then at its height, in 1900 carried out an Ashanti campaign ably and well, raising the siege of Kumasi. Under men of this capacity, who knew with intimate personal knowledge West African conditions and West African natives, the experiment in training African soldiery promised well, and well it fulfilled its promise.[1] As in the Sudan, under Lord Kitchener's firm hand, so in West Africa, native African troops, trained and led by competent Englishmen, did notable service for the Empire. The force in its initial stage served the purposes of inland Nigeria, where there was much fighting of one kind and another to be done before British control over the Mohammedan emirates and Pagan tribes could be established on a secure and permanent basis; but in 1899 the decision was taken to include within its scope all the British dependencies in West Africa, and to incorporate in it the armed constabularies of the different West African Colonies and Protectorates. Thus, prior to January 1, 1914, when, with the amalgamation of the two Nigerias, the armed forces were also amalgamated, there was a Northern Nigeria regiment, which represented the greater portion of the former Royal Niger Constabulary, and there was a Southern Nigeria regiment, with head-quarters at Calabar, composed, like the Northern Nigeria regiment, of two battalions, the first of which included what had been the armed forces of the Niger Coast Protectorate, together with the balance of the Royal Niger Constabulary, while the second battalion embodied the Constabulary of the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. From the beginning of 1914 there was one Nigerian command, consisting of five infantry battalions (one mounted) and two batteries of artillery. Another unit was the Gold Coast regiment, representing the former Gold Coast Constabulary, whose head-quarters were at Kumasi. A third was a Sierra Leone battalion for the Sierra Leone Protectorate, which took the place of the Sierra Leone frontier police; the Colony itself being amply safe-

[1] See *Colonial Reports Annual*, No. 260: *Nigeria West African Frontier Force Reports for 1897–8*, June 1899, Cd. 9046, 28.

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guarded by the Regular garrison at Freetown, including the West African [1] and a battalion of the West India Regiment; and finally there was a Gambia company, raised in 1901. Thus West Africa was supplied with an army of its own, controlled from home, from the Colonial Office, with the expert advice and guidance of the War Office, and inspected and officered by men selected from the Regular Army.

The King's African Rifles.

Analogous in many respects to the West African Frontier Force were the King's African Rifles, whose sphere of influence was Central and East Africa and Somaliland. This force was created in 1901. It was the result of amalgamating the various armed forces raised in or for the African Protectorates, which were at that date administered by the Foreign Office. Two years later, in 1903, it comprised six battalions, with a total strength of 104 officers and 4,579 native officers and men.[2] Nyasaland was the home and recruiting ground of the first and second battalions. Prior to 1901, or rather to the 1st of January 1902, when the new régime actually took effect, they were known as the Central Africa Regiment; they then became the first and second battalions of the King's African Rifles. The first battalion was constituted a Regular native regiment in 1898; it consisted of six companies, for a short time raised to nine, three being assigned to North-Eastern Rhodesia. It served in the Ashanti campaign of 1900. The second was raised in 1899; it was intended to be a foreign service battalion, and more especially designed for garrison duty in Mauritius; for the trouble in South Africa, which culminated in the South African War, tended to absorb the white

[1] The West African Regiment, like the West India Regiment, is part of the Regular Army, administered by the War Office and not, as is the case with the West African Frontier Force, by the Colonial Office. But it differs from the West India Regiment in that its officers are seconded from their units for service with it, in the same way as officers in the West African Frontier Force, whereas the officers of the West India Regiment belong to that regiment permanently.

[2] See *Africa*, No. 9: 1903, Cd. 1635, July 1903. Memorandum showing position of the four African Protectorates administered by the Foreign Office in June 1903.

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troops who had been employed in garrisoning the Colonies. Subsequently to that war it was disbanded. The rank and file of these two battalions consisted of natives of Central Africa with an Indian contingent attached. The native races represented were mainly Atonga, Angoni (of Zulu origin), and Yaos. In the past the Yaos had been pre-eminent as slave raiders; their fighting and raiding propensities were now turned to useful and legitimate purposes; and with training and discipline they made excellent soldiers. The origin of the third battalion dates from 1895. When, in July of that year, the administration of East Africa was taken over by the British Government from the Imperial British East Africa Company, a corps was formed under the name of the East African Rifles, to which, as in the case of the Nyasaland battalion, an Indian contingent was attached. This body of fighting men did good service at the time of the mutiny in Uganda in 1897–8; it was subsequently organized in eight companies, five composed of Sudanese, three of Swahilis; and in 1902 it became the third battalion of the King's African Rifles. Uganda was the birthplace of the fourth and fifth battalions. In 1891 some 800 men of the Sudanese force, which had been under the command and followed the fortunes of Emin Pasha, agreed to take service under the British East Africa Company, and became the Uganda Rifles. They mutinied in 1897–8; and subsequently two battalions of the Rifles were formed, composed, as in the East Africa Protectorate, of Sudanese and Swahilis, an Indian contingent being also enlisted. In 1902–3 the native troops of the Uganda Rifles were constituted the fourth battalion of the King's African Rifles; and a fifth battalion was created, composed wholly of Indian soldiers. In 1904, however, the fifth battalion was abolished, the Indian troops being reduced to two companies and attached to the fourth battalion. The sixth battalion was raised in Somaliland from Somali levies in 1904. In the following year it was converted into a battalion of Indian soldiers, but in 1908 Somalis were again incorporated, the numbers of the Indian contingent being

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reduced. Before 1914, however, this battalion had ceased to exist as such, its place being taken by a small 'Somaliland Indian contingent'. Thus, in August 1914, there were only three battalions of the King's African Rifles still in existence, the 1st (Central Africa) battalion in Nyasaland, the 3rd (East Africa) battalion at Nairobi, and the 4th (Uganda) battalion in Uganda.

The King's African Rifles were administered on similar lines to those of the West African Frontier Force; in either case much the same problems presented themselves, on a smaller scale, as have been faced and surmounted in India: from what native races the soldiers should be recruited, in what proportions, with what combinations; and in Africa, as in India, all has depended upon British leadership. But the Rifles differed from the West African Frontier Force, in that Indian contingents were a notable feature and an integral factor of the Rifles, whereas the West African corps was, as regards the rank and file, wholly of West African composition. It was quite natural that Indians should be more in evidence on the eastern than on the western side of Africa, inasmuch as East Africa lies over against India, and has always been more or less connected with India. The King's African Rifles, too, before the war were somewhat less localized and employed farther afield than the sister force on the West Coast. As has been stated, the second Nyasaland battalion was raised definitively as a foreign service battalion; and some of these Central African troops saw active service on the western side of Africa, in Ashanti, and on the Gambia.

Such were the two home-grown Regular military forces of West and East Africa. Side by side with them the different Colonies and Protectorates had their ordinary police forces, and in some cases more also. In East Africa and Uganda, for instance, the King's African Rifles were supplemented by armed police and rifle clubs or Volunteer Reserves. In one way and another those who were responsible for the safe keeping of British tropical Africa had taken very practical steps in the direction of self-defence.

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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI

As an illustration of the Volunteer movement in a leading Crown Colony, the following account of the Singapore Volunteers prior to the War is interesting.[1]

Singapore had a Volunteer Force some years before the Volunteer movement of 1859 in the United Kingdom. The proposal was first discussed in 1846 after a series of Chinese riots. In 1854, partly on account of a recrudescence of Chinese riots, and partly because of the Crimean War, it was decided at a public meeting to form a Volunteer Corps under the name of the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps. The Governor, Major-General W. J. Butterworth, C.B., became its first Colonel. Its membership was 61. At the first review of the Corps on the 8th March, 1855, the Governor read a dispatch from the Supreme Government of India (for the Straits Settlements were then a Province of India) noting with approbation the promptitude with which the Singapore Volunteers had come forward with the offer of their services, and expressing the hope that their example would be followed in other parts of India. The Corps was afterwards notified that, as it had had the honour to be the first to be enrolled in India, it was entitled to bear on its colours 'Primus in Indis'. This continued to be the motto until the establishment in 1867 of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony, when it was changed to its present form of 'In Oriente Primus'. In the early part of 1868, the Corps was augmented by the formation of a half-battery of Field Artillery. The officers and N.C.O.s found their own horses, and the members provided a pair of ponies for each gun and ammunition wagon.

The Corps had shrunk to a half-company in 1887, the Jubilee year, when Mr. W. G. St. Clair, then editor of the *Singapore Free Press*, urged the importance of raising a Volunteer Artillery Corps in support of the Royal Garrison Artillery. The scheme was approved, and the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps was disbanded, and the Singapore Volunteer Artillery embodied by proclamation on the 22nd February, 1888. The Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, was Honorary Colonel, and remained so until his death in 1916. The number of the members

[1] This account is taken from an article written by Colonel Derrick, which will be found in vol. i, pp. 384–91 of *One Hundred Years of Singapore*. John Murray, 1921.

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was 96. At the Centenary of Singapore (6th February, 1919) there still remained in Singapore seven original members, one of whom, Lt.-Colonel G. A. Derrick, C.B.E., V.D., was Commandant.

At the Queen's Birthday Parade of 1891, four Maxim guns were formally presented to the Corps. Two had been subscribed for by the Asiatic community, and the other two were given by His Highness the late Sultan of Johore, and the late Mr. Cheang Hong Lim respectively. The Singapore Volunteer Artillery thereby became the first Maxim-gun Company in the British Forces, Regular or Auxiliary. Since 1902, the Maxim-gun Company has worked as a separate unit.

The Singapore Volunteer Artillery continued to be the sole volunteer unit in Singapore until after the outbreak of the South African War in 1899. As the British battalion was then replaced by an Indian battalion, the British community formed a Volunteer Rifle Corps. It started with 100 members, but soon increased to nearly double that number. When a British regiment returned to Singapore in 1904, its services were discontinued.

In 1901 the Volunteers increased considerably in size and importance, and assumed their present title of the Singapore Volunteer Corps. An Engineer unit of Europeans was formed, and was later permitted to be known as the Singapore Royal Engineers (Volunteer). A Singapore Volunteer Infantry unit was also raised. In it, No. 1 Company was composed of Eurasians and No. 2 Company of Chinese. A Cadet Corps was also raised, but at a later date school cadet companies unconnected with the corps were formed in substitution.

The Eurasian Company of the Singapore Volunteer Infantry was disbanded in 1909, and the present Malay Company took its place. Later, however, a Eurasian company was again enrolled with good results.

Early in 1914, the Medical Company of the Singapore Volunteer Corps, which had been a development of a Bearer Section of the Singapore Volunteer Artillery, was reconstituted, and formed into the Singapore Field Ambulance Company, a very useful and important unit of the Corps.

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CHAPTER XII

GERMANY AND 'THE DAY'

Germany in Africa.

WE have seen that, outside Europe, Germany, as a landholder, was most in evidence in tropical Africa. Africa is the central continent, and in Africa, as in Europe, the Germans had been active in consolidating a central position. Early in 1914, a few months before the war began, the railway from Dar es Salaam, the capital of German East Africa, to the centremost African lake, Lake Tanganyika, had been completed, to link up German East Africa with the Belgian Congo. On the other side of Africa the latest deal with France in 1911 had extended the German Cameroons down to the Lower Congo, just as the Anglo-German treaty of 1890 had given to German South-West Africa access to the Zambesi. Twice already, in 1905–6 and 1911, the years of the Algeciras Conference and the Agadir incident, Franco-German relations in regard to Africa had nearly precipitated war. Africa must assuredly be credited with having been one of the contributing factors to the war which eventually came.

Germany and world-supremacy.

From the time when new worlds beyond the ocean were laid bare, to be fields for European expansion, to stimulate the greed and the enterprise of European princes and peoples, at intervals of centuries the lust of world-domination seems to have overmastered one nation or another, or the rulers of one nation or another, and to have impelled them to try to overmaster others. So it was, in effect, with Spain under Philip II; so it was with France under Louis XIV, and again a hundred years later under Napoleon; so it was with Germany. But history never really repeats itself, and every century necessarily has its own determining causes and its special features. The religious fanaticism of Philip II was present, but not omnipresent, in the régime of Louis XIV; in the designs of Napoleon or of the Kaiser religion had

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no place. In all these instances military despotism was the driving force; but the despotisms varied in origin, in kind, and in extent. The despotism of Philip of Spain or of Louis of France was rooted in monarchical tradition, backed by a despotic Church; the despotism of Napoleon was that of a military genius, the consummately successful leader in war of a newly enfranchised people; German despotism was the outcome of achievement under the leadership of a dynasty which combined the traditions of autocracy with success in war, it embodied the aspirations of a lately unified and victorious nation. What were these aspirations, and why? Whence did they arise and whither did they tend? What factors or features, if any, were there in Germany and the Germans in 1914, which did not simply reproduce, in a guise coloured by place and time, the factors or the features of past ages in history? Three wars, following close on one another, had made Germany one, and made it a Prussian Germany, a Germany moulded by the particular offshoot of the German stock of which it had been said long years before that its only industry was war. The new Germany was an empire in the old popular sense, only more so. It was an empire in the least attractive dress. No empire in the past ever rested more completely or more surely upon military strength, none was ever so well or so intelligently organized upon a uniform system. The basis of it all was might as right; the living expression and embodiment of might was the German Army, which had proved irresistible on the continent of Europe, made irresistible by concentrated effort and tireless organization, and gaining additional strength year by year. Owing their existence to war; identifying war, from recent German history, with short, swift, victorious campaigns; placed by nature for offensive war in the centremost position in Europe; by upbringing and tradition habituated to war; taught, trained, and allotted for war—this new German nation naturally ranged itself behind, or rather made itself one with, the military power, the German Army. There grew up

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a very numerous and powerful nation in arms, educated beyond all other nations, but educated with a very definite purpose on rigidly prescribed cast-iron lines, living and thriving under a military despotism, willingly and joyfully, because the military despotism had brought in abundance present wealth and power, and also because it embodied all their hopes for the future and the only means of realizing those hopes. For, as the years went on, the Germans gradually became instinct, from all highest to all lowest, with patriotic and burning belief in the national destiny and in the power of the nation to compass it. They imbibed and they preached the gospel of *Weltpolitik* and *Kultur*; they believed in a mission to dominate and Germanize the world; and they acted consistently on their belief.

In order to apprehend the 'inwardness'—to use a cant phrase—of Germany and the Germans, the stage of German evolution which had been reached in the summer of 1914, we have, on the one hand, to bear in mind the more sentimental side, to look upon German schemes as having been in their origin the dreams of ambitious patriots, to appreciate that little by little the visions of the few became the fixed goal of the many, through ocular demonstration year after year of immensely growing resources and capacity, of the impossible coming within range of possibility, of castles in the air being brought down from cloudland to a more or less firm basis upon a half-conscious and yielding world. On the other hand we have to study for our own admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come, the intensely practical steps taken to ensure that the dreams should become realities. If the call to Germany was to lead and mould the world, then, when force could be applied with advantage and effect, force should be applied. The Belgian Congo ought to be in German hands, the French colonial possessions ought to be shared with Germany, and later the British also. Meanwhile, minute attention could be given to every detail, each small opening could be pushed wider, every German could become a 'forerunner and

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emissary of Empire, all private interests serving the public interest and in doing so serving themselves. Germans taught the world a lesson, which will never be forgotten, that in peace time there can be not only preparation for war but also the actual concomitants of war; and that conquest can begin by acquiring control of economic resources as much as by annexing soil. Peaceful penetration is one phase of hostile invasion, and those who in open ports and lands are not forgetful to entertain strangers, may find that unawares they are harbouring in their midst aliens who are lower than the angels. Germans took what countries could be taken without open war; Germans politically dominated such lands and peoples as in any way lent themselves to political domination; and, where domination was not, as we say, practical politics, the same end was pursued by trade insistence, commercial combines, social insinuation, intrigue in one form or another, different means being employed under different conditions, but always to the same end. German monopoly of this or that product or industry in Australia was one thing, German underground influence in Russian politics was another, yet they were in effect only different phases of one and the same thing, German supremacy in the wide world.

The German effort, then, while starting from sources familiar in history, from success in war and from the attainment of national unity as the fruit of that success, differed from all previous ventures of military despotism, not only in degree but in kind. The distinctive feature of the German world enterprise was set design, consciously and continuously elaborated by rulers and nation alike through a long term of years. Spain and France had their overseas Empires, their traditions and experiences of Imperial aggrandizement and growth, supplementing and feeding continental ambitions near home. Their paths had been on sea as well as on land. Germany had no tradition behind her of expansion in East or West; she had served no apprenticeship; her colonial possessions, like her fleet, were creations of

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yesterday. Her 'place in the sun' could, in her calculations and by the necessities of the case, be attained, not on the lines of the long-drawn-out competition and rivalry of other European nations in other days, but only by a single stroke, a crowning triumph of organization, of strength carefully husbanded and as carefully applied, of measured penetration, of accumulated wealth converted into force. Sentiment there was, beyond all question, but sentiment subordinated to cold and material reasoning. No stone was unturned, nothing was left to chance; there was abundance of enthusiasm, but to be carried away by enthusiasm was wholly alien to the German. There was a blind belief in a national destiny, so blind as to take no count of the ultimately irresistible forces of human nature; but blindness was coupled with the keenest eyesight for the best practical machinery to serve the end in view. Some halo of romance, from one standpoint or another, attaches to the enterprises, the failures, even to the misdeeds of despot kings and peoples in former ages. The German venture had no such colouring. It stood alone in completeness, in courage of conception, breadth of scope, concentrated vigour of execution. It stood alone in brutal realism, absence of chivalry, identification of patriotism with vulgar greed of gain. No attempt at world supremacy was ever so deliberate, so little the immediate result of natural causes, so much the direct outcome of human agency, setting traps to catch men.

But it would be unfair and untrue to rate it as wholly divorced from natural causes. Behind it was German or rather Prussian nature. There was, on the one hand, a natural and rational sense of growing danger from growing isolation. The central position of Germany was her weakness, as well as her strength. In Bismarck's words, she was open to attack on three sides. Bismarck had dreaded an alliance between France and Russia: that alliance had come to pass. Great Britain, in Bismarck's time, and largely through Bismarck's handiwork, at variance with France, was now the friend of France and

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Russia, the potential enemy of Germany. Prussian history and Prussian tradition taught that danger must be met by going forward to meet it, by striking first. On the other hand, there was a conviction, exaggerated into an obsession, but rooted in the instinct of a most successful, most educated, most wealthy nation, with the finest army in the world, that Germany had not yet had fair play, that Germany had a rightful claim to lead the world, that she ought to have her turn, as other peoples and races, in German eyes inferior to themselves, had had their turns; and to this conviction was added, in the minds of this most business-like race, the consideration that prolonged ripeness degenerates into rottenness, that the tide must be taken at the flood, that 'the day', the 'now or never' time, had come.

The conclusion of the whole matter is this. A military despotism was no new thing in the chronicles of mankind. Nor was it a new thing for a nation, in the pride of lately won nationhood, to give whole-hearted adherence to the military power which had forced for them the entrance into a wider and richer future. But what was new and terrible as a menace to the world was the consecration to the cause of military despotism of all the forces which normally accompany peace, democracy, and freedom, not for the moment only, but as a law of life for all time; a law of life recognized, exalted, and loudly preached, not by military men alone, but by professors and historians, in the lecture room and the school, and not disowned in the church. What was the inevitable result? None can doubt that the Germans had high merits, unflinching courage, untiring industry, love of learning, patience in research, capacity for adapting and assimilating, patriotism and public spirit never surpassed. But courage went hand in hand with faithlessness and cruelty; industry, learning, science, one and all ministered to destruction; public spirit killed out private scruple; and service to the State, in its intensity, obliterated distinction between right and wrong. The verdict on the Germans taken in the mass, and as moulded on the dominating Prussian

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type, must be that their virtues became handmaids of crime. Throughout this land of music there was one grand harmony, which drowned all softer notes, *Deutschland über Alles*. Byron's famous lines, written of Napoleon, applied with still greater force to the Germans in 1914:

> By gazing on (themselves) grown blind
> (They) taught the rest to see.

German public opinion in 1913.

Such was the German people, as a whole, on the eve of the war; but there are cross currents and conflicting elements and interests in all nations at almost all times. A French summary of public opinion in Germany in the middle of 1913, compiled from the reports of diplomatic and consular agents, spoke of a general conviction amongst the Germans that France wanted war, but of divided German views as to the possibility and proximity of war. There were forces in Germany making for peace, among them 'the bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct', but these forces, without organization or popular leaders, were 'passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling'; and the supporters of peace believed in war in the mass, as seeing no other solution of the existing situation. The military party represented rather a state of mind than a party in the ordinary sense. It had in abundance leading and organization, 'clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed'. The Press, the Universities, historians and economists, the rising German generation in their various patriotic or chauvinist groups, headed to war, and war meant a duel between France and Germany.[1]

This was in 1913, the centenary year of the regeneration of Germany.[2] In 1813, the year which followed the retreat from Moscow, Prussia cast off her bondage to France, and a new spirit of freedom and nationhood came to birth in torn and distracted Germany. Russian armies, pressing westward on the heels of Napoleon, were then hailed as liberators, not as foes. Since that date, three

[1] See *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (1915), pp. 136–42. [2] Ibid., pp. 122–5.

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times Prussian troops had entered Paris; but Leipzig, Waterloo, and Sedan had not sated Prussian vengeance or obliterated the memory of Jena and Napoleonic tyranny. France seemed in 1913 to have regained her strength: her diplomacy in regard to Morocco seemed to have outdistanced that of Germany: to the new Army laws of Germany, which added to the active military strength of the German Empire, France had promptly replied by reviving the three years' service system, thereby multiplying the immediate number of her own effectives. In the midst of present irritation the centenary added fuel to pan-German animosity against the French; there was a growing desire for a new and final reckoning. It was not as though peace reigned in Europe generally. The years 1912–13 were the years of the Balkan Wars, of the triple combination of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece against Turkey, followed by the treachery, defeat, and humiliation of Bulgaria. The Near East was in a growing degree within the contemplated sphere of German influence. To Austria-Hungary, ally or vassal of Germany, Balkan conditions were of immediate concern, and so they were to Russia, the ally of France. In any case war was in the air; one of the danger zones in Europe was in upheaval; 'the state of war,' wrote the French Minister in Bavaria in July 1913, 'to which all the events in the East have accustomed peoples' minds for the last two years, appears no longer like some distant catastrophe.' [1]

The Balkan Wars.

In the midst of this atmosphere of unrest the great central European Power stood at the zenith of her military strength, expectant, strained, irritable, and suspicious, armed to the teeth, ready to move at a moment's notice. The German spy system had been carried to great perfection, and every German in foreign lands was an unofficial spy. Thus the rulers of Germany had the most detailed information of the inmost conditions of other nations, their political complications, and their economic conditions; though the information had one

[1] Ibid., pp. 135–6.

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great drawback—everything was seen through German eyes and interpreted on German lines of reasoning. They saw that France was not yet ready, that her new law had not yet fructified, and that under a democratic régime all was not well with the French Army. The slow rate of movement in the unwieldy fabric of Russia was carefully estimated. The political divisions in Great Britain and British pacific tendencies, especially under a Liberal Government, were noted and entered up. On the assumption either that war would probably come whether Germany wished it or not, or that without war Germany could neither solve her own growing internal difficulties nor achieve her—from the German point of view—manifest and rightful destiny, the sooner war came, the better it would be for Germany. What was wanted was a stumbling-block and rock of offence, an occasion for a quarrel; and then there would be, on the orthodox German lines which had been so successful in the past, 'an ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion'.[1] All would be ready; the German preliminary call to attention—the secret warning of coming mobilization—would be followed by mobilizing at a speed which no other Power could match; the troops would already be largely concentrated on the line of attack, and be hourly strengthened through railways designed and constructed for this one special purpose; there would be, as in former years, an irresistible swoop on one enemy at a time, while containing the others; and Germany's foes would be annihilated piecemeal.

The murder of the Austrian Archduke.

In the summer of 1914 the occasion came. On the 28th of June, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, paid a visit to Serajevo, the chief town of Bosnia. There, under circumstances which betokened, at the least, culpable neglect on the part of the Austrian police, he was assassinated with his wife. A criminal inquiry was held in the ordinary course; and, as the result of the investigation, the Austrian

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 133. Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.

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Government laid the crime to the charge of Serbia. The evidence, it was stated, proved that the plot had been hatched at Belgrade, that the bombs had come from a Serbian arms dépôt, that Serbian officials had been accessories. The Austrians contended, with substantial grounds for their contention, that the assassination was the outcome of constant propaganda in Serbia against Austria-Hungary, the work of the Press, of the schools, of nationalist societies, with the object of detaching from the Dual Monarchy its Southern Slav provinces and subjects. It was a movement which the Serbian Government—so Vienna said—had done nothing to discountenance or suppress. Serbia, who had resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had, in March 1909, formally abandoned her attitude of protest; but the soreness remained; Serbian successes in the Balkan Wars strengthened Serbian aspirations, and antagonism to Austria in Serbian circles seems to have been undoubted. Austria, in turn, as was disclosed in the Italian Chamber in December 1914, had meditated in August 1913 an attack on Serbia.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

On the 23rd of July the Austro-Hungarian Government delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, 'an ultimatum with a short time-limit,' on German lines, demanding a reply in two days' time, by six o'clock on Saturday evening the 25th of July. The German Government categorically denied knowledge of the terms;[1] but, apart from disclosures which have come in the train of the war, there was from the first evidence to the contrary, and strong presumption.[2] The terms were humiliating in the extreme; no self-respecting State could be expected to consent to them in their entirety, including, as they did, a demand that representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government should be accepted in Serbia, to collaborate with the Serbian Government in suppressing the movement against Austria, and to take part in the judicial proceedings which were to be instituted in Serbian

[1] Ibid., pp. 166, 272.
[2] Ibid., pp. 74, 153, 161, 181 note.

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territory against accessories to the assassination. The Austrian procedure and the Austrian demands found no favour in Russia, France, or Great Britain. Germany, on the other hand, declared both the one and the other to be equitable and moderate. Serbia appealed to the Entente Powers, especially to Russia, the hereditary protector of the Slav nations. Russia pressed Austria for an extension of the time-limit, but without avail; and Serbia, counselled in effect to meet Austria half-way and more, replied within the time, substantially accepting the large majority of the demands, refusing collaboration which was incompatible with Serbian sovereignty, but offering to remit the questions at issue to the Hague Tribunal or to the judgement of the Great Powers. The reply was deemed by Austria to be unsatisfactory; diplomatic relations were immediately broken off; and on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia.

Austria declares war on Serbia.

The outstanding feature in this great crisis was the speed at which events moved, or rather were hurried on by human agency. There was no undue haste in the initial stages. The Archduke was murdered on the 28th of June, and the ultimatum to Serbia was not presented till the 23rd of July. But in less than a fortnight from this latter date Europe was at war, Germany, except in the case of Serbia, going to war before Austria. The attitude which Germany took up in the first instance was that the action of Austria-Hungary was fully justified, that the matter was one to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that every effort should be made by the Great Powers to localize the quarrel. Localization meant that Russia should not intervene. This was not the Russian view. It was impossible for Russia to look on and see a Slav Balkan State reduced to vassalage by Austria. On the 25th of July the Russian Government gave the world to know that the course of the dispute was not a matter of indifference to Russia.

The crisis develops.

When action is crowded into days and hours, so that even the difference in the European clocks has to be taken into account, it is as difficult to prove, as it is easy

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to assert, which of the parties first took the decisive step, who was directly responsible for war. But there can be no reasonable doubt that the one Power which could have prevented war and did not prevent war was Germany. Austria-Hungary was under German tutelage, obedient to German dictation. It was not the habit of Austria-Hungary, when left to her own devices, to be swift and inexorable. Telegraphing on the 28th of July to the Russian ambassador in London, the Russian Foreign Minister summed up the position quite simply: 'The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally. . . . There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.'[1] The attitude of Great Britain, under the guidance of Sir Edward Grey, was consistently and persistently in favour of peace. On the 24th of July, the day after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Grey suggested to Germany that the four Powers not directly interested in the immediate quarrel, Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should do their best to mediate in the event of relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening. Two days later, on the 26th, he formally proposed that representatives of these four Powers should meet in conference in London and try to find a favourable issue, Austria, Russia, and Serbia being asked to suspend all active military operations in the meantime. France and Italy cordially agreed; Germany accepted in principle, and took exception in practice. Russia intimated that she was beginning direct negotiations with Austria; but, if they came to nothing, she would accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of the kind likely to bring about a peaceful solution. This was before Austria on the 28th of July declared war against Serbia. In consequence of that step, Russia informed Germany that mobilization would be ordered on the following day in the Southern provinces of Russia, the intimation being coupled with express disclaimer of any aggressive

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, *ut sup.*, pp. 48–9.

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intention against Germany. On the same day, Germany assured Great Britain that she was trying to mediate between Austria and Russia, and was anxious to work hand in hand with England. But on the night of the following day, the 29th, the German Chancellor began to show his hand, making a strong bid for British neutrality in the event of war with France and Russia. 'What he asks us in effect', Sir E. Grey telegraphed in reply on the following day, the 30th, 'is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. . . . The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.' The German offer was indignantly declined. To have entertained it for a moment would have involved 'a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover'.[1] Germany was now playing for what it was worth the partial mobilization of Russia, a measure taken after friendly communication beforehand to herself and with no secrecy or undue haste whatever. She was also exploiting rumours of military preparations in France. It was a time when of necessity all the Powers were preparing against possible eventualities, Germany being by far the most prepared of all. Great Britain herself, while by common consent working hard for peace, was keeping her fleet concentrated, openly and avowedly as an intimation that in the event of war British neutrality must not be taken for granted. On the 30th of July there still seemed hope for peace. The Russian Foreign Minister handed to the German Ambassador at Petrograd a written pledge in the following words: 'If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations';[2] and on the 31st came information that, at the suggestion of the

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 77. [2] Ibid., p. 288.

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German Government, Russia and Austria were entering into direct negotiations with each other. But the news followed that, hearing that Austria would not listen to intervention by the Powers and was moving troops against Russia as well as Serbia, and having every reason to believe that Germany was making active military preparations, the Russian Government had ordered general mobilization. To this the German Government replied on the same day by an ultimatum to Russia to the effect that the Russian forces should be demobilized. It was again 'an ultimatum with a short time-limit'; compliance was to be notified in twelve hours' time; otherwise there would be a general mobilization of the German Army on the frontiers of Russia and of France. The French Government was informed to the same effect on the evening of the same day, being threatened with war, although, as the German Ambassador in Paris was told, there were no differences at issue between France and Germany. Thus July ended with the possibility of Russia and Austria entering into friendly discussion, with a view to finding some *via media*, with Russia ready to accept any reasonable proposal, with Great Britain using every effort to preserve peace, with France abstaining from any ground of offence, while Germany, though not in any way primarily concerned with the immediate quarrel, threatened war against France and Russia. Why? The action of Germany, according to her own Secretary of State, was dictated by the consideration that 'she had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her vast dominions'.[1] This reasoning assumed the enmity of others; it betokened ample preparation and premeditated attack.

Belgium, more than all lands, has been the battleground of other peoples. On Belgian soil, century after century, the fate of the world has been decided. In peace time, as in the first seven months of 1914, it is a most prosperous

Belgium.

[1] Ibid., p. 100.

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land, densely peopled, closely tilled, a land of shipping, mineral wealth, and manufactures. It is the small home of a busy industrious people, neither willing nor able to trespass on their neighbours. Before the German came ravening across the border, beautiful memorials of past history, side by side with every evidence of active present life, marked the town centres of these thriving Low Countries. Yet no land has been so seamed and scarred with war, so conspicuously the stage upon which rival nations have fought and lost and won, have had their exits and their entrances. There is no reason to suppose that Germany set out to swallow Belgium; but Antwerp had become in a singular degree a feeder of and an outlet for German trade; and across the sea the Germans cast longing eyes on the Belgian Congo. From time immemorial, relations between England and Belgium have been close and constant. In the early Middle Ages the Flemish cities were the great markets for English wool; from Flanders into England came skilled clothworkers, to be the pioneers of our national industry; and the cloth trade planted the Merchant Adventurers of England at Bruges and Antwerp. In Belgium, Marlborough and Wellington crowned their fame; and when, in 1831, Belgium for the first time in her history became a separate entity, an independent nation, no longer linked to or the appanage of another Power, the first King of the Belgians was the uncle and much-loved friend of Queen Victoria. Interest and sentiment alike have bound Great Britain to Belgium. Belgium in unfriendly hands would be a standing menace to our island.[1] The best hope for the peace of Europe before the war depended upon the Balance of Power in Europe, upon conditions under which no one nation or potentate could overshadow and dominate the rest. There could be no Balance of Power in Europe without an independent Belgium.

Belgian neutrality.

At the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Great Powers of Europe combined Holland and Belgium into one kingdom under the House of Orange, hoping to form a single

[1] Napoleon described Antwerp as a pistol pointed at the heart of England.

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State, strong enough to maintain its own independence. The two partners proved incompatible with each other, and the uneasy union was dissolved in 1830–1. Then, by the 7th Article of the Treaty of London of the 15th November 1831, it was provided that Belgium, within the limits specified in the preceding Articles, 'shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.' The 25th Article of the Treaty gave a guarantee to this provision from the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia; and the 26th Article promised peace and friendship for ever between these Powers and Belgium. There was further trouble between Holland and Belgium, and a final settlement was not reached till 1839. The Treaty of London of 19th April 1839 cancelled the 1831 Treaty, but renewed its 7th Article, and the same Powers as before guaranteed Belgian independence. When France and Germany went to war in 1870, in August of that year the British Government concluded a treaty with either Power in identical terms, binding Great Britain to co-operate in the defence of Belgium, should her neutrality be violated by one or other of the belligerents. This Treaty was expressly said to be a subsidiary and accessory treaty, in no way impairing or invalidating the treaty of 1839. It was to hold good for the duration of the war and twelve months afterwards; and then the independence and neutrality of Belgium was to rest upon the treaty of 1839.

Bearing in mind this 'scrap of paper', Sir Edward Grey, on the 31st of July, 'in view of existing treaties,'[1] asked both the French and the German Governments, whether they were prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as no other Power violated it; he pressed for an early reply. On the same day France gave the required assurance. Germany gave no answer, and on the next day, the 1st of August, the German Ambassador in London inquired whether, if

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 87.

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Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, Great Britain would remain neutral. The Belgian Government, meanwhile, having been duly informed of these British queries to France and Germany, intimated on the 1st of August that they expected Belgian neutrality to be observed and upheld by other Powers, that they intended to maintain it to the utmost of their power, and believed that, in the event of the neutrality being violated, they would be in a position to defend themselves against intrusion.

Britain non-committal.

The course taken by those who guided Great Britain in these critical days and hours was cautious in the extreme. Every shred of a chance of reconciliation was eagerly seized, every possible effort was made to stave off a European war; but at the same time every care was taken not to tie the hands of the Government and the nation by pledges either to intervene or to stand aside. On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey told the French Ambassador that the policy of the British Government had always been to avoid being drawn into war over a Balkan question; that the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which his colleagues and himself felt called to take a hand; that, even if the question widened into one between Austria and Russia, it would not be a case for British intervention. If Germany, however, became involved, and France, it would be a different matter, and Great Britain then, free from engagements, would have to decide what British interests required. On the same day—and the French Ambassador was duly apprised of it—he warned the representative of Germany very explicitly against any assumption that, if Germany and France became involved, Great Britain would still stand aside—an intimation which the Secretary of State at Berlin professed to have received 'with regret but not exactly with surprise'.[1]

Germany declares war on Russia.

It has been seen that the Russian order for general mobilization was publicly given on the 31st of July, and that on the same day Germany sent her ultimatum to

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 76.

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Russia. The ultimatum demanded that Russia should demobilize and desist from all military preparations not only against Germany but against Austria-Hungary also. The message, with its twelve hours' time-limit, was delivered at midnight on the 31st July–1st August. It was communicated on the evening of the 31st to the French Government by the German Ambassador in Paris, with a demand to be informed on the following day of the intentions of the French Government. The German ultimatum, it will be remembered, was to the effect that, if Russia did not comply, German mobilization would take place; it did not in terms go beyond a threat of mobilization, though the preliminaries to mobilization were already in train. Germany's case rested on Russian mobilization, as being an indication of Russian hostility directed against herself as well as against Austria. General mobilization in Russia was the result of the Austrians bombarding Belgrade and of information of the forwardness of German preparations for war; but, in the case of Russia, a mobilization order meant the beginning of a long process. For Germany, on the contrary, mobilization was little more than a conventional term, a convenient form of expression. Not only had she a preliminary measure, a prelude to mobilization, in the form of a proclamation of *Kriegsgefahr*,[1] 'imminence of war', but, as a matter of fact, she was always more or less mobilized, and the threat to Russia was a threat not of mobilization but of war. No Russian answer to the midnight message was received, and at 7.10 on the evening of the 1st of August the German Ambassador at Petrograd handed in a formal declaration of war, while an order was given at Berlin for general mobilization in Germany, which was to begin to take effect on the next day, the 2nd of August. General mobilization in Austria was ordered on the 31st of July, the same day as in Russia; but Austria did not declare

[1] Or *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, 'state of danger of war', or *Kriegszustand*, 'state of war'. See *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, pp. 86–7, 99, 134, 222, &c.

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war against Russia till the 6th of August. French mobilization was not ordered till the 1st of August; Germany declared war on France on the evening of the 3rd of August; France and Austria did not go to war till the 12th of August. It was Germany, not Austria or Russia, or any other Power, that forced on the war.

The Germans invade Luxemburg.

A singular comment upon the difference between official and actual mobilization in Germany was supplied by the fact that, whereas German mobilization had been officially announced to begin on the 2nd of August, very early in the morning of this same 2nd of August, being a Sunday, German troops crossed the frontier into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. By way of a polite explanation for their territory being overrun, the Luxemburgers received a telegram from the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg did not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but were solely directed to ensuring the use of the railways, which had been leased to the German Empire, against eventual attack by a French army. Luxemburg was to receive full compensation for any damage done.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg had been a member of the German Confederation, established in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars; and the fortress of Luxemburg had been garrisoned by Prussian troops on behalf of the Confederation. But the Grand Duke of Luxemburg was the King of the Netherlands, and Luxemburg had come into the settlements of 1831 and 1839, made by the Great Powers with regard to Holland and Belgium. The German Confederation under Austrian leadership was broken up by the war of 1866, when Prussia ousted Austria from her place in Germany; and in 1867 France, alarmed by the growth of Prussia, and anxious to secure the town of Luxemburg, fortified in former days by the great Vauban, contracted with the King of the Netherlands for the sale of the Grand Duchy, now no longer tied to Germany. There was strong Prussian opposition; but, while opposing the cession to France, Prussia agreed

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to withdraw her garrison, on condition that Luxemburg was neutralized by a European guarantee. This was effected by a treaty signed in London on 11th May 1867. The Great Powers declared Luxemburg to be a neutral State, and guaranteed its neutrality; the Prussian garrison was withdrawn, and the fortress was dismantled. When, in 1890, the King of the Netherlands died, leaving no son, and was succeeded by the present Queen, the connexion between the Crown of the Netherlands and the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy was severed; though, when the Germans came over the line in 1914, Luxemburg was under a Grand Duchess, as the Netherlands under a Queen. It was a small principality, with no pretence to any army or armament, existing on sufferance and on the good faith of its neighbours—good faith which was violated by the very Power which had brought about its neutrality. It was only with extreme reluctance, and in order to keep the peace of Europe, that Great Britain had become a party to the Treaty of 1867; and the Foreign Minister of the day, Lord Stanley, was at pains to explain —an able explanation but hardly worthy of a great nation—that the guarantee of neutrality was only a collective guarantee, that therefore the liability was only, as he said in so many words, a limited liability, which meant in plain English that Great Britain would not fight in this behalf. The same view was held in 1914. Sir Edward Grey drew a clear distinction between the case of Belgium and that of Luxemburg; in the latter case 'all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert'.[1]

Strong pressure had been brought to bear upon the British Government by France and Russia to speak the word to Germany, to let her know beyond the possibility of misunderstanding that if the quarrel between Austria and Serbia widened into war between Germany and France, Great Britain would take up arms on the side of France. Germany, it was contended, was speculating upon British non-intervention; and if a clear pronouncement to the contrary was forthcoming, peace would probably

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 235.

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remain unbroken. So the French Ambassador in London urged with all his force; so the President of the French Republic wrote to King George. But July ended and August began without any definite pledge from England to intervene; and on the last day of July Grey telegraphed to Paris, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality'.[1] The clouds gathered daily and hourly, more and more menacing was the political outlook. On the 1st of August Grey telegraphed to Berlin to protest against the detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg, and on the next day, the 2nd of August, the day on which the Germans broke into Luxemburg, the British Cabinet went so far as to give an assurance to France that 'if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power'.[2] Even this assurance, however, was safeguarded by the proviso that Parliament must endorse the policy involved. So careful was the democratic government of a democratic nation not to bind the people behind their backs; so reluctant were those who guided the destinies of the Empire to take any step along the path of war. It was a memorable Sunday in London, this 2nd of August, no day of rest. Prayers were offered in the churches for the preservation of peace; but the Cabinet were in Council, the Naval Reserves were called out, and a partial moratorium was declared to meet the financial crisis, the Stock Exchange having been closed on the previous day. Steadily, though slowly, with a growing conviction that honour was involved, public opinion was shaping in favour of decided action, and the day brought a letter to the Prime Minister from the Leader of the Opposition, stating in very few but very plain words his opinion and that of his colleagues, that 'it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture, and we offer our unhesitating support to the

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 88. [2] Ibid., p. 105.

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Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.'

German ultimatum to Belgium.

What had taken place in Luxemburg was not encouraging to Belgium, and, before the sun went down on this Sunday night, Belgium's turn had come. At seven o'clock in the summer evening the German Minister at Brussels handed in to the Belgian Foreign Minister a very confidential note, the substance of which was that the German Government had reliable information of the intention of the French to march through Belgium to attack Germany; it was essential for Germany to anticipate this attack, and, as the Belgians themselves were not strong enough to repel French invasion, the Germans were forced to enter Belgian territory. Germany had in view no act of hostility against Belgium; and, in the event of the Belgians adopting an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the independence of Belgium would be respected and guaranteed, her territory would be evacuated when peace came again, indemnity would be given for all damage done by German troops, and 'the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring'.[1] In plain English, the wolf would work its will on the lamb, and then the wolf and the lamb would lie down together—a cheering prospect for the lamb. But, should Belgium resist, Germany, to her regret, would be compelled to consider the Belgians as enemies, and 'the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms'. That nothing might be wanting to make the procedure thoroughly characteristic of Germany, the usual twelve hours' limit was given for a reply. It was such an ultimatum as the children of Israel, when marching on Canaan, sent to Sihon, king of the Amorites, 'Let me pass through thy land;' and, when they refused, Sihon and his people were smitten with the edge of the sword. There is no reason to doubt that, in making this impudent proposal, the Germans regarded themselves as a chosen people, not bound by any ordinary rules of

[1] Ibid., pp. 309–11.

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right and wrong. At any rate, in their eyes, necessity or fancied necessity knew no law. This was the essence of the admission and the apology made by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on the 4th of August, while the event was taking place. 'We were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced, as we are, and is fighting for his highest possession, can only consider how he is to hack his way through.'[1] It was the beginning of crime; the German conscience was not yet deadened by repeated infamies; but, as the weeks and months wore on in blood and rapine, the apologist's words stood inconveniently on record. The pretext was that the French intended to march through Belgium to attack Germany, whereas France had categorically given, and again renewed, her pledge to respect Belgian neutrality, while Germany had declined to give any pledge. At 7 o'clock the next morning, the 3rd of August, when the time-limit expired, the Belgian reply was forthcoming. The German offer was indignantly rejected. 'No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.'[2] They refused to believe that the independence of Belgium could only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality; but, if their hope was vain, they were firmly resolved by all the means in their power to repel every attack upon their rights. This decision was communicated on the same day to the Governments of the various Powers; for the moment the Belgian Government did not ask for armed assistance; but the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George 'a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium'.[3]

[1] *Collected Diplomatic Documents, ut sup.*, p. 438. [2] Ibid., p. 312.
[3] Ibid., pp. 107, 313.

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In England, Monday the 3rd of August was the statutory Bank Holiday. The days on which the crisis reached its height, Sunday and Bank Holiday, seemed, by force of contrast, to heighten the drama and emphasize the coming tragedy. In the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey recounted what had passed, and outlined what was threatened, in a powerful speech, convincing by its transparent simplicity and incontrovertible evidence of good faith. He told how the Government had worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment, how careful they had been not to bind the country to war, but at the same time not to gamble with its honour. He defended the assurance given to France to safeguard her Atlantic Coast. Germany, he understood, would, at the price of British neutrality, engage not to attack that coast; but such an engagement was far too narrow to be entertained. The week before, Germany had thrown out feelers as to whether Great Britain would be content with a guarantee that after the war Belgian integrity would be preserved, and the answer had gone that whatever interests or obligations Great Britain had in Belgian neutrality could not be bargained away. He left no doubt whatever that the country was faced with a challenge alike to its honour and to its vital interests, or that the Government was prepared to meet the challenge. The mobilization of the fleet had taken place, preparations for the mobilization of the army were going forward; there was no menace in his words, but a plain statement that, should the worst happen, and the indispensable conditions not be absolutely satisfied, 'we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power.' When he spoke, he had heard of the German ultimatum to Belgium and of the King of the Belgians' appeal to our own Sovereign; but it was not till later in the evening, when the debate was resumed, that he was able to inform the House, without comment, of the Belgian reply to the German demand. He had noted one bright spot in the dark outlook, and that was the changed spirit in Ireland. This was illus-

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trated by a speech from the leader of the Irish Party, instinct with patriotism, ranging Ireland with the Empire in the hour of peril. Mr. Redmond gave the Government whole-hearted adherence, and the speaker before him, Mr. Bonar Law, repeated the assurance contained in his letter of the previous day, that whatever steps the Government thought requisite for the honour and security of the country would receive the unhesitating support of the Opposition. There was yet another bright spot in the situation, which Mr. Bonar Law pointed out. Indications had already been received that every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas would be behind the Government in whatever action it was necessary to take. There were speeches, not a few, on the other side, criticizing policy and chastising thought of war, speeches of men by tradition and temperament hard to be convinced, if they ever could be convinced, that war was either justifiable or inevitable. But the critics did not represent the great and growing majority of the elected representatives of the nation or of the nation as a whole. The Government had in effect a mandate to act as occasion required.

On the eve of the war, as throughout the war, the Germans suffered from incurable inability to interpret the feelings and forecast the actions of other peoples, except upon the assumption that other peoples would think and feel and act as the Germans themselves. This is a weakness in some measure common to all humanity; but in the case of the Germans, besotted with their own peculiar *Kultur*, it had become a disease. They seem to have held that all peoples could be bluffed or forced, duped or bribed, and they evidently thought that the peace-loving, shopkeeping English could be bought by bargaining or beguiled by assurances. The bargaining was repeated and shameless; one offer and another betokened that principle or honour had no meaning in German public life. On this Monday afternoon the latest bid for British neutrality, to which Sir Edward Grey alluded in his speech, was made public in London

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with the authority of the German Embassy. There was to be no attack by sea on Northern France, and no hostile use of the Belgian coast, if Great Britain would remain neutral.[1] Thus, it was suggested, Great Britain could help France, without going to war herself. By land French territory had already been violated on the previous day, and on the evening of this 3rd of August war was formally declared on France by Germany.

The 4th of August.

The next day, the 4th of August, there came a telegram from Berlin to the German Ambassador in London, who handed it on to the Foreign Office. It was in these words: 'Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance, that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory.'[2] This was while Belgium was actually being invaded. At six o'clock in the morning of the 4th the German Minister at Brussels informed the Belgian Foreign Minister that, as the 'well-intentioned proposals' of the German Government had been declined, that Government was, with much regret, 'compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.'[3] Shortly afterwards, it was known that the Germans were over the border and that Liége had been summoned to surrender.

British ultimatum to Germany.

In the early forenoon of the 4th of August it was not yet known in London that Germany had finally broken with Belgium, and two telegrams were sent from the Foreign Office, one to Brussels, one to Berlin. The telegram to Brussels stated that, if German pressure was applied to Belgium to make her depart from her neutrality, the British Government expected the Belgians to resist by any means in their power, and would support them in resistance. The telegram to Berlin gave the Germans to understand that the British Government had been informed of their demand on Belgium and of the Belgian

[1] *Ut sup.*, p. 239. [2] *Ut sup.*, pp. 108–9. [3] *Ut sup.*, p. 314.

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refusal to comply with it; it protested against the violation of a treaty to which Germany was a party in common with Great Britain, and it requested an immediate assurance that the demand would not be proceeded with, that Belgian neutrality would be respected. Then came the news that Germany had taken the last step, that Belgium was being invaded, and a second telegram was sent to Berlin. Under the new circumstances the attention of the German Government was formally directed at once to the telegram of the morning and to the request previously made on the 31st July for an assurance that Belgian neutrality would not be violated; a satisfactory reply was called for, to be received in London by midnight. In default, the British Ambassador was to ask for his passports and to intimate that the British Government felt bound to take all the steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and observance of the treaty. The contents of the two telegrams were duly communicated by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons. Here was something that Germany could not misunderstand, an ultimatum, on her own lines, with a short time-limit; and very dramatic was the sequel, as told a few days later in London by the British Ambassador. On receipt of the first telegram, he called in the afternoon upon the German Secretary of State, who gave a 'No' to the British demand, for the very good reason that German troops had already entered Belgium, and it was impossible to draw back. Later in the afternoon came the second telegram, and again Sir Edward Goschen visited the German Foreign Office at about 7 o'clock in the evening. He gave his message, received the same answer as before, and asked for his passports. From the German Secretary of State he went on to the Imperial Chancellor, and then ensued the memorable interview, evidence to all time of the irreconcilable difference between British and German views of right and wrong. Von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke of the step taken by the British Government as terrible to a degree, a blow from behind at a kindred and friendly

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nation, fighting for its life—all for a word, 'neutrality', so often disregarded in time of war—all for a scrap of paper. The German pleaded that it was a matter of life and death on strategical grounds for Germany to violate Belgian neutrality; the Englishman replied that it was a matter of life and death for British honour that Great Britain should keep her word. But what will be the price of keeping it? asked the German, and there was but one answer, that fear of consequences is not the measure of right and wrong. A telegram giving the substance of the interview was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office in Berlin a little before nine o'clock in the evening, but the message never reached London. Half an hour later the German Under-Secretary of State called upon the Ambassador and innocently asked whether demand for passports meant a declaration of war. It was a very German proceeding, an attempt to leave a loophole, a feeler in the direction of further bargaining; but the visitor soon came to the inevitable conclusion that what had passed meant war. The news was prematurely noised abroad in Berlin; the British Embassy was mobbed, but promptly safeguarded by the police. The German Government acted with strict propriety, and on the 6th of August the Ambassador and his suite were sent home, with every courtesy and convenience, in marked contrast—not easy to understand—to the outrageous treatment meted out to the Ambassador of France.[1] Over and above the good offices of the enemy Government, the British Embassy owed much at this critical and dangerous time to one who was in turn to pass through a similar ordeal, Mr. Gerard, the firm and fearless Ambassador of the United States.

War between Great Britain and Germany.

So, when the sun was up in London on the 5th of August, Great Britain was at war with Germany, and not Great Britain alone, but the whole—the heart-whole—British Empire. The time of tension was past, the time for action had come, to the great relief of the large majority among the British peoples, not from levity, not

[1] *Ut sup.*, pp. 245–9.

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from lightheartedness, not because they did not count the cost, nor from any spirit of vulgar Jingoism, but from sad and sober apprehension lest the good name and the good faith of England should be questioned in the coming time. What would have happened if Belgium had not been invaded, whether Great Britain would have looked on while Northern France was overrun by German hordes, or whether her sword would still have been cast into the balance, will never be known. What is certain is that the invasion of Belgium was the deciding factor, that by this outrage Germany, in spite of herself, did England the inestimable service of placing her word beyond all reach of doubt. The British Cabinet shed two of its members, Lord Morley and Mr. John Burns; but the Government as a whole at last knew its own mind, and Government, Nation, and Empire were at one. In our 'rough Island story', many have been the wars from many causes; but the cleanest of all our wars, for the best of all our causes, was the war which dated from midnight on the 4th of August, 1914. To all time there will be found critics of cantankerous mind, stoutly maintaining that British policy was to blame, that war might have been avoided, as there will always be found men and women to uphold the thesis that no consideration, moral or material, can justify war. But ordinary plain folk will record that every honourable effort was unceasingly made to keep the peace, that there may or may not be ground for contention that the British Government should have taken a final stand at an earlier date, but that no reasonable or right-minded reader of facts can cast a stone at Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues as not having striven to the utmost in honest and upright endeavour to save the world from the hideous tragedy which came to pass. Nor will any ordinary plain man shut his eyes to the accumulated and incontrovertible evidence that, in following up what she conceived to be her destiny, possibly in the instinct of self-preservation—credit her with whatever motives may supply the most plausible justification, place the most charitable construction upon

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her policy and her deeds—Germany forced on the war, and entered into it prepared to an extent and with a forethought probably unparalleled in the history of the world.

The break between Great Britain and Germany was no ordinary breach between two European Powers. Never before in history, as has been pointed out already, had the two nations been ranged in arms against each other. Since modern Germany had come into existence, Great Britain had not been involved in a European war, while as between England and Prussia there was an almost immemorial tradition of being on the same side. For a short time in the eighteenth century, in the war of the Austrian succession, England had been on one side, Prussia on the other; England, be it noted, holding by the guarantee given to Maria Theresa, which Frederick of Prussia cast to the winds. But the English were accessories only, not protagonists, in this war, and there was no actual conflict with Prussia. In times when religion caused and embittered wars, Protestantism was a strong bond between North Germany and the Island Power; Hanover supplied Great Britain with a line of kings; for generations Royal intermarriages were many; in peace and war, in public and private relations, the connexion had been close and constant. Whether we like it or not, the two peoples were and are in origin kindred nations, as Bethmann-Hollweg called to mind in the final interview with the British Ambassador; and the Prussians were our old allies of Waterloo, as the German Emperor, himself a grandson of Queen Victoria, noted in his acrid apology to the British Ambassador for the mobbing of the Embassy.[1]

All this came into the German mind when Great Britain declared war on Germany. For it is of special interest to note, and most important from the point of view of history, that while Germany beyond all possibility of doubt forced on the war, taking the initiative against Russia, France, and Belgium, leaving the original figurehead Austria slowly and reluctantly to come up behind,

[1] *Ut sup.*, p. 113.

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it was not Germany that declared war on Great Britain; it was Great Britain that declared war on Germany; and from this standpoint German utterances and doings should be weighed and judged. Modern Germany, Prussianized Germany, the Germany of Bismarck's making, had no love for Great Britain and her Empire; tradition, family connexion, and the rest was neither here nor there when German interests were concerned. It was the British Empire that stood between Germany and the sun; on the path of German destiny the British Empire was the great obstacle. German interests made for German jealousy, German jealousy for German enmity, and the new German Empire, the creation of blood and iron, was in all points the antipodes of the British Empire, as diametrically opposed as were the mind and outlook of Mr. Gladstone, who led England when the German Empire came to birth, to the moral and intellectual fibre of Prince Bismarck. It was from no love for England that Germany did not want war with England in 1914; it was because she had enough irons in the fire already. She looked for one or more campaigns, not for years of war; for swift victories on land, not a prolonged sea blockade and colonial dismemberment. All in good time, the day would come, but the work must be done piecemeal, and the turn of Great Britain was not yet. The whole policy was upset by Great Britain taking a leaf out of Germany's own book and herself declaring war. To the Germans it was the height of unfairness, a stab in the back, that the English should use German weapons and encroach upon the peculiar German province of issuing ultimatums. Hence came the reproaches of breaking with old tradition, of turning the back on old brotherhood. There is no reason to think that this was hypocrisy. It was all part and parcel of the condition into which the German mind had worked itself. Whatever Germany wished and planned was right, whatever did not suit Germany was wrong. It has been seen that the German Government had been warned that Great Britain might intervene, and that the intimation was received by the German Secretary of State 'not exactly with

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surprise'.[1] Was then the outburst of his colleague, the Chancellor, when told of the accomplished fact, all make-believe? Again there is no valid reason for thinking so, and subsequent utterances made to book need not disturb us. He thought he had diagnosed England and the English; he thought, as a true German of the modern type, that what he wished must come to pass, and quite possibly he himself sincerely wished for lasting peace with Great Britain; he had some solid grounds for his anticipation in the known and obvious reluctance of the British Government to depart from peace. Just as before the war it was common talk among Englishmen, and more or less common belief, that war with Germany was sooner or later inevitable, and yet behind it all in most men's minds there was a lurking confidence 'not in our time', so the German reasoned a little too long and a little too late that the British Government would bark but not bite.

The bite began when, on the 6th of August, the Prime Minister, in a singularly impressive speech, moved for a vote of credit of 100 millions, and for an addition to the strength of the Army of 500,000 men. The members had by this time in their hands the White Book, telling all that had passed leading up to the War; no further argument was needed to justify the action which had been taken. What we are fighting for, said Mr. Asquith, is to fulfil a solemn international obligation, and 'to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power'. That the Government meant business was proved by the announcement that Lord Kitchener had been asked and had consented to take charge of the War Office; that the Empire meant business, 'by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need.'

[1] *Ut sup.*, p. 113.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE EMPIRE AT WAR

The Empire at War.

It was the British Empire that went to war with Germany. Our terms are as diverse and illogical as are the constituent elements which they are intended to represent. We speak, for short, as in the foregoing pages, of England as against Germany—and Germany fully understood what England meant; but England is too narrow a term; so is the more accurate, but still inaccurate term, Great Britain, which leaves out the sister island in the home waters; so again is the longer phrase, the United Kingdom. It was not the United Kingdom, with an overseas tail attached to it, that went to war; it was the whole great world-wide unit, the British Empire, acting as one, with very rare exceptions feeling and thinking as one. There were, no doubt, cross currents of opinion in one overseas province and another; here and there nationalist sentiment or racial prejudice made itself felt. German intrigue was plentiful, and so was German gold. But the broad outstanding fact was that the Empire went to war. Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey spoke not for the British Isles alone, but for the Empire, in a living and real sense, with a meaning and a force not attained in former times, foreshadowed but not fully developed in the South African War. If there had been nothing else to differentiate the war of 1914 from all previous wars, it would still have had the peculiar hall-mark that from first to last the Empire made the war and carried it through. In the Old Country eulogies of the Overseas Peoples, during and in regard to the War, too often took the form of grateful acknowledgement of help given and services rendered to the Motherland. Such phraseology was well meant but misleading, and more or less beside the point. It implied a far too narrow conception of the cause and of the event. It treated the King's Dominions beyond the seas as though they were

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accessories only, instead of recognizing that, in no less degree than the home people, they took up the gauntlet and made and shouldered the war. The case can be put even stronger. The bedrock of the issue, the vital question, was the continued existence and the permanent security of freedom and democracy, in peril of being submerged by military domination. The most conspicuous living embodiments of the democratic principles which Germany set out to strangle were the young and growing democracies overseas. The best illustration of gradual evolution from the status of subordination and dependence to that of partnership was India, and the negation of all that India looked for was to be found in German methods towards coloured races. It was a world-wide issue, and on the other side of the oceans were the peoples whose future was most clearly assailed. It was their war in the fullest sense; the message was for them, and they knew it well. Loyalty, the call of the blood, chivalrous rally to the old island home were all there; but that was not the whole or the pith of the story. They came to fight their own fight, to win their own victory. That was the peculiar significance of this war from the British point of view; and through and because of the British Empire, and at a later date because of the mightiest colony to which Great Britain had ever given birth, the United States of America, the war opened a wholly new chapter in the history of mankind. From the days of Columbus Europe had dominated the other continents. With the independence of the United States came the beginning of the counter-attack, the first repudiation of supremacy by a single continent. Still the fate of the world continued more or less to be centred in Europe, and this last and greatest of wars represented the expiring effort of militant Europe to control the world. By way of answer to the challenge, for the first time in modern history, the armed men of the other continents invaded Europe. Europe had too long decided their fate; it was now their turn to join in deciding the fate of Europe. That all peoples on the face of the earth, great or small, should live their

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own lives and work out their own salvation, that no one race and no one continent should overawe the others by force of arms, that coloured men should not be reared and trained to be the chattels of Europeans—that was the meaning of the war, and that is why the British Empire made the war its own.

The King's messages to the Dominions and India.

In the first weeks of the war, from all quarters of the world came evidences, one or another, of United Empire. It was as when in the Mother island in bygone days from hill to hill the beacon fires gave the danger signal, or as when, on the call to war, the fiery cross sped from clan to clan in the Highlands of Scotland. But there was this difference. The answer came from overseas before any call went forth. The Sovereign of the Empire had not to summon; he had only to respond. The newspapers of the 10th of September 1914 gave to the public the following Royal message which had been sent to the Dominions and India:

To the Governments and Peoples of My Self-governing Dominions

During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and Overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization, and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which My Kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated, and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with Me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire.

My peoples in the Self-governing Dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly

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endorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of My Oversea Dominions had led Me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at My disposal fills Me with gratitude, and I am proud to be able to show to the world that My peoples oversea are as determined as the people of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.

The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at My disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong Expeditionary Forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British troops and has undertaken important military responsibilities, the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the Empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of My naval and military forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom, which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstance.

The message to '*The Princes and Peoples of My Indian Empire*' repeated the first part of the above[1] and then continued as follows:

Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved Me

[1] Down to the paragraph 'My peoples in the Self-governing Dominions, &c.' But there were two textual alterations. In the message to India, for the words 'pledges to which My Kingdom was a party' was substituted 'Pledges to which My Empire was a party'; and for the words 'common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire' the words 'common heritage of England and of India'.

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more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched My heart and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship, which greeted My return in February1912 after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi; and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

The messages were 'To the Governments and Peoples', 'To the Princes and Peoples.' In the words of the prophetess Deborah—though her song was sung when the fight was over and the victory won—'the people willingly offered themselves', and the Princes 'offered themselves willingly among the people'. White Books followed the publication of the messages [1] showing how prompt and wide and practical was the effort of the Empire. It was but the beginning of infinitely greater effort, of sacrifice beyond all that reason could predict or imagination picture. And yet the Princes and Governments and peoples of the Empire counted the cost, or at least were prepared to pay the price to the uttermost farthing. For it is impossible to go back to the opening of the war, and study the record of the first rally to the cause, without conviction that in some strange way an instinct was awakened throughout the manifold races and peoples who looked to the King as their overlord, and to the Commonwealth, which the King personified, as the communion into which their lot had been cast, that the final challenge had come, that the question for the Empire was to be or not to be. The South African War had been ruled to be a white man's war; a far greater issue was now at stake, and a far wider view was demanded and taken. The strength of India was at once

[1] Cd. 7607, September 1914; Cd. 7608, September 1914; Cd. 7624.

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thrown in, never so welcome and never so sorely needed as in the first critical months of the war. At a very early stage New Zealand Maories volunteered, and a contingent was accepted for service overseas. The outlook went on widening as the war went on. As the needs increased, and the issues became more imperative and more clearly defined, distinctions of race and colour receded more and more into the background; more and more the sole question came to be where and how, from a military point of view, every unit of the Empire, all its men and all its resources, could be best utilized in the interests of the whole. But from the first, in greater or less degree, equality in citizenship was in evidence in offers from all quarters, made and received without the touch of haggling which accompanied the first stages of the war in South Africa. Taken as a whole, the uprising of the British Empire, when war was declared on Germany, cannot be matched in history. For it was an uprising in the fullest sense. It was not merely a general acquiescence in the declaration of war, a general recognition of a common danger. It was a kind of self-assertion by each of the component parts of the Empire, a pronouncement that this was a matter which was their primary concern no less than that of the other parts, an enterprise in which they ought to have a hand and meant to have a hand, not in a secondary degree but as their own war. It was little short of a new birth of the Empire.

There will be critics to say that this picture of a commonwealth of peoples inspired by a common purpose, answering to a common call, is overdrawn. It may be argued that the bedrock feelings and minds of men are not to be found out at moments of excitement and crisis, not at the beginning of a long war, when initial enthusiasm has not had time to cool, when the evil days have not yet drawn nigh, and the loss and misery, which follow in the train of war, are still in the future. It may be said again, that rulers and princes and governments and the classes—whatever the classes may mean—who are in touch with the Powers that be, and whose interests lie

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in upholding existing conditions, are not the people: that for the real feelings of the peoples of the Empire we must look elsewhere, we must ask the backveld Boer of South Africa, the French-Canadian habitant, or, nearer home, the intransigent Irishman, what is his measure of loyalty to the Empire: or, if we turn to the coloured races, we must sample the views of the modern generation of educated natives, with advanced opinions, and we shall draw another conclusion than that which is gleaned from White Papers, from loyal telegrams and set speeches. The first answer is, that the strain and the agony of a long-drawn war tested whether the utterances and the actions, which the early days of the War called forth, were or were not genuine; and proved to demonstration that the often-quoted Australian pronouncement, 'To the last man and the last shilling', was no idle word, that it interpreted aright the mind of the Empire. The second answer is, that it is true that there were exceptions to the general rule, due to particular local conditions, to special racial temperament, to sinister influences applied to the conditions and to the temperament. How could it be otherwise in an Empire covering more than a fifth of the globe? It is true that in some few provinces or districts the people, or sections of the people, were passively indifferent or actively disaffected. It is true, again, that disloyal opinions may have been here and there ventilated by young men, who had swallowed but not digested unwholesome doctrines; but the minds of the people, of the dumb, toiling millions, are not to be interpreted from this source. All these exceptions not only prove the rule, but explain why it is the rule. In no other so-called Empire, since the world began, could it be said, in anything like the same sense as in the British Empire, not only that 'a man may speak the thing he will', but that—almost beyond reasonable limit—a man may do the thing he will. Because this has been and is so, discordant voices always have made, and always will make, themselves heard; but, because it has been and is so, the vast majority of the voices and

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of the minds are at one. Where races, white or coloured, have had the opportunity of comparing British rule with other rule, their support of British rule has, in the vast majority of cases, been unswerving and unshaken, most of all among the fighting peoples of the earth. Where British rule is questioned, there the malcontents would still give it preference as against the rule of any other alien people. There have been blots on our history and taints of crime, never to be whitewashed by any honest writer; but, on striking a balance of the account, the sum of it all is that the British Empire has brought with it law, liberty, and justice. Because this conviction had come home to men, the princes and the peoples entered into the War with a whole heart. They knew the paths on which Great Britain walked, and they preferred them to the ways of Germany.

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